Date of Completion

4-10-2013

Embargo Period

3-29-2015

Keywords

Philosophy, Epistemology, Intuition, Seemings, Justification

Major Advisor

Dr. Michael Lynch

Associate Advisor

Dr. Joel Pust

Associate Advisor

Dr. Donald Baxter

Associate Advisor

Dr. John Troyer

Field of Study

Philosophy

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Open Access

Open Access

Abstract

Rationalism is the view that intuitions are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification. The first part of this dissertation is an exposition and defense of this view. I begin with an account of what it is for a proposition to seem true, arguing that seemings are a sui generis, irreducible propositional attitude that is importantly related to, yet distinct from, perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences. I then defend the view that intuitions are seemings of a certain sort. I argue that seemings generally, and thus intuitions in particular, are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification, and I defend the epistemic value of seemings and intuitions against various objections. The second part of my dissertation assesses a familiar argument in defense of the epistemic value of intuitions. Roughly, the argument goes like this: “to have an argument which gives us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions, one must rely on intuitions as though they had epistemic value. Thus, such arguments are self-defeating and are therefore unable to give us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions.” Against this, I argue that some self-defeating arguments can give us a reason to not believe in the epistemic value of intuitions. I conclude my dissertation by addressing certain puzzles raised by the phenomenon of self-defeating arguments.

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