A Difference That Makes a Difference: The Role of the United States in World Society

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Jason Francis Charrette, PhD

University of Connecticut, 2016

Abstract: This dissertation examines the global role of the United States and other organizations within world society. What sets this project apart from previous scholarship is that it relies on the insights of Niklas Luhmann’s modern systems theory to contextualize those roles. Luhmann argues that the closest human civilization has to a world order is a “world society” made up of many functional communication systems. These systems each provide a distinct model through which humans understand and construct their social world. Because these models are not always compatible, the potential for conflict is woven into the fabric of world society. Extending Luhmann’s theory further, I argue that the differences between these systems structure this conflict and manifest themselves through organizational behavior, which I demonstrate through the development of a model of organizational behavior. I apply this model in four case-studies that reveal Luhmannian dynamics at play. From the political system, I focused on the United States. From the religious system, I examined the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the historical and current Catholic Church. In each case, organizational behavior conformed to the expectations of the model – conflict is driven by systemic differences. In addition to this observation, this dissertation makes several other contributions. It is the first book-length treatment that explores modern system theory’s application to the study of international affairs. Along with this, it is also an explicitly self-consciously analyticist project, a rarity in international relations. Substantively, it provides a unified theory of conflict for state and non-state actors sorely lacking in the field. Lastly, it suggests that conflict within world society will increase along with the number of communication systems.
A Difference That Makes a Difference: The Role of the United States in World Society

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A Difference That Makes a Difference: The Role of the United States in World Society

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Introduction

John Ruggie (1998: 855) once asked, “What makes the world hang together?” This question is arguably the most fundamental of all in the field of international relations. How one answers this question will greatly shape which actors are considered important, which actions are considered relevant, and, most importantly, the nature of global order itself. This question matters not just because it is theoretically foundational, but because “everyone uses theories” – policy makers included – to understand the current shape of our social world (Walt 1998:29). Theories matter. Broadly speaking, each IR perspective has a set of ideas that guide what they think makes the world hang together, especially when theorizing the origin of global order. Realists say strength and respect can catapult a nation-state to primacy.¹ Liberals argue that well-designed institutions and compatible interests can lead to integration.² Constructivists and English School scholars point to the norms and identities that foster friendship and amicability among neighbors.³ Although they might disagree as to the likelihood, durability, specific characteristics, and precise causal mechanism that lead to a world order, every perspective has an available narrative about its potential creation.

This project starts at a very different assumption about that same potential. The world will likely never hang together, or at the very least, will never be unified in any meaningful way. This is not just because of an anarchic state system, incompatible interests, or “otherization,” but because of the fundamental differences embedded within the very fabric of the human social world.

The title of this project is “A Difference That Makes a Difference,” and it refers to Gregory Bateson’s (1973) notion of difference as consequential information within an environment or system. This notion of a “difference that makes differences,” in the context of thinking about global order, refers to the differences that are so consequential that they prevent integration. Accordingly, the meta-project of this dissertation is to examine a few of these differences through an exploration of American foreign policy history and the recent rise of religious actors in international affairs. The central thread through both of these accounts is how these differences manifest themselves in conflict.

The argument that “differences matter” is hardly an earth-shattering revelation. After all, presumably differences of some sort or another cause much of the conflict in the international environment and, consequently, prevent humans from forming a happy union (see Betts 2015). 4 This project argues that there are more fundamental differences baked into the contours of the human social world than are accounted for in the current theoretical panoply. Humans are presented with a relatively constrained set of fundamental worldviews with which to make sense and construct their social world. These worldviews, which are premised on the unique distinctions provided by one of a dozen or so communication systems, structure human conflict. These are the differences that make a difference for the possibility of human integration. These are also the same differences that impact the role the United States and religious actors play in the international environment.

4 Richard Betts is the editor of an excellent edited volume that examines the various explanations for human conflict, including macro-social factors such as globalization and civilizations (Fukuyama 2006, Huntington 1997), anarchy, arms and power transition (Blainey 1994; Fairbanks and Shulsky 1987; Gilpin 1983; Levy 1984; Waltz 1979), lack of arbitration mechanisms, proper institutions, and misaligned interests (Keohane and Nye 1973; Nicholls 1991; Doyle 1986; Wilson 1918), psychological factors including conflict-seeking behavior and misperception, (Kahneman and Renshon 2007; Jervis 1978), norms regarding fear, interest and honor (Lebow 2006), narratives that laud warrior masculine narratives (Tickner 1992), and nationalism (Gellner 1994). There are obviously a great many other works on the topic that I could cite here.
To uncover these fundamental differences, I turn to modern systems theory, a theoretical framework developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann that marries an explicitly Darwinian evolutionary logic to social constructivism. Luhmann’s modern systems theory provides insight into how these differences emerge, how they perish, how they shape human social interaction, and crucially, how they structure conflict within world society (see Luhmann 1982, 1995, 1997a, 1997b).

This term, *world society*, is a concept that has a unique meaning within Luhmann’s modern systems theory. Luhmann argues that the world is comprised of global systems of communication organized around a single difference, or what Luhmann calls a “distinction” (Luhmann 2002). Each system offers a unique model or worldview through which humans can understand and create their social world. These systems have evolved over time without a direction or pre-determined endpoint. For this reason world society refers to a given point within an ongoing evolutionary process rather than a finished world order with specific ideological features, meaning that the number of communication systems is variable and likely to change. Moreover, it is not reducible to global capitalism, liberalism, or the international state system since no one communication systems dominates the others (cf. Buzan 2004; Fukuyama 1992; Hardt and Negri 2000; Wallerstein 2011).

If world society is but one point in an ongoing evolutionary process, then the process itself is defined through the conflict generated by the evolutionary pressures facing communication systems. These systems are in implicit competition with each other to be the dominant model by which people understand and construct their social world. In order to encourage peoples’ selection, over time these communication systems develop adaptations to
encourage people to use them. Not all adaptations are successful. The result is that systems wax and wane in correspondence with their successful adaptations and subsequent selection.

World society is thus not a harmonious order with a central core or premise, but merely a singular moment within the undirected evolutionary process of competition among global systems of communication. Right now there are multiple world orders because there are many communication systems, not just one, and they all provide an equally valid model that humans can use to understand and shape their social world. All actors, the United States included, are embedded within this systemic competition and influenced by its contours.

In this regard, “world society” has a different meaning from the way it is conventionally deployed within international relations. The principle differences lies in its relationship to the international state system and its focus on conflict rather than integration. For example, Barry Buzan’s (1993:337) concept of a “world society” rests on the foundation of an international society and assumes a certain level of state cooperation and consensus around supporting norms. Similarly, John Burton’s (1972; Burton et al 1974) idea of world society is that of a globe-spanning cobweb of actors and relations independent of the state system. Yet it is different from Luhmann insofar as Burton believed conflict is antithetical to world society.

In contrast, modern systems theory presents a world structured by conflict and disorder, rather than an imperfect society yet to be achieved. World society is defined by the differences that divide it. Of Luhmann’s vision of human society, sociologist Marion Blute once remarked, “Reading Luhmann is not for the critical. Rather, it is for the resigned” (Blute 2002:2)

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5 “Individuals, non-state organisations, and… the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements” (Buzan 1993:337).
6 His overarching argument is that the people in charge of the state want to keep their power and resist anyone who challenges their monopoly. In fact, Burton made some waves within the English school by claiming conflict was the result of mistaken individuals convinced of their incompatibility due to the omnipresent power of state actors and ideology (Burton 1969, 1979).
Despite the abstract orientation of his work, Luhmann’s ideas provide a potentially useful way to explain systemic conflict around the globe without privileging a political, state-based vantage point. Not only is conflict due to the permissive structure of anarchy or the failure of institutions to regulate conflicting preferences between rational actors, but also by these macro-social structures. Luhmann’s ideas allow us to add to (but not replace) our already impressive array of theories by highlighting how worldviews drive us apart.

This project follows the line of recent entries on Luhmann in international relations scholarship. Mathias Albert (1999; see also Albert and Hilkermeier 2004) suggests that Luhmann’s ideas could provide fertile ground for cross-fertilization between sociology and international relations. Volumes since that time have examined its suitability for understanding conflict (Stetter 2007) and for defining world order (Buzan et al 2013). What sets this work apart is that it is the first extended project that provides a fully realized Luhmannian theory of international conflict and the first empirical application to familiar cases.

That being said, the problem with any adaptation of Luhmann’s work is that modern systems theory is not a linear, rational sort of argument with a definitive prediction that allows for easy falsifiability. Moreover, modern systems theory is ontologically fairly far afield from traditional neopositivist political science, residing in what Peter Jackson calls the “analyticist” mode of social science that is similar in orientation to critical scholarship (Jackson 2010:150). That means any work that relies on Luhmann’s theoretical architecture is going to be necessarily bound to his epistemological commitments, which includes a heavy reliance on evidentiary case studies used to demonstrate ideal types in action, but without the neat hypothesis testing seen in the discipline’s mainstream journals (see Furlong and Marsh 2010; Monroe 2005).
To illustrate the impact of communication systems and the fundamental differences they introduce into the human social world, I have chosen to ground an exploration of modern system theory’s usefulness in several historical case studies likely familiar to the reader. These cases are not designed to be a hard test of the empirical validity of Luhmann’s claims, but illustrate how modern system theory can highlight some potential sources of conflict. This dissertation argues that differences within world society have structured the conflicts fought by the United States and religious actors such as ISIS, including their mutual conflict in the Global War on Terror.

In addition to this larger purpose, each chapter serves to make an additional point about modern systems theory’s potential usefulness. For example, I have chosen to examine the history of US foreign policy to illustrate the difference in ideas between modern systems theory and more conventional ideas about global order. In the conventional narrative, states forge through some combination of power and won consensus an order based on commonly accepted principles or rules. Since world orders are carved from the anarchic system, the role the US plays is one of “first mover” and agent \textit{par excellence}. The conventional wisdom is that the United States helped to create a world order and at the very least plays some role in sustaining that order (Ikenberry 2011).\footnote{The most iconic examples are from Gilpin 1981, Kennedy 1987, Ikenberry 2001, Brooks and Wolforth 2008.} This sense is reflected in the breathless fears of triumphalism and declinism that appear every decade or so (Krauthammer 1990, 2002’ Layne 1993, 2006).

Modern systems theory suggests that the American role might be narrower. If global order is defined by conflict instead of integration, then perhaps its conflicts matter more than its diplomacy. The US role might be defined by macro-social structures such as communication systems, forever locked into making a difference through conflict. The natural question turns toward the sorts of conflicts the United States has fought and what differences those conflicts
have made. At the risk of oversimplification, there is a decidedly democratic streak to its conflict history. In fact, there is a narrative that connects all of the major US conflicts up to and included the Global War on Terror as part of a consistent pattern of behavior.

Similarly, I have chosen religious organizations such as the Islamic State and the Catholic Church to demonstrate how modern systems theory renders both religious and political organizations as equal participants in these macro-social processes, thus obliterating the non-state/state distinction. Just like the United States, these religious organizations are acting according to the differences provided by communication systems. Actors like the Islamic State do not just want to terrorize “the West,” but completely remake the world according to a specifically religious difference (Wood 2014; see also Mendelsohn 2012).

This is not how they are typically understood. Religious actors are typically analyzed through a Westphalian lens, and as such, are thought to have little to do with global order (Fox and Sandal 2010: 4; Hehir 2012; Hurd 2004; Shah and Philpott, 2011 24). The most charitable depiction of religious actors are as bit players in a drama led by states, with perhaps some role in domestic affairs, but almost never a factor in the international environment (Mendelsohn 2012: 591, Philpott 2002:83-92; see also Busby 2007, Fox and Sandler 2004, Thomas 2005, Troy 2104:299). When religious actors do make a play for equality on the world stage, they are labeled as terrorists and psychotics who cynically deploy religious ideology for political gain (see Nexon 2011, Cho and Katzenstein 2011).

In contrast, modern systems theory treats religious actors no less seriously than state actors. In fact, they are considered equivalents in terms of their important within world society. This is not to say that religious organizations like the Taliban do cloak their political intentions in religious language, nor does it preclude the possibility that religious organizations like the
Islamic State are run by bloodthirsty monsters. What it does provide is a greater depth of analysis. Modern systems theory highlights the systemic factors that lead to a pattern of conflict without getting bogged down in psychological analysis or armchair theology. The three organizations reviewed in this project – the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the Catholic Church – have all engaged in conflict explicable in Luhmannian terms.

**Modern Systems Theory and a New Theory of Conflict**

The central argument of this project is that the differences between communication systems promote and structure conflict within world society. The logic of this argument depends largely upon the theoretical architecture of modern systems theory. The next chapter will go into greater detail on modern systems theory. For now we are limited to a few paragraphs to capture the basic logic of the framework.

Luhmann argues that world society is currently—although not necessarily permanently—comprised of many communication systems, a condition he calls “functional differentiation” (see Luhmann 1982, 1995). These systems are the most important features for explaining social outcomes because they provide the language humans employ to see differences, thus allowing them to understand and create their social world. Because language is social reality, modern systems theory is a description of the process by which social reality is continually (re)created through difference (Luhmann 1997a, 1997b).

So what are communication systems? A communication system is a linguistic model built around a single distinction that makes a difference— the organization of the human social world into this and not this (Luhmann 1995: 455; Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 25-26, 190). In addition to the single distinction, a communication system also has symbolic media, organizations,

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8 Something is family or not family, purchasable or not purchasable, of this world or of the spiritual realm, scientific truth or falsehood, to provide a few examples.
programs, and other adaptations designed to shore up the perceived usefulness of the distinction. The most important feature to remember is that communication systems are *autopoietic*, which means they are self-referential and self-generating (Luhmann 2002a:143). A communication system can only ever model the human social world in terms of their core distinction, which means that any human using only that model will also be so limited.

Right now the world has between ten and fifteen identified systems, depending upon which scholar is asked (see Roth and Shutz 2015). These include but are not limited to politics, economy, science, art, religion, law, the medical system, education, mass media, love, morality, social movements, ethics, social work, culture, and war. ⁹ Each of these systems is built around a core distinction – the division of the human social world into *this* and *not this*. These systems are powerful models and tools that allow people to create and understand their social world, made more powerful by the potential universality of their distinction. The notion that anything can be commodified, that all things are political, and that every facet of human existence can be explained in terms of a deity are all informal hints at the totalizing, hegemonic potential of a single distinction to define the world.

Because all aspects of the human social world are defined by the distinction of one communication system or another, Luhmann claims that the reproduction of these distinctions, empirically speaking, is the communication communicating about itself (Luhmann 1992, 1994a: 371). The system provides the language which people either select for use or not, but from the perspective of world society, the only relevant communication is that provided by the communication systems themselves. This is what “communication communicating” refers to.

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⁹ In systems theory research there has been a good bit of controversy surrounding attempts to provide an exhaustive or canonical list of functional communication systems (Roth and Schutz 2015). All of the lists include the political system, economy, science, art, religion, law, medicine, education, and mass media (see Luhmann 1989: 36).
Theoretically speaking, people themselves are irrelevant, or at least can be treated as if they do not matter. For this reason, the study of human society becomes the study of this reproductive process – the process by which communication – and almost paradoxically, human society -- continues.

The idea that language structures or even constitutes social reality is not at all foreign to IR scholars (Wendt 1999). What makes Luhmann’s contribution unique is that he has chosen to adopt a Darwinian evolutionary model to describe how these systems replicate. Instead of looking at “norm entrepreneurs” as the agents of reproduction and “tipping points” to explain the spread of ideas, he depicts the communication systems as organisms responding to the pressures of their environment (see Pace 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). In this case, the environment is constituted by people who select useful worldviews and discard those less suited to their needs.

This might seem an odd choice, but it was done to avoid having to make primordial statements about human nature (Luhmann 1982:43; 1992b: 1422; 1997a:35). It is assumes only that humans want to understand and be understood, which is the thinnest of rationales. It is also one of the few observations about “human nature” with empirical support (see Byme and Whiten 1989; Dunbar 1998).

So where do these communication systems come from? There is a distinct evolutionary character to this argument and it is the basis for why world society is premised on conflict rather than integration. Essentially, communication systems are treated as if they are organisms competing within an environment with all the attendant consequences of such competition. And as with evolution, it is difficult to observe the development of communication systems and the distinction around which they are built in real time.
Much like Foucault’s (1977) archeology of the prison, confirming the existence and origin of communication systems requires painstaking historical research and is in fact what Luhmann spent the majority of his forty books and hundreds of published articles doing. Based on his work we are reasonably certain that distinctions emerge from random human interaction. Even nascent distinctions have the potential to allow humans to understand and create their social world, yet for whatever reason only a few of them replicate (Luhmann 1995: 131-132). With a little luck, these distinctions can grow into full-fledged communication systems, complete with a distinction, symbolic media, and organizations that spread around the globe. When this happens, they can become globally functional and serve as a means for many or even all humans to understand and create their social world.

Even though these communication systems reach global status, their longevity is not guaranteed as some communication systems will outcompete other systems for control over communicative space. As the number of available communication systems proliferate, only the ones with adaptations that clarify and amplify their difference are consistently chosen. The most prominent adaptations are “symbolic media” -- an understandable “communication package” like “money” or “love” that allow people to quickly and easily use a distinction in their daily lives (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 193). Another adaptation is the development of organizations that

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11 Technically, we only have the language to describe a communication system once it supplies it for us. It would be difficult to describe the emergence of a new distinction with other distinctions. This means that historical distance really is the safest way of determining the emergence of communication systems.
build programs around a system’s distinction in order to convince people of the distinction’s coherence and scope, determine who has access to the creation of programs, and provide a physical address for the system in the “real” world (Luhmann 2000a). These organizations are physical manifestations of the distinction and convince people of a distinction’s permanence and ability to shape the human social world.\textsuperscript{12}

Because communication systems themselves cannot act or think, we can look for the manifestation of conflict in organizational behavior. Organizations take a simple distinction, determine the applicability of that distinction through a program, restrict the list of people who can alter that program, and add to these features physical capability. Conflict arises when one organization’s members reject another’s attempts to define some portion of the social world according to a particular distinction, and neither deviates from this stance. The potential for conflict is heightened if the organizations promote an intolerant programmatic content, aspire to achieve universal membership for their organization are able, and are willing to use force to “ensure communication communicates.” At its most extreme, an organizational program can seek complete communicative hegemony, whereby it seeks to impose a knowledge hierarchy that destroys functional differentiation (Luhmann 2000a: 185; [2013] 1997a: 812-65; see also Nassehi 2005).

Although organizations are the actors, the boundaries of the conflict are always structured by the meaning produced by communication systems. Consequently, conflict occurs at predictable places within world society - between competing organizations of different system and between organizations of the same system that promote different programs. Within-system conflicts can occur when two (or more) organizations within a single functional system of

\textsuperscript{12} Although it is pure speculation on my part, their emergence is likely tied to the quality provided by giant buildings filled with devoted followers who will advance their programmatic agenda with force.
communication advance programs with different interpretations of a communicative system’s distinction. Between-system conflict can arise when organizations seek to impose their distinction on a communicative space that is either unclaimed but contested or already defined by another distinction. If this seems like there is potential for a lot of conflict that is because world society is premised on it. To put it simply, world order is based on conflict, not peace.

So what does this look like in the social world as we can observe it? To take one example, the religious system categorizes the social world in terms of that which is of the spiritual realm and that which is not (the *transcendent* and the *imminent*, respectively). But what precisely gets to be “transcendent?” Many of the conflicts throughout human history have been fought between religious organizations promoting different interpretations of this distinction. Different cults, sects, denomination, and religions -- these are competing religious programs. To be clear, from the perspective of these organizations, the question is never about whether or not religion is the appropriate lens for understanding and creating the social world, but *which* religious program would do the shaping.

To this point, let us say that religious organizations are not just content with the idea that religious belief is just one of the many ways humans can understand and create their social world. Perhaps a few religious organizations believe it should be the *only* way humans do so. There we see an organization, like the Islamic State, attempt to become a “communicative hegemon” that not only tries to prevent Shi’a Muslims and Orthodox Christians from practicing and promoting their religious program, but all other forms of communication as well. According to their program, literally all of the human social world must be processed according to their interpretation of the religious distinction. Science, family, politics, law, economics – all of them become subordinate to a particular interpretation of one distinction.
This state of affairs is then considered unacceptable by many other organizations. Political organizations like states refuse to recognize the superiority of this religious program as a means to create and understand the human social world, and so they declare ISIS as an illegitimate political actor (they have no grounds to claim it is not a legitimate religious actor) and organize a counter-balance to the Islamic State’s hegemony. They answer force with force.

Although all organizations have basic functionality, obviously not all organizations will pursue this sort of communicative strategy. Moreover, most organizations do not and will never possess the capability to literally force people to accept their program. Nevertheless, as an ideal type this organizational behavior presents a unique distinction itself with which to understand the social world. In fact, this entire project is about applying an ideal type to international relations.

This theory of conflict is quite different from the overwhelmingly agent-focused, state-centric explanations of conflict common within mainline paradigms. Realists typically focus on the motivation of states within an anarchic environment, with the nature of weaponry, power transitions, perception, and fear being among the common explanations (see Blainey 1994; Fairbanks and Shulsky 1987; Gilpin 1983; Jervis 1978, Levy 1984; Waltz 1979). Similarly, liberal scholars emphasize the failure of institutions or agreements to mitigate the clash of competing interests (Keohane and Nye 1973; Nicholls 1991; Doyle 1986; Wilson 1918). The same holds true for “thin” constructivists such as Wendt who see conflict as the result of reaching a critical mass of state actors who identify each other as enemies (Wendt 1999:23, 260-261; see Lebow 2006). Even postmodern constructivists tend to have an agent-centric explanation of conflict insofar as interests, some of which can lead to conflict, are generated narratives a state actors has about itself (Campbell 1992; Gellner 1994; Mercer 1995).
That being said, there is some conceptual similarity between this theory of conflict and those of Samuel Huntington and Immanuel Wallerstein, insofar as both locate the source of conflict in purely macro-social trends. For example, Wallerstein’s world systems theory sources conflict the contours of global capitalism (Wallerstein 1979, 1983). Conflict emerges as a direct result of expansion of the core into what became the periphery, between the coming world order and traditional ideas about it. It also emerges over which states would be the center of capitalist power among the core (see also Arrighi 1994).

Luhmann often criticized Wallerstein for his reliance on a single vantage point to describe world society (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 171). In his telling, Wallerstein had chosen to understand all of human society – what he called the “world system” -- through an economic model that privileged some causes while being blind to others. By vantage point I refer to proposed causation of macro-social outcomes -- if one were to remove all explanations from Wallerstein’s theoretical account except for economic factors, nothing notable would change in his analysis. This is what it means to privilege a certain vantage point over others.

So while the two perspectives share a macro-social approach to understanding the potential for conflict, they are not directly comparable. Modern systems theory would suggest that the economic system is but one of a dozen or so systems that structure conflict, and thus giving it pride of place misses other potential fault lines of conflicts not generated by the economic communication system. Despite their similar sounding names, modern systems theory and world systems theory are not the same.

Samuel Huntington’s (1996) Clash of Civilizations is the approach most directly comparable to modern systems theory, at least superficially. In his seminal article, Huntington states that “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural” (1993: 22). With the recession of Cold War logic and nationalist ideologies, primordial cultural and religious identities will be in ascendance. It is at the fault lines where these identities intersect, he argues, where we will find conflict (1993:28).

Favorably comparing modern systems theory to Huntington’s approach is obviously dangerous given how thoroughly Huntington was excoriated for cultural ignorance and definitional sloppiness (Berman 2004; Said 2001). Nevertheless, the notion that “fault lines” between macro-social entities provoke conflict is a powerful similarity. So too is the idea that other identities besides the nation-state – especially religious – are equally if not more important for understanding the origin of conflict. Nevertheless, there are quite a number of substantive differences between the two perspectives.

The most obvious is the lack of a geographically bound cultural identity as an important factor for conflict in modern systems theory. Because communication systems are self-referential, they do not typically rely on additional identities or markers for their functionality. In fact, they cannot rely on another distinction to substantiate their own and maintain autopoiesis. It makes little sense to speak of a specifically Japanese or Muslim desire to demarcate the world into family or not, scientific truth or not, art or not, or legal or not. The notion that someone is family, something is scientifically true, something is beautiful, or something is legal is not in any way impacted by civilizational identity – or national identity, for that matter. As simple distinctions they are ubiquitous.

Relatedly, there is no a priori reason to assume that any one difference matters more than any other for the generation of conflict. Huntington (1993:22) introduces his argument about the importance of civilizational differences by asserting that political ideologies would matter less in the wake of the Cold War. Modern systems theory suggests that without evidence there is no
reason to assume world society has moved to a more hierarchically-oriented arrangement like this. All distinctions, including religious and political, are equal sources of potential conflict.

A second difference concerns the reification of civilizational identity. The idea that certain civilizations or communication systems are primordial and relatively unchanging is something that would never appear in a modern systems theory analysis. It is true that the differences introduced by communication systems are fundamental insofar as they constitute the human social world, but they are not static. The evolutionary pressures and sheer randomness of human interaction guarantees constant change in the landscape of world society.

In short, modern systems theory provides a novel means to explore the generation of conflict without reliance on a state-centric, political vantage point. Additionally, it eschews statements about human nature or other assumptions about individual motivations. And while is similar to other macro-social approaches, its theory of conflict generation is far more flexible.

**Applying the Theory: Methodology and Case Study Design**

In keeping with Luhmann’s ontological commitments, this project adopts an “analyticist” scientific position (see Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 46). Analyticists believe that knowledge creation cannot be separated from the models or language used to access the social world. Given this commitment, the scientific goal is not focused on determining the empirical accuracy of a claim since that would be an illogical goal. Instead the evidentiary standard is whether or not the work can provide a useful model through which we can better understand the social world.

In terms of model creation, Jackson is quite explicit that analyticism requires a “disciplined ordering of the facts of experience” which “must terminate in a case-specific narrative” (Jackson 2010: 114, 152). For this reason, I follow the standard practice of analyticist
knowledge creation through the use of “ideal types” applied to case studies.\textsuperscript{13} Ideal types are “one-sided accentuation[s] of one or more points of view” designed to reduce the complexity of reality through “the instrumental oversimplification of complex, actual situations” that highlight the “most important” features for a given explanation. (Jackson 2010: 142, 150).

Jackson lays out several requirements for the creation of an ideal type. He suggests that it must (1) bring order to the social world through the use of models that highlight a “relevant feature of the object or process under investigation” (2) reveal “intriguing and useful things about the objects to which it is applied”; and (3) allow for reasoned conjecture as to the “reasons why then observed outcome in that case was not what the model ideal-typically envisions” (Jackson 2010: 144-147). The model set forth in chapter three and the case studies across chapters four and five are all designed to meet these requirements.

Importantly, the purpose of this project is not to generate universal covering laws. Unlike case studies used in a neopositivist enterprise, the purpose of ideal-type application in analyticist projects is to illustrate the features of the model being applied (Tilly 1989:82). The idea that communication systems introduce differences which structure conflict in world society is not meant to be the “capital-T” truth that precludes other useful explanations for conflict and war. Ontologically speaking, the end goal is not to create an externally valid theory, but merely a useful model that provides one more filter that allows the researcher to understand the human social world.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} As Weber points out, Ideal types are “[F]ormed through a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual events, which are arranged according to these emphatically one-sided points of view in order to construct a unified analytical construct… In its conceptual purity, this analytical construct… is found nowhere in empirical reality. It is a utopia” (Weber 1990a:191 quoted in Jackson 2010: 143).

\textsuperscript{14} Having said that, in a review of Jackson’s typology, Adam Humphreys (2013: 300-308) suggests that there might not be as sharp a distinction between my definition of usefulness and a standard understanding of Popperian falsification. This is partially borne out by Jackson’s requirements for ideal-type construction which do not seem far
This idea of “usefulness” is a tricky one to define because it has no obvious externally valid definition. What precisely does it mean to “highlight the most important feature” of an object or event? After much thought it seems to me that this is an impossible question to answer, and so I approach the concept of usefulness in a very mind-world monist way – the usefulness of a model is largely in the eye of the beholder. I am at a loss as to what other standard there might be. What I find useful might not be thought as such by another reviewer. This requires a certain amount humility regarding any grand claims about scientific contributions.

In light of this point, it seems to me that tethering the model to well-known, well-researched cases is the best check on usefulness that I can provide from my ontological perspective. Following this, I have chosen three religious organizations that either have in the past or are currently pursuing maximalist communication strategies – the Taliban, the Islamic State, and the medieval/current Catholic Church. I have also chosen a single political organization – the United States. In truth, I could have chosen any number of other organizations from any number of communication systems, but I thought these four cases would be helpful particularly because of how well known and well-researched they are. I cannot rely on reader ignorance as a shield from their assessment of usefulness. Moreover, I have also chosen these four cases because there is a robust theoretical literature backing alternative explanations.

In my account, the history of US foreign policy is overlaid with the ideal-typical Luhmannian organization and as such, the consistent advancement of its organizational program is implicitly contrasted against the absence of any such program. The United States has two-

removed from the requirements for theory construction in a neopositivist enterprise (Popper 2002, chp 3). Analyticist models have to tell scholars something about the world that at least seems to comport with the real world-- just like neo-positivist scholars.
hundred years of democratic promotion and has perceived the six major conflictual epochs in which it has been involved – the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the War on Terror – via opposition to this program. In fact, nearly all of its primary opponents in the international sphere have been defined programmatically.

Its organizational program – what I rather unimaginatively call “democratization” -- has been a consistent feature of American foreign policy over its 200 year history. Typically such a claim would founder upon the shoals of history – the US had a nasty habit of propping up dictators and overthrowing popularly elected governments if they displayed far-left sympathies. However, a modern systems theoretical perspective suggests that the same programmatic impulse is at work historically throughout. The case shows how a single organizational program manifests itself differently depending upon the axis of conflict.

Within the political communication system, the United States takes a hard line against what it perceives as true programmatic rivals – monarchism, fascism (including the proto-fascism of the Confederacy), and communism. Non-democratic governments that worked against the spread of these programs were often ignored until after the offending programs were defeated. With between-system conflict we see little compromise with programmatically opposing, non-political actors and almost complete cooperation by political actors. The War on Terror has brought the United States into alignment with competing organizations – some of which are not allies. In fact, the reaction to non-political organizations attempting communicative hegemony has been swift and uncompromising.

Where this account differs from standard realist or liberal fare is that it presents the United States as neither a unipole nor lauded hegemon. I am interested in uncovering neither the mechanisms by which an American leadership is sustained or lost, nor is its behavior relative to
the institutions it created. Whether or not the US intended to build a world order or maintain it is 
irrelevant to this account. Rather, the application of this model highlights the remarkable 
continuity displayed by the United States – a democratic program regardless of opposition or 
relative capability, whether or not it is a multipolar or bipolar world, whether it is 1815 or 2015.

Again it bears repeating that the ontological orientation of this project precludes any 
assertion that this is the only way to interpret the history of American foreign policy. A 
Luhmannian overlay certainly obscures as much as it reveals, just as any theory of international 
politics necessarily directs attention to some features over others.

Likewise, religious organizations share these same traits when overlaid with a 
Luhmannian organizational ideal type. Where this account differs from standard treatments is 
that I present these organizations as functionally undifferentiated from political organizations 
like the United States. They are also intent on promoting their particular program using a 
totalizing communication strategy. In this regard, I am not interested in what makes these 
organizations into “criminals” since their actions are from the perspective of modern systems 
theory no better or worse, legitimate or illegitimate, than those of the political organizations like 
the United States. Furthermore, I treat their religious claims as the sole animating motivation to 
their behavior, which is a more controversial position than one might initially think.

There is a distinct tendency when thinking about violent religious groups to classify 
their methods are deemed illegitimate. Religious actors who employ violence are often treated as 
psychologically defective (Richardson 2006:11). Criminalizing violent religious organizations 
is part of a larger secular bias that is common within political science (see Hurd 2004; Jones 
2003: 371; Lausten and Waever 2000). Religion, it is argued, is often just a mask for a pedestrian 
power play (see Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). It is not the religious, it is argued, but
political leaders who defined the parameters and gave meaning to religion on the basis of the
determined needs of the state and its political leaders (see Nexon 2011, Cho and Katzenstein
2011). At worst, this sort of literature resorts to the “No True Scotsman” logical fallacy - no true
practitioner of x religion would ever choose to engage in such activity. I do no subscribe to this
perspective.

For the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the Catholic Church I am interested in showing
how modern systems theory can be used to describe their organizational program and their
communicative strategy in a way that respects the content of their program without resorting to a
political perspective to characterize their role in international affairs. It also shows how the
different communicative strategies play out historically and in current events. Furthermore, I use
all three cases to illustrate what within-system and between-system conflict actually looks like.
The Islamic State is particularly useful in this regard as it has adopted the most totalizing,
maximalist approach of the three. It will also demonstrate what the “balancing mechanic” looks
like in the real world.

The Benefits of a Luhmannian Theory of Conflict
It seems to me that there is at least one good reason for utilizing this theory as a supplement to
the existing stable of perspectives – modern systems theory provides the conceptual tools to
effectively describe the complexity of a globalized world without relying solely on political or
economic distinctions to make sense of that world.

When IR scholars theorize “world order” they typically rely on a single vantage point
through which to describe it. Realists, English School scholars, and liberals typically depict
world order as corresponding to the political interests of a single state, group of states, or the
“harmony of interests” of state and non-state actors engaged in political or economic transactions
economic transactions reinforce political strength). Marxists describe world order through the lens of an economic distinction, with economic forces determining outcomes. To put it in the language of modern systems theory, these scholars are choosing to self-limit their understanding of the world through the distinction of a single communication system.

This is not to say that these perspectives are wrong, of course. There are, however, consequences to this approach. Chiefly, these scholar limit their ability to conceptualize the existential nature of potential conflict between all of the competing social realities that comprise the modern world. It commits the researcher in advance to the assumption that all relevant actors, causes, and outcomes are either economic or (more likely) political in nature. While political science might seem predisposed to a particular vantage point, the field of international relations surely requires a more ecumenical approach. Using a political lens and grounding every analysis in the state makes every analysis of the international space an implicit referendum on the continued relevance of that one particular kind of organization.

Modern systems theory provides one of the first real theories of conflict generation in which the political Westphalian conception of “the international” or the economic logic of Marxism are regarded as but one among many competing world orders. This perspective especially obliterates the state/non-state distinction, or at least reveals that it is an explicitly political way to view the world (i.e., a distinction only meaningful from a political perspective).

Moreover, this makes us rethink non-state, non-liberal actors in ways that do not reduce their motives to reactionary or residual categories, but gives them equal status in terms of defining a world order that is not explicitly liberal. More importantly, it acknowledges the ideological and spatial limits of the liberal world order. Modern systems theory therefore has the effect of expanding the range of actors potentially relevant to world order.
Right now IR theory has a fairly one-dimensional understanding of the theoretical significance of an actor like the Islamic State. In liberal terms, the action of a religious organization like the Islamic State is the response of extremists to the encroachment of democracy and capitalism. A perspective which uses the conceptual language of modern systems theory would agree with this assessment, but would also argue that the actions of the political coalition of states is the response of extremists to the encroachment of a religious world order. Neither religious nor political communication is privileged as the singular vantage point through which we can theorize the social world. The Islamic State is not just reacting to a liberal world order, but is seeking to install its own version of world order. They interpret events and social outcomes through a religious, not a political or economic, distinction.

A further, if minor, benefit of adopting modern systems theory as a means of understanding conflict is that it dispenses with the fiction of “levels of analysis.” The conflict between a local church and a town hall is generated by the same impulses that drive conflict between two competing visions of world order, such as the political “liberalism” of the United States versus the religious vision of the Islamic State. While your local church and town hall may not resort to violence in a between-system dispute, the source of the conflict is this same between-system dynamic.

**Three objections to Luhmann**

To the uninitiated, Niklas Luhmann’s modern systems theory will seem at times very familiar. Luhmann deploys a conventional understanding of constructivism and grounds his theoretical claims in exhaustive historical research. At other times, Luhmann will grate against traditional sensibilities. I see three objections to Luhmann that relate to his reliance on a Darwinian model of social change – the lack of meaningful agency and appearance of tautological theorizing. I
see a further objection that is based on the trajectory of his likely employment in the discipline. Many will think modern systems theory is yet another in a line of liberal theories predicting the decline of the state and the rise of non-state actors, yet nothing in Luhmann’s writings suggests that specific outcome.

Luhmann’s commitment to a Darwinian, process-based explanation for social outcomes effectively denies the explicit role of agency. In contrast to this view stands the widespread acceptance of an Enlightenment view of human progress premised on actions of purposeful and understandable agents who work to better their environment (Ross 1991: 8). This idea of agency is an example of what Daniel Dennett refers to as the human preference for the “intentional stance” (Dennett 1995, 1996: chp 3). Agents are relatable in a way that blind process is not. Agents can change and can be changed. Process-based agency simply executes function with only minor variations.

Unfortunately, I do not think there is a neat pathway out of this tension if one is fully committed to agent-centered explanations for social outcomes. There are, however, numerous instances of agency without intentionality occurring in biology, ranging from the behavior of viral agents to evidence of instinctual behavior throughout the animal kingdom. In the social world we can point to bureaucratic rules, automated trading, and self-executing military responses as simple examples of process-based agency. Overall, I think a process-based approach is not so far from mainstream IR theorizing as to prompt outright rejection, but I understand many will disagree.

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15 For example, viruses are nothing more than errant strands of DNA or RNA which replicate using the hijacked reproductive machinery of cells. They are not in any meaningful sense alive, yet they single-mindedly pursue a strategy to guarantee their own reproduction. So why do they do it? From an evolutionary perspective, there is really only one answer – they do that because that’s what they do. Their function was determined by processes that began with the creation of self-replicating strands of DNA. The evolutionary process itself saw to it that all of those actions would in fact occur, intentionally or not. There was no agent responsible for the process but the process itself.
A second consequence of Luhmann’s commitment to an evolutionary process is that it looks like tautological theorizing – how do we know a functional communication system when we see one? Luhmann argued that communication systems could only really be distinguished after they had developed self-reference – which is to say, after the fact. While this might seem like a major problem, I would argue it is not more an issue than other post-hoc determinations of status so long as they are based on some evidence. To this point, Luhmann spent an entire career – seventy books and four-hundred articles, in fact – uncovering the historical origin and development of communication systems. Taking his work as a whole, one is left with the distinct impression that anticipating the evolutionary paths of communication systems, to say nothing of the development of new ones, is a fool’s errand. It can only be done through archeological research. We can no more predict the rise of new species than we can the ascendance of new functions within world society. Again, I do not regard this concession as extreme, but I am aware others might.

A third and related issue concerns criticisms of non-falsifiability. This is a difficult critique to defend simply because empirical falsifiability (or at least verifiability) is a concern for neopositivists and some critical realists (see Baskhar and Lawson 2013). As noted earlier, modern systems theory rests more on the analyticist and reflexivist side of the ontological divide. Additionally, Mathias Albert (1999:241) describes modern systems theory as a “closed system,” which means that, when coupled with its analyticist ontological moorings, it is difficult to subject modern systems theory to an empirically-derived falsification standard. Luhmann’s own description of his work often comment on its own self-referential nature, meaning modern systems theory closely resembles the communication systems (see Luhmann 1990).
Beyond a strictly philosophical defense, guiding frameworks, rather than mid-range predictive theories, seem to dominate IR theoretical paradigms. In this regard, modern systems theory resembles complex frameworks like Andrew Moravcsik’s (1997) “theory” of liberalism, Waltz’s (1979) structural realism, or Wendt’s (1999) social theory that are clearly designed to draw attention to some features over others without making strictly falsifiable statements. This is especially true of classic theories of liberalism or realism that rest on assumptions about human nature as a means of informing about potential state activity (Angel 1910, Morgenthau 1948).

A final objection is that modern systems theory is just old wine in a new bottle. This reflects my personal concern about how modern systems theory is likely to be rejected as just another liberal theory of global governance or “end of history” thesis (Fukuyama 1992). Talk of functional differentiation, and the importance of non-state actors superficially appears as yet another liberal missive on the decline of the state and a new global cosmopolitan reality.

The project you are about to read is not the first scholarly work that has examined modern systems theory’s potential to assist IR scholars in understanding their social world. As of this writing, there have been three edited volumes that examine the applicative potential of modern systems theory for IR theorizing. With the exception of Stephen Stetter’s (2007) excellent edited volume on modern systems theory and conflict, from which this dissertation borrows several concepts, there has been a decidedly liberal bent to the theoretical consideration of Luhmann’s work. Both Albert and Hilkermeier (2004) and Zurn et al (2013) are primarily interested in using Luhmann’s concept of differentiation for global governance studies.16

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16 Initial exploration of Luhmann’s potential contribution to IR was guarded. In his 2004 volume, Albert summarized the initial reaction as positive, noting that, despite its inherent complexity, it could be applied in, “modest ways or even used as a toolbox paying little respect to the ‘purity’ of a vast body of theory” (Albert 2004:...)
The editors of the Zurn begin their volume by asking whether “globalization [is] best understood as the breakout of functional differentiation from its state cage” and conclude by suggesting that it is apparent that “many function systems have moved easily beyond national borders and thus escape regulations of the nation-state” (Zurn et all 2013: 228, 242). They helpfully suggest that Luhmann’s ideas, which they consistently and perplexingly refer to as “differentiation theory,” should be considered as part of a narrative where the state had “dominance over other function systems in the Westphalian system,” but lost it over time. As other systems have developed, the states that allowed “functional differentiation” have thrived and unleashed the growing complexity other functional systems “such as the economy, science, art, and law, which are each driven by their specific inner logic” (Albert et al 2013: 20; Zurn et al 2013: 230, 235). Functional differentiation, they argue, has weakened the political system such that other systems “can now prevail and the political system has no good reason (or the means) to limit this development” (Albert et al 2013:12; Zurn et al 2013: 236-237).

The goal of these two prior volumes is to “shed light on issues that both grasp developments that are in line with our intuitions and existing evidence and are neglected by dominant theories,” to use their words” (Zurn et al 2013: 241). Yet their intuition leads their use of “differentiation theory” to the same conclusions as the rest of the liberal global governance agenda. That is, they conceive of “differentiation theory” as a means to understand the “post-Westphalian” moment and essentially equate functional differentiation with globalization itself. This badly misunderstands what differentiation actually is.

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223-225). Particular areas of usefulness would be to use it to “think globalization thoroughly” and to analyze a post-Westphalian world (Albert 2004: 13, 223-225).
By linking differentiation exclusively to “post-Westphalia” they unwittingly anchor the analysis of world society to an explicitly political self-understanding by choosing one side of the distinction (state/not-state, but still political). Seeing world society through a political distinction, even if the claim is that states are declining, is to look at it through a political key-hole. If this is any indication, the likeliest use of so-called “differentiation theory” in the future will be to buttress, instead of challenge, mainstream disciplinary ideas of world order. In fact, they say as much. Zurn et al (2013: 243-244) argue that:

The existing normative framework of international society is largely a projection of those Western powers within which functional differentiation (aka modernity) initially took the dominant role… What we have, therefore, is a liberal form of international society in which a whole group of liberal states have both successively and in parallel projected their interior functional differentiation onto international society… for states that do not share this domestic pattern of differentiation, an international society featuring functional differentiation is deeply threatening… that, in a quite profound sense, is what the Cold War was about. It is also what the current tensions between Western-dominated global international society on the one hand, and China, Iran, North Korea and many other non-democratic states on the other, is about.

Again, the equation of functional differentiation with globalization, and the insistence that it arises from within the state (i.e., from within the political system), unnecessarily ties it to a political vantage point. A functionally differentiated world society has no central organizing principle.

In other words, an incomplete commitment to Luhmann’s theoretical architecture leads to the submergence of his most powerful insights into an exclusively liberal theoretical agenda.
This is evident in the way they deploy the concept of functional differentiation as a synonym for globalization, which allows scholars to simply plug “functional differentiation” into existing ideas about world order without taking on board all of the other theoretical commitments that implementing Luhmann’s ideas actually require. This move saps modern system theory of practically all of its potential insights, including the important role of conflict between communication systems. Although modern systems theory has the capacity to theorize global governance, international institutions, a post-sovereign de-territorialized world, or liberal hegemony, it is certainly not a theory about those topics since that would unnecessarily tie it to a singular vantage point – the political.

Plan of the Book
The first chapter presents modern systems theory. This chapter is intended to introduce a non-informed reader to the basics of Luhmann’s sprawling theory of society. It first lays the foundation for modern systems theory by describing its ontological claims. In this, the chapter relies heavily on Peter Thaddeus Jackson’s (2010) Conduct of Inquiry to locate modern systems theory within the field of political “science” broadly construed. The chapter will then move on to a discussion of modern systems theory’s intellectual lineage which is necessary to understand why Luhmann turned to a Darwinian evolutionary approach to explain system development. After laying this groundwork, the chapter will move on to the substance of the theory itself. Luhmann’s argument is that the entire social world can be deduced from the blind process of communicative production. This final section will explain why communication can be the basis of social reality and why communication systems – and not humans – deserve pride of place at the center of our analysis. It will then expound on this basic theme by outlining how communication systems reproduce and why this reproduction might lead to conflict with other
systems. It will hint at my contribution to Luhmann’s ideas, which is the model of organizational conflict.

The second chapter will provide a brief discussion of how Luhmann’s ideas might actually be of help to international relations. It will begin by discussing what modern systems theory will not bring to the discipline. It will neither provide a pathway out of the structure-agency debate despite its unique conception of agency and structure, nor will it be an addition to the so-called “critical theory” in IR. After this, this chapter will spend address the key gap it fills as a replacement for “single distinction” theories of world order which currently populate the discipline’s theoretical pantry. It allows for the rendering of multiple world orders without using the political distinction as a central organizing principle.

The third chapter lays out the central theoretical argument and further develops a theme I briefly touched on at the conclusion of the first chapter. Modern systems theory locates the origins of conflict in two related mechanisms -- the reproduction of a communication system’s distinction and the function of organizations in that process. Specifically, I argue that conflict is generated by organizational function and structured by the communication system distinction. Organizations advance programs tied to a given communication system decide who gets to “belong” to their programmatic interpretation, which is their inclusion/exclusion function, and pair these features with physical capability. Whereas Luhmann worried about organizational exclusion, I contend that universal inclusion tied to an aggressive communicative program can lead to hegemonic strategies which result in conflict. Each of these three features increase the possibility and intensity of conflict in different ways, but taken together result in the possibility of “communicative hegemony,” which is defined as a (often territorial) space where one particular distinction operates hierarchically relative to many or all other distinctions. These
organizations advance their program at the cost of the human freedom to select other distinctions as a means to understand or create their social world.

The fourth chapter illustrates ideal typical organizational behavior through three mini-case studies – the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the historical/current Catholic Church. Each of these three cases demonstrates some of the core organizational communicative strategies expected by the theory laid out in chapter three. The Islamic State presents a “maximalist” strategy. It applies a hegemonic religious program universally while restricting membership in the decision-making apparatus. When combined with formidable military capability, we have an ideal-typical case for understanding what a “communicative hegemon” looks like in the real world. The Taliban and Catholic Church also display elements of this ideal-typical organizational model, but fail to couple with these three basic features convincing material capability. In this regard, the Catholic Church is particularly interesting as a historical case study – it went from possessing the means to go toe to toe with other religious and political organizations to being forced to work through less coercive means.

The fifth chapter once again illustrates ideal-typical organizational behavior, but this time uses the history of American foreign policy to do so. The argument is that the United States has consistently pursued a political program – democracy promotion – that functionally resembles those of the religious organizations covered in chapter four. Consequently, its primary adversaries over two hundred years were those organizations that were perceived to be programmatically oppositional. Autocracies, fascists, communists, and religious organizations were all deemed a threat on the basis of democracy promotion, rather than on the basis of invasion.
Chapter One: Modern Systems Theory and the Logic of Conflict within World Society

Modern systems theory invites us to consider two important points that illuminate the American role in the international environment. The first is that the international environment is best described by the concept of world society. The second is that this world society is by its nature defined by conflict. The American role is defined according to this conflict.

The juxtaposition of a concept like world society alongside the notion of conflict is likely odd to some. Most domestic societies are not defined by or prone to conflict. The existence of a society implies at the very least a “we-group” which has set aside endemic conflict in favor of some degree of solidarity. Luhmann’s theory, in contrast, assumes the presence of conflict as a precondition for society due to the many differences that comprise it.

The source of conflict within world society is traceable to the process that governs its creation. The human social world is made up of differences which take the form of a single distinction. These distinctions are generated spontaneously and persist only if people continue to find the difference they introduce into the world useful. If at any point a difference no longer seems useful, that difference is discarded (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 90). Conflict occurs because there is an a priori reason to assume one difference is better than another for defining a given aspect of the human social world. The potential for evolutionary obsolescence drives distinctions to evolve into communication systems that possess additional mechanisms to encourage selection by people. Some of these mechanisms, such as organizations, can lead to conflict as some people convinced of the merit of some differences over others, attempt to displace or even eradicate other differences. Occasionally, extraordinarily fit communication systems can crowd out other systems, resulting in the ascendance of a particular distinction as a
means of creating the human social world. This communicative hegemony is rare but possible, since it emerges from the same Darwinian logic that produces all communication systems.

World society is currently functionally differentiated and thus “cannot be characterized by a “most important” part, “be it a religious commitment, the political state, or a certain mode of economic production” (Luhmann 1982b: 177).\(^\text{17}\) It is the correlate to the existence of a large number of communication systems, each with their own model of reality which is based on a single observed distinction (Luhmann 1997b [2013]:88). These realities by definition cannot meaningfully be combined. “Society is not integrated by a precept of unity,” Luhmann writes, “but is a unity only in the sense that all communication systems are united in their difference” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 16).

To be clear, just because world society is currently functionally differentiated does not mean that is just a synonym for a “liberal world order.” Quite the opposite, insofar as the functional differentiation of world society by definition precludes characterizing the world in terms of some ‘liberal project’ of global governance since that would presume that this distinction is more important than all other distinctions. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the supremacy of a single distinction is impossible (Luhmann 1977: 70). The same process that creates functional differentiation today also makes a world in which only one observed distinction reign supreme theoretically possible, even if that outcome is not entirely likely. Because this process works in both directions, understanding the process of how systems make and sustain these observed distinctions (i.e., meaning making) is absolutely essential to my larger argument.

\(^\text{17}\) Some constructivist make a similar point insofar as they believe there is no “Archimedean point” by which to assess the social world the linguistic creation of the world (Campbell 2007: 209-10; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 262).
The role of the United States in world society emerges from this process. Using the formal language of modern systems theory, I would describe the United States as an organization generated by the political system in order to convince people to select political communication as a useful means of creating their social world. When we assess what difference the United States makes within world society, we do so by assessing its activity to assist the survival of the political system. The notion of the United States making a “difference that makes a difference” is a reference to this functionality.

The US is of course not alone in this function. Every state is also engaged in this role. Outside of the political system, we see many organizations fulfilling the same role for their particular communication system. For example, as a religious organization, the role of the Islamic State is to ensure that the religious systems survives by convincing as many people as people of the efficacy of a particular religious worldview. In other words, the United States and the Islamic State, although they are substantively much different in practically every way, are functionally undifferentiated regarding their particular role within world society. Any difference between them in terms of this functionality comes down to their respective ability to fulfill this role.

Along with highlighting a different kind of systemic role for state and non-state actors, thinking about the international environment in terms of modern systems theory redraws the terrain of potential conflict in the international environment. The lines that demarcate conflict can be found between communication systems and the programmatic ambitions of their organizations. Thinking about conflict only in terms of state competition, class warfare, or competing interests misses this dynamic. Or to put it in terms of modern systems theory, it no longer makes sense to privilege the perspective of the singular communicative vantage point –
in this case the political system -- in the description of world society (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:129-130).

Because these claims rest on the logic of Luhmann’s ideas, the first chapter of this project will present Niklas Luhmann’s grand theory of society. This is not the first time modern systems theory has been discussed within the field of international relations, but this will be the most extended treatment to date (see also Albert 1999; 2003; Buzan et al 2013). Nevertheless, because of modern systems theory’s complexity, a comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope of this introductory chapter (see Moeller 2006 for an excellent introduction to Luhmann).

The next section will lay the foundation for modern systems theory by describing its ontological claims. In this, the chapter relies heavily on Peter Thaddeus Jackson’s (2010) Conduct of Inquiry to locate modern systems theory within the field of political “science,” broadly construed. The chapter will then move on to a discussion of modern systems theory’s intellectual lineage. After laying this groundwork, the chapter will move on to the substance of the theory itself. Luhmann’s argument is that the entire social world can be deduced from the blind process of communicative production. This final section will explain why communication can be the basis of social reality and why communication systems – and not humans – deserve pride of place at the center of our analysis. It will then expound on this basic theme by outlining how communication systems reproduce and why this reproduction might lead to conflict with other systems.

I have found that one’s first encounter with modern systems theory largely determines whether it is accepted as a unique and exciting model of the world, or rejected out of hand because of its unfamiliar concepts and abstract language.\(^\text{18}\) Modern systems theory depicts a

\(^{18}\) One reviewer of Luhmann remarked, “Neophytes should be warned that Luhmann is not for those who prefer an
world in which communication communicates without people and “systems” replicate and evolve on their own. On the first page of his book, *Luhmann Explained*, philosopher Hans Moeller (2006:1) describes the introduction to this perspective as initially frustrating:

Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems is discomfiting to many and irritating to some. In a society that puts so much emphasis on the individual and defines itself as 'civil,' Luhmann's basic claim that, in fact, society does not consist of human beings can be seen as shocking, as going against common sense, or as absurd.

Mathias Albert (1999: 241) similarly warns his reader that:

Introducing modern systems theory to another context presents a general problem which deserves to be addressed right at the beginning of the present argument: Luhmann's theory is in itself a 'closed system.' It provides a rich a conceptually dense language of its own for examining how society observes itself. It seems to present the observer with a 'take it or leave it' choice resembling the structure of the Hegelian universe: once in, there is no way out.

As will be discussed below, modern systems theory is familiar in some respects and wildly different in others. The traditional means of introducing new concepts is to connect those new ideas to familiar ones and to contextualize that new information. This section and the one immediately thereafter seek to do just that.

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extended, linear, rational argument… In reading Luhmann, before long one inevitably experiences a “clang” as a thought resonates with something pre-existing but only half-formed, evoking a “now that’s something worth thinking about”, and you put the book down gently for a while lost in thought. Yet, there is a definite risk that you will throw it down in disgust before you get that far, so be warned” (Brute 2002:3).
1.1 Modern Systems Theory as Analyticist Masterpiece: Model-Makers All the Way Down

Following Patrick T Jackson’s (2010) *Conduct of Inquiry*, this section argues that Niklas Luhmann’s ideas are explicable as ideal types in the analyticist mold and should be judged on that basis. What this means is that Luhmann paints a world which is true because it is useful, not true because it is necessarily reflects reality in an externally valid way. This point is not merely a digression. Jackson’s typology locates – and in a sense normalizes -- Luhmann’s contribution to IR theory. Although the presentation is radical, Niklas Luhmann’s perspective is not as foreign as it appears, and is in fact a close cousin to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) structural realism ontologically, if not necessarily substantively.

Jackson (2010:37) argues that disciplinary fault lines emerge from two ontological wagers about our interface with the world. The first wager concerns the relationship of the observer (mind) to the observed (the world), insofar as one has to choose whether there exists a “real” world independent of the observation of it (*mind-world dualism*) or if it “exists” only as the mind so orders it (*mind-world monism*). The second wager concerns the limits of knowledge claims and the belief that scientific claims need to be limited to (in)direct experience (*phenomenalism*) or can extend beyond it (*transfactualism*).

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19The irony of course is that modern systems theory is complex, abstract, and full of jargon seemingly designed to defeat easy understanding. One possible reason for this feature is that Luhmann was naturally pessimistic about the role of scholarship, morality, or ideology to effect social change, as evidenced by *Ecological Communication* (1986), one of the few policy works he wrote. In accordance with his ideas, Luhmann apparently did not believe society could be steered or organized sufficiently to ‘solve’ global issues due to its tendency to decompose all problems diverging functional perspectives. Luhmann devalued academia’s privileged place in society as a source of intellectual leadership. Unlike Parsons, who described the university as ‘the most important structural component of modern societies that had no direct counterpart in earlier types of society’ and devoted significant research to uncover this impact, Luhmann considered the university as a second-class institution that did nothing except satisfy the communicative requirements of the scientific system (Luhmann 1992; Parsons 1961: 261; Parsons and Platt 1973). Because of this perspective, he favored “labyrinth-like”, “non-linear” monographs explicitly designed to frustrate the lay understanding of his work (Luhmann 2005: 199). In contrast to scholars like Habermas, who was Luhmann’s principal academic rival, Luhmann simply not see the point of public engagement (see Habermas and Luhmann 1971). If people were going to make use of his ideas, they would have to work for the right to it.
Putting these four position in a two-by-two grid, Jackson derives four ontological positions: neopositivism, critical realism, reflexivism, and analyticism. Neopositivists argue that theories need to correspond to reality and are, or should be, limited to the observations of it (Jackson 2010:41). Critical realists agree with neopositivists that theories should correspond to an external world, but would disagree that our theories must be confined to the observable world (2010: 130). Both of these ontological perspectives exhibit what Jackson calls “mind-world dualism,” a position which “necessitates a notion of truth centered on the correspondence between statements and the mind-independent world” (Jackson 2010:141). That is, the purpose of scientific endeavor from their point of view is to produce stable, lasting “covering laws” (with varying degrees of generalizability) that accurately describe our world. The “great debates” between liberals, realists, and Marxists have largely been over which theory best captures “real world” phenomenon (Jackson 2008: 130-131; see also Schmidt 1998).

In contrast to these perspectives, the analyticist wager is one of mind-world monism. As Jackson describes it, mind-world monism is the philosophical position that there is not a “real” ontological distinction between the observer and the observed, since knowledge of the latter is in part created subjectively by the former. It is therefore essentially “meaningless to speak of ‘the external world’ in the first place” (Jackson 2010: 114). Theories, “do not represent or depict a
mind-independent real world,” but serve as mental constructs or intellectual edifice (Jackson 2010: 114). The analyticist position holds that ideas about the world both provide access to it and even shape it in accordance to expectations.

This does not mean these models are generated solely on the whim of the researcher. In addition to mind-world monism, analyticism exhibits phenomenalism – or the restriction of knowledge to the observable. Like positivists, analyticists are required to restrict their theories to human experience – otherwise other people would have no ‘access point’ to useful knowledge. For analyticists, the purpose of theory is to organize human experience and observation in such a way to make it “portable” – a tool to analyze a variety of real-world situations (Jackson 2010: 117, 126). Accordingly, the purpose of the scientific endeavor is to create “helpful idealizations or oversimplifications that can be used to order the complex chaos of empirical reality into more comprehensible and manageable forms” (Jackson 2010: 113). Whether or not these ideas incorporate factual notions is largely beside the point so long as the end result of our use of “imaginative pictures” is the creation of accessible knowledge (Weber 1999b: 275 in Jackson 2010: 148).

The typical pathway to analyticist knowledge creation is via the deployment of “ideal types.”20 Ideal types are a means to order our thinking about social outcomes by instrumentally reducing the complexity of social reality through highlighting specific contributing factors

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20 As Weber points out, Ideal types are “[F]ormed through a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual events, which are arranged according to these emphatically one-sided points of view in order to construct a unified analytical construct… In its conceptual purity, this analytical construct… is found nowhere in empirical reality. It is a utopia” (Weber 1999a:191 quoted in Jackson 2010: 143). Jackson goes on to note that “Ideal-types are… more like deliberate caricatures or partial sketches, or perhaps specialized conceptual filters that focus our scholarly attention on particular aspects of actually existing things to the detriment of other aspects of those same things… [They] necessarily function as a way of expressing values even as it calls attention to specific feature of the actual world and gathers them together under one conceptual heading… [They] direct us to focus on particular aspects and not others” and other researchers may reformulate these ideal-types so as to “focus on different aspects of the same entity or object, and they would not in any simple sense be ‘wrong’ for doing so” (Jackson 2010:145).
(Jackson 2010: 150). Their explanatory power comes by way of an analytical narrative which leverages the logic of counter-factuals, insofar as the researcher is required to make a reasoned judgment that the particular outcome would have possibly been otherwise in the absence of the idealized factors (Jackson 2010:142, 149).

It is important to note that there is no standard method for generating ideal types, nor is there any external standard on which to judge them, since their purpose is not to attain external validity vis-à-vis an external world so much as to highlight certain features of the social world, and thus prompt further investigation (Jackson 2010:150). That means their validity, if such a term can even be applied to this perspective, is entirely dependent upon its usefulness relative “to the specific goals and purposes that animate them” and are “discarded – not for being false, but for being useless” (Jackson 2010:143).

Since “usefulness” is often relative, the form that ideal type takes can often be idiosyncratic and culturally embedded. These “model airplanes” of the imagination are the product of not only minds, but prior existing rule-sets and value systems (Waever 2009:206). Jackson points out that this tends to render “the whole procedure of ideal-typical analysis…all about the transmutation of cultural values into analytical tools… [Which] define and orient the investigation from the outset” (Jackson 2010: 143). For this reason, one of the natural inclinations for analyticist researchers is to adopt a form of social constructivism out of concern with the propagation of inter-subjectively-held ideas that guide or motivate behavior. If we are minds reaching out into the void, surely other people just like us are doing the same. Thus it stands to reason that understanding our social world depends on understanding this process.

On this point, Jackson is very careful to note that analyticism is not synonymous with social constructivism or an interpretivist methodology (Jackson 2010: 141-142). Attention to
rule-sets or guiding norms need not be concerned with how they are propagated, merely that people can be observed to follow them (Jackson 2010:133). As Jackson notes, “it is possible to generate valid knowledge about the rules of the game without thereby reducing the game to the subjective beliefs of its players” (Jackson 2010: 134). In fact, “there is no necessary reason why a philosophical-ontological monist need be committed to a participant-observation ethnography, qualitative interviewing, or any other ‘interpretive’ research tool or technique” (Jackson 2010: 134). It is sufficient merely to observe that they conform to expectations, regardless of the model of human behavior.

Jackson claims that Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* is the most notable – and perhaps the most frequently misinterpreted – example of analyticism in IR (see also Waever 2009).²¹ According to Jackson, it is fairly clear that Waltz sees theory, not as a ‘mirror’ held up to reality, but as a mental construct designed to help researchers resolve certain features at the expense of others – rejecting the “sharp distinction between theory and empirical reality upheld by neopositivists” (Jackson 2010: 113).²² Waltz asks and answers:

If a theory is not an edifice of truth and not a reproduction of reality, then what is it? A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and the connections among its parts … the infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different way. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifics relations among

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²¹ It should be noted that not all scholars agree with Jackson’s characterization. Jonathan Joseph (2010), for example, argues that Waltz is a neopositivist. Others argue that he is a Popperian or a pragmatist. Ole Waever (2009) suggests Waltz is a scientific realist, a classification rejected by both Alexander Wendt (1987) and Fred Chernoff (2002). Despite these objections, I am convinced of Jackson’s perspective.

²² “Theory, rather than being a mirror in which reality is reflected, is an instrument to be used in attempting to explain a circumscribed part of reality of whose true dimension we can never be sure (Waltz 1997: 913-914)
them… theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually (Waltz 1979: 8-9).

According to Jackson, this passage is evidence that Waltz is, at least as he expresses in *ToIP*, a mind-world monist who believes that theory serves an instrumental purpose in assisting the construction of reality.

As Waltz notes, the assumptions that go into Waltz’s theory is done, “for the sake of constructing a theory,” which is assessed not on the basis of its truth, “but whether it is the most sensible and useful one that can be made” (Waltz 1979: 91). So when Waltz speaks of the anarchic state system populated by rational actors, he is not intending to accurately reflect the international environment, but is instead creating an ideal-type international system against which we can choose – if we find it useful to do so -- to measure reality in order to derive, “important consequences not otherwise obvious” (Waltz 1979: 91).

Like Waltz’s structural realism, Luhmann’s modern systems theory is a classic example of analyticist thinking, displaying both mind-world monism and phenomenalism. Luhmann, who often referred to himself as a radical constructivist and frequently connected his work to that of Nietzsche and Derrida, argues forcefully for the inseparability of observed and observer (see Moeller 2006: chp 14). He argues in *Theory of Society* that:

[O]ne can neither assume that there exists a world at hand (*vorhanden*) consisting of things, substances, and ideas, nor can one designate their entirety (*universitas verum*) with the concept of ‘a world.’ For sense-systems the world is not a giant mechanism that produces states out of states and thus determines the systems themselves. The world is rather an immeasurable potential for surprises, it is virtual information that needs systems
to produce information, or more precisely; to ascribe to selected information the sense of being information (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 46).

Only systems of meaning – such as psychic systems (people) and communication systems -- can produce meaning. The world cannot produce meaning on its own as “self-evident” truth.

Strongly reminiscent of Wendt’s famous dictum, Luhmann asserts that “the world’s sense and essence is what autopoietic, sense-processing systems make it to be… to observe reality is to construct reality” (Luhmann 2002a:143). Reality is constructed by systems of communication which provide a model to processes meaning, and regardless of the model chosen, something is left un-theorized or unexamined (Luhmann 2002a: 147).

In addition to his mind-world monism, Luhmann adopted phenomenalism, arguing that, although his model extrapolates some factors of reality, it is still largely bound to experience and observation. He argues that even, “normative questions have to be derived from within this reality… they cannot be submitted to society as ideal conceptions of sociology from the outside... (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 13). Of course, being grounded in reality is not the same as rejecting simple models of the world. Just because the world has grown more complex does not mean we need an infinite number of observations to make any statement about the world. He points out that the:

Scientific treatment of complexity is that idealization or the simplification of model building does not suffice. Such proceedings misunderstand complexity as complication...

[and believes it can] be replaced by a methodology of second-order observation. We

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23 Translated from Moeller 2006: 69.
24 Luhmann was often dismissive of postmodernism as second-order observation, pointing out that critical theory and social constructivism, which for all of their cynism, merely run headlong into the paradox that the renunciation of a teleological narrative is itself a metanarrative – if it is true it is false (see Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 335-349).
hence abandon the idea of making complexity transparent and intelligible (Luhmann 1997a[2012]: 83).

To this end, Luhmann offers a theory with the capacity to “enhance its potential for complexity... for interpreting more heterogeneous facts with the same concepts and thus ensuring the comparability of widely different facts” (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:83).\(^{25}\)

That concept is grounded in the notion of “third-order” observation, which moves beyond the mere observation that social reality is constructed to a model that understands the world by modeling the models in everyone’s head. In this regard, modern systems theory takes the analyticist approach to its logical conclusion. If it is true that we only access the world via models or theories, and that these theories need to be grounded in reality in order to be useful, then an intelligent model of the world is one that incorporates the model makers and their respective model-making into a coherent model of society.\(^{26}\) As Luhmann explains in an interview shortly before his death:

The observation of the observers, the change of the consciousness of reality towards the description of descriptions, towards the perception of what others say or what others do not say, has become the advanced way of perceiving the world. And this is the case in all important function areas, in science as well as in the economy, in art as well as in

\(^{25}\) Luhmann recognized that what Talcott Parsons was trying to accomplish with AGIL template would have been better accomplished by reformulating it through what he called “analytical realism.” “At this level of reflection we can combine two fundamental interests underlying Parsons’ theoretical program that have appeared to be separate: the methodological effort to give his theory systematic coherence by means of ‘analytical realism,’ and the ‘Hobbesian-problem of order’ that formed the starting-point for the content of his theory. The first concern was that social reality can construct interdependences (i.e., systems) only by selecting certain aspects of things; and the sociological theory has to develop along lines as well, for only so can it come to be coherent. The second concern was that social order does not have to be instituted against self-interest. It is always already given, since the selective combination of components making up the action has itself a normative structure…. These conditions together form a structural property of complexity. They rise from the fact that a large number of elements can be combined only by means of selections” (Luhmann 1982b:64).

\(^{26}\) Luhmann argues that the pinnacle achievement of social science is to develop the ability for it to observe society observing itself – to model the modelers (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 1130).
We no longer need to know how the world is if we know how it is observed and if we can orient ourselves within the realm of second-order observation. We... follow the legitimizing systems such as science, economy, politics, or mass media of which we are not independent but who themselves are also only observing observations (Luhmann 2002a: 140-41[italics mine]).

Modern Systems Theory is a theory premised on “third-order observation,” and is concerned with the way in which observing systems construct their reality. Or to put it another way, it is the observation of observational systems, which is as much an empirical observation as it is an ontological commitment. It understands that there will be multiple models making sense of the same events, and rather than simply point out the contingency in their construction, it “[takes] them seriously as a condition of systemic reality and complexity” (Moeller 2006:75). This positions Luhmann to credibly argue for the existence of multiple “world orders” by modeling the process by which these competing visions of reality construct their worldview.

1.2 Moving past structural functionalism

While Luhmann can be ontologically positioned next to Waltz, substantively they are obviously quite different. Luhmann’s ideas – which he developed over the course nearly 400 published works – sit at the center of a broad array of concepts imported from disciplines far afield from sociology. The range of direct influences is vast, including his personal experiences with fascism and the German welfare state. Luhmann also seemed to have a knack for finding the

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28 Luhmann was born to a modest family in the northern German town of Luneburg on Dec 8, 1927. Luhmann’s early years were unremarkable save the observation by those who knew him that his reading regime was “forbidding,” as was his penchant for remarkably quick self-study. It is likely he acquired this skill out of necessity, if it did not come naturally. The gymnasium he attended at Luneburg was notable for its National Socialist thinking, a stance from which his conservative family distanced themselves, but which young Luhmann could not avoid.
work of unused or forgotten scholars and elevating their importance.\textsuperscript{29} He was particularly influenced by Continental philosophy and psychology. His philosophical forebears include the works of Gaston Bachelard,\textsuperscript{30} Reinhart Koselleck,\textsuperscript{31} Kenneth Burke,\textsuperscript{32} and Edmund Husserl (see

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Although we cannot know for certain, it is reasonable to assume that Luhmann suffered some isolation during secondary school because of this. Despite this social distance from Nazism, 15 year-old Niklas Luhmann found himself pressed into service in 1943 in defense of a local military airfield. The next year, he was forced to leave school and deploy to southern Germany as a conscripted soldier. Although this effectively ended his secondary studies, the geographic position of his station turned out to be quite fortunate. In August 1945, he was captured by advancing Americans – and not the Soviets -- and sent to a labor camp near Marseille. By his account, his treatment was not good and he was frequently beaten. Upon conclusion of the war, Luhmann was released back to his home town, but without any formal education, he was denied entrance to the local university. Through self-study, he was able to obtain his ‘abitur\textsuperscript{28} in and one year and was granted matriculation to the University of Freiberg. There he studied ancient Roman and comparative law. Although it is only conjecture, it is reasonable that his life experience – particularly the breakdown of order in pre-war Germany - led to this choice of career.

By the age of 26, after a brief stint as a private lawyer, he moved to the public sector – first as legal clerk in the higher administrative court in Luneburg and then as an educational official with the Ministry of Culture in Lower-Saxony. During this time he began his private study in sociology while maintaining his day job as a civil servant. He published two papers – one in 1958 and 1960 -- in a journal for public administration, and decided he wanted to do research. In 1960, he took leave from his position with the Lower Saxony government and gained admittance to the Harvard Littauer Center of Public Administration for a one-year term. However, when he arrived in Cambridge, he actually ignored his appointment and studied instead at the “Department of Social Relations,” where he met Talcott Parsons and ultimately decided to pursue a career as a sociological researcher.

After the year-long stint at Cambridge, he returned to Germany where he served as a guest lecturer at the University of Administrative Sciences in Speyer, Germany. Several years later, he was offered a spot by noted German sociologist Helmut Schelsky at the nascent University of Bielefeld. He took the position Biefeld as the department head of the “Institute of Social Research,” affiliated with the University of Munster in 1968. Before he assumed his role, he was required to submit an official research and funding proposal. His response was to hand back the form nearly blank except for this succinct statement: “The theory of modern society. Duration 30 years; no costs.” He remained as chair until his retirement in 1993, which allowed him to complete his masterwork Theory of Society, which was published one year before his death from cancer in 1998.

\textsuperscript{29} For example, Luhmann advances a theory of time which attributes he attributed to little-known French enlightenment philosopher Vauvenargues (Luhmann 1982: chp 3). He declared this man to be one of the key thinkers of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, despite his relative modern obscurity.

\textsuperscript{30} From the work of Gaston Bachelard he borrows the notion of obstacles epistemologiques and paradigm-contingent meaning of facts. Bachelard argues that science’s history is filled with "epistemological obstacles”—or unthought/unconscious structures – periodically created in the sciences which have to be torn down if science wishes to move in another direction, a process he refers to as epistemological break. Facts only have meaning from within these epistemological frames, and so new hypothesis require new breaks. Bachelard’s influence is wide reaching, including fellow French philosopher Michael Foucault and American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Luhmann’s usage is obvious insofar as Luhmann, as an analyticism owes in part this perspective from Bachelard’s pioneering works.

\textsuperscript{31} Reinhart Koselleck’s “historical semantics‘ from which Luhmann develops the concept of the change in language as a result of modernity.

\textsuperscript{32} From Kenneth Burke he borrows the idea of ‘perspective by incongruity,’ from which Luhmann develops the argument that meaning systems work only in a specific context. “Perspective by Incongruity” is Kenneth Burke's critical method in Permanence and Change (1935) and Attitudes toward History (1937). Burke (1937:308).

Defines the concept as a “method for gauging situations by verbal ‘atom cracking.’ That is, a word belongs by custom to a certain category—and by rational planning you wrench it loose and metaphorically apply it to a different category” (p. 308). An example of perspective by incongruity is the notion of “trained incapacity,” which refers to
Luhmann 1995b:Ch.1-4). From psychologists such as Fritz Heider, Rosh Ashby, Gregory Bateson, and Donald Campbell, Luhmann developed the mechanism for communicative replication.

Besides these influences, three names loom particularly large for Luhmann’s work – sociologist Talcott Parsons, mathematician G. Spencer Brown, and biologist Humberto Maturana. Modern systems theory is the direct descendent of Parson’s work, but Luhmann’s later writings draw heavily on Spencer Brown’s (1969) “calculus of distinctions” and Maturana’s (1980) concept of “autopoiesis” in order to fix many of the conceptual issues with Parson’s theory (see Luhmann 1997a [2012], 1997b [2013]; 2000a: 65). However, at its core, modern systems theory is a reimagining and “repair” of Talcott Parson’s functional systems theory and it is there we begin our discussion of modern systems theory.

the way in which one's very abilities can function as blindstones. In Luhmann’s work, this became the blind spot present in every functional system.

33 The idea that there is a strict separation of psychic systems (human minds) and social systems (communication systems) is developed from Edmund Husserl’s work, from which he also borrowed the notion of meaning as a mode of selectivity that builds complexity by remembering all the choices not taken.

34 Fritz Heider’s idea of “psychological balance” helped Luhmann develop the idea of a systemic binary code which maximizes the possibility of communicative success and minimize a person’s ambivalence toward the system’s attempt to continue its communication. In The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, Heider (1958: 182) argues that “To conceive of a person as having positive and negative traits requires a more sophisticated view; it requires a differentiation of the representation of the person into subparts that are of unlike value.” This perceptual organization is psychologically balanced, which means that the positive and negative sentiments about a person are represented such that information about the person is maximized and non-information minimized.

35 Luhmann leaned heavily on cyberneticist Ross Ashby’s (1952) argument for the “requisite variety” of a system, which states that systemic complexity reflects the demands placed upon it by its environment.

36 Gregory Bateson’s (1973) notion of “a difference that makes a difference,” is directly ported into Luhmann’s thinking (and serves as part of the title for the manuscript you are now reading). Obviously the phrase "a difference that makes a difference" resonates powerfully with many people. Perhaps this is because it is a pointer to a very common and important kind of complexity, in which systems are composed of linked, tightly coupled, sub-systems whose causal relationships have the property that any event in one sub-system (e.g. some property, value or relationship changing, or a part being added or remove) has effects in other subsystems, possibly ripples of effects spreading out through the whole system. Along with this idea of systemic need to minimize ambivalence, Information is a difference that can have an impact somewhere in the environment.

37 He also directly applies Donald Campbell’s (1965) theory of social evolution -- “variation, selection, retention” to his concept of communication system evolution.

38 Parsons built on the ideas of Robert Merton’s (1968) ‘functional equivalents,’ from which both he and Luhmann borrowed the concept of equal subsystems in a given society.
Talcott Parsons believed that the basis of social action, and therefore society itself, emerged from a series of events linked together -- what he referred to as an ‘action system’ (Parsons [1937]1968:16). Broad societal outcomes are, according to Parsons, best explained not through exploring why agents acted, but by uncovering the structural situations and objects that lead to social outcomes as an emergent functional process. As with most functional accounts, it excels at describing current structures but cannot account for system formation (see Wendt 1987). This is an obvious but nevertheless powerful critique of functional arguments that gets at both the arbitrary determination of structure and the perspective’s general inability to deal with change. Parson’s calls this particular nut the problem of “double-contingency” – the need to explain joint social actions of “Ego” and “Alter” when their internal motivations and drives are independent, but their social action (and even the very concept of social action) is dependent upon relational social knowledge (Parsons 1951: 16).

Parsons’ solution should be familiar to any IR scholar that has read Wendt (1992: 404-410) – resolution through the establishment of a consensus based on a normative “interpenetration of persons” (Parsons 1951: 536-537; Parsons and Shils 1951: 180). In this case, “interpenetration” refers to the imposition of or consent to “a single common system of ultimate ends… [or a] culminating element of unity” of which both Alter and Ego are naturally aware because humans, “develop and maintain attachment to the same integrated system of norms and to find solidarity in the pursuit of shared goals” (Parson 1934-35: 295; Parsons 1937: 249). Even where perfect solidarity cannot obtain, the “collective interests can be expected to prevail over the unit interests of its members whenever the two conflict” either through physical

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39He defines this concept as a “complex of interdependencies between parts, components, and processes that involve discernible regularities of relationship, and to a similar type of interdependency between such a complex and its surrounding environment” (Parsons 1977: 177).
or moral restraint (Parsons 1937: 403-404; 1968: 182). This ultimate value of solidarity, which Parsons argues becomes a normative order over time, is “by far the most satisfactory general solution of the problem of the basis of order in society” (Parsons 1934: 518; 1935: 282-316). In other words, these structures naturally form because Alter and Ego understand that survival requires cooperation, which in turn requires a system of rules to ensure fulfillment of the functional imperatives necessary for life.\(^{40}\)

Despite this apparent solution, Luhmann believed Parsons’ appeal to some innate awareness of future functionalism insufficient due to its failure to address the complexity inherent in acknowledged self-reference (Luhmann 1982: 59-64). Parsons thought that the creation of human society was a one-time event that was solved by the scholarly imposition of an inter-subjective “functional imperative” that was generalizable to all times and places, but ignored that it was in actuality a historically-contingent, Western idea. It never occurred to Parsons while he was inventing his theory he essentially faced was the same fundamental problem facing his fictional Ego and Alter – the creation of a distinction to understand the human social world.\(^{41}\) Luhmann realized that a theory that could demonstrate the process of knowledge

\(^{40}\) It would be wrong to suggest that Parsons believes that any idea could animate society. Parsons understood that social order is not merely the extension of culture or internal psychology, and thus required “selective factor” that would link the proper functioning with normative purpose (Parsons 1949: 44f). Such a notion, “ignores the organization of action about the exigencies of social systems as systems” (Parsons 1951: 539). Ultimate values are shaped by ‘real world’ factors, meaning that shared ideas run along a track of certain values. Social order “cannot have stability without the effective functioning of certain normative elements” (Parsons [1937] 1968a: 92). The AGIL analytical framework merges a voluntaristic theory of agency with a stable set of societal functions necessary for stability over time. These functions are as follows: [A]daptive function, [G]oal attainment, [I]ntegration, and [L]atency. Successful societies exhibit all four functions, and thusly have “[attained] the highest level of self-sufficiency as a system in relation to its environments” (Parsons 1969a: 10). Moreover, these functions provide the animating purpose that solves the problem of double-contingency. Faced with scarce resources, Alter and Ego are made aware of their need to work together to ensure their survival. The plan ahead to do this, because it is in both of their interests. They set out a series of rules to follow to ensure this plan is not interrupted, and they pass on this rule-set to others.

\(^{41}\) What he thought were two separate lines of inquiry – the origin of society (and the problem of double-contingency) and his desired ontological perspective – culminating in an ideal-type schema -- were actually bound “together … [as] a structural property of complexity (Luhmann 1982:64).
creation – model its own creation -- could also plausibly model the process by which human society constantly creates itself (Luhmann 1982:49). Parson’s did not.

This kind of self-aware theorizing is not particularly difficult for modern scholars who are steeped in post-modernism. In fact, one of the purposes of critical theory is to highlight these unacknowledged and contingent “truths.” However, what happens when Alter and Ego are also “in” on the contingency?

Reframed in the language of the double-contingency problem, the consequences of everyone possessing the capacity for second-order observation is that both Alter and Ego know that they can know more than they know. That is, they are aware of two paths in any functionally-motivated “ultimate value” -- a negative and a positive – which would totally negate the impact that a structural impetus is supposed to have. They would realize that despite the existence of a certain economic imperative or political plan, for example, matters could be otherwise.

In Parson’s world, they never do, which makes them puppets not actors. The only agent in Parsons’ world is Parsons – which is why functional arguments are so often unconvincing. The theory therefore breaks down when dealing with questions such as the origin of society, the limitation of systems, and society’s evolution because Parsons is not omniscient -- Parsons

42 Or to put it Luhmann’s terms, “The contingency inherent in every theory must be made visible before we can judge its claims and can recognize and explain its consequences” (Luhmann 1982:47). It must be built with self-awareness because the object of study (society) is inseparable from the mind that creates it. To wit, Luhmann asks: “Is analysis itself an action, and if not what is its actual social basis? If it is an action, what enables it as a means of decomposition to undercut and go beyond the elementary structures of action-systems? Can an action system that analyzes actions analyze its own practice of analysis, even if actions within a system function as elements? Must theory at this point rely upon a non-empirical, a priori epistemology? Or can theory justify itself self-referentially by treating itself as one of its objects, as an action-system among others? And above all, how do answers to these questions predetermine the behavior of the theory over time, its ability to learn, and its future prospects?” (Luhmann 1982:49).
simply cannot see what he cannot see – and, even if he could, the agents that populate his model are not Parsons.  

Analyticism is, frankly, a risky proposition. In the end it boils down to buying the theorist’s assumptions or not, a decisions which rests on the reasonableness of the wager. Parson’s AGIL-framework merely asserts that society is differentiated among functional systems without explaining why that should be the case or explaining how it could have been different. In the end, Alter and Ego never did have to solve the problem of double-contingency because it was solved for them by Parson. Referring to the current status of world society, Luhmann remarked that accepting Parson’s formulation as given requires, “giving up the theoretical possibility of independently judging this development” (Luhmann 1982: 59).

To correct Parson’s inability to conceptualize neither the origin of functional systems nor systemic change Luhmann turns to two unlikely sources -- British mathematician G Spencer Brown and Brazilian biologist Humberto Maturana. Spencer Brown’s work on observation provided the skeleton for Luhmann’s understanding of how these self-referential systems can simultaneously be highly structured yet prone to change. Maturana’s work gave Luhmann the conceptual language to describe how these systems could reproduce themselves through internal mechanisms, and with it the language to describe complexity.

In Cognition and Autopoiesis Maturana and Francisco Valera advance the idea that one way to distinguish living from non-living entities is through what they called the autopoiesis of

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43 Luhmann frames the consequences thusly: By claiming that this [AGIL] schema is deduced from his theory, Parsons could (and had to) postulate that these are the only such functions. That means that every action-system must exhibit them (if not optimally, then at least adequately). And that means that the internal differentiation of any social systems requires that this schema be exhibited in each of the subsystems within that system. These are bold and risky assumptions by which to support a whole theory!” (Luhmann 1982:54-55).

44 “A scientific theory can only focus on a limited number of aspects of its domain and hence must limit its endeavors. A theory putting forth universal claims must therefore adduce and justify its own principles for limiting itself. In other words, it must be able to describe what it excludes and demonstrate that its exclusions are well chosen (Luhmann 1978 pp. 14ff)” (Luhmann 1982:56).
the living entity. The word itself was invented by Maturana and is a neologism made up of two ancient Greek components *autos* (self) and *poiesis* (production).\(^{45}\) The basic idea behind autopoiesis is that it refers to a self-referential system that, through its own components, reproduces itself without any other goals (Maturana and Varela 1980: xvii-xviii, xix- xx). Successful reproduction produces a near-copy of itself (or as near as can be managed) (Maturana and Varela 1980: xx). Disrupting this process by introducing other elements may result in its failure to reproduce (Maturana and Varela 1980: xxii-xxiii).

The importance of this concept to modern systems theory cannot be understated. Broadly speaking, systems theory (e.g., structural functionalism) is particular vulnerable to critics who point to the nearly tautological argument that justifies a given structural arrangement -- a system exists because it is needed. That is, because *humans need it*. This implies that humans could change it if they want to, but for whatever reason ‘functional imperatives’ or some other such thing prevents them from doing so. This arrangement is obviously unsatisfactory, both because the lived human experience brings with it a certain belief in one’s agency and because, more importantly, ‘just so’ theorizing is not particularly good.

The concept of autopoiesis allows for a different perspective by giving the systems the same sort of agency possessed by microbes and other limited organisms – a sort of ‘process-based’ agency. Instead of growing to cover some eternal human need, these systems simply reproduce. Any ‘functionality’ is a byproduct of this process. They are systems of communication first, functional systems second.

\(^{45}\) Autopoiesis is “a word without history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems [the word’s invention]... simplified enormously the task of talking about the organization of the living without falling into the always gaping trap of not saying anything new because the language does not permit it” (Maturana and Varela 1980: xvii)
This concept also subtly shifts the potential for human agency within Luhmann’s theory. Functional theories typically limit human agency by depicting a very static picture of human nature. To explain the current range of functions, theorists like Parsons lean on ‘self-evident’ human needs. A world society populated by autopoietic communication systems, on the other hand, suggests that the current range of functional systems present within world society depends solely on the process by which communication systems reproduce their communication. Instead of an unchanging human nature, humans are portrayed as a variable environment for the systems. Environments can be beneficial or harmful, and they are not always constant. “Functionality” is thus relational – if the environment becomes hostile to a given difference, those systems that fail to adapt simply perish.

While the concept autopoiesis does accurately convey the nature of communication systems and at least hint at the role of human agency, alone the term does not quite explain how humans interact with systems. Humans as “the environment” suggests that the best they can do is occasionally ‘interfere’ with systemic reproduction, but on what basis would a human even know to interfere at all? To clarify the role of humans in the construction of the social world, Luhmann relies on the concepts developed in the calculus of G Spencer Brown.

In The Law of Forms,46 Spencer-Brown describes the mathematical characteristics of observations. According to Spencer-Brown, each observation has two components – a distinction and an indication. The distinction separates space into two spaces – observed and unobserved – and the observer indicates which is which. This creates an asymmetrical reading where one space is a marked state and the other is an unmarked state, but the observation itself carries with it both sides of the distinction. The observation itself, or the “form” the observation

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46 Nowhere in this book is there any description of society, communication, or systems. It is a book about algebra. Luhmann merely applied the concepts to the study of society. Also, this language is very technical.
takes, is therefore the “unity of the difference” between the two sides, even though only one can be marked at any given time. The two sides could not be more differentiated since they are by definition opposites, but they are unified in the sense that the two states are the direct result of a single observation. As Spencer Brown points out, “It is the condensation [of the two meanings into one distinction] that gives the symbol [of the distinction] its power” (Spencer Brown 1969: 81). Or to put it another way, the observation marks one thing in the world as this and all other things as not that. It is, by its nature, a totalizing binary.

Spencer Brown illustrates his formal mathematics with a metaphor (Brown 1969: 58-60). Imagine that before you is a blank sheet of paper. No distinctions currently exist on the paper. Now imagine that you draw a circle on the paper. You observe that the paper now consists of two distinct sections -- an inside and outside of the circle on the previously blank piece of paper. The two sides are simultaneously unified and divided by the drawing of a circle. This is what is meant by the phrase “unity of the difference.” This circle also creates new knowledge about that space by indicating a space inside and outside of the circle.

We can take this metaphor and extend it to explain how humans can interrupt but are also limited by the autopoiesis of a communication system. Imagine that on the paper there is a two-dimensional being and it draws this circle. Liking circles, it chooses to dwell in the circle for its entire two-dimensional life. Inside the circle is “home” and outside is “not home.” For this creature and its eventual descendants, their world is understood using this distinction – home and not home. These descendent two-dimensional creatures are bound by the original distinction – they see their world in terms of “home” and “not home” – which limits their model of their world to this single distinction. That there was a time before this distinction, or that there might be
other distinctions to be made, does not occur to them, and so it becomes an insurmountable observational *blind spot*. They cannot see what they cannot see.

As an outside observer that was present from the beginning, you of course can see both the original distinction *and* the blind spot. You can also see that at one time the two-dimensional creature drew the circle, making the choice to mark one space and not the other. You see what the current two-dimensional creatures do not. This is the difference between first-order observation (the two-dimensional creatures) and second-order observation (you) (Luhmann 1993b:16). Now imagine that a third observer watches you watching the two-dimensional creature. This new observer sees that you made an observation as well -- the distinction between *before the circle* and *after the circle*. This new observer is observing you observe, but wonders why you are fixated on the temporal dimensions of the circle when there are other features of the paper that could generate knowledge about it.

Even if it is a little imperfect, this metaphor is useful because it establishes that the only way to observe the original observation is to essentially “leave” the marked/unmarked space. However, the two-dimensional creatures doing that would forever destroy their forebear’s original observation – the distinction of *home* and *not home* is obliterated in favor of a new distinction. This knowledge constitutes a paradox: if we can see that we have a blind spot, the blind spot instantly vanishes since the distinction on which it is premised vanishes. A second observer observing the first observation, on the other hand, is not so bound by the original observation. Spencer Brown originally solves the paradox by the inclusion of time, which connects all of the distinctions through an observational process (Spencer Brown 1969: 58-60). As social scientists we would simply refer to this as contingency.
The notion of contingency is not particularly radical, but to this Luhmann adds the third-order observer. This observer sees that second-order observers are, in a way, still bound by the original observation. Even if they understand the time-related contingency of the original observation, they are still choosing to limit their observation to the making of that particular distinction itself and can be observed doing so. However this also highlights the fragility of all distinctions and the differences they provide.

Luhmann marries Spencer Brown’s law of forms to Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis to explain in part how communication systems function as self-referential systems and how humans interact with these systems (Luhmann 1995: 455). Going back to the metaphor, the two-dimensional observer is the communication system itself. It is the original observation – the circle as *home* and the area outside as *not home* – and it must maintain that observation or that observation is destroyed. In other words, to maintain its autopoiesis, it must continually reproduce that single distinction. If anything were to supplant this distinction, the autopoiesis of the distinction is interrupted.

Second-order observers – in other words, people -- might understand that there are probably more ways to model the space on the paper beyond the *home/not home* distinction, but if they do not act to disrupt the original observation, they are confining their second order observation to the original distinction even if they know it could be otherwise. They are thus participating in the autopoiesis of the communication systems by choosing, in essence, to ratify the original distinction as a useful way to think about the space on the paper.

These second-order observers in turn run the risk of having their own observation disrupted by a third-order observer, which for our purposes will be myself, the researcher. I spend this paper theorizing why and how second-order observation either restrict themselves to a
first-order observation or instead choose to disrupt that autopoiesis. However, and this is important to note, I am also a second-order observer in that I am observing this process through the distinction provided by the scientific system, a functional communication systems that demarcates the social world in terms of [scientific] truth/not truth. This model of the social world forms the framework for my interrogation of the organizations (second-order observers) of the political (the United States) and religious systems (the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the Catholic Church). In other words, one of the interesting aspects of modern systems theory is that it allows us all to locate ourselves within it, giving us a curious degree of bounded agency.

### 1.2.1 Repairing Parsons

In Parson’s telling, Alter and Ego overcame their lack of social capability through accession to a singular, unifying framework – survival. This moral value or simple desire in turn gave rise to sub-functions that serve this larger purpose, which Parsons describes using his famous AGIL schema. This was a satisfactory solution to no one except maybe Parsons. Armed with this new conceptual language borrowed from Maturana and Spencer-Brown, Luhmann reframes Parsons’ problem of double contingency and provides a new story for the formation of systems.

It goes like this. Alter and Ego might indeed come into contact, but they have no joint frame of reference. There simply is not any self-evident function that precedes social action. If there is repeated interaction, perhaps eventually they begin to share a common distinction, which is to say, the communication spontaneously evolves. Whereas before there was nothing, now there is a “circle on a piece of paper,” metaphorically speaking.

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47 That is, they have their “Darmok and Jalad at Tanagra” moment,” to relate this to science fiction [Star Trek the Next Generation].
If Alter and Ego meet repeatedly, they may remember that the situation was handled using the “circle on paper” distinction in the past, yet they still lack a way to interface directly – neither can read the other’s mind, after all. Lacking such interface, the only thing that can reduce their mutual uncertainty is for both to refer to the prior distinction as their frame of reference (Luhmann 1995: 131-132). More specifically, they begin to build a social world around the metaphorical circle on the piece of paper. Thus knowledge creation around the distinction itself becomes central to Alter and Ego’s efforts to reduce uncertainty between them if they are to continue interacting. They become “increasingly occupied with arguments about [this] self-created reality: with handling facts and expectations that the [communication] itself has helped to create” (Luhmann 1995: 132).

At this point that particular distinction can evolve in different ways. Even with a well-defined, well-documented distinction to guide them, the contingency built into every interaction opens up the “chance for conditioning functions within the system… the transformation of chance into structural probabilities” (Luhmann 1995:120). For example, Alter and Ego can take their metaphorical circle on paper to others, who in turn may decide that is a good way to structure social interactions. Or perhaps these others prefer squares on paper, which keeps the same distinction with only a slight modification. Or they might reject it completely because they already have other distinctions available to understand their social world – say sky/not sky. Maybe faced with such a new and lovely distinction, Alter and Ego abandon “circle on paper” completely and spread the benefits of sky/not sky throughout their area (see Luhmann 1995: chp 3). Thus would end the “circle on paper” as a useful distinction to help generate social knowledge.
What Luhmann realizes is that the ‘problem of double contingency’ only ever manages to temporarily resolve itself, yet it is in this tension between solution and dissolution where we find the key to functional systems without functional imperatives. This process provides the potential for an unlimited number of potential distinctions. Expanded outwards, a never-ending condition of double contingency enables the creation of society because it opens the possibility for limitless distinctions, limitless difference, and thus limitless evolution. Contra Parsons, Luhmann thus argues that double contingency is not actually an obstacle to social order, it constitutes social order. The human social world is a never-ending process of meaning-creation.

This formulation also opens up a nuanced conception of agency within modern systems theory – the notion of people as selectors. Alter and Ego select a random distinction as the means of communication, but once the selection is made, that distinction is independent, and while the information around the distinction can get quite complicated, the distinction itself can only ever be accepted or rejected in total. In this way, people are constantly selecting and rejecting and thus hold a sort of instantaneous veto power over knowledge creation in their social world. Yet the process of meaning-creation is not explicitly directed by human agency. Once this distinction spreads to a large number of people, the particular characteristics of an Alter or Ego become less important than the distinction itself. At a certain stage -- although there is no way to be certain when that stage is reached until it happens -- understanding the autopoietic process of a given distinction becomes more important than understanding the characteristics of individuals.

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48 In this theory people function as selectors of meaning. “Through the connection between selections and further selections is the course of communication, a domain of what is to be accepted and expected condenses, and its boundaries cut across the world of meaning. Psychic systems thereby become persons, namely, collages of expectations, functioning as points of reference [the expectations] for further selections within the system [of communication] (Luhmann 1995: 127).
So the question Luhmann asks is “why?” Why does this distinction persist while that distinction does not? In what ways is a given distinction used and how does this distinction communicate its usefulness? More pointedly, how does this distinction maintain its usefulness in the face of a universe of other potentially useful distinctions?

To answer these questions, Luhmann shifts the study of society from the actions of agents to the process by which communication replicates. Since this communication is not reducible to any one person’s selection or action, the theoretically and empirically sound choice is to analyze the communication alone as an autopoietic thing in itself.

1.3 Modern systems theory: The logic of communicative reproduction
Modern systems theory begins with two assumptions about “human nature.” The first is that humans want to and do participate in communication. The second assumption is that nothing more specific about human nature can be ascertained aside from this basic impulse. What kind of communication or how much communication a specific person will engage in is an unanswerable question. A human could engage in economic communication, political communication, and religious communication throughout the course of a single interaction, or choose to reject it all entirely. Because of this contingency, modern systems theory concerns itself with modeling the process by which communication systems convince humans to “select” their distinction as a means of understanding and creating the social world. Humans are an environmental constraint, but given their inherent indeterminacy they cannot be meaningfully modeled.

Many social scientists are used to thinking about people doing the acting, or failing that, we are used to thinking about states or other corporate entities doing things – including communicating. Luhmann stakes out a strong position arguing that this is not the case:
Within the communication system we call society, it is conventional to assume that humans can communicate. Even clever analysts have been fooled by this convention. It is relatively easy to see that this statement is false and that it only functions as a convention and only within communication. The convention is necessary because communication necessarily addresses its operations to those who are required to continue communication. Humans cannot communicate; not even their brains can communication; not even their conscious minds can communicate. Only communication can communicate (Luhmann 1994a: 371).

The consequences of this decision to move our focus from people to communication systems are vast. With the move to exclude humans from communication, modern systems theory removes humans from the social world, which is from the standpoint of modeling only comprised of systems of communication. This has the rather perverse effect of giving humans ontological equality to communication system since it “frees” them from a particular system, but it does so at the cost of being usefully modeled as a part of the social world. Humans therefore have no single address in society.

A brief illustration will hopefully shed more light on the reasoning behind this particular decision. Imagine that while you are sitting at your local coffee shop you notice a small family engaged in conversation while waiting in line. Right before they get to the counter, a cell phone rings and one of the family members answers it. From what you can tell, the phone call is about a scientific medical study being supervised by the family member. Still on the phone, the conversationalist pays for the others with a small plastic card. Once the transaction is completed the family leaves and get in their car. This story is a variation on everyone’s lived experience,
but despite its mundane appearance, it is actually a rich and nuanced example of what Luhmann calls “communication communicating.”

The idea of “communication communicating” is an empirical statement about the content of the communication itself. We witnessed several communicative events – among the family members, the medical supervisor and her team on the phone, and between the phone caller and the cashier. The supposed “nature,” identity, or internal disposition of these people is unobservable. The only thing we can actually observe is that there were several communicative events and that the people in the coffee shop selected a particular form of communication in these interactions. Communication systems communicate without explicit reference to the cognitive status or action of a state or human. For this reason, its theoretical focus is on the process of communication with empirical attention paid to the actual communicative event.

In positing a post-anthropogenic social world, modern systems theory finds itself out of step with much of the social theorizing in the Western tradition, and almost certainly the instincts people have about the social world “works.” 49 In fact, many of the theories available to IR scholars rely on some extrapolation of an explicit “human nature” -- realist power maximizers, liberal rational actors, and Marxist homo economicus – to name just a few. Even constructivism, with which modern systems shares an ontological commitment to theorizing contingent, macro-level meaning-creation, typically directs analysis to the role of humans and states in propagating

49 In contrast, traditional theories of society are modeled as assemblages of human beings animated by a single purpose – or at least united along a singular definitional axis. This is true of political theorists from Hobbes to Habermas and in IR of theorists as varied as Waltz and Wendt. Whether society is predicated on the aggregation of interests or a shared value (as in Parson’s case), the mechanics of the model are basically the same. “Traditional (“Old European”) descriptions of society still dominate public education and the mass media more than our actual experiences of social life… [They] tended to define society in terms of a group of people: the polis was, in the words of Allan Bloom, ‘a community of men sharing a way of life’ (1991, 439-40)... [It is a] society based on a ‘social contract’ between its individual members… Jeremy Bentham rationalized… the idea of a community of individuals so that it became a mathematical sum of individuals… consensus theory of ‘communicative action’ (Habermas) or of ‘fairness’ (Rawls) still conceived of society on the basis of a group model and of communication between human beings. There is a strong ‘anthropocentric’ tradition in European and North American social philosophy” (Moeller 2006: 5).
ideas, identities, and roles. So while modern systems theory also leads to the rejection of the ‘anarchy problematique,’ levels-of-analysis concerns, and the existence of an “Archimedean point” from which to assess reality, to provide a few examples, it does so without agency (see Campbell 2007: 209-10; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 262).

Of course the idea of linked meaning creation and the depersonalization of people through meaning constructs is not a new insight (see also Checkel 1998:341 for a similar idea). However, modern systems theory differs from critical constructivist theory in that it is not primarily concerned with problematizing power structures or the state system (Ashley 1987; Biersteker and Weber 1996). It is also unconcerned with how powerful groups use meaning constructs to silence groups. From the perspective of modern systems theory, both sides of a given distinction are unified in that single communicative observation insofar as both subaltern and dominant groups are generated by that singular distinction. They are part of the same process of meaning creation. Whether or not there is an advantaged and disadvantaged group is irrelevant – it does not make a difference that makes a difference.

In sum, humans are not explicitly theorized in modern systems theory. Beyond their role as selectors, which does suggest that they are cognitively or mentally engaged with communication, they have no determined nature or internal disposition save as a potential environment for various distinctions. If humans were to have a distinct set of preferences, some

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Constructivism broadly construed examines how people act toward objects on the basis of meaning (Wendt 1992: 396-397). These meanings are intersubjective and are thus “not reducible to individual minds” (Legro 2005:5). They are not mental so much as they are “symbolic and organizational… embedded not only in human brains but also in [the] ‘collective memories’” of institutions and state interactions (Legro 2005:6). How people and states create their social world through collective understandings (Adler 1997: 322; Barnett 2005; Hopf 1998: 182; Hurd 2007a). It looks at how people create stable identities and roles, and how these ideas are internalized (Hurd 2007a; Wendt 1992: 397). Applied to the study of international relations, it focuses on the mutual constitution of actors and structures, the inter-subjectivity of anarchy, the social construction of state interests and identities, the relevance of discourse for state legitimation, the possibility for change (Hopf 1998: 172-173; see also Finnemore 1996, 2003).
systems of communications would obviously be advantaged over others. Empirically that does not seem to be the case, unless one wants to delve into arguments about shifting human nature.

1.3.1 The process of communication

If humans do not communicate, then it is necessary to model how communication itself communicates. In modern systems theory, communication formally refers to the process of uncertainty reduction through the selection of a particular distinction as a means of creating or sustaining the social world (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 190). There are three stages to this process – “information, utterance, and understanding” (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 36). Information refers to the observation of a distinction and the difference it marks. Utterance refers to the delivery of this distinction through a medium or organization. Understanding refers to the acceptance (or rejection) of a given distinction by people as selectors. All of these steps to the process are independent of one another, but communication has not occurred unless they are all present. Or to put it in Luhmann’s words, “communication …functions operationally as the unity of the difference between information, utterance, and understanding without being able to communicate this unity” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 45).51

The first stage in communication is the creation of meaning, which Luhmann defines as the “determination of a distinction” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 25-26). When you observe that something is different, you also note that something is not this, the differentiation of some thing into a marked and unmarked state. “All observation depends on differences [which] explain the

51 “If we understand communication as an entity comprising the three components information, utterance, and understanding, which are produced only in communicating, this excludes the possibility of assigning ontological primacy to one of these components. It can neither be assumed that there is a factual world that can then be talked about nor does the origin of communication lie in the ‘subjective’ act of communicating that imparts meaning; nor is there a society at the outset that prescribes via cultural institutions how something is to be understood as communication. The unit of communicative events cannot be deduced objectively, subjectively, or socially; and for this very reason communication creates the medium of meaning in which it can decide continuously whether further communication seeks its problem in information, utterance, or understanding” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 36).
wealth of meaning in the world; for we can identify what we are indicating by exposing it to one
difference after another” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 26). As the object and subject of this meaning
creation, all information creation takes the same “form.”52 In this Luhmann follows Spencer
Brown, insofar as the study of society becomes:

[Concerned]… not with special objects... but with a special sort of form... a form of
forms... that explicates the general properties of every two-sided form in terms of 'system
and environment'... this mode of presentation can show that, although systems and
environment are separate as two sides of a form, neither can exist without the other”
(Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 30).  

Modern systems theory is concerned with the manner in which these forms are created and
sustained.

Following Brown’s logic, this distinction, once made, can only ever be about that
distinction. In this regard, it is something like a flashlight. It can illuminate one thing, but leaves
everything else in the dark, including itself. This is key, because if it could see what it does not
see it would obliterate its ability to make the distinction at all (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 45).

The second stage in the communication process is the delivery of the meaning – the
“utterance” and the “acceptance” of that utterance. According to Luhmann, “every
communication must at the same time communicate that it is a communication and mark who
has uttered what so that follow-up communication can be determined and autopoiesis continued”

52 “A form may consist in the difference between something and everything else, in the difference between
something and its context... or in the difference between a value and the counter value to the exclusion of third
possibilities. Whenever the form concepts marks the one side of a distinction on the condition that there is another
side determined by it, there is also a super form, namely, the form of the distinction of the form from something
else” (30).

53 This is what Luhmann talks about when he refers to the “unity of difference.” The actual differences – the unity
of differences – are generated blindly and can only be observed by a given system (since it is generated by the
operations of a system) if they were able to observe themselves observing (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 31).
Communication is a process and not simply a description of speaking or writing, which separates it from common every-day interactions, but is akin to model-making, where the language itself is declarative to that effect. “Utterance” implies this sort of language as opposed to every-day interaction. Organizations, which will be discussed in much more detail later, are a key component of this stage of communication since they are particularly adept at ensuring a given distinction is delivered intact.

The final stages is the acceptance of this distinction. Once accepted, the process will cycle again because that is the only thing communication can do -- communicate. “It uses this distinction to see whether further communication has to react to doubts about information... [or] difficulties in understanding” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 45). Its goal is to continue and spread indefinitely. This creates tunnel vision on the part of the observer (the system). It is like the hedgehog, it knows only one big thing to the exclusion of all other distinctions. For this reason, no purveyor of an observation is, “in a position to capture the full reality of the system that carries it out. It can only do something instead, only choose substitute solutions; and it does so by selecting distinctions with which the system observes itself” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 45).

This is the process by which communication systems maintain their autopoiesis. Once a distinction is made, it either continues to be a useful way to create or sustain the social world, or it ceases to exist. All communication systems, whether functional or not, follow this cycle.

This brings us to an important question about communication. Specifically, how do we know when a communication system becomes a system? In truth, the answer is likely unsatisfying – it is difficult to assess and requires some historical distance. Luhmann writes that the, “structural change of society is beyond the observation and description of its contemporaries. Only after it has been completed and when it becomes practically irreversible,
semantics takes on the task to describe what now becomes visible” (Luhmann 1989: 8). At its most basic, communication systems can be identified through basic operations which reference society and cannot be identified as a subsystem of an existing system. That is, it must contribute to the creation of society through providing a useful model without reference to any other distinction, which it indicates through its self-identification as a functional system (See Roth and Schutz 2015: 15; Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 96). Strictly speaking, we only have the language to describe a communication system once it supplies it for us. A world without a political system, for example, would never be able to describe the emergence of a political system unless that distinction has been already been made.

This is not a tautological claim. To be clear, there quite obviously had to be a group that was the first to use a particular distinction. However, given the randomness involved there is simply no way to model it precisely—anymore than we could successfully theorize the emergence of wings or eyebrows. Certainly there is a great deal of archeological research that can be done to trace the genealogy of a given distinction, which is, coincidentally, what Luhmann spent the grand majority of his career working on.\textsuperscript{54} We can describe the evolutionary trajectory of all the communication systems. However, it is impossible to model what is at its core the result of accident and chance. Even concepts such as “tipping points” or “critical junctures” are not as useful as it seems. Just as there was no way to tell what life forms would

emerge from the Chicxulub impact evolutionarily ascendant, or what the human form might look like two million years hence, so too is it impossible to predict which communication systems will remain functional or what new systems will emerge in the future.

The only thing that can be predicted in advance is the process itself. The process described by modern systems theory tells us that some systems of communication will likely emerge in the future, and some will decline. We can make guesses about the future trajectory of these systems based on certain metrics (e.g., strong organizations), which I do, but we cannot know for sure. No other theoretical perspective can do more than this, and some do a lot less as a matter of fact.

1.3.2 Communication systems

Because human beings cannot be located at any specific address in society, the main focus of modern systems theory is on the communication systems themselves. Both theoretically and empirically it is the communicative systems themselves that replicate and adapt.

Conceiving of society in this way results in the unavoidable attribution of a process-based agency to communicative systems, even if they have no intentionality. 55 Conceptually, I liken communicative systems to “memes” – a unit of information transmission whose sole purpose is to replicate – popularized by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and philosopher Daniel Dennett (see Dawkins 1976; 2003: 128-145; Dennett 1995). 56 Although this is not a perfect metaphor, it does capture the essence of communication systems. Like viruses or memes, communication systems are concerned with reproduction and so their top priority is continuing

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55 Daniel Dennett (1987:3-4; 1989, 2006) argues that humans like to attribute agency – what he calls the “intentional stance” – to anything that alters an environment.

56 The study of “mimetics” is largely a moribund research program in part because it duplicated what many in the social sciences, including Niklas Luhmann, were already doing (see Claidiere and Andre 2012; Edmond 2005).
their independent – or autopoietic – existence as meaning-makers. Like biological organisms, they also have an environment, which in the case of communication system is people as selectors. As selectors, people decide which communication systems reproduce and which ones are quite literally forgotten by using the distinction as a means to organize and create their social world. *If there is only one concept to glean from this chapter, it is that communication systems are oriented entirely to this one task of reproduction and that means getting people to adopt their model (or distinction) as a means to understand and create the social world.*

So what is a communication system? Put technically, a system of communication is an iteration of meaning selections (a distinction) with content that can be differentiated by an observer from other iterative meaning selections (distinctions) (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 22, 35). These systems are quite literally a distinction between themselves and everything that is not marked by the distinction, including people and other distinctions (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 76). Every time the distinction is accepted by selectors, the selection reaffirms the boundary between itself and the distinction of every other communication system (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 38-39). Communication systems that helpfully order the world through the difference they provide can become functional. That is, functionality is created through a useful distinction that references society, allowing for the understanding and creation of the social world by people.

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57“Systems using meaning are systems that, by their very medium, can observe and describe themselves and their environments only in the form of meaning, in other words, with reentry of the form into the form Systems that operate in the medium of meaning... must, distinguish between self-reference and other reference; and they must do so in such a way that the actualization of self-reference always comprehends other-reference, and that the actualization of other-reference always comprehends self-reference as the other side of the distinction. All forms in the medium of meaning must therefore be constituted relative to the system, regardless of whether the accent is on self-reference or other reference at the given moment. It is this distinction that makes such processes as learning, system development, and the evolutionary development of complexity possible... it also makes possible to set out from two operationally very different meaning-constituting systems... psychic systems and social system” (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:22).
Below is a table that lists ten consistently identified functional systems within world society research. These functional communication systems share two features. Firstly, they

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some Functional Systems of World Society</th>
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<td>Mass Media</td>
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In systems theory research there has been a good bit of controversy surrounding attempts to provide an exhaustive or canonical list of functional communication systems (Roth and Schutz 2015). This indeterminacy on the margins is most likely due to the open, process based generation of systems. Even Luhmann himself had a tendency to add the phrase, “and so on,” or “for example,” to his lists. He wrote in *The Paradox of Observing Systems*, “Society remains the same but appears as different depending upon the functional subsystem (politics, economy, science, mass media, education, religion, art, and so on) that describes it (Luhmann 1995b: 48 emphasis added). Since Luhmann, there have been numerous attempts to establish a canon (Anderson and Born 2008: 334; Guenduez and Schedler 2014: 61f; Kunzler 1987, 1989; Moeller 2012: 29; Stichweh 2001: 30f, 2004:3, 2005: 163; Reese-Schafer 1999: 176f). Systems that have been included are those of politics, economy, science, art, religion, law, the medical system, education, mass media, love, morality, social movements, ethics, social work, culture, war, and psychic system (people). All of the lists include the political system, economy, science, art, religion, law, medicine, education, and mass media (see Luhmann 1989: 36).

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60 Who gets to make collective decisions or not.
are autopoietic and characterized by a distinction that takes the form of a binary code. Secondly, these functional systems are propagated through media and organizations which are designed to package the distinction in an immediately identifiable way and actively promote the distinction through the development of programs, respectively.

As has been discussed at some length already, the *distinction* of communication systems takes the forms of an identifiable *binary code*, which marks the social world into two pieces — *this* [positive value] and (everything else is) *not this* [negative value]. Meaning – or the reduction of uncertainty through the creation of a distinction-- is generated through the observation of a difference vis-a-vis the environment and reproduced through this binary code (1997a [2012]:33, 76-83; 1997b [2013]: 868-79). All events and interactions within the social world can be interpreted through this binary code (even if a particular interpretation is not particular useful for humans).

For example, global climate change can be interpreted through the scientific binary of *true/untrue*, but it can just as legitimately be understood through any of the other binaries as well. Moreover, these interpretations are independent of each other. The determination that global climate change falls on the positive side of the scientific distinction – that is, it is *true* – has no natural bearing on its interpretation through the religious binary of *immanent/transcendent* or the legal binary of *lawful/unlawful*. Over time humans might select the scientific system to be the distinction through with which to view global climate change until at last it attains a sort of “communicative hegemony” on this issue. Nevertheless, other binaries will likely always present alternatives to the dominant model.

The preservation of this binary distinction is referred to as the communication systems’ *autopoiesis*. To recall our earlier discussion of the concept, an autopoietic structure is defined as
a thing that reproduces itself through an internal capacity (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 66, 114). In the context of modern systems theory, autopoiesis refers to a communication system’s autonomy from and operational closure relative to other distinctions (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:32). Autonomy and operational closure are the natural consequence of a system’s evolution around a singular distinction. Communication system cannot contain or make reference to any other distinction; else its distinction will be obliterated. Communication systems are necessarily independent of anything other than their own internal operations (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 24, 32- 33).

A good way to conceptualize operational closure is to think about the immune system’s interaction with other systems within the human body. We tend to think of the immune system as defending the body from outside threats. In reality, the immune system responds solely on the basis of its own internal workings. Even though it relies upon the circulation system for transport, the cardiovascular system for oxygenation, and the digestive system for energy, it will attack all of these systems if it perceives them as ‘threats’ according to an internal logic. Because of this, its output relative to its environment is variable. Depending on chemical markers which it alone understands, it may or may not recognize a bacterium or virus as hostile. Similarly, depending on chemical markers, it may or may not recognize what we could consider healthy bodily tissue as friendly. Auto-immune disorders such as Lupus or rheumatoid arthritis are described as “disorders,” but they are disorders only from the perspective of a unified system. The immune system is just doing what it does on the basis of what it “knows.” Although we

\[\text{A machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network” (Maturana and Varela 1980: 78-79).}\]
would like to think we are a biological unity, in reality our bodies are comprised of unique systems that work only in contingent harmony with one another.

Although this seems limiting and perhaps a counter-intuitive as way to understand the workings of the social world, understanding communication systems as autopoietic actually reveals more than it obscures, at least in my opinion. Remember, while communication systems are limited to one distinction, humans have no natural address in any one system since they are technically speaking, the communication systems’ environment. Humans are free to select any of these systems – any distinction -- as a means to understand and create their social world. By closing off other distinctions, each communication system in a sense offers a pure ideal type that can be employed to create meaning wherever desired. Moreover, these distinctions can provide an informational edifice upon which there can be developed any number of media and programs, depending on what people deem useful.62

Secondarily, but of potentially great interest to international relations scholars, the limitless number of potential distinctions means that the number of potential social realities are limited only by the number of autopoietic communication systems. Society cannot therefore be defined by any one meaning system.63 (This will be the subject of the next chapter).

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62 Luhmann sums up the importance of operational closure for our understanding of the world: “(A brain) has a small variety of sensibilities that reduce that which can be seen, that limit the spectrum of colors, and also reduce that which can be heard. Only because this is so, the system is not overburdened with external effects on it. And only because this is so can there be learning mechanisms in the brain that allow it to build up more complex structures. We observe a low variety of external contacts going along with an enormous development of the structural capacity of the brain and an enormous capacity for processing the few irritations that are available to the system. And we see that this is again compatible with its autopoietic structure, with its operational closure. Everything depends on the system not establishing contact with the environment, but only being photo-chemically or acoustically stimulated. Then, from these irritations and with its , the system produces information that does not exist in the environment but only has correlates out there – that can again only be seen by an external observer” (Luhmann 2002a: 122)

63 Autopoiesis prevents a singular representation of reality to each system, since all systems create their own. “By constructing itself as a system, a system also constructs its understanding of the environment. And thus a systemic world cannot suppose any single common environment for all systems that can somehow be ‘represented’ within any system. Every system exists by differentiation and thus is different from other systems and has a different
Besides operational closure, there is another feature of autopoietic entities – reproduction. In the context of modern systems theory, reproduction is defined as the continuation of a particular distinction through selection by the system’s environment. A successful outcome is not guaranteed. This might not seem the case since many of these systems, especially those like politics, economics or law, seem immune from elimination considering their perceived functional importance to modern society. Yet history shows that, despite their complexity or current relevance:

Meaning-constituting systems delude themselves if they think there have always been and will continue to be enduring identities, and that we can therefore refer to them as extant. All orientation is construction, is difference re-actualized from moment to moment (Luhmann 1997 [2012]:18).

For an entire functional communication system to perish is a rare historical occurrence. The family system, with its distinction of family/not family as a useful means of relating to and understanding the social world, is probably the most significant communication system to significantly decline as a useful means of understanding and creating the social world (Luhmann 1990c). Another notable example of systemic failure, but also of functional rebirth, is that of sport, with its distinction of failed performance/successful performance (Bette 1999). Along with...

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64 “Meaningfully operating systems reproduce themselves in ongoing implementation of the distinction between self-reference and other-reference. The unity of this distinction cannot be observed it is carried out only operationally and only internally” (39). With the continuously reproduced distinction between information and utterance, a social system can observe itself. An observer of this observing, a second-order observer... can also distinguish between the topics and functions of communication and thus observe the conditions for the iterativity of operations” (39).

65 To be clear, this does not refer exclusively to a nuclear family. In fact, this expansive concept of “family” was the likely one of the reasons the familial communication system could not cope with the increasing number of interactions between humans – the family/not family distinction was simply too uninformative relative to other distinctions.
these large systems are the various “stratified” distinctions such as nobleman/commoner and other caste-like distinctions (Luhmann 1984).

That it is difficult to kill these systems should be evident by the persistence of the caste distinction in India, for example, despite immense political, economic, and religious pressure to dispense with it. In recent times, much ink has been spilt over the perceived ascendance of economic communication over every other system, yet as of this writing the economic system has yet to overwhelm the distinctions of other systems. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, the process contains the potentiality for the ascendance or destruction of communication systems if those systems are no longer convincing or useful people. It has happened in the past, and it can happen in the future because the process of communicative reproduction remains the same.

1.3.3 Communication Systems: autopoietic replication

Part of the process of communicative reproduction is the incremental adaptation of a communication system to the demands of its environment. This process of adaptation, which is not in any way directed or planned by the communication system itself, manifests itself in two forms – symbolic media and in organizational programs. Organizations, which will be discussed in greater detail below, are decision-making centers that provide programmatic content around a given distinction. There is no cap on the number of organizations within a single functional system.

Symbolic media, on the other hands, are typically (but not always) singular within a communication system since they “utter” the original distinction plus any programmatic language in a way makes it likelier that the distinction is selected. (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:
Their purpose, according to Luhmann, is to “miraculously transform a no likelihood into a yes-likelihood” (Luhmann 1997a: 320). Symbolic media take what should be a highly improbable event – the continuing of communication – and make it possible.

To give one example, one of the most successful media is money. Think about how difficult it would be to purchase something in plain language, let alone attempt to conduct a complicated economic transaction across cultures. Money simplifies the process of allocating thinking of the world in terms of scarce resources (the function of the economic system).

Thinking back to the metaphor presented at the beginning of the chapter, the family engaged in an economic communication when they made their purchase. They wanted to purchase goods from the barista. This is the “marked” state that indicated they wanted to engage in economic communication and not some other form of communication. Handing over the money or card is the “utterance.” By taking the card or cash, the barista indicated his “acceptance” of the communication. Media function symbolically by fitting two pieces of communication together.

The importance of symbolic media becomes even more pronounced if we imagine that the family were not English speakers. Despite the language barrier, they would have still been able to engage in economic communication by simply handing the barista a portable meaning package!

As the programs built around the original distinction change, it becomes ever more important for that system to produce media that communicate the usefulness of the original distinction. For example, the media “money” communicates the distinction of payment/non-payment regardless of the program that has built up around the distinction. Money has communicated this distinction through barter, fiat currency, gold-based currency, and electronic

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66 In addition to symbolically generalized media, communication relies on what Luhmann calls dissemination media. This class of media includes the means by which information is conveyed – for example, oral traditions, writing, and now the internet. “If there are sustained trends in evolution of dissemination media.... they can in brief be identified as the trend from hierarchical to heterarchical organization and the waiving of the spatial integration of societal operations” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 187).
currency. It manages to keep the original distinction even as the specific content of that distinction changes. Although important to modern systems theory, this dissertation does not deal with this concept overly much in favor of organizations and programs.

Symbolic media are not the only means by which communication systems thrive. Late in his career, Luhmann began to explore the ways communication systems use organizations to further enhance successful communication through their advancement of programs (Luhmann 2000a). Organizations’ most important function is the development of programs. Programs arise out of the tension between the marked and unmarked state and the content-free status of the distinction.

Programs provide context to the codes and bolster the “correct” value. Although technically the binary distinction is the “unity of the difference” between the marked and unmake state, the marked state is often taken as the values represents the “true” communication of the system. It could potentially become what we might think of as a “moral code,” insofar as the other value is deemed illegitimate (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 221-223). To support this “morality,” systems often develop a “supplementary semantic of criteria determining the conditions under which positive and negative values are positively attributed” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]:303).

Whereas the binary distinction is locked to their communication system as a core feature of their understanding of the world, programs are far more changeable (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 217). These programs “attach themselves as a vast apparatus to their respective codes” by describing in detail which content does or does not constitute a given distinction (Luhmann 1997

67 The contingency inherent in a negative and positive value allows the function system to better adapt to people’s selection without losing their autopoietic capacity. Whereas a communication system insists that its functionality is the only necessary functionality (because all they can see is the marked space of their observation), the development of a code with two opposing values provides a failsafe. Even if the one is rejected by people, it is rejected in favor of the other meaning, instead of the functionality of the system itself being rejected (Luhmann 1997b [2013]:90-91). It should be noted, the negative value is always a last resort option.
Programs are often the vector through which “opposing” ideas of the positive value can challenge the dominant content of the distinction (Luhmann 1997 [2012]:226-27). Due to their complexity, programs are also quite contingent and typically are the means by which the content of a given communication system changes. That is, it is the vehicle through which communication systems evolve over time and perhaps even give birth to new communication systems. There is no limit to the number of codes in a given system.

For example, the programs within the political system consist of ideologies which each provide information about who should make collective decisions regarding the application of power. Communism, democracy, fascism, and monarchy are all examples of programs within the single political system. Programs within the religious system include all of the world religious, including Islam and Christianity. As with the programs of the political system, these confessionals and doctrines describe the content that falls on either side of the transcendent/immanent binary. What might seem divine revelation to the Sunni Muslim might not be so to a Protestant. Each of these programs are competing interpretations of the same distinction, and they do not always coexist easily together, even if they are all oriented toward the same purpose of ensuring the continuation of their respective system’s distinction.

Each program is advanced by one or more organizations. Organizations are “decision-making” structures with physical addresses and identifiable members that assist in the communication system’s autopoiesis by providing a tangible existence to these programs—“god made flesh,” if you will (see Nassehi 2005). Organizations also reduce the chance that communication will be rejected by creating and promoting programmatic content that provides information about the content that lies on each side of a given distinction (Luhmann 2000a: 185; [2013] 1997a: 812-65). Marrying programmatic content to a physical address and exclusive
membership transforms the rather abstract concept of a communication system to potentially quite real world force.

The United States is an organization of the political system. It has an exclusive membership which it defines in political terms. It links its political decisions that it makes to previous political decisions, and it advances a particular political program, which I argue in later chapter is “democracy.” The same features are present with other states such as Germany, Denmark, and Cuba, and also political parties and other explicitly political organizations.

Likewise, the Islamic State is an organization of the religious system. It also has an exclusive membership which it defines in religious terms. It links its religious decisions to prior religious decisions, and advances a particular religious program of Salafism. Much more will be written about organizations and their programs in later chapter.

1.3.4 Conflict through process

To this point, the description of how communication systems come into being and maintain their autopoiesis presents a rather static picture of world society, and as such one might even be forgiven for dismissing modern systems theory as just another static structural theory. This is not an accurate assessment. To solve the structural bias in Parsons’ structural functionalism, Luhmann chose a contingent process, rather than teleological functionality, as the theoretical foundation on which to build a theory of world society. The solution, which as you can see turned out to be quite complex, was to source the generation and maintenance of world society in the process by which meaning itself is accepted or rejected—the ability of communication systems to maintain their singular distinction in the face of new and novel events and the inherent randomness of human interaction. It is in this contingency that we can find the potential
for the never-ending evolution of each system, and consequently the potential for conflict within world society.

There are two main impetuses for systemic evolution, and thus two main sources of conflict. The first source is found in the instability inherent in the relationship of programs to the binary distinction of a system. The second is in the adaption of system to novel and even autopoietically threatening events generated by the systems’ environment.

As you may recall, each distinction carries with it a positive (marked) side and a (unmarked) negative side. Alone, a single distinction is fairly simple. As organizational programs are added, however, the information conveyed by the negative and positive values increases the potential of complexity communicated by the distinction (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 259). For example, the religious system categorizes the world into the immanent and the transcendent – but the content that fills out those two categories can diverge quite wildly. If that which is religious comes to be defined in terms only of personal confessional, all those programs which defined it in terms of pagan ritual might themselves by definition excluded. What is considered the legitimate scope of the religious today might be considered out of bounds tomorrow. This proliferation of choice can lead to the evolution of the specific meaning of the distinction. It can also lead to conflict if the organizations which promote certain programs do not agree.

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68 “Binary codes therefore appear to be hinges for opening the gates to subsystem evolutions in society where favorable circumstances occur; and writing, as we have seen, will have had an important role to play in this. Binary structures have speed advantages: they offer the fastest way to develop complexity and, at the same time, the simplest form of ordering memory. Since language is already binarily coded, memory is easy to update. On the one hand, binary decisional situations occur often enough and have enough practical relevance in life not to have to rely on corresponding functional systems already existing in autopoietically closed form. On the other, they entail a sufficiently specific need for criteria, so that special evolutions can take off as soon as recursive reference to criteria of the same type comes into play.” (339)

69 Because evolutionary pressure occurs to every system, an effect magnified by the dual role systems play –along with selectors -- as the environment of other systems. The result is the “co-evolution of unsustainability” through all systems – the production and reproduction of a difference between system and environment (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 263).
A second source of instability comes from the environment of communication systems – namely, other communication systems which define all of human existence in terms of their singular distinction. For example, the economic system defines *all of human society* in terms of its distinction and rejects all other distinctions (Luhmann 1990:173). That means political, legal and scientific communication are all defined by the economic system in terms of its economic distinction only, and the same is true for the distinctions of all other communication as well. Put another way, all communication systems have a hegemonic distinction at the center of their meaning generation. Consequently, each distinction faces a universe of potential replacements.

The presence of other communication of course does not on its own mean conflict is necessary. In fact, the typical means by which communication system adapt to external communication is referred to as *structural coupling*. In technical language, “structural coupling allows the system to compensate for the ‘unknownness of the environment’” via the “internal surplus of [meaning] possibilities, by matching indeterminacy with indeterminacy” (1997b [2013]: 56). These sites of structural coupling, which are typically designed to interface with one or two other communication systems, “filter” information on behalf of their system and can be incorporated into programs (1997a [2012]: 59-60, 115-117). The Federal Reserve Bank, to provide one notable example, serves as a site of coupling between the economic and political systems. The Fed translates political communication into economic communication through expansion or contraction of the monetary supply (interest rates). Can the US government *actually* control what the US economy does or does not do? No, but it can attempt to ‘nudge’ the “economic system” through what essentially amount to political statements that are translated

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70 “Everything that is excluded cannot have an irritating and stimulating effect on the system, but only a destructive impact. That is the only way to safeguard the autonomy of the system’s autopoiesis and the development of the system's own complexity... it is always a matter of utilizing order (structures but certainly not predictable) complexity in accordance with a system's own operational possibilities” (1997a [2012]: 59-60).
into an economic statement. Without this ability, the political system would not be able to adapt as well to economic communication.

Having said all that, the question remains as to how precisely this all this leads to conflict. Broadly speaking, evolution entails the rejection of a positive value in favor of a negative one, conflict has the potential to break out over which program – which side of the binary code – to select. “If a person dares to refuse after others have already committed themselves in communication, conflict is at the door” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 280).

More specifically, I argue that conflict enters into world society through organizations, which are the broadly-defined “decision making” structures referenced earlier (Luhmann 1997a: 812-65; 2000a: 185). The nature of the organizations leads to conflict because they are the physical entries of the communication systems into the physical world and because they function as exclusion/inclusion devices.

Firstly, organizations function primarily through being visible – physical manifestations of communication. Examples include universities, courts, legislatures, corporations, banks, churches, states, terrorist groups– just to name a few. Organizations absorb uncertainty about a distinction’s usefulness by giving the appearance that humans, using a particular distinction, are in control of the social world. Organizations communicate this continuity by linking whatever the current decision is to prior decisions – each arrived at in a manner consistent with prior communication (Luhmann 1995: 137-75).  

71 Organizations point to the repeatable, structured, and expectable nature of a system’s communicated distinction. This includes the need to visibly create and advance programs, which in turn serves to routinize decisions by linking them to previous decisions and provide stated goals. Essentially, the real purpose of organizations is to

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71 This helps hide the fact that decisions are not really decisions if they are premised on prior communication, yet if they are not premised on prior communication uncertainty cannot be absorbed.
make the single distinction appear universal in its ability to create and understands the human social world

The second function of organization is as an inclusionary/exclusionary mechanism (Luhmann 2000a: 185). They define the “correct” value of a binary either through creating or advancing programs, deciding who gets to be part of the organization, and designating appropriate venues of and forms for systemic communication. In practice, this sort of behavior looks quite familiar. Universities (organizations of the science system) decide what is and what is not science, they decide who is allowed to serve as members of the university, and designate the appropriate avenues through which science can be conducted. States decide who gets to be part of state on the basis of its ideological program and determines the appropriate avenues for political communication. Religious organizations like churches decide who gains membership – typically on the basis of some confessional – and determines how religious communication gets to be communicated.

Luhmann did not spend much time theorizing organizations. If he had, he would have likely come to the same conclusion that I have – the introduction of organizations amplifies the potential for conflict. Distinctions are universal but are, because of their autopoietic nature, blind to other distinctions. There could be a million distinctions and it would not raise the potential for conflict overly much. However, the addition of specific programs and organizations that claim universal application and universal membership means conflict is likely.

This brings us to a final note about evolutionary conflict. Societal evolution is a blind process. World society is not evolving to anything in particular, and certainly not a state that is

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72 Thus far, evolution has moved from societies differentiated on the basis of only a few models to one characterized by many. For example, the earliest state of differentiation was segmentation, in which human societies were characterized by a single, common communication -- the position of individuals are fixed according to familial
necessarily progressive. This change is random and unpredictable, so that only after it happens is it made obvious (Luhmann 1989:8, 284). Moreover, because the process is blind, there is no bias favoring any single system, nor is there any bias in favor of a world society characterized by many distinctions (functional differentiation). However we can say that, intuitively, those systems that have more efficient media and more capable organizations might “get more people to yes” than those without those features (Luhmann 1997 [2012]:199, 217-219). Luhmann explains it thusly:

The different capabilities… lead (among other factors) to an unequal growth of the function systems, and thus to unequal application of those functions regarding their respective communicative expenditure and visibility – without a hidden rationality or hierarchy fundamentally attached to those functions. Society does not expand like leavening; it does not symmetrically grow in size complexity, and differentiation as supposed by the nineteenth-century theories of progress (which could suppose this

communication (Luhmann 1997 [2013]: 27-38). In some societies, this eventually results in some families being materially better off. Although this move is undoubtedly resisted, it society becomes understood on the basis of a center-periphery distinction. The move to center periphery happens “when the dominant position of the center [is] used to establish other forms of differentiation and, above all, greater role differentiation (“division of labor”)” (2013: 42). Families on the upper end of the differentiation at the center are understood to be at the apex of society only within their immediate vicinity. Although their material base may extend further, those areas do not necessarily share their model of the world, and may even have their own center-peripheral familial distinctions. It is not until these sorts of societies develop a more solidified stratificatory differentiation that come to see an actual hierarchy of meaning creation. In such a society, some subsystems establish themselves as superior to other systems in the environment on the basis of a rank” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 54). This is evident throughout history, without anyone common system dominating the others, although societies based on a religious hierarchy are certainly rather familiar to Europeans. The creation of hierarchy presupposes that, along with higher rankings being treated better in society, lower ranking members are treated worse. This stratification is maintained by described the hierarchy on the basis of some objective understanding such as morality or nature. Even as societies are hierarchically ranked, the advent of dissemination media like writing undermined the order. Hierarchies are about asserting a certain point of view from an apex, whereas heterarchies are based on “the interconnection of direct contacts discriminating (observing) on the spot” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 187). The failure of censorship “finally obliged all hierarchies, including those of politics and the law, to come to terms with a fundamentally heterarchically communicating society... celebrated as the primacy of ‘public opinion’” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 187). The availability of meaning creation “explodes a premise important for all hierarchically stratified societies, namely, the assumption that all positive values come together at an apex (in the nobility, the ruler, God)” (216, 217).
because they understood society as merely an economic system). Modern society increases the complexity of some systems and lets others wither” (Luhmann 1997a: 391-392).

The success or failure of functional communication systems is the result of an evolutionary process where some communications might outcompete others. There is no teleology at work. There is no ultimate destiny with freedom and democracy at one end up a long train of events. There is only the process.

**Conclusion**
The purpose of this chapter was to present three core concepts from modern systems theory. The first concept is that only communication communicates. Although humans participate in communication, they do so only as selectors who choose to participate or not. The second concept is that long-term communication eventually forms systems of communication which constitute society. For this reason, the study of society is shifted from human action to the study of the reproduction of communication systems. The final concept is that this reproductive process is a driver of conflict. Although communication systems do not necessarily need to conflict, the reproductive behavior of communication systems can threaten to disrupt the autopoiesis of other communication systems by outcompeting them for selection by the environment. Consequently, successful communication system develop symbolic media, structural couplings, and organizations to defend their internal reproduction processes.

Presenting this theory does not, of course, necessarily imply that its adoption is required. And although this chapter hints at how our understanding of the international environment is improved by Luhmann’s ideas, it does not explicitly state them. For that reason, the next chapter will make the case for Modern Systems Theory as a means of understanding global politics.
Chapter Two: Modern Systems Theory and International Relations Theory

Taking modern system seriously will have significant consequences for how we theorize international politics. The purpose of this chapter is to explain precisely what modern system does and does not bring to the study of international politics. There are some very radical ideas in Luhmann’s thinking that might not sit well with readers who have an attachment to particular understanding of agency -- specifically, the ability of that agency to effect change in the social world. On the other hand, modern systems theory has excellent conceptual language for describing a globalized world filled not just with competing political actors and interests, but competing versions of social reality. If it has a comparative advantage, it is surely that it has the neutral language necessary to privilege no particular vantage point in its analysis.

By far the biggest drawback is the lack of meaningful human agency. Modern systems theory theoretically precludes the possibility of actors acting outside of the distinctions that comprise their social world. Individuals and organizations are theoretically limited by the meaning boundaries of a given distinction. For example, when engaged in political communication, actors such as organizations make decisions and pursue programs defined in terms of the political distinction alone. When religious organizations make decisions, they act according to the social reality revealed by that system’s distinction. Using modern systems theory commits us to modeling communication systems and the reproduction of their unique distinctions as the primary driver of all social outcomes. Siding firmly on the side of structure in the structure-agency debate means that individual humans do not sit at the levers of history.

The absence of meaningful agency also means that there is a distinct absence of confidence that human agency can “progress” or otherwise improve the state of world society through effort. Although modern systems theory is epistemologically constructivist and certainly
“radical” in its perspective, it does not share critical theory’s implicit goal to improve the lives of humans. At best the perspective it offers scholars is one of ironic detachment (see Hacking 1999:19-20). Yes, the world is terrible, but no, there is no “new” perspective that can be introduced that will result in a “positive” change or improvement. Recalling Marion Blute’s word once again, “reading Luhmann is not for the critical. Rather, it is for the resigned” (Blute2002:2).

Although modern systems theory does not paint a picture of hopeful agency, it does provide the conceptual tools to effectively describe the complexity of a globalized world without privileging a single distinction. Thinking about world order in terms of state/non-state actors, for example, is replaced by a world comprised of multiple and competing social realities where that distinction is no longer necessarily meaningful. In other words, it simplifies without asserting the ontological properties of a single vantage point.

This is in my opinion sorely needed given the interdisciplinary nature of IR. Yet many of the perspectives in international relations privilege a single vantage point when theorizing the international space. Scholars that see through the lens of one distinction will only ever see one set of differences. Prioritizing the political distinction results in seeing world society as the political distinction defines it. The same is true when scholars prioritize the economic or legal distinctions. “Seeing like a state” might not necessarily be an advantage when thinking about the generation of conflict across the totality of the human social world.

This is not to say that these perspectives are empirically invalid. Such a statement goes far beyond the epistemological warrant of an analyticist project. Nevertheless, it is justified to point out that seeing in terms of only one difference results in a limits the potential to conceptualize the existential nature of potential conflict between competing world orders – or
more accurately, competing social realities – that comprise the modern world. Modern systems theory at the very least introduces scholarly awareness that not all actors see the same set of differences when looking at the world and will thus not act in the same way.

For example, from the perspective of the political, the Islamic State is a significant non-state actor because of their destruction, but they are not theoretically significant when thinking about the orientation of their aggression. They are merely a non-state actor which possesses the ability to nuisance and harass, but they will only ever be criminals or extremists who reject the legitimate state-sponsored world order. So their destruction is a priority, but the “why” of why they fight is not fully appreciated. They are simply barbarians impotently raging against the civilized world.

In contrast, modern systems theory depicts the Islamic State, not as a mere “non-state actor” with “interests,” political or otherwise, but as the manifestation of a different social reality as depicted by the religious communication system. Regardless of the word “state” in their name, the significance of its rise might be lost if only a political vantage point is retained for their analysis. An analysis which uses the conceptual language of modern systems theory, on the other hand, would agree that they are extremists pushing back against a political order, but would also argue that the actions of the political coalition of states is the response of extremists reacting to the encroachment of a religious world order. Neither religious nor political communication is privileged as the singular vantage point through which we can theorize conflict in the social world and in a sense normalizes it. In other words, modern systems theory has the effect of expanding the range of actors potentially relevant to identifying theoretically relevant conflict.
This is also evident even when thinking about global order more broadly. When IR scholars theorize “world order,” for example, we can see how they typically rely on a single distinction or vantage point through which to describe it. Realists, English School scholars, and liberals typically depict world order as corresponding to the explicitly political interests of a single state, group of states, or the “harmony of interests” of non-state actors engaged in political or economic transactions. Marxists describe world order through from the vantage point of an economic distinction insofar as macro-social outcomes can be explained in terms of economic interests or modes of production. Even constructivists privilege a certain vantage point insofar as they often focus on the spread of political ideas or norms among states or state institutions.

Defining order in a certain way leads scholars into overestimating the importance of one facet of the social when thinking about social orders. The debate that periodically consumes international relations scholars about the future of the American-led liberal world order is a perfect example of this in action (e.g., Ikenberry 2011; Layne 2006). Worries about a conflict between the United States and China over which state gets to “lead the world” often unconsciously inflate the relevance of a conflict contained entirely within and relevant almost entirely to the political system.

Yet the resolution of the conflict one way or the other will only matter to scientific, economic, or religious actors in a very narrow set of circumstances – if victory for one side (China or the United States) happens to bring with it the end of scientific, economic, or religious communication. Otherwise, scientific, economic, and religious communication will continue regardless of which colored piece of cloth flies highest within the world of political organizations. The same could be said of the conflicts within any of the other communication systems as well.
Having said all this, it is important to note that modern systems theory was not crafted with international relations in mind. Outside of Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory (which Luhmann critiques for its exclusively economic perspective), Luhmann makes no attempt to explicitly theorize international politics (see Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 171). His critiques of are confined to the arguments about social order offered by his fellow sociologists. Any application of his critique to IR theories of world order will thus have to be applied transitively. But this should not be an insurmountable obstacle. International relations scholars have an established track record of utilizing mainstream sociological theories when thinking about how to characterize world order (see Lawson and Shilliam 2010).

This chapter will now get on with the business of convincing the reader why Luhmann’s ideas might actually be of help to international relations. It will begin by discussing what modern systems theory will not bring to the discipline. It will neither provide a pathway out of the structure-agency debate despite its unique conception of agency and structure, nor will it be an addition to the so-called “critical theory” in IR. After this, this chapter will spend address the key gap it fills as a replacement for “single distinction” theories of world order which currently populate the discipline’s theoretical pantry.

2.1 Drawback to adopting modern systems theory: Disappearing People
The principle drawback to using modern systems theory is that it erases human agency from its own society. This is something of an obstacle for some who are convinced humans have something to do with social outcomes. However drastic this move might seem at first, it is actually the result of interesting side-step to a problem that has long bedeviled social theorists, and so I begin my discussion of what modern systems theory does not provide by way of the “structure-agency” problematic in international relations.
The “structure-agency” debate is a wide-ranging disagreement over matters of social ontology, epistemology, and ultimately methodology (Waever 1994). At its root is the question of social causation. Wendt (1987: 338-339) describes the paradox as, “the need to adopt, for the purpose of explaining social behavior, some conceptualization of the ontological and explanatory relationship between social actors or agents…and societal structures.” Historically there have been two strategies for explaining the origin of society – methodological individualism and structuralism. Jeffrey Alexander writes that:

Society may be viewed as the product of negotiation freely entered into, as the result of individual decisions, feelings, and wants. On the other hand, we can view society as constituting, in Emile Durkheim’s famous phrase, a reality *sui generis*, a reality ‘in itself.’ (Alexander 1988: 14)

The consequence of choosing only one side generally reduces the other in terms of causality or influence, and in many cases we “simply have to accept it without recourse to theoretical justification” (Carlsnaes 1992: 250).

Regardless of concession to formal theoretical logic, in the real world international relations scholars can typically accept structural realism’s thin conception of agency or liberal institutionalism’s reductive theory of structure because choosing one side of the structure-agent divide does not completely disappear the other from the causal story. The role of institutions and

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73 Social theorists who choose to prioritize agency “reduce system structures to the properties of individuals” and relegate the “explanatory role of structures as one of constraining the choices of pre-existing agents” (Wendt 1987: 340). In contrast, social theorists who emphasize structural explanations present those structures, “as irreducible entities underlying agents [and] typically understand structures as generating or explaining agents themselves” (Wendt 1987: 340). Wendt criticizes Neorealism because it lacks a theory of the state, without which it is problematic to assume anything about what states might want, seek, or fear – either individually or in groups (Wendt 1987: 344). Likewise, he criticizes World Systems theory because it reifies the capitalist structure and “treated as an object analytically independent of the actions by which it is produced” (Wendt 1987: 345). World Systems Theory renders the state as a ‘bearer’ of class impulses that are analytically independent of and ontologically prior to agents and cannot ‘explain anything but behavioral conformity to structural demands,’ therefore failing “to provide a basis for explaining the properties of deep structures themselves” (Wendt 1987: 347).
rules constrain rational actors (North 1991) and the choices of actors can interrupt the inertia of history and structure (Pierson 2004). An outright rejection of agency’s important is typically not required to buy into the major assumptions of paradigmatic approaches in IR.

Choosing modern systems theory, on the other hand, brings with it the rather novel feature of structures that act like agents. Humans are relegated to the background noise of the universe, a constant hum, but nothing overly interesting. Although that seems at odds with our lived experience, the choice was not done simply because Luhmann liked structure a lot. It was his solution to the structure-agency problem the bedeviled sociologists since its foundation as a discipline.

In keeping with his attention to second and third-order observation, Luhmann interpreted the structure-agency problem as a problem of theorists and not theory. In his telling, sociologists had yet to truly grapple with the consequence of the Enlightenment human. The advent of liberalism in the 18th century “exploded the traditional positioning of the human being in an order that gave him status and a way of life” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]:7). Humans could no longer be understood as residing within a divine pecking order or embedded within a family structure that gives them a pre-defined purpose, and this posed problems for theorists. Independent, free-thinking beings could always choose to defy standing conventions and overturn the social apple cart, upsetting conventional theories of social order in the process.

Initially, Luhmann (1997b [2013: 7) writes, social contract theory was proposed as a means of reconciling free humans with social order, but the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke relied on imagined reconstructions of a time before society. To theorize sociological

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Footnote 74: Hobbes argues that naturally self-interested, rational people would agree to vest their rights against one another in a sovereign in order to escape the State of Nature. Arguing against Filmer’s notion of divine right of kings (Filmer 1680), Locke (1689) contends that humans have a moral instinct to preserve “life, health, liberty, or possessions”
problems, Emile Durkheim (1893 [1933]) and Max Weber (1968) attacked the problem from radically different sides of the structure-agent debate – Durkheim through the imposition of a moral purpose and Weber through the human consent to a legitimate authority. Both ended up coming to the same conclusion -- that individuals could be convinced to integrate by a central moral purpose for society which is then enforced through coercion and sanction (Wight 1999: 114; see also Reus-Smit 1999). In other words, they created theories of people that cast them as residing within a moral pecking order or embedded within a social structure that gave them purpose.

Luhmann thought neither solution was particularly good. Regardless of the empirical veracity of either man’s ideas, both end up with agents that crave a single or central order that governs their social lives. In both cases, neither theorize humans as free or enlightened but are instead cast as curious creatures bound by the theorist’s opinions of the most important social systems. Durkheim and Weber’s models, “presuppose that man as a complete personality lives within the social system and that he identifies himself with the bases of action it represents” (Luhmann 1982:43). Arguing that humans (or states as agents) can be locked to a system means the theorist is committing in advance to look for a pre-determined, one-dimensional definition of social order which entirely defeats the notion that humans are agents.75

(par. 6) which prompts the creation of a making a social compact to form “one body politic under one government” (par. 97) under which they give up their rights to prosecute natural law for themselves. Of course, while useful as a sort of metaphor, social contract theory was never meant to empirically describe the creation of society. Luhmann points out that the social contract is a “circular construction and thus unable to explain the absolute and permanent binding force of the contract” that has no basis in history, rendering is it, “a fiction without explanatory value” (1997b [2013]:7).

Both assume that agents can be locked – or modeled as if they were -- into a singular orientation and that anything not thus aligned is by definition not a part of society. This is problematic not because they are wrong, but because they cannot know why or when they are right. Conceiving of society as a single moral cause “makes it possible to consider the social order as a ‘subject’ or as an object ‘for itself,’” it conceals, from Luhmann’s perspective the “problems of self-reference and self- denouement… within the concept” (1982: 7). That is, because their models do not see people as external to the system – whether bound to it qua structure or due to consent -- they assume that systems have no natural boundaries. This “lack of concern for one boundary strips all boundaries of their...
Now this particular criticism is interesting for our purposes because Durkheim and Weber represent the two sides of the structure-agency debate – a debate we continue to have in IR. The conventional thinking is that we as theorists have to choose one side or the other, yet Luhmann chose none of the above since both rely on implicit models of people, and according to Luhmann, it is problematic to suggest that humans can be locked into a single system of understanding since human choice is too contingent to be modeled one way or another (Luhmann 1997a [2012]:7).

As the previous chapter explained, modern systems theory treats humans as selectors – because nothing more can be said about them than that they constitute the environment for communication systems and “belong” to all communication systems simultaneously (Luhmann 1982:43). In other words, his solution is to remove humans entirely (Luhmann 1997a:35). It is thus with some irony that Luhmann contends that, “the theory of autopoietic systems could bear the title Taking Individuals Seriously, certainly more seriously than our humanistic tradition” (Luhmann 1992b: 1422). The only way to free people was to turn them into the environment for communication systems.

The consequence of adopting modern systems theory is rather stark – the surrender of any claim that humans can affect any change in the social world. This choice further situates modern systems theory within the discipline -- it is the utter rejection of the moral, activist purpose of constructivist critical theory (see Neufield 1991). Mark Hoffman (1987: 233) provides the seminal mission statement of critical theory, in that is purpose is:

significance since behavior directed toward the external environment can then no longer appear hampered or difficult” (Luhmann 1982: 45-46).
To understand society by taking a position outside of society while at the same time recognizing that it is itself a product of society. Its central problematic is the development of reason and rationality that is directly concerned with the quality of human life and opposed to the elevation of scientific reasoning as a sole basis of knowledge.... It entails the view that humanity has potentialities other than those manifested in current society...therefore, [it] seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it... It is not merely an expression of concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions.

The purpose of critical theory is to understand how our understanding of the world comes to constrain our understanding of the possible (see Habermas 1972: 308; Payne and Samhat 2012: 18). It is a move beyond the simple “problem solving” theories of those who are unaware of how their own norms bias the very presentation of those problems (Cox 1981: 128; Risse et al 1999: 11). Once we see how it constrains the possible, how it limits human freedom, the purpose of critical theory is to determine “the prospects for realizing higher levels of human freedom across the world society as a whole” and to push the limits of theory to figure out how humans can determine its own way of life (Bernstein 1976: 181; Linklater 1990a:7, 1990b: 10).

Critical theory also recognizes that there is a moral quality to human decisions. Thus the purpose of theory is also to “increase the spheres of social interaction that are governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force,” and more importantly, “to expand the number of human beings who have access to a speech community” in order to alleviate global suffering.

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76 Critical theory is a broad perspective on theorizing, characterizing the work of scholars such as John Ruggie, Stephen Gill, Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater, Richard Ashley, James Der Derian, and RBJ Walker, Neta Crawford all engage in the demystification of the past and the present.

In contrast, Luhmann takes what Hacking (1999:19-20) calls the “ironic” stance where the world is as it is through historical accident devoid of any moral content, and nothing can be done about it. There is a reason that within the world of German sociology, it was Jürgen Habermas who was the principle scholarly foil for Luhmann. Whereas Habermas thought human society could be improved over time through human intervention, Luhmann argued that humans did not even register as part of the social world. This is an unavoidable downside to adopting this perspective and cannot be minimized.

2.2 Benefit of modern systems theory: multiple and competing world orders
Having discussed the downside to the application of modern systems theory to the study of international relations, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the positive – it fills a gap in our disciplinary pantheon of theoretical perspectives. Modern systems theory presents a world society premised on a “unity of difference” where communication systems present competing visions of social reality which amount to competing world orders.

To remind the reader, each communication system forms around a single “distinction” which provides a set of differences for humans to use. These distinctions develop randomly and evolve into functional communication systems incidentally through the gradual accumulation of “selections” by humans who use the distinction as a means of describing, understanding, and creating their social reality. Over time, these communication systems develop symbolic media which package the communication system’s distinction (plus any programmatic content) in convenient ways to encourage selection. They also over time develop organizations which develop programs built around the distinction.
Within world society, there are at a given time any number of communication systems, each with their own media and an innumerable number of organizations pushing their own program without making any reference to any other communication system. Within the political system, for example, there are nearly two-hundred states and thousands of political parties – each with their own idea about what program should define power and who gets to make collective decisions (even if they are only sub-types of a few well-defined programs such as democracy or dictatorship). Within the religious system, there are hundreds of thousands of organizations such as churches or affiliated missions which push one of the many competing programs (e.g., denominations and different religions) to define the single distinction of the religious system – immanent/transcendent.

In no case do they define their existence through any other distinction but their own. Political organizations do not define themselves in terms of their legality or their artistic creativity. Religious organizations do not define themselves in terms of economic value or scientific truth. The same could be said for all other organizations of all other systems. In other words, these communication systems exist in their own social realities.\(^{77}\)

This is in contrast to mainstream theories of world order that rely on the old sociological definition of society. To foreshadow the more detailed discussion below, most scholars think about “world order” in fairly one-dimensional terms. For most IR scholars, “world order” is interpreted through the “domestic analogy” (Suganami 1989: chp 9). There is a single communication system that sits at the “top” as the “privileged distinction” through which social reality is created and “correctly” understood. For most IR scholars, the international

\(^{77}\) To be clear, as a human you have the ability to use every program of every system today if you have the time and are not bodily prohibited, since you do not have a single address within the social world. However, you as a human do not get to build your own social reality from scratch every time you walk out your door. While over time new systems for social reality building might arise, this is an emergent process.
environment “makes the most sense” in terms of the political system. For others, it is the economic system that sits atop the hierarchy. In either case, the possibility that there might be other competing “world orders” (communication systems) is an odd claim – but if it is entertained it is always in reference to the privileged distinction.

2.2.1 Challenging the Traditional Model of Order

The first print article to introduce Luhmann’s ideas as a way to supplement the existing stable of IR theories was Mathias Albert’s (1999) piece in *Millennium*. The thrust of his argument (1999:246-247, 252-259), which this section expands upon, is that modern systems theory provides a sophisticated means of theorizing world order. The vulnerability of current models of order lies in the pervasive but implicit reliance on older sociological conceptions society, what Albert calls the “classical model.” He argues that this model, “grossly distorts the way that modern society works and, in extensor, prevents an adequate account of global change” because of the model’s extensive blind spots (Albert 1999: 246-247). The classical model defines social order in terms of unification around a single norm, purpose, or political power. Change in the classical model thus emerges by way of the actions of an individual or group to unify people or compel them to action in some way.

The classical model can roughly be sourced to the writings of Durkheim (1893 [1933]) and Weber (1968). Emile Durkheim argues that society is created forcing otherwise directionless humans (*anomie*) to agree to a single moral purpose, whether through the *conscience collective* of a traditional [mechanical] society or the “consensus of parts” forged by government in economically advanced [organic] society (Durkehim 1893: 360, 398; see also Merton 1934).78

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78 He begins The Division of Labor in Society with the stated objective of “[treating] the facts of moral life according to the method of the positive sciences” (Durkheim 1893 [1933]: xxv). This “moral life” is a reference to the
Max Weber, on the other hand, believes comes together through human consent (Durkheim 1964:325-240; Weber 1968:12-14, 941-47). Accordingly, he defines society as a system of ‘determinate maxims or rules’ which are legitimated on the basis of authority and generated through an individual’s “emotional surrender’ or rational perception of self-interest and manifested through an obedience to the commands of an executive (Weber 1964:125; 1968: 37-38; 1972). 79

The debt owed by international relations scholarship to Durkheim and Weber’s conception of society is manifestly evident. The bifurcation of the domestic and the international – what Ian Clark (1999) calls the “great divide” in international relations -- privileges the idea of nation-state as society and the “international” as an anarchic realm (Ashley 1988). Relatedly, a great deal of the “grand theorizing” on international relations concerns itself with the question of whether or not international actors (state and non-state) can replicate the integration of a domestic society – that is, a society organized around a nationalism or “moral purpose” (Reus-Smit 1999; Suganami 1989: chp 9). 80

To one degree or another, every theoretical perspective is asking the same question – can we get a domestic-type order at the international level manufactured through either imposition of

79 Traditional authority is defined as decision-making legitimized via the linkage to past decisions. Charismatic authority is defined as decision-making legitimized via the inspirational qualities of the decision-maker (Weber 1964: 215). “The exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber 1964: 215). In both charismatic and traditional domination, legitimate authority is premised on an affectual or emotional norms (Weber 1964: 115). Legal Rational authority, or *Vert-rationality*, is defined as “involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospect of success” (Weber 1964: 155, 215). That is, unlike the other two patterns of authority, legal-rational domination is the belief that law is correct and proper as an end to itself, and thus obedience to commands based on legality is justified (see also Spencer 1970).

a central organization principle [Durkheim] or through consent [Weber]? This is not to argue that the paradigmatic entries on world order define the term in precisely the same way (Sorenson 2006). Rather, they both use a model that conceives of world order as a unity, even if the source of this unity comes from different sources (Sorenson 2006:344).

In defining unity, I follow disciplinary convention. Unity is a “composite” of a “particular kind” oriented toward a specific purpose (Donnelly 2009:54; Ikenberry 2001:23). It is “a pattern of a particular sort” that “promotes goals or values” (Bull 1977:3-4). This singular purpose can be defined via “shared norms, rules, institutions, values, common identities and/or cultures” (Buzan 2004:70-72). Alternatively, it can be rendered simply as one powerful state which possesses the capability to “organize political, territorial, and especially economic relations in terms of their respective security and economic interests” (Gilpin 1981: 144).

To be clear, there is nothing necessarily wrong with keeping the “domestic analogy” in mind when theorizing international politics. However, there are consequences to applying this model of the social order to the international. There is typically an overemphasis on the binding powers of commonly shared values or other unifying frame with non-integrative actors being depicted on the “outside” of society. This means that a single vantage point being privileged as the means by which society is evaluated, which results in the integration society often being seen

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81 Typically, discussions of ‘world order’ usually concern themselves with distinguishing theories on the basis of their content (Sorenson 2006; Chaturvedi and Painter 2007: 380).
82 The elements of a “world order” differ precisely because they privilege certain assumptions about human nature or the impact of anarchy (Connolly 1993: 23). After all, there would not be paradigms if there was substantive agreement about the structure of the international environment. From this perspective, a singular definition of world order is impossible to derive due to its certain self-contradiction and conceptual imprecision. As Sorenson points out, the notion of world order is “fuzzy” precisely because the substantive variation across paradigm (Sorenson 2006: 344).
83 World order as a multidimensional construct would need at the very least to include “(a) the realist concern of the politico-military balance of power; (b) the liberal concern of the make-up of international institutions and the emergence of global governance; (c) the constructivist concern of the realm of ideas and ideology, with a focus on the existence or otherwise of common values on a global scale; and (d) the IPE concern of the economic realm of production, finance and distribution” (Sorenson 2006: 344).
as more important theoretically than its differentiation. One way to think about this criticism is through the idea of the “ordering principles” concept used by English School scholars to talk about world (see Buzan 2004; Donnelly 2009, 2012; Watson 1992). The establishment of ordering principles determines where we as scholars look for relevant actors and it determines the scope and characteristic of relevant action and activity.

The classical sociological model suffers from what I call the “thief problem” in modeling social order. The “thief problem” is taken from Weber’s discussion of the legitimacy – and therefore the empirical existence – of a social order. He observes that:

A thief orients his action to the validity of the criminal law in that he acts surreptitiously.

The fact that the order is recognized as valid in his society is made evident by the fact that he cannot violate it openly without punishment (Weber 1968:32).

Of course this ignores what the thief thinks about the social order. There could be an entire order of thieves and all manner of other societies which reject the moral purpose of society as defined by the modeler (whether it is imposed or consented to). In fact, the problem of thieves tells us a great more about the theorist’s predilections than it does how social order comes about. This seems a strange concession for the sake of simplicity, and should give us cause to doubt the value of such models. Yet, “despite all concessions to reality, integration on the basis of consensus has remained the principle by which society is identified as an entity” (Luhmann 2012 [1997a]:8). All of the general perspectives exhibit a thief problem, even if they do not present in quite the same way.

This makes them blind to the potentiality of different and equal social realities that exist simultaneously. It also blinds them to the potential for and source of conflict between groups within world society that are not aligned along its predefined, singular axis. Modeling society as
conforming to a singular moral purpose precludes from analysis not only that which is “anti-society,” but any and all “non-society” communicative elements within it (Luhmann 1982:11). Luhmann asks: “According to this line of thought… must not deviant behavior lie utterly outside society? Must it not, in the strict sense, be extra societal or socially irrelevant behavior” (Luhmann 1982:11 *italics mine*)? Conceiving of society in this way declares as outside of social relevance all of the people who, for one reason or another, do not operate on the basis of this central social premise.

Theoretically, this obscures the possibility that society might generate persistent and irreducible conflict through what amounts to multiple societies (system) within larger human society. Durkehim and Weber get to deny that “social conflicts, dissent, and deviant behavior are part of society, or make do with the assertion that they, too, presuppose some sort of consensus” (2012[1997]:8). They are, in quite a real sense, seen as pathologies. 84 While one might be able to get away with this when analyzing domestic societies, it seems a sure path to mis-theorize the totality of human sociality, especially as it pertains to the international.

Each of the approaches in political science prioritizes some conceptions of world order at the expense of others through their ideas about whom or what constitutes that social order. The thief problem in realism and the English School is evident in two ways – state bias and their conception of order as following from the politico-military and normative interests of a powerful state or society of states. For liberalism, their vantage point, which is rooted in an economic-style methodological individualism, privileges a singular order which emerges from the self-evident self-interest of numerous actors. Marxist ideas about world order are quite explicit in its focus on the economic logic of capitalism as the ordering principle for world order.

84 Not least of which because it suggests that “Distance, indifference, and weak integration are seen from this viewpoint as imperfections that ought to be removed” (Luhmann 1982:43).
Constructivist accounts that focus on the origin of world order tend to emphasize the impact of ideas and norms on state or state-sponsored institutional behavior.

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2.2.2 English School

Although the English School is home to terminology such as *world society* that resembles that of modern systems theory, its ideas about world order and thus conflict could not be further removed from Luhmann’s notion of world society as a “unity of difference.” English school scholars overwhelmingly privilege the political system via the sovereign nation-state as the progenitor of world order. No other communication system is accorded the special status of political organizations. In other words, all other actors but states are the “thieves.”

English school’s defining concept is the notion of an “international society” which their scholars define as a group of states whose behavior is limited by rules and norms derived from state expectations and agreement (Alderson and Hurrell 2000: 18; Bull 1977, 23, 41). This society of states, whether it arises organically or through negotiated consent, is exclusive and concerned with its preservation (Buzan 1993; MacMillan and Linklater 1995). One of the bedrock assumption undergirding the normative order established within the international society is the defense of it against those that would violate is norms. The rise of a potentially revisionist state or some other organization represents an “anti-social” element that requires joint effort to defeat (Watson 1992). This club has in the past included some non-state actors like the Catholic Church and might further be expanded to include other non-state actors in a “world society” that links “all parts of the human community” on the basis of shared interests and values, but it does so through recognition by states and on the basis of state interests and values (Bulls 1977:279; Jackson 1990; see Risse et al 1999).

The English school is particularly vulnerable to the thief problem as it is a theory by states about states. In the language of modern systems theory, we would say the English School presents a very clear picture of the “self-understanding” of the political system. It defines the
“international” solely in terms of political organizations and is the gatekeeper to its access, which is, if you recall, one of the three functions of organizations. Even international society’s evolution to a world society – which ostensibly includes all potential international actors – is derived from normative content arising from evolving state behavior (Buzan 1993, 2004; Wight 1977; Risse and Sikkink 1999).

It also displays a definition of social order that is narrowly drawn and conflict-averse. The order is premised on a particular arrangement between states that strongly resembles the Durkheimian “consensus of parts.” Most remarkable from the perspective of modern systems theory is its restriction of “revisionism” to states or other political entities. That means meaningful conflict is restricted to state-on-state conflict because only states could significantly alter the characteristics of international society. At least in the canonical entries from English School scholarship, potential challengers outside of the political system are not explicitly theorized.

2.2.3. Realism

Like the English School, Realism is a theory about states as the principle actors in world politics. Unlike the English School, it presents a theory of world order that is much “thinner” on content which could potentially allow non-state actors given enough capability. Nevertheless we see the same approach to world order on the basis of a unifying political framework. No other actors are expected to provide equal and competing social orders, and non-political actors are certainly not sources of world order as realists define it.

Realist characterization of world order follow from several linked assumptions about international politics (Grieco 1997; Walt 2002; Wohlforth 2007; 2008: 133). They assume first that international politics take place within and between solidaristic groups – the most important
of which are nation-states – in the form of conflict and cooperation. The second is that these
groups act on the basis of some conception of “we-group” self-interest. These interactions
occur in an anarchic environment which promotes egoism and imposes constraints on
cooperation, thus realists assume that states find themselves in a situation in which their security
is precarious and depends on their ability to provide for themselves (Greico 1997). Although
realists do not agree on the optimal solution for the provision of security under anarchy, all argue
that the demands of self-help lead states to acquire power (Waltz 1979:88). Some states are
more successful than others and come to possess the capacity for domination.

Although the replication of a domestic-style order or even a “society of states” is unlikely
in most realist accounts, an order of sorts can be established by the most powerful actors or actor
(Gilpin 1981:27-33; Mearsheimer 2001). Although both multipolar and bipolar arrangements

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85 Lust of power in Classical Realism; “evil” in Christian Realism; “survival” in structural realism – which is split
off into security seeking through different strategies in offensive and defensive realism.
86 Defensive realism, derived from Jervis (1978; 1986) security dilemma, rejects the state preferences assumed under
offensive and structural realism (the mere possibility of conflict Brooks 1997) and instead assumes security seeking
(due to only the probability of conflict) to be the primary state goal under anarchy (or at least contingent expansion
Taliaferro 2000: 129) by the acquisition of an advantage in defensive weaponry, as otherwise cooperation is difficult
(Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1984). However, this approach relies both on the assumption that all other states define
security seeking in this same way (the security dilemma) and that defensive weapons are specific enough so as to
discern intent (cf Schweller 1996). Various scholars attempted to remedy this weakness by first examining the
conditions under which misperception could occur regarding the primacy of defensive versus offensive weaponry
(van Evera 1998). A second attempt remedied the problem of “greedy” states by relying on a “by their fruits you
will know them” approach (Glaser 1997:193; Kydd 1997). An even more nuanced solution went from this
dichotomy of greedy or security seeking to considerations of graduated threat (Walt 1988). However, these solutions
ultimately lowered the level of analysis to elites by relying on perceptions of intent and capability, something
specifically avoided in structural realism. The cause of war in defensive realism can be then seen as primarily
agency based, in that it is misperception of either intent or capability that prompts elites to commit to the “mistake”
of offensive war. Offensive realists, in contrast, are more persuaded by the conflict-generating, structural potential
of anarchy (Labs 1997; Mearsheimer 2001; see Brooks 1997 for difference between Postclassical and
Classical/Offensive/Neorealism; Taliaferro 2000). With no overarching authority, states can never be certain of
peace in their Hobbesian World, even in the presence of institutions (Rose 1998: 149). Even if conquest may seem
hard today owing to geography, technology, or group identity, there is no guarantee against the prospect that another
state will develop the capacity to overcome these obstacles. As a result, states are often tempted to expand or
otherwise strengthen themselves—and/or to weaken others—in order to survive over the long haul
87 Even defensive realists such as Schweller and Priess (1997:18) argue that world order is a unipolar hegemon,
although they differ as to its specific characteristics. They argue that, “contrary to the popular conception, the
‘ideal’ realist state is not the power-maximizing, malevolent hegemon that attempts to impose its values on others
through naked power and external crusades. Rather the ideal is the prudent, benevolent hegemon that understands
create singular orders within their respective spheres of influence, a unipolar or hegemonic system is the classic model for order in the realist perspective (Gilpin 1981, chp 2). This singular state claims dominance over the system through an acknowledged preponderance of capability and provides content to the order through pursuit of its national interest (see Brooks and Wohlfarth 2007:22; Gilpin 1981:116n; Ikenberry et al 2009: 3). The longevity of a hegemonic order depends on its level of aggression in pursuit of its aims and the benefits it provides to other states (Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger 1973:28; 1981:247; see also Schweller and Priess 1997).

The collapse of world order mirrors its creation. Because realists focus on preponderant capabilities as the source of order, the loss of those capabilities results in the loss of that singular order. The maintenance of the world order and the resultant “imperial overstreach” inflicts an inescapable and eventually fatal “economic drain” on the hegemon that eats away at its relative superiority in power vis-à-vis its rivals (Gilpin 1983: 156-157, 175-85; Kennedy 1987: xvi; Lake 1993: 462-83). And although balancing is temporarily forestalled due to security concerns, the logic of anarchy (helped along by an aggressive hegemon) inevitably provokes balancing


There is not a one-to-one ratio between hegemony and unipolarity. Although both require the preponderance of capabilities, hegemony has both an intentionality and relational component not implied in the definition of unipolarity (Krahmann 2005: 533; Wilkinson 1999, 2008:139). To elaborate, “If hegemony is understood as a unipolar configuration of politico-military capability with a structure of influence that matches capability, unipolarity without hegemony is a configuration where the preponderant capability of a single state is not match by a predominant influence” – the difference between strength and mastery (Wilkinson 1999: 143). See also Posen 2003:5; Layne 2006: 11-12; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979: 97; 1999:699; Webb and Krasner 1989: 183

Gilpin argues that control over the international system is a function of three factors: the material distribution of power among states/coalitions, the reputation for power that undergirds the hierarchy, and a set of right and rules that govern inter-state interaction (1981:19).

This is most likely to happen when a hegemon declines (due to rise of service sector decline of productivity, increasing cost of war, rise of public and private consumption without GDP rise, corruption of affluence, increasing cost of political dominance, loss of technological and economic leadership). A hegemon can forestall decline by eliminating cost, security retrenchment, and abandoning external commitments... but if that doesn't work, war is more likely of the “closing in” space and opportunities between great power, fear that a historical shift is taking place, and events escaping human control (Gilpin 1981: 201).
The order of the hegemon is replaced by order provided by an anti-unipole alliance or that of a revisionist power unsatisfied with the former arrangement (Gilpin 1987:90; Layne 1993: 12; Mearsheimer 2001: 139, 156-157 Organski 1980:19).

Like the English School, realism privileges a political self-understanding of human society - the theory is about states and for states. Furthermore, its conception of order, while much thinner than that of English School, is also derived from state behavior. Yes it is technically possible for a non-state actor to possess tremendous capabilities relative to states, but that non-state actors would still be playing a game designed for and by sovereign nation-states. More to the point, using realism and the English School perspective conditions the scholar to look at states for the generation of theoretically significant conflict. That there might be other sources is not a possibility easily theorized due to realist assumptions about the origin of world order.

### 2.2.4 Liberalism

Unlike many of the other approaches in IR, the liberal conception of social order is much closer to that of Weber than Durkheim. Despite its commitment to methodological individualism, which should theoretically account for the rise of a “unity of difference,” its description of world order is often remarkably similar to that of the other state-based approaches. Where it

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91 Kenneth Waltz (1993) argues it is not stable because of the lack of balance of power within the international system. Michael Mastanduno (1997: 54) argues that, “Balance-of-power theory is very clear about the behavioral implication of unipolarity. States seek to balance power, and the preponderance of power in the hands of a single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalitions of powers, determined to balance the dominant state.” There will be attempts at hegemony control. See also Layne 2006: 21-22; Walt 1987; Walt 2005:132; , Waltz 2000: 27-30

92 These moments of power transition, followed by a return to multipolarity are associated with higher levels of warfare among the great powers (Layne 1993: 7; 2006: 36-41; Levy and Thompson 2005: 29-30; Waltz 1993: 50-76; Zakaria 2008: 1-5, chp 7). See also Tammen 2000; Schweller 2010: 153; Wohlforth 1999

93 That it, I mean that is should be able to account for the many different simultaneous social realities since individuals all have some conception of the world in their head.
does not privilege a political definition of order, it accords special status for the logic of an economic definition of the social world. This means it remains unable to properly theorize the rise of any other competing framework as a peer-competitor to those two systems of communication.

Theorists working from this perspective, which in international politics extends back to Norman Angell’s *Great Illusion* (1910) and 19th century economic thinking, contend that social order requires a “harmony of interests” or failing that, mere cooperation on common issues for its substantiation (cf. Carr 1942:11; Keohane 1984: 50-51). Keohane and Nye’s (1972, 1977) classic statement argues that international politics is the result of a condition of “complex interdependence” whereby states and other actors are enmeshed in a tangled web of these various relations. Keohane (1984) expands this concept to note that, even accounting for the importance of an actor to overcome the collective action problem inherent in such ventures, it is “shared economic interests [that] create a demand for international institutions and rules” (Keohane 1984: 7; see also Slaughter 2004; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Snidal 1985b).95

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94 Specifically they argue that “sensitivity” (within a given policy framework how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another and how costly are these changes?) and “vulnerability” (the country's ability to offset these costly effects through policy changes) lead to political outcomes. See also o Little, Richard. 1996. “Issue-area governance is sufficient to create cooperation after hegemony, “not only because shared interests can lead to the creation of regimes, but also because the conditions for maintaining existing international regimes are less demanding than those required for creating them (Keohane 1984: 50-51).” The Growing Relevance of Pluralism? In International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 68-86.

95. Issue-area governance is sufficient to create cooperation after hegemony, but not before because “the conditions for maintaining existing international regimes are less demanding than those required for creating them (Keohane 1984: 50-51).” The resulting order, referred to as regimes, are “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” suggests that anarchy can be managed (Krasner 1982: 185 see also Young (1986); Rittberger with Mayer (1993); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997). They remain because they are difficult to create. “Even after the conditions that facilitated their creation have disappeared, “he argues, “regimes acquire value for states because they perform important functions and because they are difficult to create or reconstruct” (1984: 14). IGO's are particularly important in this regard, playing a role through monitoring, providing forums for negotiations to resolve coordination problems, an avenue for state learning about the preferences and constraints facing other governments, and as structure for enforcement and dispute resolution.
One particular manifestation of this perspective the “New Liberalism” and “global governance” approach (Moravscik 1997; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Generally speaking, this perspective defines world order as the “[outcomes] of innumerable governances of varying degrees of inclusiveness, legitimacy and effectiveness” (Whitman 2009: vii). Shepard Forman and Derk Segaar (2006:221) describe it as “a world of ad hoc negotiations, shifting alignments and alliances, and interest-based coalitions.” 96 That is, the source of world order is interest centric, the “systems of rule at all levels of human activity,” and the sum of articulated and often competing interests expressed through repeated interactions among public-private partnerships, network entanglements, empowered individuals, spheres of influence, states, and non-state actors (Payne and Samhat 2003; Rosenau 1995: 13-18; Whitman 2009). 97 Essentially, world order in global governance is Weber writ large -- agents working together, unified through discrete regimes intended to govern competing interest across multiple issue areas (Murphy 2000:794). 98

While governments do play some role in this vision of world order, governments do not command global governance, able to influence it only through indirect mechanisms that alter rules or modify behavior and orientation of actors (Rosenau 1995: 14). In fact, most global governance theorists remark on the sheer, uncontrollable complexity of the arrangement, such that “there is no single organizing principle on which global governance rests, no emergent order around which communities and nations are likely to converge” (Rosenau 2009: 11).

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96 Which, because of interest contestation, lead to an “exacerbating existing concerns about consistency in adherence to international law, universality of standards and codes of conduct, and equity in the distribution of international public goods and services (Forman and Segaar 2006: 221)”
97 He argues that rule systems have become (1) more intensive in their permeation of daily life (2) more permanent over time (3) more extensive over space (4) larger in size (5) wider in functional scope (6) more constitutionally differentiated and (7) more bureaucratic (1995: 18).
98 Global governance describes a condition in which “global-level 'private' authorities that regulate both states and much of trans-national economic and social life [private bond rating agencies, global oligopolies in reinsurance, accounting, consulting; global extraction oligopolies, oligopolistic or ad-hoc regulation of global telecom; NGO's giving aid]” (Murphy 2000: 794).
Unable to conceptually or causally link all of these often disparate interests together, scholars have often resorted to a variety of portmanteaus to describe this process (Knight 2009: 163). Rosenau (2005: 136) argues that global governance is characterized by “fragmegration” which he argues captures its near dialectical nature. Other memorable terms include “heteronomy” (Ruggie 1983), “neomedievalism” (Bull 1977:254), and “glocalization” (Robertson 1995). Nevertheless, it is believed that some combination of “intersubjective consensus based on shared fates and common histories, the possession of information and knowledge, the pressure of active or mobilized publics, and/or the use of careful planning, good time, clever manipulation, and hard bargaining” can result in “governance without government” (Rosenau 1995:15).

On a basic level, if there is a conceptual challenger to modern systems theory, the general idea behind liberal global governance represents the closest attempt IR currently has at its disposal. Describing a world without a single governance structure, “its central unit of analysis would be the conditions for social activity, rather than actors and relations between them... with complexity rather than parsimony” (Dingwerth and Pattburg 2006: 199). This is somewhat similar to modern systems theory’s focus on the process of communicative replication. Nevertheless, even here we see a commitment to a singular sort of order that privileges at most two vantage points, and at that it heavily emphasizes the growing political role of non-state governance.

Despite its commitment to a focus on interests rather than actors, global governance theory’s main departure from Luhmann’s theory is that it is intensely political, insofar as it is deployed to denote, “all systems of rule at all levels of human activity” which together act as a kind of global “steering committee” (Rosenau 2009: 7; Whitman 2009:vii). Recalling Hedley Bull’s

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99 On the hand, the demands of globalization force centralization, which prompts a reactionary forces that are fighting for more localization of governance. And while this in some respects dashes the hope for “true” global governance, as “too many actors can intrude ruptures in the webs (149), he remains hopeful that information about and consensus on global problems will steer the world down the right path.
concept of “New Medievalism,” Ruggie (1993) highlights the disintegration and diffusion of state power and authority to other actors, including international corporations, terrorist and secessionist organizations, and even private individuals.

Even where it is decidedly non-state centric in its view of world politics, it still sees world order as an inherently political domain when dealing with specific issue areas. An actor – any actor – is relevant to the extent that they command significant levels of “governance resources” spread across the spectrum of political, financial, cognitive, and moral properties (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009: 49). Despite commenting on the general messiness of global authority, it still assumes that authority – the central, moral political core of society – exists, even if it is found in a proliferation of authority centers. My reading is bolstered by the assumption that the rise of each power center necessarily seems to lessen the authority and legitimacy of the available to all other power centers (Rosenau 1995: 4). The implication of this argument is that as the rise of non-state actors in political authority and legitimacy necessarily implies a consonant decline of the state itself. If the state is a political actor, it can only be sharing political – or governance – resources.

Other versions of liberalism envision a more muscular role for centralized political world order (Nexon and Wright 2005). For example John Ikenberry’s (2001: 29-31) “constitutional order” depicts world order as a durable, shared understanding of governing rules and independent institutions that “lock in” US gains and interests. It does so via institutions that both act as enforcement mechanisms and checks on American power, which underscores the legitimacy of the arrangement by ensuring that lesser powers can “exert influence over the

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100 “In our view, global governance is therefore best seen as a specific perspective on world politics. As such, it differs from the state-centric perspective of seeing world politics as essentially “inter-national relations”” (Dingworth and Pattburg 2006:197).
decisions of the hegemonic power... [and] diminish the political autonomy of the hegemon, allowing it to credibly commit to policies of strategic restraint (Ikenberry 2001: 29-49).”

David Lake (2009) also argues that world order, which he also refers to as “global governance” can be understood as an authoritative social contract in which a hierarch provides a political order of value to a community in exchange for compliance by the governed with the rules necessary to produce that order. He also takes a strong position regarding the necessity of a singular vision. Lake argues that in the absence an authority above states:

International authority is most effectively organized under a single state. Thus, while in principle collective action problems can be solved by privileged groups of more than one state, authoritative orders may arise most frequently and effectively under a single hegemonic state (Lake 2010: 16-17).

Thus hierarchies are centered on a single state such as the United States or Great Britain who held together the order through equal parts trust and coercion(Lake 2009: 151- 61). Coercion is oriented against “outsiders” who do not recognize the authority of the hegemon (e.g., the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War) and wayward subordinates (e.g., the Suez Crisis, Cuba). Trust is granted to the central authority figure to mediate disputes as an adjudicator of last resort. The “stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy... rooted in a combination of material

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102 These institutional sites “operate as social sites for reciprocal ties of authority between the hegemon and the lesser powers. Second, these ties connect all relevant actors within the hegemonic order... Third, they are formal ties, representing organizational patterns of authority... an institutionalized hegemonic order that looked closer to ideal-typical hegemonic order s tan ideal-typical hegemonic orders would involve authority operating from the hegemonic power over lesser powers through institutional sites” (Nexon and Wright 2007:257-258).

103 A world characterized by this sort of authority will have: (1) zones of peace and commerce among states subject to a common authority; (2) binding rules and compliance from a sense of duty or obligation; (3) coercion used legitimately to create order and discipline wayward states; (4) authorities, including states, limiting their power to preserve their legitimacy; (5) social actors defending private and supranational authorities from state encroachment (lake 2010)
calculations... and ideational convictions” (Goh 2008: 359-360). In both case, coercion and trust are vested in a singular state actor.

In this model, world order comes to an end when there is a failure to produce a harmony of interests. In the more decentralized type, this could be a breakdown in select issue areas. In the hegemonic liberal model, collapse follows from failure in leadership. Regarding the current world order, for example, Ikenberry points out that “This American-led order is in crisis. The underlying foundations that support this order have shifted.” Primarily due to American intransigence, there are increasing “pressures for change – a struggle over how liberal order should be governed” Ikenberry 2011: 334-35). In Lake’s model, since authority relies upon social relations, “if subordinates withdraw their support of... the ruler must... work harder to rebuild the order on which authority rests... to restore confidence in its willingness to live within the limits of the contract” (Lake 2009: 33; see also Cooley 2006; Donnelly 2006; Kang 2004; Lake 2007).

In short, liberal theorists equate world order with a singular axis of cooperation or consent on either political or to a lesser extent economic terms. While there is a bit more space in the global governance framework for competing version of social reality if defined as the “interests” of individual actors, global governance itself is not typically characterized as anything but the diffusion of political governance. Other sources of potential world order, such as the religious, are not thought of as being legitimate or even relevant save as foils.

This obviously shapes where we look for theoretically relevant conflict. As has been mentioned previously (and will be covered in more detail in chapter four), forces arrayed against this political and economic governance are seen as enemies of human progress (see Barnett 2005; Fukuyama 1992). They are at best reactionary elements, as antagonist rather than
protagonists for their own, equally valid global order. In more muscular versions of liberal order, such as those presented by David Lake or John Ikenberry, they do not even matter—the only systemically relevant conflict comes from states looking to upend the US-led liberal order.

2.2.5 Marxism

The basic outline of the Marxist perspective on world order is well known and does not require extended treatment here, except to point out that it elevates global capitalism as the primary determinate of international outcomes. There are two variants—capitalism as world system and capitalism as empire. The former has gained greater traction than the latter in mainstream IR theory, but the latter is also relevant for our discussion here. Although both of them take somewhat different approaches, both privilege an economic self-understanding of the human social world. That is, they overwhelmingly see economic forces as primarily responsible for all theoretically relevant social outcomes, including conflict.

Immanuel Wallerstein’s World System’s Theory (1974a; 1974b; 1983; 2006; see also Chase-Dunn 1991) models the international environment as the internal ordering of the capitalist system. International outcomes between political units depend upon the global economic position of their dominant trading class within the global division of labor. “The interstate system is the political superstructure of the capitalist world-economy and was a deliberate invention of the modern world” (Wallerstein 1995: 141). Each state lies somewhere within the “Core,” “Semi-Periphery” or “Periphery,” and largely remains there due to reinforcing economic and political hierarchies that transfer wealth from the periphery to the economies in the core. Within the core, one state the most technologically and economically advanced state places itself at the top of the division of labor, typically after an intra-core war to establish its dominance.
Similarly, NeoGramscian IPE, often identified with Robert Cox (1987: 1-15; 1996), contends that a “structure of accumulation” – a configuration of interlocking set of ideas, institutions, and material capacities -- is projected abroad by a “transnational historic bloc” – consisting of a hegemonic state, transnational elites, elements of global civil society, managing institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, independent groups such as the Trilateral Commission, as well as cooperating elites in “subaltern states” that act as “transmission belts” through which the “structures of accumulation” through “containers of power” subsume domestic populations (Arrighi 2003; Cox 1992; Gill 1990). World order, in this case, is established through the hegemonic power of this trans-historical bloc (Robinson 2011:343; 2004).

In contrast to these more familiar approaches, other Marxist models emphasize the role of the United States as the center of an “empire.” The general thrust of this argument is that the US state and its capitalist class – and capital more generally – share a “robust, mutual loyalty” for mutual benefit (Gowan 1999; 2004a:15). The policies of the United States have expanded the reach of capital first into Europe and then the rest of the world. IN return, this has allowed the establishment of a “American Global Government” that has embedded its policies within Western governments, forming “part of the mechanism” that brings “global savings to the US... strengthening the American economy as the core material base for American neoimperialism” (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 32). America's status as destination for global capital and “market of last resort” deepen this structural power as foreign investors and exports became increasingly dependent on the United States (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 16). Moreover, the United States

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104 See also van der Pijl 1984; Gill and Law 1988; Gill 1990: 33–56; 1993; Arrighi 1994; Rupert 1995: 14–38
possesses sufficient military clout to shape the security environment of the West and its peripheral allies, control access to global energy supplies, and shape political values—(2004: 475-476). These two factors have allowed the United States to resolve “the coordination problem of inter-state anarchy among multiple capitalist centers of power—not by fabricating consent, but by sheer geopolitical weight” (Teschke 2008: 183).

More so than realism or liberalism, Marxist ideas about world order emphasize its economic origins. Luhmann was immensely critical of the Marxist approach because it privileged an economic self-understanding over all others. He wrote that:

Wallerstein’s much discussed concept of a capitalist world system is based on the primacy of the capitalist economy and it thus underestimated the contributions of other function systems, especially those of science and mass media communication... Only when one brings to light in synopsis the very different tendencies of the globalization of specific function systems, can one realize the level of change in comparison to all traditional societies (Luhmann 1997a [2012]: 171)

From the perspective of modern systems theory, Marxism restricts scholarly understanding of the breadth of the possibilities for change within world society. As with English School, the terminologies sound similar, but there is quite a gulf between the world society as a “unity of difference” and that of a single, capitalist world order. In the one religious, sport, family, science – all of it is reduced to a commodified, economized understanding of its relevance for human society. In the other, each is described in terms of their own distinction. There really is no similarity between the two.

In terms of theoretically significant conflict, Marxism looks to economic forces that drive state and non-state actors into competition (Wallerstein 1979, 1983). Conflict emerges as a
direct result of expansion of the core into what became the periphery, between the coming world order and traditional ideas about it. It also emerges over which core states would be the center of capitalist power among the core (see also Arrighi 1994). No other distinction matters.

2.2.6 Constructivism

This project has to some extent already contrasted modern systems theory and constructivism. Luhmann’s approach shares constructivism’s prioritization of constructed meaning over brute material facts (see Adler 1997:322; Finnemore 1996, 2003). On the other hand, they disagree as to whether the structure of the international environment and the agents living in it are mutually constituted (Checkel 1998; Wendt 1999). Further, whereas many constructivists would emphasize the role of actors, particularly states, in erecting the structure of the international environment, modern systems theory sees actors as theoretically epiphenomenal (cf. Biersteker and Weber 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992).

Unlike the other paradigmatic approaches, there have been few attempts made at an archetypical constructivist approach to world order. Although they all share roughly the same epistemological commitment to the causal role of ideas and norms, there is nothing to truly distinguish much of the substantive content of constructivist scholarship from liberalism or realism. This is particularly true of liberal constructivism. As Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2000: 99, 109) remarks, the “foundational insights of postmodernism are being transposed into the field of IR in order to reify the project of modernity,” namely, a liberal project in which political governing resources are gradually shared with non-state actors. That is, the vantage point is typically political in nature. Many of the more notable constructivist works in the past decade share this same commitment and serve to underscore Sterling-Folker’s point (e.g., Badescu and Weiss 2010; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Checkel 2005; Hurd 2008).
A similar commitment to liberal-constructivist perspectives can be seen in the adoption of Michel Foucault’s concept of a “liberal global governmentality.” These scholars note that liberal governmentality works through and on states via technological and census-taking “techniques aimed at regulating the behaviour (sic) of states and governments... benchmarking and targets, practices like good government and transparency and openness to the discipline of global markets. ...carried out by IGOs and other organisations (sic)” (Joseph 2009: 427; Methmann 2011: 6). Foucauldian IR scholars typically describe this global liberal governmentality in two ways. The first is as a sort of unshackled power nexus – with various sites and objects, but tied to no specific hierarchy and dependent upon self-surveillance and norm-internalization (Hardt and Negri 2000: xi-xiv). The second ties liberal governmentality to a hierarchy of liberal states that ensure international activity takes place “within a liberally tilted two-level game” (Neumann and Sending 2010:178). These liberal powers and their attendant international organizations “discipline” smaller, less powerful states marked as being “fragile and failed” relative to their responsibilities to hew to liberal line, ' reflective of a distinct 'police character' inherent to this conception of world order (Neumann and Sending 2010: 156)

Although much of the constructivist tends to be liberal in oriented, we see a similar use of constructivist epistemology in English School and realist approaches. For example, Ian Clark argues that hegemony is a property of the international society of sates, a collectively agreed-upon ‘office’ designed to uphold the dominant values of international society (Cronin 2001: 107–8; see also Buzan 2004:184; Clark 2005). International society harmonizes the “office” of hegemony with the norms of international society (Clark 2009: 222).

Although space constraints prevents a more thorough accounting, neoclassical realism and realist-constructivism both rely on a constructivist perspective to buttress realist arguments
about the source of social action. Barkin’s realist constructivism would commit itself to uncovering “the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affect power structures” (Barkin 2003: 337-338). Neoclassical realists, generally speaking, use domestic-level characteristics such as norms to explain divergence from the expected outcomes under structural realism, including the role of ideas and uncertainty (see Rathburn 2008; Schweller 2006). In both cases, standard realist assumptions about important actors and causes apply.

In contrast to these scholars, Wendt’s entire body of work, particularly Social Theory of Politics (2003) stands as one of the few examples of an original offering on world order from a constructivist perspective. It also provides a clear contrast between Luhmann’s constructivism Wendt’s “thin” constructivism. Wendt begins by asserting that the structure of international politics is mutually constitutive of states -- social structures partially construct the identities of the actors and actors partially construct social structure (1992:94; 1999: 24, 43, 257-258, 410). In SToP, he argues that the demand for absolute, sovereign recognition of the Self can only be fully realized through “corporate subjectivity,” a stable:

Structure [of] a collective intentionality, an ability of its members to act consistently as a… ‘plural subject’… a shared belief among its members that constitute a collective identity… a ’group mind’ in which individuals define their identities and interests in terms of membership in a group (2003:22).

This is an important point since self cannot exist or be understood with an other (1999:224-226). These identities lead to interests, of which he lists four—physical survival, sovereign autonomy, economic well-being, collective self-esteem (1999: 235-236, 336-337). There are three structures that determine these interests – Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian (1999: 43)
Transitioning from one to the next occurs once a “tipping point” is reached. In other words, the “cultures” of anarchy will eventually be overcome by the drive to produce a domestic state at the international level, mirroring precisely the process that led to the creation of nation states.\textsuperscript{106}

Given the vastness of constructivism, obviously more could be written on this point. However, like the other approaches, much of the scholarship source the theoretically significant action and thus any source of conflict in the ideas and norms that govern state behavior. This is not to say that all constructivists look at states, since I have not read every constructivist account of global order, yet it is I think fair to point out that the most notable constructivist works have thoroughly grounded their analyses in a political difference.

### 2.3 The common theoretical blind spot

All of these perspectives offer useful and important explanations for how and why social outcomes occur. To be clear, the adoption of modern systems theory does not and should not be used as justification for dismissing their claims since that goes beyond the epistemological warrant of modern systems theory. However, all of them suffer from a theoretical shortcoming that generates a distinctive blind spot – they view the world through a single distinction. This blind spot is made more evident by looking at their respective conceptions of world order. Across the board, each encourages the scholar to conceive of world order as a *unity* defined according to a singular distinction. From the perspective of realism and the English School, world order is defined in explicitly political terms. The same is true for liberalism as well since global actors are consistently depicted as contributing to a global political program regardless of

\textsuperscript{106} This world state concludes a process that moves through five ‘stages’ of recognition, four of which are ‘cultures of anarchy’ – system of states, society of states (Lockean world), world society (universal security community), and collective security (Kantian culture of collective friendship, based on consensus), culminating with the world state – in which the collective will is in harmony (2003: 39-57).
their various interest. And of course, from the perspective of Marxism, world order is defined solely in economic terms.

Again, there is nothing inherently incorrect about any of these models, yet they do potentially fall short when trying to describe a world of equal differences – of many equal distinctions. Modern systems theory encourages scholars to think about the world in terms of the conflict and disunity inherent in a world society filled with incompatible yet equal versions of reality (communication systems). If you accept this characterization of human society, there can be no binding representation of the world, and human society cannot be successfully modeled on the basis of a single distinction. The assumption that world order can be modeled on the assumption that there is only one relevant distinction leads to a situation in which the:

Integration of society … is systematically overrated against its differentiation. Processes of society-formation and community-formation are taken to be of a purely integrative nature…. [which] leads to overemphasizing systematically the binding powers of commonly shared values…. …[Yet] if ‘society’ is conceived as a social totality, it cannot be thoroughly understood if only a part of it is focused upon, e.g. its (normatively) ‘integrated core.’ (Albert 1999:253)

The classical model of societal creation, from which all of international relations borrows, suffers from assumptions that act as epistemological obstacles to certain understandings of society – namely that they promote the search for that ‘silver bullet’ of integration according to their one distinction (Luhmann 2013 [1997]:6).

The ongoing debate about the alleged demise of state dominance is a perfect, if a bit cliché, example of this orientation in action. The argument concerns whether or not the rise of multinational corporations and transnational advocacy networks, the differing capacity of states
to respond to the pressures of globalization, and the variable nature of sovereignty itself has resulted in the decline of the state in terms of its importance to the current political world order (see Agnew 1994; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; see also Krasner 1999). This is a defining point of contention with the discipline of international relations, yet it perhaps fails to capture any of the non-political differences within human society. In other words, even talking about non-state actors participates in reinforcing the distinction of the political system!

Tying our model of world order to a singular premise of centralized power or values, whether it be political or economic or scientific, “underestimate[s] not only the diversity and complexity of communicative circumstances at the regional level but also the extent of worldwide, decentralized, and connectionistic communication via networks in the ‘information society’ (Luhmann 2013 [1997]:10). That is, we run the risk of simply failing to capture all relevant events and developments in world society. It obscures some potential fault lines for conflict and overestimates the generation of a single order through which humanity understands and creates it social world.

2.4 The Way Forward
Modern systems theory presents a different way to look at the social world than what is currently available to mainstream international relations scholars. It conceives of world society as a “unity of differences” in which various communication systems each exist in their own world order. Because these systems of communication are the most relevant features of the social world, modeling their communicative reproductive process is central to building a useful

understanding of social outcomes. If you buy this perspective -- understanding that I take as a given Luhmann’s empirical evidence that this is the case -- there are several consequences that follow from your choice.

World society is comprised of more than just the political or economic system. Therefore it no longer makes sense to restrict our models of the international environment in terms of those single self-understandings of those systems. This is not just about taking “non-state” actors seriously but doing away with the distinction of state/non-state entirely (except when talking explicitly about the political system). Modern system theory’s application to the study of international relations involves rethinking the international space in such a way so as to theorize all actors on the basis of their communication system first and other features secondarily.

To be clear, there is no definitive, a priori list out there from which to determine to which communication system each actor belongs. We can only know by making reasonable assumptions based on the content of the actor’s communication. This is not a high bar to clear, and I would argue is no different than the quasi-scientific means by which IR scholars make determinations of power, capability, reputation, prestige, or consensus, or “polarity.”

Another consequences of applying modern systems theory to international relations is that it heavily implies that the cooperation and conflict IR scholars study are both traceable to the broader composition of world society rather than the solely political or economic calculations of individual agents. Specifically, conflict and cooperation is likely related to the process by which communication systems reproduce their distinction. In other words, cooperation and conflict occur in accordance with the internal logic of communication systems in addition to the logic of anarchy or universal enemy/ally designation. Understanding the dynamics that characterize communication systems’ internal and external working individually and relative to each other
thus becomes central to understanding and explaining the causes of these social outcomes. This dissertation has chosen to study conflict and will confine its scope there. Chapter three will present a much expanded treatment of this question, but a brief preview will provide a helpful look to the way forward.

Given that each communication system only sees the world in terms of its own distinction, how does conflict occur within world society? Although each of these systems are operational closed, they are immersed in an environment that is saturated with the communication of other systems. While communication systems can only ever interpret outside information in terms of its own distinction, to continue its autopoiesis it must compete for selection by humans who are free to adopt some communication and eschew others. This presents complications for communicative reproduction which are now faced with a situation where they successfully compete or cease their operations.

One response of communication systems is the development of organizations. As you may recall, organizations serve as a means of ensuring communication reproduction by visibly making decisions (at a real address), by advancing certain programs (what gets to be consider systemic communication), and by deciding who gets to be a part of the communication system. They are the “boots on the ground” in trying to convince humans to choose systemic communication. Luhmann spent much of his later life developing a theory of organizational behavior (Luhmann 2000; Nassehi 2005) It is through these organizations that we can examine a more concrete manifestation of the inter-system dynamics.

The first way is through the internal dynamics of the communication system. The first chapter described all communication systems as having a single distinction around which many programs “compete” to determine the content that defined the distinction of a communication
system. Organizations are the key player in this contest. They advance programs in response to external or internal communication and attempt to win selection for their interpretation of their system’s distinction. Some of their interpretation will be an attempt to process outside information presented by other communication. This is the one of the ways through which systems evolve over time. It is also the source of potential conflict between organizations within a single communication system.

For example, the proliferation of the state system is interpreted as a particular self-understanding or program of the political system. States as organizations move together to defend their conception of what is and what is not “political communication” by upholding national sovereignty. While they do agree on the idea of sovereignty, they disagree over what precisely that sovereignty means. Fascism, democracy, and communism are three political programs which describe the scope of the political system. While Nazi Germany may have agreed in principle with the United Kingdom with regards to sovereignty in the abstract, the UK political program defined political communication in a much less expansive way than did Hitler’s Germany.

The second way is through the external dynamics between communication systems. This particular feature is the natural consequences of the exclusionary function of these organizations. If their particular program entails ensuring their communication system reproduces through the restriction of other communication, there is the potential for conflict with the organizations of other systems.

The Islamic State is advancing a particular religious program. Because they are an organization of the religious system, they are concerned primarily with ensuring the religious distinction remains a relevant tool for humans to construct their social world. In this regard they
are no different from any other religious organization – including your own church if you attend. Their particular program, however, is a maximalist one – it is easy to ensure the reproduction of your communication if it is the only communication that exists. This is what I call “communicative hegemony” and it is one of outgrowths of the process by which communication systems reproduce.

These preceding paragraphs hint at the last consequence of adoption modern systems theory for analyzing international relations. Using it to analyze international relations naturally expands the number of potentially important actors due their role in communicative reproduction. Furthermore, it suggest that we should analyze them in reference to this process. Organizations which make decisions and advance programs that ensure successful reproduction are equally important within world society.
Chapter Three: The Clash of Communication Systems and World Society

The preceding chapters have established the basics of Luhmann’s modern system theory and presented a case for its adoption by IR scholars. To briefly review, Luhmann argues that the highest unit of analysis for human civilization is world society. World society, which is comprised of the totality of all communication system at a given time, is differentiated from other notions of world society insofar as it does not refer to a society arranged by states nor or does it refer to a liberal world order. Instead it refers to all of the distinctions available at a given time through which humans understand the social world and through which they (re)create that social world. The existence of what amounts to a multiplicity of world orders makes modern systems theory better suited to understanding the current human social world than other models of social order which view or theorize this multiplicity through a singular distinction. It is also useful particularly useful for analyzing the origin of conflict.

Throughout his career, Niklas Luhmann was despised by the left-wing of German politics because he would often argue that a world society comprised of communication systems resisted steering. Hopes of coordinating a world-wide response to social or global problems were, in his view, difficult if not impossible due to the closed nature of communication (Luhmann 1991). His reasoning is that each system models the world only through their single distinction -- each system is like a blind man trying to describe an elephant by touch, to recall an old Indian parable.108 And while humans are not supposed to be limited to any one distinction, bringing the full range of meaning creation to bear on a single issue is often difficult due to the natural incongruity of core distinctions.

108 "It is impossible to properly understand an entity consisting of infinite properties without the method of modal description consisting of all viewpoints, since it will otherwise lead to a situation of seizing mere sprouts (i.e., a superficial, inadequate cognition), on the maxim of the blind (men) and the elephant." Mallisena, Syādvādamanjari, 19:75–77. Dhruva, A.B. (1933) pp. 23–25.
Global climate change, for example, has many facets which make its solution difficult, and can take on different meanings depending upon the distinction used to understand it. The scientific community is concerned with establishing the ‘truth’ of its existence. The fossil fuel industry, which I think is easily categorized as being comprised of economic organizations, sees global climate change primarily in terms of profit calculation. Political organizations like states see the problem as one requiring a political agreement and political action. Some religious organizations might interpret global climate change through the lens of their religious doctrines. Medical organizations might interpret the problem through an increase in the number of sick. Other system might not even be able to “see” problem at all. Without the creation of a specific legal framework to address the problem of global climate change, technically it does not “exist” within the social world constructed by that system. The same is true for other systems like art, sports, or family. Humans that primarily use some systems but not others to construct their social world are naturally limited by the horizon of their available meaning-creation.

Toward the end of his career, Luhmann theorized that communication systems might not just resist steering due to their autopoiesis, but actually create the conditions for conflict between them by greatly expanding the events and problems in the environment (1997c).

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109 See page 38 of chapter 1 for the chart of communication systems as a reference.

110 “There is no longer a quasi-cosmological guarantee that structural developments within function systems remain compatible with each other. Science does not add knowledge to power but uncertainty and risk to decisions. Physics made it possible to produce the atomic bomb, the economy finds it profitable to use high risk technologies—both with enormous impacts on the political system. The free press changes politics into a turmoil of scandals and enforces and reveals hypocrisy as the typical style of political talk, and this leads to a widespread critique of the ‘political class’ and to a decline of political trust. The highly efficient modern medicine has demographic consequences. The new centrality of international financial markets, the corresponding marginalization of production, labour and trade, and the transfer of economic security from real assets and first rate debtors to speculation itself, leads to a loss of jobs and seduces politicians to ‘promise’ jobs (without markets?). The welfare state produces completely new problems for the legal supervision of politics and leads to deformations of legal doctrine that undermine the predictability of legal decisions. On the other hand, the corresponding judicial ‘legislation' of constitutional courts affects politics in a way that can hardly be called ‘democratic’ (the degree of centralization of the emerging European Union will not be decided by the governments in London, Paris or Berlin but by the European Court in Luxembourg)” (Luhmann 1997c). Accessed at http://www.generation-
communication system generates externalities such as novel organizational programs or
symbolic media that are difficult for other systems to successfully process. He was also
particularly interested in understanding the massive exclusions generated by organizations like
banks or nation-states that could by design bar humans (such as those living in slums and
favelas) from organizational membership, effectively cutting off their access to these meaning
systems. Luhmann died before he could develop this research, but his initial work in this area
inspired others to pick up the theme of conflict within world society.

Within international relations, there is only one volume that explicitly theorizes the
conflict generative elements within world society -- Stephen Stetter’s (ed) 2007 *Territorial
Conflicts in World Society: Modern Systems Theory, International Relations and Conflict
Studies*. Most of the ideas presented in that volume were theoretical sketches, highly
speculative, and lacking an empirical context in which to explore an application to international
relations. The purpose of this chapter is to build on those ideas through the presentation of a
full theory of conflict based on the theoretical architecture of modern systems theory and, in the
last half of this dissertation, explore them in an empirical context.

My argument is that conflict is generated by organizational function and structured by the
communication system distinction. Organizations advance programs tied to a given
communication system and decide who gets to “belong” to their programmatic interpretation,
which is their inclusion/exclusion function. Whereas Luhmann worried about organizational
exclusion, I contend that universal inclusion tied to an aggressive communicative program can
lead to hegemonic strategies which result in conflict. These organizations advance their program
at the cost of the human freedom to select other distinctions as a means to understand or create

[online.org/p/fpluhmann2.htm](http://online.org/p/fpluhmann2.htm)
their social world. What follows in this chapter is the introduction of this new theory of conflict and a brief introduction of the empirical portion and methodology of this dissertation.

This treatment of organizations, although it relies on a specifically modern system theoretical interpretation, is not done in ignorance of its standard treatment within the comparative and international subfields. Organizations within modern systems theory are physical embodiments of communication systems, yet they lack the ontological priority they possess in institutional approaches. They also lack the complex relationship with agency seen in many of the institutional approaches within political science.

The institutional approach in political science places economic, political, and social institutions at the center of political analysis (Katzenelson 1997: 83). These institutions are understood to have autonomous effects on political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938-939). Institutionalists analyze these “big structures, large processes” through “huge comparisons” and historical case studies (Tilly 1984). There are three variants of this general approach: rational choice, sociological, and historical. Each presents a slightly different perspective on precisely

111 The most prominent approach of structuralism is historic institutionalism, which re-emerged in the 1980s through Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (SER) (1985) seminal work “Bringing the State Back In”. Alongside path dependency and critical junctures, the concept of state autonomy is central to historic institutionalism (Robertson, 1993). These “historical institutionalists” see their approach as useful for addressing large-scale “substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics,” analyzing the importance of time, and considering the “macro contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 703).

112 Substantively, institutionalists investigate the impact and development of numerous large-scale features of modernity such as capitalist development (Moore 1966, RSS 1992), market-generated rationalities (Mosely 2003), social movements (e.g. McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), the creation of social identity (e.g. Varshney 2001; Nasr 2005), the development and maintenance state institutions such as the welfare state (e.g. Amenta 2002; Pierson 2000, 2004; Swank 2003) or electoral systems that shape actors' decisions (Hall and Taylor 1996). Structuralists frequently use historical and comparative case study techniques to account for unobservable elements in a case as well as the passage of time (Thelen 1993, 1999; Skocpol 2003: 15). Central to these historical institutionalist studies (e.g. Collier and Collier 1991; Pierson 2000; Ertman 1996; Hacker 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001) are the dynamics of self-reinforcing and positive feedback processes in a political system, or “increasing returns” processes, referred to as “path dependency” (Pierson 2000; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Thelen 1999) which are punctuated by formative moments that determine new institutional paths, referred to as “critical junctures” (Pierson 2000; Rose 1989).
how institutions cause social outcomes, but the approach itself is so ubiquitous it is not much of an exaggeration to exclaim “we are all institutionalists now” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:706).

The underlying logic of rational choice institutionalism is that institutions are a collections of rules and incentives designed or at the very least derived from the aggregation of individuals' preexisting preferences in order to overcome collective action problems (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944, 945; Moravscik 1997; Przeworski 1991; Geddes 1994; Tsebelis 1994). Sociological institutionalism, which Peters (1999a) calls the normative approach, understands political behavior through the “logic of appropriateness,” “cognitive templates,” or “frame of meaning” that individuals incorporate into their identity when exposed to them through institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 946-947 see March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 2004). Historical institutionalists argues that policy and structural choices – what David Coates calls a “congealed form of social power” -- exert a gravitational pull of sorts on the course of history (Coates 2002:32; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992).

The role of agency relative to these institutions is variable. The rational choice approach see institutions as equilibria reached through agency (Cohan 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001; Keohane and Martin 1995). That is, institutions reflect and respond to agent preference. Historical institutionalism, in contrast, presents a more limited role of agency where strategic actors have but a few “critical junctures” in which they can puncture the accumulated asymmetries of power and “sticky” influence (Goldstein 1988; Collier and Collier 1991; Thelen 1993; see Fioretos 2011). In sociological institutionalism, agency is far more restricted given that institutions are culturally-specific practices, akin to myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a results of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 946-947).
how institutions “concretely structure” the “relations among social agents” through norms, rules, and standard operating procedures that (Lichbach 1997: 248, 249; March and Olsen 1984). That is, institutions “fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of appropriate action” and influence actors because “they are constitutive of member identities” (March and Olsen 2006: 3; Simon 1965:115).

Foreign policy analysis as a field is particularly reliant on this general approach. Valerie Hudson (2005:4) argues that foreign policy analysis examines the role of actors as decision-makers who are grounded in an organizational, cultural, and historical context that shapes agent “definition of the situation. Understanding this context is key, since “it is far easier to calculate the rational response to a fully specific situation than it is to arrive at a reasonable specification of the situation” (Simon1985:303). For this reason, FPA leave no institutional stone unturned. Attempting to understand the “definition of the situation” has led to the study of the impact of individuals within group decision-making (Snyder and Paige 1958; Janis 1972), the role of organizational culture on decision-makers (Allison 1971, Halperin 1974), and the role of organization in reinforcing perception and misperception (Jervis 1976). The part of national foreign policy models (Holsti 1970), national identity formation (Walker 1987), and analogies (Khong 1992) in shaping how individuals perceive their role and future course of action has also been a major focus (see also Theis and Breuning 2012).

All of these variants of institutionalism have two commonalities. Firstly, each attempts to reconcile active agency to the institutions and organizations that both constrain and enable their actions and decisions. Without this focus on agency, our accounts have “no change, no creativity, no persuasion, [and] no accountability” (Hudson 2005:3). Secondly, each approach
treats institutions and organizations as ontologically prior – they are self-evidently important to understand if we as political scientists are to understand social outcomes.

My use of organizations in this section does not share these features. Although I accept as uncontroversial much of the work done in this area, from the perspective of modern systems theory humans are not actors in any real sense. Whether they are, relative to their organization, empowered or constrained is strictly speaking theoretically epiphenomenal. While we can assume that individual humans – even those in leadership – have ideas and wishes, interpretations and goals, they are irrelevant to the analysis.

Secondly, whereas organizations and institutions have ontological status in the institutional approach, organizations in modern systems theory are more greatly constrained. Communication systems are, theoretically speaking, prior to and determinative of organizations. Because of this status, the culture or rules of a given organizations are not determinative of any outcome, at least on the macro-scale modern systems theory examines.

3.1 The ordering principle of World Society

I have referred to world society often in the preceding three chapters, but I want to make clear that world society is only a descriptive concept. It is the horizon of all current communication systems, and thus cannot be the cause of social outcomes. It is devoid of specific content, implying neither a dominant norm nor any other characteristic of a given world order. World society would be called world society if there was one communication system or if there were one million communication systems. It is simply a category to denote the total available of distinctions to humans – the sum of all available meanings.

For example, a totally isolated tribe in the Amazon whose society is defined entirely by its religion is a world society in that there is a definable boundary to the meaning processing
available to the humans within it – its religious beliefs. A plane flying overhead might be interpreted as a god by the local witch doctor who, by virtue of religious communication being the only communication, is limited in his interpretation of the event because no other interpretation is available. The witch doctor applies literally all of the meaning processing available to his society to understand the airplane. A “functionally differentiated” world is obviously not so limited, but if we were to remove half of the communication systems, or even reduce them down to one, world society would remain world society.

Although world society is not determinative of social outcomes, communication systems are. The internal organizations of communication systems and their external arrangement relative to each other are what determine social outcomes, including conflict. Whereas anarchy is typically presumed as the chief ordering principle in international relations, communicative reproduction is the ordering principle within world society. Communicative reproduction refers to the means by which a single distinction is selected by humans as a useful means of creating and understanding their social world.

The most important way the internal workings and external arrangement of communication systems determine outcomes is by structuring the behavior of all actors within world society. All actors, either organizationally (or individually as humans), participate in the reproduction of distinctions. When an organization makes a decision or a person chooses to engage in a certain kind of communication, it can be theoretically rendered as acting as part of this reproductive process. Understanding the system to which an organization belongs allows us

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115 My application of modern systems theory to international relations takes what Waltz calls a “systems approach” to theorizing outcomes, which is needed when, “outcomes are affected not only by the properties and interconnections of variables but also by the way in which they are organized” (Waltz 1979: 39).
to anticipate the sorts of decisions they will make in the future and the general shape of their programmatic content.

Based on the theoretical architecture of modern systems theory, it is safe to assume that when the US government acts, either collectively or in its various parts, it continues the reproduction of the political distinction. Its decisions, its exclusions, and its programs are generated in accordance with some understanding of the collective will of the voters. When a decision, inclusion/exclusion, or program is carried out by some element of the bureaucracy, it chooses to apply power (the symbolic media of the political system) to a particular problem. Regardless of the specifics of the decision, whatever the US government decides to do, it is always applying a political distinction as a means of understanding a particular thing in its environment.

Sitting here I can imagine protest at this gross oversimplification, but consider -- when does a political party or government not act politically?\footnote{And might I add that it is a fairly well-established notion within international relations that when nation-states focus on their economy, their scientific research, and their culture they do so in hopes of strengthening themselves relative to other actors (see Gilpin 1981). This is precisely what it means to see the world in terms of a single distinction.} Yes it might encourage scientific endeavor. It might craft an industrial policy or present a budget. It might ban any other religions but one or house leaders who are overtly religious themselves. It might make decisions regarding who gets healthcare, what art gets funding, which families get to be families, in fact. Nevertheless all of its decisions work by applying power which carries with it the collective will of some “selectorate” or another. No political organization can determine through political communication scientific truth – only a scientist using the scientific method can do that. Political organizations cannot forever dictate prices, they cannot stop global recessions, and they cannot determine the daily valuation of the stock exchange (even if their actions influence
valuation). They cannot determine who gets sick and who gets well, regardless of their healthcare policy. Political organizations cannot determine which art is considered beautiful, what religion captures the transcendent, or whether families love each other or not. All they can do is communicate politically about all events, problems, or other communication.

This is not limited to the political system. Organizational behavior is bounded by the limitations of their communication system’s distinction. Religious organizations do not make authoritative statements about art, but do make religious comments about art. Economic organizations do not make authoritative statements about religion, but do make economic statements about religion. A legal organization can only ever communicate legally about religion or art, but can never make authoritative statement about art from the perspective of art.

To be clear, the United States— or any organization of any other communication system—are not puppets manipulated by some communicative system working behind the scenes. They are staffed with people, not robots. Moreover, it is important to remember that the people themselves are generally not limited to the use of one distinction even if their organizations are. Nevertheless, for whatever reason people choose to limit their self-understanding of the scope and mission of the organizations to which they belong. And because people choose to limit themselves, we can model organizations as if they were avatars of their communication system.

Consequent to this, a second way communication system reproduction serves as the most important ordering principle in world society is that it renders all organizations functionally undifferentiated. Even if they are not equally important or efficacious, they are all more or less the same in terms of what they do for their communication system. The political system’s parties and administrative institutions, the legal system’s courts, the economic system’s banks and equity markets, the scientific system’s think tanks and universities, the religious system’s
churches and sects are all functionally speaking, undifferentiated units. They can all be modeled as if they are a part of the communicative reproductive process – organizations are all trying to get a certain distinction selected. It is in this regard that I refer to the notion of systemic relevance which is meant in a functional sense insofar as a given organization is enabling or blocking communicative reproduction. A single organization can be relevant to its own communication system insofar as it function is to help convince people to select a distinction. Conversely, it can be relevant by convincing or perhaps even blocking the selection of another distinction by pursuing a hegemonic communication strategy (more on this later).

The principle, if not necessarily the substance, of this claim is already well-represented in theoretical literature. Waltz rather famously argued that, “So long as anarchy endures, states remain like units” who face similar tasks, regardless of their domestic characteristics (1979: 93, 95). Similarly, the demands of communicative reproduction flatten out some of the difference among organizations. States, banks, churches are alike with respect to their function within their communication system.

The key areas where their differences matter relative to each other is through programmatic content, communicative strategy, and of course their efficacy (which is empirical rather than theoretical). Each of these can be ascertained empirically through the reading the

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117 Organizational effectiveness, on the other hand, is a bit trickier of concept to nail down, and I spend some length later in the chapter addressing it. The truth of the matter is that I can conceive of no non-arbitrary ways to determine at the outset which organization will be more or less effective at communicating their program outside of broad generalities. Obviously we can say that possessing access to some technological means of distributing a message, having a physical address, and being able to exclude/include members – by force, if necessary – all play a role in determining whether or not an organization is capable. However all of these features are included in the definition of organizations, and so I think the best that I can do is post-hoc analysis. This being said, I do not think this is any worse than what most IR scholars can do relative to states. Even with military power, there is no clear way to determine which country is more or less capable in the absence of a decided conflict. Yes, the United States is far and away the most powerful actor by military metrics, but which country would win in a fight, the UK or France? Could Turkey defeat Israel? How about South Korea and Japan? Outside of counting the numbers of tanks or missiles or warships, which is itself a fairly imperfect metric, or extrapolating from GDP “staying power” in a fight,
content of organizational communication, looking at the decisions these organizations make, and
assessing the success relative to their system and their sister organizations. For example, the
Catholic Church under the Pope and ISIS under their Caliph are each religious organizations, but
each promotes a different program (Sunni Islam vs Catholicism), pursues a different
communicative strategy (ISIS converts through literally killing competing organizations of all
systems), and has been more or less successful in their efforts. Regardless of their difference,
both are trying to convince humans to continue selecting the religious distinction, but do so in
different ways.

3.2 The logic of conflict in world society
To make clear at the outset, modern systems theory is not only a theory about conflict.

Sometimes communication systems can benefit from outside communication by forcing it to
adapt to a changing environment. To deal with the externalities generated by other
communication, communication systems often develop what Luhmann calls sites of “structural
coupling” that deal with these incidental irritations (Luhmann 1997b: 618, 782-786). Structural
coupling is defined as “a state in which two systems shape the environment of the other in such a
way that both depend on the other for continuing their autopoiesis and increasing their structural
complexity” (Moeller 2006: 19). Sites of structural coupling “translate” the communication of
other systems using their system’s own distinction. They are almost always specialized, usually
designed to interface with one or at most a few systems in the environment. Sites of structural
coupling are important to communication systems because they open new pathways for the
evolution of programs by potentially absorbing the incorporating the new information into future
evolution. Some even become permanent structures designed to promote “cross-communication

there really is not precise way to measure relative capabilities. For all of the years spent on this problem in
international relations, the best anyone can do is post-hoc analysis.
system” communication, and in this way actually end up benefiting the communication system (1997b [2013]: 116-117).\textsuperscript{118} Yet as a communication system’s environment is flooded with communication and the novel externalities generated by other system, there is always the potential for the disruption of reproduction, and sites of structural coupling are not always capable of dealing with the high volume of sustained disruptions caused by many organizational programs (Luhmann 1990). These disruptions can lead to conflict.

Modern systems theory locates the origins of conflict in two related mechanisms -- the reproduction of a communication system’s distinction and the function of organizations in that process. Communicative reproduction is premised on “getting to yes” – people have to use a distinction for it continue, so there is always the possibility that they could reject an offer. Organizations try to minimize the potential for a rejection through strategies which raise the possibility for conflict. To put it another way, the contingency inherent in the communicative process itself often leads to conflict. Stephan Stetter (2007:9) points out that, “conflicts lie at the heart of systems theory… [and] emerge whenever a communication is rejected… conflicts are…ubiquitous phenomena, not just in the sphere of the international but in world society at large.” This is particularly the case where individuals are committed to using a particular distinction to understand and create their social world and thus resent the imposition of another world view.

\textsuperscript{118} Examples of structural coupling sites run the gamut in terms of size and scope. Notable sites of structural coupling include the welfare state (political/economic), central banks (political/economic), courts (political/legal, legal/economic, religious political parties (political/religious) and so on. Simply put, some organizations are far more aggressive in their communicative style and ambition, and this leads to potential conflict between communication systems. For example, the Federal Reserve acts as an intermediary between the economic system and the political by translating political will into interest rates which are in turn interpreted by market actors. High courts act as sites between the political and legal systems. A single court case can have a low impact on a legal climate yet massively influence politics, and vice versa. More mundane sites of coupling include fund raising offices in universities and churches; lobbyists serve as sites for many non-political organizations. In each case, the site of structural coupling “translates” the communication of one systems into that of another.
A conflict has its specific origin in the attempt of one organization to “restructure the border of an individual social domain [communicative system] relative to that of the respective other” (Messmer 2007:111). This typically involves trying to define a particular issue or perhaps even a large “chunk” of society according to a particular meaning distinction, an act Heinz Messmer calls “symbolic social demarcation” (Messmer 2007:111). A conflict begins when this communication “offer” is rejected and neither the meaning-giver nor the meaning-recipient alters or softens their communicative claims (Messmer 2007:104). “If a person dares to refuse after others have already committed themselves in communication,” Luhmann writers, “conflict is at the door” (Luhmann 1997 [2012]: 280). Although some communicative conflicts are short episodes, some can intensify to violence as a means of forcing communicative acceptance, depending upon the rigidity of each side’s stance. Over time, conflict between meaning-giver and recipient, “capture[s] more time, more issues, more energy, and thus, more features of the social relationship” (Messmer 2007:109).

This potential for conflict is heightened due to the programs and communicative strategy of organizations. Whereas a communication system cannot make humans do anything they do not want to do, organizations can. Organizations are decision-making structures that try to enhance the possibility of accepted communication through physically representing the system in the real world through an address and a decision maker, by developing programmatic content designed to entice selection, and by determining membership (see Nassehi 2005). Each of these three features increase the possibility and intensity of conflict in different ways, but taken together result in the possibility of “communicative hegemony,” which is defined as a (often

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119 Luhmann (2000a: 142) describes the function of organizations as a contingency reduction machine that has to, “Inform about itself, but also about its alternative, thus, about the paradox, that the alternative is an alternative (otherwise the decision would not be a decision) and at the same time is not an alternative (otherwise the decision would not be a decision).”
A real-world location with a real-world decision-maker provides a sense of physicality to that a communication system lacks and gives assurance that the distinction used to make sense of the world is robust (Luhmann 1995: 137-75; Luhmann 2000a 135. 261). Leaders can inspire confidence in members to follow a particular plan of action. More importantly, organizations possess the physical capacity in defense of a particular programmatic interpretation. Communication systems do not have armies or the technical capacity to coerce unwilling participants in a program, but organizations often do.

Programmatic content limits communicative choice to a pre-determined range options as determined by the organization itself (Luhmann 2000a: 185; [2013] 1997a: 812-65). Organizations can decide what interpretation of a distinction is the “real” one and exclude “unofficial” communication. Depending upon the zeal of those creating the program, all other interpretations of a distinction might be declared as heretical, and when combined with the

\[120\] Organizations provide an “address” where selectors can see communication in action and be reassured that a worldview is stable and complete (Luhmann 1995: 137-75). The value of such a physical address as a communicative strategy is fairly obvious, if a little tautologous. Proof that states are powerful actors, and thus political communication is stable, is found in the sheer number of people in their employ, the construction of enormous buildings as monuments to their importance and permanence, and the pomp and circumstance surrounding their daily function. Similarly, the blessings of the divine is evident by the huge number of “official” converts, enormous mosques and temples, and the mysticism surrounding religious ceremony. This sense of “realness” is enhanced by the existence of decision-makers who can be observed weighing options and coming to reasoned decisions. This is an illusion designed to enhance the perceived flexibility of a given program (Luhmann 2000a 135; 2005). Barak Obama has a “situation room” where he and his advisor purportedly grapple with all the relevant events happening around the globe, for example. The appearance of decision-makers absorb uncertainty because they appear to narrow the full range of choices available to people, which has the effect of structuring and stabilizing communication (Luhmann 2000a: 261).

\[121\] It also creates a linked stream of communication that is both plausible and logically connected, setting conditions for future decisions such that they are regarded as a “given” and unproblematic (Luhmann 2000a: 222, 261). This organizational function is similar to the establishment of a “logic of appropriateness” that governs institutional behavior (March and Olsen 1995: 30-31). It conditions selectors to see the existence of a given program as a normal, routine state of affairs
physicality of organizations, can result in the persecution or execution of those who disagree with the “correct” interpretation.

The inclusionary/exclusionary feature of organizations allows them to determine to whom the program applies and who gets to have a say in its creation (Luhmann 2000a: 185). This is a particularly dangerous feature of organizations, since it is entirely possible for organizations to claim a universal-type membership orientation for its program. At the same time organizations can exclude huge swaths of the human population from actual membership. This especially raises the potential for a totalizing approach to communicative reproduction.

Taken together, the potential for conflict between systems is heightened by these three features of organizations. Organizations can couple the universality inherent in systemic communication with a restricted interpretation of that communication, producing the potential for a kind of “communicative fundamentalism” that lends itself to a hegemonic communication strategy. As Luhmann puts it, “by means of organizations,” Luhmann argues, “society lets fail the principle of freedom and equality which society cannot negate” (Luhmann 2000:394). To be clear, not all organizations will exhibit the “maximal” strategy in each category, but some will.

For example, the religious system is built around the single distinction of transcendent and immanent, but there are approximately 4,200 religions in the world, which means that within the religious system itself there are at least as many programs, if not many more once sub-sects and denominations are taken into account. For each of these programs, there are at least one if not more organizations that decide who gets to make authoritative decisions on behalf of the program, what is and is not “heretical,” and who does and doesn’t belong. Your local church, temple, synagogue, or mosque is one of these organizations. The Islamic State is one as well.
Once again, I can imagine the protests at your local worship establishment being compared to the butchers of ISIS, yet from the perspective of modern systems theory they are more alike than different. The differences they do have lie with their respective program, the membership, and the communicative strategy, but both your local organization and the Islamic State are trying to convince people to choose religious communication.

Yet there is obviously a difference. Unlike your local place of worship, the Islamic State has declared its program to be the only proper interpretation of the religious distinction and has pledged to cleanse their territory of heretics and apostates. They have amassed a military capability to ensure those who will not convert will die. They have also done something your local religious organization has likely not done -- the Islamic State has declared that their religious program is the only distinction that matters and has accordingly tried to remove access to those systems within their territory. That is, they are attempting to achieve selection through communicative hegemony. If they are successful, functional differentiation – which depends upon the ability for people to act freely as selectors of communication – is replaced by an area of “de-differentiation” where access to other communication has to go through a “gatekeeper” system (Luhmann 1990: 126). In the case of the Islamic State, it is a particular interpretation of Islam that “approves” of other communication systems.

This kind of behavior is not just limited to the Islamic State. History is littered with actors who have the program and capability to attempt this sort of hegemonic strategy. The obvious ones are political organizations like Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and the DPRK under the Kim dynasty. Other examples include the economic organizations aligned with the “neoliberal consensus” that tries to assert the privilege of the economic distinction over all other organizational decision-making, the logic of patrimonialism (family system) that assert
dominance by particular families over decision-making, and the technocracy of scientists through eugenic-type programs, and so on.

Now not all organizations will have all three features. Although the reproductive logic of communication systems can lead to communicative hegemonic ambitions on the part of organizations, ambition and capability are two very different things. As Stichweh (2013:138) argues, the reproductive logic of communication systems tells us:

About the dynamics of self-description in function systems and the myths they cultivate – for example, that world politics rules supreme due to its direct link with principles that ‘represent’ the world as a whole such as sovereignty or, alternatively, human rights – but less about their factual ability to represent and organize society as a whole.

Any organization can claim to speak on behalf of an entire system, and can then further claim they speak on behalf of world society, but whether it does or not is an empirical question.

I myself grew up in a fundamentalist Baptist sect that declared as heretics all other religious groups, had both exclusive decision-making access but (potentially) universal membership, yet lacked the physical capacity to enforce a program of communicative hegemony. Nevertheless, their strategy of de-differentiation was impressively effective. Members routinely limited access to other communication on the basis of their application of their organization’s religious program, yet they could also simply leave the church if they wanted to choose another organizational program. Perhaps it might have been more effective had they used coercion.

This project will spend the remainder of its space on analyzing the actions of states and religious organizations caught up in large-scale militarized conflict, yet as a theory of conflict modern systems theory is not limited to the “international level.” The local contest over prayer in school (religious versus the political program), a fight over the privatization of water resources
(economic versus political), and a dispute between a university and its state (scientific versus political) over what research to prioritize can be theorized in the same terms as the war between the Axis and Allies (which political program) or the contest versus the Islamic State and western powers (religious program versus political program).

This theory of conflict also suggests “fundamentalism” is neither a perversion of an ideology or exclusively religious in orientation. Fundamentalism is simply one endpoint of the process by which communication systems replicate. Communists, Nazis, neoliberals, religious extremists – even hippies! – are all “fundamentalist” in their disregard for the communication of other systems, with some even going so far as to advocate their chosen enemy’s destruction. Certainly not all organizations choose this particular strategy, but some organizations do.

3.2.1 The types of conflict in world society
Conflict within world society is generated by the particular communicative strategies of organizations, but it is structured by the content of communication systems and the nature of their autopoietic reproduction. Because of this, we can expect two different axes for conflict among competing organizations—within-system conflict and between-system conflict. These axes are not mutually-exclusive. Although it is rare, an organization(s) might have a particular program that seeks domination over its system and all other systems as well.

Within-system conflicts can occur when two (or more) organizations within a single functional system of communication advance programs with different interpretations of a communicative system’s distinction (Luhmann 1997b [2013]:90-91). Choosing one program choice brings with it the potential rejection of other programs. This in turn can spark conflict between the organizations that refuse to accept rejection and those that have been selected.
Alternatively, organizations might come into conflict over the “right” to offer their program at all.

Within-system conflict characterizes much – and perhaps most -- of the “systemic conflict” seen within world society. International relations scholars are by now well acquainted with Spruyt’s (1994: chp 8) account of the rise of the sovereign-state system. The end of medievalism in Europe brought with it a great many different political units, including urban leagues, city-states, and proto-states all competing with other organization for programmatic dominance – to determine which political “self-understanding” would characterize the political system. Through a combinations of economic ascendancy, military victory, and ultimately diplomatic recognition at the Congress of Vienna, states edged out the competing political organizations for the right to declare states as the exclusive members of the political system within Europe, a pattern these victorious organization repeated through the various conquests and conflicts that led to a modern international state system.

In the 20th century there was a debate over which kind of political program was acceptable. Various political programs such as fascism, communism and democracy all competed for programmatic dominance, with organizations promoting democracy eventually declaring victory. Fukuyama’s (1992) “End of History” is in this vein a triumphalist pronouncement that democratic states that it has vanquished its programmatic competitors. The research surrounding the “democratic peace” thus almost comes across as a warning that there will only be peace between democratic states (Risse-Kappen 1995).

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122 An example a bit closer to home is the choice of scientific communication. In the social sciences, we often have the option of choosing between different ways to communicate “truth.” This choice is often referred to (erroneously) as the “quant-qual” divide, but is more accurately described as a ‘choice’ between ontologies (Jackson 2010). Reflexivist scholarship is often rejected or ignored by positives on the basis that science is about reproducibility and objectivity, a standard which reflexive scholarship cannot meet – with a real impact on careers and lives (Monroe 2005).
Religious disputes provide another example of within-system conflict.\textsuperscript{123} The religious wars in Europe, the Crusades, the current conflict between Shia and Sunni are some of the more extreme examples. Others include the 1054 East-West schism, the great schism of the Sangha after Buddha’s death, and the various splits within Protestantism. Not all of these conflicts resulted in violence and bloodshed, but many did.

This dynamic shows up in surprising places. The history of the scientific system is one of constant programmatic competition among scientific institutions – early in the “Age of Science” academies of phrenology, alchemy, and astrology competed alongside academies of science for the mantel of true science (Cooter 1976)\textsuperscript{124}\textsuperscript{125} Later, private academies and public universities competed for the right to conduct science and convey this new way of understanding the universe to the public at large, but they often ran into the scientific communication of private individuals who practiced “lay science” (see Cooter and Pumfrey 1994). Eventually universities managed to win out by exploiting economies of scale and attracting support from other systems. There was no “war” within the scientific community, of course, but the manufacture of scientific truth became subject to a list of organizational decisions that limited the procedure and venue for the production of science.

Between-system conflict can arise when organizations seek to impose their distinction on a communicative space that is already defined by another distinction. Alternatively it can arise

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\textsuperscript{123} Relatedly, to a very large extent Samuel Huntington’s expectation that civilizations will come into conflict, insofar as those civilizations are in large part derived in part from religious identity, could be easily construed as examples of within-system conflict (Huntington 1996: 63, 70-72).

\textsuperscript{124} None other than Isaac Newton was an adept practitioner of alchemy. In fact, given the recovery of his alchemal writings, it is arguable that his writings on that subject are more voluminous than those on physics. Given the communicative conflict between the various ‘sciences’ it is notably that his alchemal writings were suppressed by the Royal Academy until their auction in 1937. (see http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/newton/project/about.do)

\textsuperscript{125} Ironically, the critics within the scientific academies criticized phrenology for their materialist belief that the mind was contained wholly within the brain. That is, that the mind was the product of a natural process rather than something spiritual. This is the same sort of criticism that was leveled at Darwin by the very same people! (Johnston 2012: 6).
\end{footnotesize}
from a clash between systems attempting to define a novel event. In both cases, organizational programs can demarcate their distinction in such a way so as to exclude the claimed functionality of one or a few other distinctions. At its most extreme, an organizational program can seek complete communicative hegemony, whereby it seeks to impose a knowledge hierarchy that destroys functional differentiation.

Technically speaking, given the fact that each communication system possesses a unique distinction with which it renders the social world, all communication systems possess the necessary framework for communicative hegemony. Each distinction is a world of meaning unto itself and could be used to define every event and every feature of the human social world. It is entirely possible, for example, to define all of human society in terms of family, law, and art. However, the operationalization of this hegemonic-imposition is rare and requires a particular organizational strategy to see it to its conclusion. Perhaps the future might hold in store a scientific hegemony that organizes the basis of human society on some genetic sorting process.

Less speculative examples of this sort of totalizing organizational strategy can be drawn from recent political, economic, and religious history. Communist and fascist governments attempted with some success to liquidate competing organizations by overtly oppressing or outright killing religious, economic, scientific, and art “decision-makers” and, when not outright banning them, subordinating their organizations to the political program of those governments. The people living in within the reach of these organizations were forced to submit to the political calculations of the organizational program – prices, religion, art, sport, and even family were all tightly regulated according to a particular political idea. This is what I mean when I refer to communicative hegemony.

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126 Between-system conflict is a bit more complicated than within-system conflict as it usually entails a more complex interplay of organizational programs.
Of course this is not to say that other political programs do not assert that their organizational programs over others. Democratic organizations, despite having a much more open program, have accomplished a similar feat, relegating the family and the religious to the “private sphere,” casting the legal system in a supporting role, and declaring that economic decisions are subject to collective decision-making through the welfare state or subsidies. Even universities struggle to gain purchase over democratic organizations, as the current debate about global climate change and the controversies over evolution demonstrate.127

Economic organizations have rather infrequently acknowledged political ascendency. Discussions of monetary policy, trade policy, growth policy usually entail a choice of whether to “let the market reign” or allow political decisions to constrain market choice with economic actors typically argument the latter. Economic organizations typically encourage humans to run all decisions through a commodification- matrix to which everything is accorded a price (see Hardt and Negri 2000). The biggest question from this perspective is not the ultimate health or wellbeing of humans, whether or not democratic collective-decision making is respected, or whether scientific research is interesting, but whether these endeavors can turn a profit. In fact international relations has an entire corpus of theory dedicated to attempts by economic actors to attain hegemony over all other communication. The Marxist and Neo-Gramscian perspective typically refers to some sort of “Neoliberal consensus” which intrudes into all facets of human

127 In Daniel v Waters (1975) the Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee law that ordered science teachers to give “equal time” to both evolution and Christian creationism. In Edwards v Aguillard (1987) the Supreme Court ruled that public schools could not endorse a particular religion in the context of scientific education, and thus creationism was disallowed. This prompted creationists to reformulate their communication as that of “intelligent design” and “creations science,” thus circumventing the legal ruling. From the perspective of modern systems theory, the successful bid for hegemony by the scientific system resulted in “irritation” of the religious system which in turn prompted the evolution of that strain of communication.
existence, and manifests itself in the international environment as an economic world order (Hardt and Negri 2000; Neumman and Sending 2010; see also Brown 2015). 128

Religious organizations also have a long history of attempting to establish a communicative hegemony over human selection. In fact, it is one of the few systems can claim a number of organizations to have attained such dominance. The medieval Catholic Church commanded the allegiance of many in Europe, at times exceeding the capabilities of individual kingdoms in terms of coercion. Today the Islamic State and the Taliban provide two excellent examples of religious organizations attempting to establish a communicative hegemony that restricts the communicative choice of humans who live within their organizational reach.

3.2.2 The consequences of conflict in world society

There are two primary consequences to the conflict generated by organizations within world society. Due to the superiority of some communication system’s organizational strategies and capabilities, it is expected that some communication systems will be more successful than others. This feature is reminiscent of the evolution of species where some species outcompete others for dominance within a given environment. Relatedly, we should expect to see organizations of

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128 In an interview with Booked, Wendy Brown gave an excellent summary of the manner in which economic thought is universalized. She writes, “neoliberalism [is] a governing rationality through which everything is “economized” and in a very specific way: human beings become market actors and nothing but, every field of activity is seen as a market, and every entity (whether public or private, whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm. Importantly, this is not simply a matter of extending commodification and monetization everywhere—that’s the old Marxist depiction of capital’s transformation of everyday life. Neoliberalism construes even non-wealth generating spheres—such as learning, dating, or exercising—in market terms, submits them to market metrics, and governs them with market techniques and practices. Above all, it casts people as human capital who must constantly tend to their own present and future value. Moreover, because neoliberalism came of age with (and abetted) financialization, the form of marketization at stake does not always concern products or commodities, let alone their exchange. Today, market actors—from individuals to firms, universities to states, restaurants to magazines—are more often concerned with their speculatively determined value, their ratings and rankings that shape future value, than with immediate profit. All are tasked with enhancing present and future value through self-investments that in turn attract investors. Financialized market conduct entails increasing or maintaining one’s ratings, whether through blog hits, retweets, Yelp stars, college rankings, or Moody’s bond ratings.” Read the full interview at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/booked-3-what-exactly-is-neoliberalism-wendy-brown-undoing-the-demos
threatened communication systems push back against this success with “balancing behavior” reminiscent of states within anarchy. Both the success and push-back are likely to be heightened and intensified by organizational attempts at communicative hegemony.

As noted in chapter one, communication systems wax and wane according to their selection by the environment (people). Naturally, some communication systems will be better or worse at this competition at various times and in various spaces. This superiority can be more lasting if various symbolic media and organizational programs prove particularly effective. Luhmann points out that:

The different capabilities for system-construction… distinctively characterize the feature of modern society. They lead (among other factors) to an unequal growth of the function systems, and thus to unequal application of those functions regarding their respective communicative expenditure and visibility – without a hidden rationality or hierarchy fundamentally attached to those functions. Society does not expand like leavening; it does not symmetrically grow in size complexity, and differentiation as supposed by the nineteenth-century theories of progress (which could suppose this because they understood society as merely an economic system). Modern society increases the complexity of some systems and lets others wither” (Luhmann [2012]1997a: 391-392).

In other words, there are simply going to be some communication systems that expand more efficiently than others due to a more successful means to “getting to yes.” This dynamic really gets to the heart of modern systems theory – although the evolution of world society has no teleological end point, there will be winners and losers along the way.

Over time, it is expected that some communication systems will wax and wane, and that some might even disappear. To recall Luhmann’s quote from chapter one:
Meaning-constituting systems delude themselves if they think there have always been and will continue to be enduring identities, and that we can therefore refer to them as extant. All orientation is construction, is difference re-actualized from moment to moment (Luhmann 1997 [2012]:18).

And as history demonstrates, communication systems have shifted over time. For one example, the earliest communication system to dominate the way humans interpreted and constructed their social world was the familial system (Luhmann 1997 [2013]: 27-38, 54). Where these arrangements resulted in some families being better positioned relative to other families, we see the expansion of hierarchical relations (if you are not part of this family, you cannot rise) first locally, and then regionally. We see similarly hierarchical arrangements in religious-based societies throughout the world that slowly gave way to other communications.

This gets to the second consequence of conflict that results from the attempted imposition of a communicative hegemony. Hierarchically-ordered societies where one communication system dominates most or all other systems is difficult to achieve. Hierarchies are about asserting a certain point of view from an apex, yet any failure to maintain total communicative censorship through some whatever means, “finally oblige[s] all hierarchies… to come to terms with a fundamentally heterarchically communicating society” (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 187). The availability of outside distinctions “explodes a premise important for all hierarchically stratified societies, namely, the assumption that all positive values come together at an apex (in the nobility, the ruler, God)” (Luhmann 1997b [2103]: 216, 217). In other words, there is a natural balancing mechanic embedded within the communication reproduction process – just as life finds a way, so too does communication. Stetter points out that, “functionally differentiated society seems to have some inbuilt mechanism against a wholesale replacement of functional
logics through conflict and securitization dynamic” (Stetter 2013:153). In other words, the status of our currently functionally differentiated world society is likely the result of a balancing mechanic that manifests itself in two ways.

Although communication systems present a distinction that is supposed to be universal, in reality subordinating all communication to one distinction – especially if the people are used to a functional differentiation – typically runs beyond the ability of the dominant system’s organizations to maintain credibility. If an organization has established itself as the only worldview, it runs the risk of exposing the paradox inherent in its communication. Each failure undermines the supposed efficacy of the organization and renews interest in other communication as a more useful addressee for the issue. The barrier presented by self-reference nearly guarantees this. For example, the Soviet Union was unable to reconcile its political directives to economic problems despite all efforts to bend it to its will, nor was it able to adequately fulfill the function of religion despite its attempts at creating a “new” Soviet man. In short, hegemony might fail because it is weakened from within – the failure of the hegemon’s capacity to address novel communication or events.

Moreover, based on the reproductive imperative, it is highly likely that other systems and their organizations will not simply concede communication space to a would-be hegemon. Other organizations of other systems will likely react to communicative hegemony by altering their own communicative strategy. Reactions might run the gamut from attempting to regain the space through a more competitive program to resorting to violence, but there will likely be a push back of some kind. As with expectations about concentrations of power, organization immersed in what amounts a self-help environment in which their continued survival depends
upon successfully maintaining their autopoiesis, will not long be permit an area of de-
differentiation and will internally balance against it (Waltz 1979:118-127, 168-172).  

In this dissertation I spend a great deal of time detailing precisely this reaction by
political organizations against the religious organization the Islamic State and the Taliban. 
However, there are less drastic illustrations of this in action on which to draw. For an example 
of what reclaiming communicative space might look like, consider the reaction of some 
evangelical Protestants to the scientific theory of evolution. Fearful that an account of 
mankind’s origin that does not include their chosen deity might replace religion’s role in 
explaining this outcome, evangelicals have presented options that borrow the trappings of 
scientific communication – notions of “intelligent design,” “irreducible complexity,” and 
“theistic evolution.” Instead of *ex nihilo* creation, some evangelical organizations have created 
think tanks and even museums to promote these scientific-sounding claims as an attempt to 
forestall the loss of this function within world society.

3.3 Summary of Theory
This chapter presents a theory of conflict based on the theoretical architecture of modern systems 
theory. It provides an explanation for the cause, characteristics, and consequences of conflict 
within world society. To be clear, it is not an exclusive theory, but is merely an additional lens 
through which to view the conflict that occurs within the social world.

To summarize, the origin of conflict can be sourced to the contingency inherent in the 
communicative process of reproduction and the organizations that work to reduce that 
contingency. Conflict arises when one organization’s members reject another’s attempts to 
define some portion of the social world according to a particular distinction, and neither deviates

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from this stance. The potential for conflict is heightened if the organizations are able and willing to use force, promote an intolerant programmatic content, and aspire to achieve universal membership for their organization. At its most extreme, an organizational program can seek complete communicative hegemony, whereby it seeks to impose a knowledge hierarchy that destroys functional differentiation. Organizations couple the universality inherent in systemic communication with a restricted interpretation of that communication, producing the potential for a kind of “communicative fundamentalism” that lends itself to a hegemonic communication strategy. This is the link between communication systems, which have at best only process-based agency, and traceable action within the social world.

Although organizations are the actors, the boundaries of the conflict are structured by the meaning produced by communication systems. Consequently, conflict between competing organizations is expected to appear both within a single communication system and between at least two communication systems. Within-system conflicts can occur when two (or more) organizations within a single functional system of communication advance programs with different interpretations of a communicative system’s distinction. Between-system conflict can arise when organizations seek to impose their distinction on a communicative space that is either unclaimed but contested or already defined by another distinction.

Two consequences follow from this conflict. Some communication systems will outcompete other systems for control over communicative space. Relatedly, some organizations of threatened communication systems will push back against this success. Both the success and push-back is likely to be heightened and intensified by organizational attempts at communicative hegemony.
3.4 Application of the organizational ideal type
The second half of this dissertation will demonstrate the usefulness of this perspective by examining the organizational activity of the Taliban, the Islamic State, the medieval Catholic Church, and the United States through the lens of this theory of conflict. It will compare the ideal-typical behavior expected of organizations by this theory against the historical and current actions of these actors. This next section will address several questions regarding how I will examine these cases and why it is I chose these four cases and not others.

Following the argument in the first chapter, it bears repeating that the ontological orientation of modern systems theory is that of analyticism, with all of its attendant epistemological and methodological restrictions. Given this ontological commitment, the only thing that we can know in a scientific sense about a model is whether or not it is useful and not, strictly speaking, whether or not it is empirically accurate. For this reason, the typical pathway to analyticist knowledge creation is via the deployment of “ideal types.”

Ideal types are “one-sided accentuation[s] of one or more points of view” designed to reduce the complexity of reality by highlighting the “most important” features for a given explanation. (Jackson 2010: 150). Ideal-types leverage their exaggerated characteristics to provide insight into social outcomes.

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130 As Weber points out, Ideal types are “[F]ormed through a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual events, which are arranged according to these emphatically one-sided points of view in order to construct a unified analytical construct… In its conceptual purity, this analytical construct… is found nowhere in empirical reality. It is a utopia” (Weber 199a:191 quoted in Jackson 2010: 143). Jackson goes on to note that “Ideal-types are… more like deliberate caricatures or partial sketches, or perhaps specialized conceptual filters that focus our scholarly attention on particular aspects of actually existing things to the detriment of other aspects of those same things… [They] necessarily function as a way of expressing values even as it calls attention to specific feature of the actual world and gathers them together under one conceptual heading… [They] direct us to focus on particular aspects and not others” and other researchers may reformulate these ideal-types so as to “focus on different aspects of the same entity or object, and they would not in any simple sense be ‘wrong’ for doing so” (Jackson 2010:145).

131 The purpose of a case is to apply the ideal-type, and not to compare cases. “However, analyticists can, for all intents and purposes, take or leave case-comparison without any consternation, and if a piece of analyticist research does utilize more than one case, it does so only in the pursuit of what Charles Tilly (1989: 82) calls ‘individualizing comparisons’ that are useful for ‘grasping the peculiarities of each case’” (Jackson 2010:153).
There is no standard method for generating these types, nor is there an objective standard for assessing them, although it is typically the case study where these ideal types are applied. Unlike positivist accounts, the rationale for the case is not necessarily to demonstrate generalizability across cases, although this will certainly happen to some extent over the course of the next two chapters. Instead, the purpose of a case is to apply the ideal-type, and thus the choice of case(s) is more a matter of illustration rather than testing. For this reason, “analyticists can, for all intents and purposes, take or leave case-comparison without any consternation, and if a piece of analyticist research does utilize more than one case, it does so only in the pursuit of what Charles Tilly (1989: 82) calls ‘individualizing comparisons’ that are useful for ‘grasping the peculiarities of each case’” (Jackson 2010:153).

This freedom of case selection obviously builds a tension into a given analyticist project regarding a confirmation bias in case selection— one can always make claims ex nihilo, the result of a fevered imagination totally unmoored from reality, so long as a few cases conveniently present themselves. Certainly positivists might claim that freedom from the demands of rigorous hypothesis testing will inevitably lead to the accumulation of bad ideas at best and conspiracy theories at worst. They have a point, although one that is not as strong as they think it is.132 Analyticists must ground their model in the observable world to warrant long-term consideration. For this reason, well known cases are preferable over obscure ones to maximize perceived usefulness.

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132For Luhmann, untethered model creation was a significant problem in classical sociology. From his perspective, scholars like Weber and Parsons took too many liberties with their scholarly freedom. They were a bit too untethered to reality, and as a result, were less useful than they might have been. He writes in his work on the religious system, “The analytical thinker claims he is free to determine the scope of his own thought. For him, only propositions can be true, not ideas. However, he is confronted with having to limit arbitrariness (a methodological concession), a problem that cannot be resolved (least of all ‘empirically’…the worst thing to do would be to look for a (practical) solution somewhere ‘in the middle’ ” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 9-10). For Luhmann, and for all analyticists, methodological sophistication is demonstrated through the artful construction of ideal types that possess ontological properties. They cannot be falsified, but they can be useful or not. And if they are useful, they are real.
I have chosen three religious organizations that either have in the past or are currently pursuing maximalist communication strategies – the Taliban, the Islamic State, and the medieval and current Catholic Church. I have also chosen a single political organization – the United States. In truth, I could have chosen any number of other organizations from any number of communication systems, but I thought these four cases would be helpful particularly because of how well known they are. To put it simply, the reader’s knowledge of the case will provide a methodological check on the application of the theory. I have also chosen these four cases because each has a robust corpus of research that explains their historical or current behavior. The theory cannot hide behind their obscurity.

Although it seems I am trying to have it both ways -- pre-emptive insulation from any questioning of the cases, yet taking credit for having chosen well-known case – I am simply trying to stay true to the analyticist ontological commitments of this project and Luhmann’s stated intentions for his theoretical apparatus. The only standard by which a theory can be judged is whether or not you the reader find something useful in the ideal-types set forth in this project. I cannot know in advance whether or not this project will clear this bar, and so I have chosen cases that will at the very least generate strong opinions. I have also tried to be as systematic as possible, insofar as I deal with historical entirety of each case such as I can given space constraints. Ideally, I would have liked to have added two additional political organizations and three economic organizations just to demonstrate what this dynamic looks like across a larger number of cases. Again, space constraints prevent this sort of treatment.

For example, US foreign policy is contrasted against the ideal-typical Luhmannian organization and as such, the consistent advancement of its organizational program is implicitly contrasted against the absence of any such program. The United States has two-hundred years of
democratic promotion and has perceived the six major conflictual epochs in which it has been involved – the Civil War, the Cuban conflict, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the War on Terror – via opposition to this program. In fact, nearly all of its primary opponents in the international sphere have been defined programatically.

This claim is at the same time both controversial and banal from the perspective of international relations scholarship. Realists would point out that more often than not the shape of American foreign policy conforms less to some Manichean worldview than it does the more work-a-day figure of realpolitik. Propping up dictators and knocking down nascent democracies, ignoring the UN and implementing unfair trading regimes is hardly the work of liberal angels. Conversely, liberal internationalists have been pointing to the special characteristics of the American and British world order for quite some time.

Where this account differs from those that have been written previously is that it presents the United States as neither a unipole nor lauded hegemon. I am interested in uncovering neither the mechanisms by which an American leadership is sustained or lost, nor is its behavior relative to the institutions it created. Whether or not the US intended to build a world order or maintain it is irrelevant to this account. Like the Islamic State and the Soviet Union, the organization that is the American government promotes a singular program regardless of opposition or relative capability, whether or not it is a multipolar or bipolar world, whether or not it is 1815 or 2015.

As with the role of the United States in world order, the study of religious actors has surged since September 11th, leading one scholar to declare the 21st century to be “God’s century,” (Philpott 2012; Toft et al 2011; Wald and Wilcox 2006). Like the US, religious actors also have a well-accepted theoretical location within the state/non-state hierarchy, and despite their obvious importance to influencing world order, there has been little new theorizing
outside of the standard secular/political system worldview (Shah and Philpott, 2011:24). Religious actors are assigned a “fixed role in politics” that is subordinate to political actors (Hurd 2010:136, 137). At best religion and its actors are seen as an “intervening factor” that “targets” the secular, either quietly whispering in the ear of foreign policy-makers or shaping domestic politics (Mendelsohn 2012: 591, Philpott 2002:83-92; see also Busby 2007, Fox and Sandler 2004, Thomas 2005, Troy 2104:299).

This tendency is particular pronounced when thinking about religious actors and violence. Violent religious groups are referred to only as “terrorists” and their methods are deemed illegitimate. Consequently, much of the research tends to focus on the “micro-phenomenon” of the terrorist’s psychological or instrumental reasons (Richardson 2006:11). Religion, it is argued, is often just a mask for a pedestrian power play (see Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003. It is not the religious, it is argued, but political leaders who defined the parameters and gave meaning to religion on the basis of the determined needs of the state and its political leaders (see Nexon 2011, Cho and Katzenstein 2011). At worst, this sort of literature resorts to the “No True Scotsman” logical fallacy - no true practitioner of x religion would ever choose to engage in such activity.

Where this account differs is that I present these organizations as functionally undifferentiated from political organizations like the United States. They are intent on promoting their particular program using a totalizing communication strategy. In this regard, I am not interested in what makes these organizations into “criminals” since their actions are no better or worse, legitimate or illegitimate, than those of the political organizations like the United States. Furthermore, I treat their religious claims as the sole animating motivation to their

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133By keeping religion and politics as separate spheres, “secularism does not so much mark the demise of faith or the exit from religion as it represents an alternative sacrality – a secular capture of the sacred” (Pabst 2013: 1002).
behavior. One would think this would be an uncontroversial claim, yet in my exhaustive review of the international relations scholarship on religion, there is virtually no work that is free from secular bias.

What follows now is the empirical illustration of this perspective across these four cases. My strategy for discussing the religious actors is slightly different than the one I use for the United States. For the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the Catholic Church I am interested in showing how modern systems theory can be used to describe their organizational program and their communicative strategy in a way that respects the content of their program without resorting to a political perspective to characterize their role in international affairs. It also shows how the different communicative strategies play out historically and in current events.

Furthermore, I use all three cases to illustrate what within-system and between-system conflict actually looks like. The Islamic State is particularly useful in this regard as it has adopted the most totalizing approach of the three. It will also demonstrate what the “balancing mechanic” looks like in the real world.

My discussion of the United States takes a slightly different approach in terms of its structure. As with the three religious cases, I make the case that the organizational program – democratization -- has been a consistent feature of American foreign policy over its 200 year history. However I use much more space working through this claim given the skepticism it is likely to prompt among readership. A modern systems perspective suggests that the same programmatic impulse is at work historically and I go to some length to bear that out.

The case also shows how a single organizational program manifests itself differently depending upon the axis of conflict. Within the political communication system, the United States takes a hard line against what it perceives as true programmatic rivals – monarchism,
fascism (including the proto-fascism of the Confederacy), and communism. Non-democratic governments that worked against the spread of these programs were often ignored until after the offending programs were defeated. With between-system conflict we see little compromise with programmatically opposing, non-political actors and almost complete cooperation by political actors. The War on Terror has brought the United States into alignment with competing organizations – some of which are not allies. In fact, the reaction to non-political organizations attempting communicative hegemony has been swift and uncompromising
Chapter Four: Religious Organizations as Hegemonic Actors

Chapter three outlines a general theory of conflict – it is structured by communication systems and generated by organizational strategy. The potential for conflict is heightened if the organizations are able and willing to use force, promote an intolerant programmatic content, and aspire to achieve universal membership for their organization. This chapter will provide three examples of this conflict generation – the Islamic State, the Taliban, and the historical/current Catholic Church.

The purpose of this chapter is really four-fold. The first objective is to demonstrate how an analysis that uses modern systems theory actually works in practice. Modern systems theory brings attention to organizational strategy and programmatic content as the source of conflict. Members of these religious organizations seek communicative hegemony not because they are psychotic criminals or because they are reacting to liberalism, but because the demands of their program would, even in the absence of a liberal world order, prompt them down that particular path. This strategy prompts a response on behalf of other systemic organizations, notably political organizations that seek to roll back religious hegemony.

The second objective is to show how that, even though all three are religious organizations that are seeking or have sought religious hegemony, there are gradations in
organizational strategy. The Islamic State is a good example of a “maximal” strategy coupled with excellent physical capability and universal membership. This maximalist program has caused a massive conflict both within the religious system and between systems. The Taliban also has a maximalist strategy for the establishment of a religious hegemony but only within a certain region, with limited membership and much limited organizational capacity. The historical Catholic Church was, like both of these current organizations, interested in maintaining a religious hegemony in Europe. Its defeat came in the midst of a within-system and between-system conflict caused by its own hegemonic program. Since this time it has had to modify its strategy to a more conciliatory position.

The third objective is to demonstrate how modern systems theory presents a new way to theorize religious actors. This will be discussed in a bit in the conclusion to this dissertation, but I would ask the reader to keep several thoughts in mind while they read these accounts. Modern systems theory takes religious actors and organizations on their face and sees no hidden “political” motive or “rational” power-seeking at work in their actions. These organizations are motivated purely by their religious ideas for a religious objective. For this reason, the state/non-state dichotomy is a useless one – or more accurately, it is a political viewpoint not shared by these religious organizations. To this point, these actors do not just seek parity with states, they want to replace the state-led order with an order based solely on a particular religious program. Modern systems theory provides a means to render religious actors with the same lens through which it views political actors – a true rarity in the discipline.

Finally, this chapter moves part-way to answering the “so-what” question -- whether or not an account of conflict which relies on the insights of modern systems theory offers something truly unique or worthwhile. As discussed in the first half of this project, the only
true metric for an analyticist project is the usefulness of an approach. While I find this perspective immensely useful in thinking about global conflict, there is nothing to say the reader must be equally persuaded.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The next section will briefly discuss how religion has recently fared as a subject of study within international relations. It will then turn to how I choose to define and “ operationalize” religion and religious organizations. After which, it will examine three case studies of unequal length. The first is the Islamic State which is the largest of the three cases on account of its more lengthy programmatic analysis. It will then turn to the Taliban and finally the Catholic Church which has both an historical and current section.

4.1 Studying religious actors in international politics
After decades of ignoring religion, political science scholars were confronted with the continuing relevance of religion to international affairs in the aftermath of Sept 11th, 2001. Since that time, the list of works that examine religion have exploded, with one influential volume even dubbing the 21st century ‘God’s century’ (Toft et al. 2011; see also Dawson 2013).

134 Kenneth Wald and Clyde Wilcox (2006) found that “prior to 1960 only a single APSR article sought to use religion as a variable to explain empirical phenomenon.” Philpott (2012:4) notes that of IR articles sampled over a similar period “only six or so out of a total of about sixteen hundred… featured religion as an important influence.

some credence to this claim. According to surveys, the number of people who claim to be “more religious than secular” has among all religions risen steadily last 30 years despite the expectations of scholars (Inglehart and Wezel 2004; Toft, 2011: 116).\footnote{A number of hypotheses have subsequently been floated to explain it — that secularization is not yet complete, the religious have a favorable birth rate, secular regimes have turned to religion to boost their flagging legitimacy, globalization has assisted the spread of religion, and secularism itself is no longer as attractive, among others (see Hehir 2012; Shaf and Philpott 2011; Toft 2012: 128-129).}

Despite religions “ferocious” return to the fields of comparative politics, “international relations theory has little to say about it” (Shah and Philpott 2011:24). This is puzzling, since, as Hehir (2012:15) rightly claims, “religion has never been absent from the international arena or the reality of world politics.” Nevertheless, owing to secular definitions of “the international” in the aftermath of Westphalia, the study of religion is seen as “out of bounds” (Hurd 2004; Jones 2003: 371; Lausten and Waever 2000).\footnote{Ironically the treaties at Westphalia concluded a religious war and, despite being premised on Luther’s “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments” led to religion’s territorialization (see Philpott 2000; Nexon 2006:277).} This perspective locks IR theory into treating the political triumph of Westphalia as a timeless and enduring norm (Dawson 2013:202-203). The consequence of this “secularism bias” is that it assigns religion a “fixed role in politics” that is subordinate to political actors (Hurd 2010:136, 137). At best religion and its actors are seen as

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an “intervening factor” that “targets” the secular, either quietly whispering in the ear of foreign policy-makers or shaping domestic politics to achieve interests (Mendelsohn 2012: 591, Philpott 2002:83-92; see also Busby 2007, Fox and Sandler 2004, Thomas 2005, Troy 2014:299). At worst religious actors are demonized as illegitimate.

This tendency is particularly pronounced when thinking about religious organizations’ use of violence. Much of the research on the use of violence by religious actors (i.e., terrorists) has focused on uncovering its hidden political rationality (Pape 2003, 2005; Young and Findley 2011: 8). If religion inserts itself into politics on religious terms, “then that religion is frequently viewed as defective – it is the work of fanatics…who do not, as it were, understand how to be properly religious” (Dawson 2013: 203). Consequently, much of the research tends to locate religious violence either in the defects in the state’s ability to integrate, socialize and represent interests or in the defective psychology of a of the individual terrorist (Crenshaw 1990a, 1990b; Pape 2003; Richardson 2006:11). In both cases, religion, it is argued, is often

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138 J Bryan Hehir (2012) points out that the entire notion of a “resurgent” religion presupposes its wane after Westphalia. In reality, he argues, secular statehood is no less a normative/ethical dogma than a religion. The Westphalian exchanged the religious universalism typified by the Catholic Church for the secular universalism of the system of state sovereignty. By keeping religion and politics as separate spheres, “secularism does not so much mark the demise of faith or the exit from religion as it represents an alternative sacrality – a secular capture of the sacred” (Pabst 2013: 1002).

just a mask for a political power play (see Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; see also Nexon 2011, Cho and Katzenstein 2011).

Of course not all IR scholars treat religion this way. Snyder (2011) argues that one strategy to theorize religion is to reframe its relationship to the state (Pabst 2013:999). Daniel Philpott’s “differentiation” theory, Ayse Zarakol’s notion of “system threatening” organizations, and Barak Mendelhson’s concept of “competing ordering principles all do an excellent job presenting religion as a powerful force in international politics. Where they perhaps fall short is that they really are only theorizing religious actors and furthermore, do so through the lens of the state. A Luhmannian perspective, in contrast, is able to render all actors on equal footing. So while their arguments are similar to the one that I have made, they are not comprehensive and can thusly be “folded” in my own perspective.

Ayse Zarakol (2011: 2311) argues that terrorist organizations can be distinguished on the basis of their rejection of the Westphalian order. According to Zarakol, the Westphalian system replaces three types of historical authority -- religious, personal, and local. Organizations that claim legitimacy on the basis of local or personal authority are seen as less threatening than those who claim legitimacy on the basis of religious authority, since they are perceived as less threatening to states(Zarakol 2011: 2311). Religious legitimation, on the other hand, is

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141 A number of scholars also provide a piece of a complete theory that can be combined into a single workable causal chain. For example, Appleby (2000: 87-94) argues that fundamentalists intend to spread their universal message internationally, which Elizabeth Hurd (2010: 154) argues they can accomplish through taking over a state through which they can broadcast their universal message. This then runs into conflict with other fundamentalist visions, including liberal ideology (Appleby 2000; Fukuyama 2004:30).
perceived as “-- an assault on the modern (state) project of reducing indeterminacy through classification and comparison… [thus] directly [threatening] the ontological security of the state” (Zarakol 2011: 2315).

Barak Mendelsohn (2012) argues that religion provides a “competing ordering principle” to Westphalia. These actors, in the strongest sense, deny the authority of the state and negates its political borders on the basis of “[uniting] people around a set of rules applied on a non-territorial basis” (Mendelsohn 2012: 596). Although subordinated in the international arena by a Westphalian political order, “Religion remained a legitimate (though in the dominate secularist view, undesirable) and in fact pervasive source for state identity, informing traditions and institutional forms as well as policies in numerous countries” (Mendelsohn 2012:590). And since all organizing principles “aspire to hegemonic status” (even if they are often unsuccessful) it always remains an option for the international system (Mendelsohn 2012: 597). In fact, he argues that:

The potential to serve as an organizing principle is inherent in the most prominent religions; and while it could like dormant for generations, its vitality can never be fully vanquished. It may resurface wen a critical mass of religious states merges, or as this article emphasis, through the rebellion of non-state actors who refuse to accept the legitimacy of the Westphalian state even as a temporary compromise that necessity dictates”(596).

\[142\] As an ordering principle, religion “religion defines actors within the system… standards for standing and legitimacy of those actors… , and their form. This shapes actors goals, parameter for action, legitimate means of control, scope of control over individuals, bundles of principles and values; Organizing principles determine the source of authority, status of units comprising the order, and the parameters for interaction; also shape determination of and treatment of lesser units (593-594)

\[143\] Religions, “provide an opening for groups of believers to interpret them as a guide for the political management of the public sphere, some on a broader scale than others. Monotheistic religions, with their emphasis on the oneness of god, are particularly prone to broad interpretations that envision a global religious order. Such an order is universal and hierarchical in its nature. Unlike the international society, which allows for multiple ‘truths’ to
Mendelsohn argues that it is the failure of the state-based system that is providing an opening (Mendelsohn 2012: 590). That is, it is the capability of states to enforce their order that is the important causal feature. Seen in this light, actors such as Al Qaeda, “may represent a unique challenge but hardly a new phenomenon given a millennia-old struggle between agents of dissimilar organizing principles over the shape and organization of world politics” (Mendelsohn 2012:590). Organizations such as Al Qaeda present an “alternative route” to changing the existing order (Mendelsohn 2012: 592).

Daniel Philpot (2007) employs the concept of “differentiation” to characterize the relationship of international religious actors to their state. Those where either the political or religious system seeks to unify the polity to the exclusion of all other concepts, he calls “integrationist.” Where they are in separate spheres, he calls “differentiated” (Philpott 2007: 506-507). The degree to which such an arrangement is amenable to one or both parties ranges from “consensual” to “conflictual” (Philpott 2007: 507). For example, a highly differentiated society formed on the basis of consensus such as the United States or India see religious and government entities with separate, legitimated spheres of authority. Conversely, states such as the Soviet Union forcefully integrate religious and political authority on the basis of political authority.145

coexist, in a religious order the source of authority is one, and it demands exclusivity, denying the existence of any other truth but its own (Mendelsohn 2012:595).”

144 According to Philpott, differentiation is the degree of mutual autonomy between religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal authority, that is, the extent of each entity’s authority over the other’s basic prerogatives to hold offices, choose its officials, set its distinctive policies, carry out its activities, in short, to govern itself. Religion and state relationships with a high degree of differentiation can simply be called “differentiated”; and ones with a low degree, “integrationist.” There are four dimensions of differentiation: (1) is there a constitutional status for a single religion? (2) Does the state promote religious goals through its organs and actions? (3) Does the state restrict the right of minority religions in any way? (4) Does any religious body holy political prerogatives or positions within government? (Philpott 2007: 507).

145 Differentiated, consensual: US, India, “Engaged Buddhism Differentiated, conflictual: Communist Poland, Pinochet Chile, Kemalist Turkey, Postcolonial Indonesia; Integrationist Consensual: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,
The degree of differentiation depends largely upon the level of democracy in that county, since democracy, “embodies differentiation, the mutual and consensual distancing of religious and political authority that Stepan (2001) has described as “the twin tolerations”—especially if democracy is conceived to embody not only contestation and participation but also liberal freedoms like minority rights and religious freedom” (Philpott 2007: 509-510). The degree of political activity of a religion can then be measured against its agitation for democratic governance.

In the absence of modern systems theory, each of these three approaches would have been a useful means to analyze the religious actors discussed in this chapter. All three concern themselves with the dynamic between the religious and political systems, and they capture at least some of the drivers for conflict between them.

Whereas, Realism struggles to explain such massive alliances in the absence of a true threat, and rationalist strains of liberalism would likely read all terrorist actors merely as interests, Zarakol’s approach would be able to explain why so many states have responded to the Islamic State, yet comparatively few respond to ETA or FARC. Mendelsohn’s idea of “ordering principles” approximates the Luhmannian concept of “communication systems” insofar as they can be characterized as competing worldviews. Philpott employs a differentiation-based approach to explain the relationship of religious organizations to states. Both can explain conflict on the basis of difference – conflict comes about because each system desires autonomy.

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Medieval Christendom, Colonial LA; Integrationist, Conflict: Communist, Bulgaria, Romania, USSR, Czech, Arab nationalist (Philpott 2007: 508).

146 An initial global glance shows religious actors exercising such influence during the Third Wave in places like Poland, Lithuania, the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, Kenya, South Africa, Chile, and Brazil, but not in places like Rwanda, Argentina, and Senegal. What explains the varying postures? Those who agitate for democracy are motivated by a political theology that endorses liberal democratic institutions. (510)
There are a few minor areas of difference. Philpott, for example, defines “differentiation” as “the degree of mutual autonomy between religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal authority… [and] the extent of each entity’s authority over the other’s basic prerogatives… to govern itself” (Philpott 2007: 507). This definition ignores that sociological differentiation by definition would not require “legal authority” since that would mean both the political and religious systems are defined through the legal system.

Mendelsohn thinks that a religious order would be an authoritarian hegemony, contrasting it with an “international society… [that] allows for multiple ‘truths’ to coexist” (Mendelsohn 2012: 595). This ignores the hegemonic nature of political programs. For example, the cornerstone of the liberal project is that the only legitimate form of governance democratic. Then same could also be said Communist or Fascist governments.

That being said, the basic ideas they present are very similar to my own, however their principal deficiency is that their lack of an underlying mechanism for actor behavior that is not tied to the state system. They fail to answer the question as to why religious organizations and terrorist organizations desire to differentiation themselves or establish a separate ordering principle for the international environment. It is simply taken as a given that religious principles are opposed to the state, which implies a subtle secularism that sees a duality between the sacred and the secular.

The logic of communicative reproductive is critical to creating a theory that can equally theorize the actions of states and religious organization, universities and banks. Without it, it simply is not possible to render states and religious organizations as analogous units without simply declaring it to be so. But what of the banks that desire that their logic hold sway?
Modern systems theory sees all of these systems as competing and competing on more or less even terms. It takes religious actors seriously because it takes all actors seriously.

What is required is a deeper conceptual language to theorize religious actors and political actors – to say nothing of all other systemic actors – on equal terms. For example, a simple duality fails to address the need for religious organizations and terrorist organizations to differentiate themselves or establish a separate ordering principle for the international environment. It is simply taken as a given that religious principles are opposed to the state, which implies a subtle secularism that sees a duality between the sacred and the secular. This account, in contrast, expects that all systemic organizations are functionally undifferentiated in their systemic role of pursuing communicative reproduction, and can only meaningfully be differentiated on the basis of their programmatic content (which is structured by their communication system). This places both religious and political actors in the much larger context of world society, where they are but one organization among many all engaged in the same process of communicative reproduction.

4.2 Defining religion and religious organizations
This chapter relies on Luhmann’s understanding of religion as defined by modern systems theory. Modern systems theory treats all religious, regardless of their differences, as programs united around the core distinction of the religious system. This might offend those that believe their chosen religion is the only non-heretical option. It might also offend those for whom religion is a personal experience that defies easy categorization, since Luhmann’s take on
religion ignores non-organizational religious communication. For Luhmann, the religious system operates the same as any other communication systems.\footnote{For example, religion “claims that it can justify the exclusionary power of forms (as ‘this and not that’)” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 16). That is, according to religious communication, its communication is right and the others are wrong. Consequently, “religion needs to be imagined as an object that expands its own boundaries” – just like all other systems (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:327).}

I am not overly troubled by this (probably) controversial definitional choice. Even a cursory review of the literature will reveal that there is no consensus on how to conceptualize religion (Shah 2012:12; Snyder 2011: 3-4). Depending on who you ask, religion can be defined as a deeply personal experience or in terms of its doctrinal organization; as centered on a single divine being or a multifaceted transcendence; it can be metaphysical or comprised of mundane practices; treated as both a resource and constraint (see Fox and Sandal 2010:149-150).\footnote{The traditional Weberian tradition defines religion as a unified system or theology of “values, beliefs, and practices” that center on a divine being and/or transcendent order designed to create a moral community within a society (Haynes 2007:12; Norris and Inglehart 2011: 27, 40). Another definition defines religion by those who profess to be religious – “any individual, group or organization that espouses religious beliefs and that articulates a reasonable consistent and coherent message” or theology (Toft et al 2012: 9-10, 23). But even definitions of this sort can be criticized as the imposition of the secular-religious divide – a “construction of European modernity” – which creates the notion of religion in the first place, when in reality religion is a personal, transcendent experience that defies categorization (Casanova 2012: 27; Shakman-Hurd, 2011). Others have settled on the idea that religion is best conceived as faith-based worldview, “irreducible to any other sphere (nature or consciousness), while at the same time being embedded in narrative and culture (Pabst 2013: 1000). In short, religion can be defined in terms of “discursive contexts, traditions, or Deleuzean metaphysics” (Dawson 2013: 219). It can also be a resource for legitimacy and persuasion, a catalyst for social action, or a constraint on human behavior (Fox and Sandal 2010: 149-50). See also Fox 2000; Fox and Sandler 2004: 2, Fox 2008, Fox and Sandal 2010: 149-150, Hassner 2009:38-50, Henne 2012; Toft 2011.}

Given this array of ideas about religion, my choice is as defensible as any other.

From the perspective of modern systems theory, the religious system is defined in terms of its organization around a single distinction -- “the double valuation of everything as immanent and as transcendent” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:69). **Immanence** refers to the mundane, knowable universe; **transcendence** to the ‘divine,’ unknowable/inaccessible side of the code.

“Communication is always religious, “Luhmann notes, “Whenever it observes immanence from the standpoint of transcendent” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 83). The primary function of the
religious system is therefore to observe immanence from the standpoint of transcendence and thus accord religious significance to the human social world (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 83, 95-96). Like all other systems, there is no single definition of the transcendent side of the distinction.\footnote{149}{The religious system remains oriented ‘in the direction of juxtaposing every distinction that can be used in observation (recognition, imagination, action, etc.) with its counter-value of transcendence [everything is god’s will]...’ (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:135, 137).” It is the very openness of this code that allows for the system’s proliferation, since it provides a great deal of flexibility when trying to secure acceptance (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:291, 296).World religions are an important – perhaps the most important – contribution to differentiating a religion system. They more or less anticipate a world society, at the same time cutting off possibilities (and thus plausibilities as well) for justification, which might arise from nonreligious sources” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:296). “And perhaps this is also a reason why at this time the idea of a unified world religion seems pale and unattractive” he adds. “Instead of find a system (one system!) with a preponderance of nonintegrated self-descriptions. It can be assumed these have a common coding, function, and ability to be distinguished from nonreligious communication... a remarkable ability is found to adapt to different local and social-structural demands, different types of audience, and different conditions for inclusion and exclusion. The impression of diversity and liveliness in religious communication is empirically and theoretically justified.... Against all the prognoses... that such a quagmire of mysticism and irrationality would eventually be done away with” (369-370).}

The historical evolution of this functionality involved the gradual reduction of the arbitrariness of the transcendence, which meant the development of programs that restricted access to the transcendent in order to “marginalize those who question it” while at the same time making it “more real” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:61).\footnote{150}{Such that “not just anybody can come and maintain just anything” to increase the plausibility of the communication (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:67). For this reason, “resolving the fundamental paradox of reentry [of transcendent into immanent] demands timely and convincing forms placing limits on what can ultimately be accepted” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:67, 90-91). Access to this transcendence is critical but hidden from most to allow for flexibility, since, “remaining unknown contributes to respect for the holy and also confers authority on those who can credibly cite experience of it. To the extent that rituals are agreed upon, myths associated with them are gathered and recount why people do things they do” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 92-93).}

The eventual solution was the development of deities (or similar transcendent figures) that embody the transcendent and could “cross over” into the immanent to deliver pronouncements about it (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 98).\footnote{151}{Therefore “the appearance of religion in history is unavoidably linked to implementing a reentry, even if we can only see at the end that this was how it began” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 98) For example, Luhmann points out that in Judaism, “a transcendent god is presented as an observer of the world, as a unity of observer and observation. All sacred things of this world are, in comparison, merely a reflection” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:97). And with this comes inerrancy. “God observes without being dependent on the distinction of being and nonbeing, and as a result, there is no ‘excluded third possibility’ for him – and thus no logic, either” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:173)}}
observations which in turn insured against rejection of religious communication (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:181, 183-184). It also gave the religious system an easy means to include and exclude on the basis of adherence to transcendental dictates (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:59-60, 165).\footnote{\textquoteright Transcendence exists as a person, it is the one God. And whoever does not believe in him is excluded\textquoteright (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:165). Yet access to a deity or deities means hope, as \textquoteleft no matter how inadequate or susceptible to sin he is, man is able to observe how God is observing him\textquoteright (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:115-116). This is most clearly expressed in the \textquoteleft redemptive outlook\textquoteright of the majority of the world\textquotesingle s religions. The transcendent divine provides the possibility of redeeming the sinful mundane. Any programs that become associated with this redemption process thus becomes elevated over observable reality and thus become the most successful program (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:163).}

Given that distinctions are applied to both understand and create the human social world, the distinction was naturally applied to social relations. The complexity reduction inherent in tying social \textquoteleft good\textquoteright to religious \textquoteleft transcendence\textquoteright is incredibly efficient, allowing for a high degree of such reduction throughout human societies using religious coding. Any and all \textquoteleft acceptable\textquoteright social behavior was perhaps inevitably tied to transcendent communication (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:10, 102, 104). Many facets of human life that could be subsumed under this worldview were, such that in its earliest years it is difficult to identify a single function for religion beyond its usefulness as a \textquoteleft universal system\textquoteright (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:129; see Armstrong 2006).\footnote{Karen Armstrong\textquoteleft s (2006 \textit{The Great Transformation}) provides a compelling account of this similar functionality across all of the major civilizations -- Semitic, Greek, Chinese, and Hindu.} This was abetted by the development of a powerful symbolic code that combined a belief in a relationship between one\textquoteleft s soul and transcendence (god), the ever-presence of \textquoteleft sin\textquoteright throughout immanence, and the possibility of inclusion/exclusion from religious organizations. (Luhmann 1997c [2014]: 218-222). Thus early on, access to world society was gated by the religious function, with strong exclusion/inclusion potential.\footnote{The religious binary, and the programs that built up around it, serves as an, \textquoteleft evolutionary \textquoteleft attractor,\textquoteright attracting parasites that are ready to submit to the code\textquoteleft s demands and that do not attach themselves as third, fourth, or fifth values, but make use of a need for conditionings --regardless of opportunity or interest\textquoteright (Luhmann 1997c}
As the number of functional systems began competing with the religious system increased, the number of possible functions performed by the religious system decreased. It gradually lost its ability to participate in the substantiation of knowledge, in the determination of proper familial roles, of establishing the allocation of resources, and so on. In short, it gradually lost its ability to forge “a relationship of all societal activities to a total meaning” across all of world society due to the development of other systems (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:234).

Nevertheless, religion’s, “universality implies that religious problems can appear in every communication, even in the context of specifically organizational operations or those assigned to the function systems of economy, science, law, politics and so on. (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:154).

It thus still serves as a sort of “catch-all” to make the universe understandable, even if competition has moved it from its ascendant perch on top of the functional hierarchy (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:147, 148).

4.2.1 Identifying Religious Organizations

Because I rely on Luhmann’s concepts, I take claims of religious organizations at face value. If a religious organization is promoting religious communication, even if they are engaged in what many consider a so-called “political” activity, I consider them to be religious actors if their stated goal is religious. Moreover, I leave interpretations of certain doctrinal positions to theologians. Whether or not a program is “legitimate” is a matter of contestation between religious sects and denominations.

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[2014]:108-109). This eventually results in a stratified society whereby religious code served a means to reduce a great deal of complexity through all of world society (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:111).

155 This does not mean that religious functionality does not respond to other elements within society – religion has to abide by law and pay for the allocation of goods – but it does mean that religion functions as if all other communications are pregnant with transcendent potential.
Secondly, religious organizations are identified and differentiated by their development of programs that routinize the human choice to understand and create their social world in terms of a religious distinction (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:242). While all of these organizations are united by their adherence to the immanent/transcendent distinction, what constitutes the transcendent is a matter for programming. More descriptively, programs are what is typically referred to as religious denominations. They might be associated with a larger organization that makes official pronouncements for many churches (the Vatican) or they might be advanced by a single church organization (like the Westboro Baptist Church). Programs are recognized by the establishment of routines or rituals used for interpreting the transcendent distinction -- recognizing the “correct” belief structure and excluding “incorrect” belief structure. This canon is periodically scrutinized or ‘peer-reviewed” within an organization, allowing for the evolution of a program, thus increasing its legitimacy (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:254). There may be many points of disagreement with other programs or few, but programs can be determined through a review of organizational literature and other communication.

Besides promoting a certain program, organizations can be identified and differentiated on the basis of their inclusion/exclusion function. This has several facets. Organizations firstly decide to what elements of the immanent their interpretation of the distinction applies. This can include humans or other elements of the physical or social world. Religious organizations secondly determine who is recognized as official communicators of religious programs and who is subject to the program’s dictates. As part of this, organizations often develop means to “test the faith” of would-be adherents. From the perspective of ensuring religious communication is reproduced, those who have “had their faith tested” are often more deeply convinced of the usefulness of the religious distinction.
A well-known example demonstrates all of these features. The Catholic Church has a theory of *universitas*, adjudicates internal problems, possesses its own means of interpreting the immanent/transcendent, and maintains a hierarchy designed to make both programmatic and inclusion/exclusion decisions centered on the office or person of the Pope (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:243). Its program centers on the uncertainty of salvation, which provides a powerful incentive for choosing religious communication. Accordingly it provides moral plans, prayer and communal faith services that encourage selection by reducing existential uncertainty (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:24).

The aggressiveness with which they pursue these three functions can often lead to conflict among other rival religious organizations, and is the final means by which we can differentiate religious organizations. If the decision premises of a given religious organization are rejected organizations have the option of resolving conflict through some element of coercion. In so doing, “the organization [transforms] uncertainty (about the true faith) into certainty (about the conflict diagnosed)” (Luhmann 1997c [2014]:256).

4.3 The role of religious organizations within world society

The remaining portion of this chapter will examine three organizations. It will look at how their particular religious program, when coupled with capability and expansive inclusion/exclusion functionality, leads to conflict both within system and between systems. It will also cover the reaction of other systems to their purported communicative hegemony. Each case study consists of three sections – the history of the organization, the program of the organization, and the reaction by other (mostly political) organizations. Throughout the account, each will be compared to the ideal-type presented in the third chapter with special attention paid to the
fidelity to religious ideals in the pursuit of a strategy of communicative de-differentiation. The organizations are surprisingly alike in this regard.

To be clear, these organizations do not comprise the universe of potential communicative strategies. Other communicative strategies could be much more accommodationist, as the history of the Catholic Church certainly attests. Nevertheless, it is certainly not the case that there are only three instances of organizations that are, for whatever reason, engaged in conflict driven by pursuit of religious hegemony. Which is to say, I believe that this ideal type is useful for a macro-level analysis of the role of religious organizations in generating conflict even though I have chosen to focus on the meso-level.156

Religious scholars have only recently begun quantifying the involvement of religious actors in conflict (particularly military disputes). For example, from 1940 to 2000, 42 out of 133 civil wars have involved religious organizations; 105 out of 268 ethnic minority disputes have been religious. This number has gone up over time – 19% in 1940’s, 29% in 1950’s, 43% in 1980’s and since 2000 50% have been religious. Fifty-eight percent of these conflicts occur in Muslim countries (see also Fox 2004: 68). According to Monica Toft, thirty-two percent of all civil wars involve a religious antagonist, with a further sixty percent of these (twenty-five out of forty-two percent of religious civil wars) involve religious goals (Toft 2007:97, 103). One or more belligerents – the state or the opposition – seeks the end of differentiation, calling for a regime that discriminates against a separate, usually minority, religious group. In other words, this kind of strategy appears to be common.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to Islam or Christianity. Hindu nationalists wish to establish Hinduism as India’s national religion and have undertaken a national program to

156 In truth I wanted to avoid making broad generalizations ala Clash of Civilizations without first establishing meso-level applicability.
systematically eliminate other religious organizations and their members from functioning within
Indian society. Buddhist extremism has also emerged in the Southeast Asia in the form of
sectarian violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine state (Burma) with 150,000
people displaced following riots and the development of religious rules designed to discriminate
against Muslim families and businesses. This movement is led by a Buddhist radical monk
named Ashin Wirathu, who calls himself “the Burmese bin Laden,” and has been quoted as
saying, “You can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog... I am
proud to be called a radical Buddhist.” I plan to write a fuller treatment of this in a different
article. For now, I focus on these three organizations.

4.4 The Islamic State
The Islamic State is an organization of the religious system that seeks to achieve communicative
hegemony for their particular religious program. That is, they want to limit the programmatic
success of other religious organizations and they want to degrade the ability of other
communication systems.

157 And they also seek to establish Hinduism as a national religion and urge symbolic activities like constructing a Hindu temple on the site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, the alleged birthplace of the god Ram, which Hindu rioters destroyed in 1992 Once it became the dominant partner in a coalition government in 1998, the BJP (a Hindu nationalist political party) passed laws in some states prohibiting Christian and Muslim conversions, limited quotas for economically disadvantaged Muslim minorities, and even sanctioned pogroms against Muslims in Gujarat. Here, then, is a case where a religious actor’s integrationist ideas actually curtailed the differentiation of institutions. They encourage job discrimination on the basis of religion. Modi is the hero of the “militant, trident-shaking wing of the BJP known as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). He was chief minister of Gujarat state in 2002 when Hindus killed 1000 Muslims. He is adored as Hindu champion. The BJP chief minister of the northern state of Haryana announced the Bhagavad Gita would be mandatory throughout the state. They have even banned beef in the state of Maharashtra to deliberately harm Muslim business. See http://www.indiatomorrow.net/eng/since-bjp-came-to-power-more-companies-discriminating-with-muslims-amp-chief; and
158 They have enrolled 60,000 Burmese in Sunday schools. There has even been a 2-child limit placed on Muslims by Buddhists in Rakhine state. See http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/extremist-buddhists-spearhead-anti-muslim-violence/
The Islamic State is, simply put, the closest to an ideal typical example of the religious hegemonic organization in the modern era. Not since the Catholic Church was dominant over most facets of life in Europe, or religion more broadly dominate within society, has there been a more complete and naked attempt to achieve such total and expansive control. More importantly, there has not been a religious actor with such a capacity to achieve their aims. This section will review the history of the organizational force that became the Islamic State.

4.4.1 The History of the Islamic State

The rise of ISIS begins in the midst of a between-system conflict-- the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Inspired by Salafist terror acts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and funded by private donations from throughout the Middle East, Afghanistan became ground zero of the “defensive” jihad against the expansive political program of the Soviet Union (Saltman and Winter 2014:13). Shortly after the Soviet defeat and before the collapse of the Najibullah government, the mujahedin began to splinter and fight amongst themselves for control of the region. Eventually, the Taliban would emerge from the Pashtun-dominated northern Afghanistan region and establish a quasi-caliphate. The Taliban was native to the region, existing in a state of uneasy cooperation and often outright hostility with the mujahedeen operating in and around the country. The Islamic State would emerge later, and although it was linked to Al-Qaeda, it had a distinct program from the beginning.

160 Particularly, Juhayman al-Otaibi’s capture of Mecca’s Grand Mosque and the assassination of Anwar Sadat. This rise was facilitated in part by Saudi Arabia’s investment in Salafism as a counterweight to Iran’s revolutionary movement in the 1979. Islamist terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS are all part of the Sunni ideology of Salafism which emphasizes three concepts – hakmiyyah, jahiliyyah, and global jihad. Developed by the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi, hakmiyyah refers to Allah’s total sovereignty over all aspects of human social existence. The term jahiliyyah, developed by Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, denotes the return of the world to a pre-Islamic state of affairs in the absence of a caliphate and calls for its establishment. Global jihad in the context of modern religious terrorism refers to Abdullah Azzam’s claim that all Muslims have an obligation to wage a defensive jihad against anti-Islamic forces (Saltman and Winter 2014:13).See Sayyid Qutb (2007), Milestones, (Damascus: Dar al-Ilm), 2007, p. 2.
ISIS’ founder Ahmad Fadl al-Nazal Khalayley, better known to the world as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, met his mentor and author of The Creed of Abraham, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (Michael 2006; Weaver 2006). After the Soviet pullout, and uninterested in fighting the Taliban, he was inspired by Maqdisi to instead “purge Muslim societies of immorality and non-Islamic practices” before moving on to the West (Alshech 2014: 8). He subsequently returned to Jordan, where he joined the Bayat al-Imam with Maqdisi before his arrest and imprisonment by the Jordanian government.

Prison proved to be formative time for Zarqawi. While there, he quickly accumulated a following among the prisoners due to his charismatic personality – he was reportedly referred to as the “emir” – and amassed some scholarly credibility, reportedly memorizing the 6,236 verses of the Koran. Supplemented by Maqdisi’s increasingly formidable reputation as a scholar of Salafism, he gained notoriety outside of prison even as his views – he regarded all those who disagreed with his religious program as infidels, worthy of death. (Weaver 2006).

Upon his release in 1999, Zarqawi moved to Afghanistan’s Kandahar province bearing a personal letter of recommendation from a noted jihadist. Despite these credentials, he was not well liked by bin Laden. Zarqawi publicly disagreed with bin Laden’s conduct of the international jihadist movement. Nevertheless, he received from bin Laden a $5k loan to start his own organization, and he subsequently established a training camp in Herat (geographically about as far away as he could get from bin Laden). It was in Herat that al-Zarqawi formed the

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162 The Bayat al-Imam was a militant organization founded in 1992 by Issam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi
163 It is reported that Maqdisi often disagreed with his vitriolic perspective, a rift that finally became public in November 2005, when Maqdisi criticized his former protégé on Al Jazira for his hotel bombing in Amman.
164 Jihadist London-based Abu Kutaiba al-Urduni and ahead of Jordanian accusations of his involvement in the failed attempt to bomb Amman’s Radisson Hotel Al-Urduni had been a key deputy to—and the chief recruiter inside Jordan for—Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the pivotal figure in the Pan-Islamic recruitment of volunteers for the jihad
militant organization *Jund al-Sham*, or Soldiers of the Levant, from jihadist drawn from his native Jordan and surrounding locations in the Levant (Weaver 2006).\(^{165}\) Although he was uninterested in resolving the struggle between the Taliban and the remaining mujahedeen, he was drawn into fighting Coalition forces in 2001, after which he relocated to Kurdistan where he and 300 of his followers worked with Ansar al-Islam. There he would adjust his strategy to fight both the “Near” and “Far” enemies of the *Ummah*. 

By March 2003, Zarqawi had established a small base in Biyara in the Kurdish province of Sulaymaniya from which they initiated the Iraqi insurgency with three car bomb attacks in August 2003 – one outside the Jordanian embassy, one outside of the Canal Hotel which housed UN Assistance mission, and one outside the Shiite Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. The attacks killed 134, including the head of the UN mission Sergio Vieira de Mello and Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the spiritual leader of Supreme Council of Islamic revolution in Iraq). Although his organization was not the principle thrust behind the insurgency, Al Qaeda thought it profitable to lend their name to his organization.\(^ {166}\) 

A year into its insurgency campaign, JTWJ’s success earned it official status within the AQ global network in Sept 2004, rebranded as *Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* – or, as it is more commonly known, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Despite the official nod (which was, incidentally earned after over eight months of painful negotiations), AQI’s program remained distinct from that of Al Qaeda’s in its indiscriminate selection of targets and extreme violence, and thus its relationship vacillated between fraught and hostile (Weaver 2006; Zawahiri 2005).\(^ {167}\) Zarqawi intended to attack not only Americans, but also Shi’ites and Sunnis that

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\(^{165}\) It was renamed to *Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa’ al-Jihad* within a few months of its formation.

\(^{166}\) By any accounting, JWTJ attacks never comprised more than 10% of all total attacks.

\(^{167}\) According to Oraib Rantawi, bin Laden was often furious at Zarqawis methods and targets, according to the
refused to submit to his program, and thus he never deviated from his intention to wage a between-system war. According to a letter intercepted by American intelligence, Zarqawi was reported as stating that “If we succeed in dragging [the Shia] into a sectarian war,” he purportedly wrote, “this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death at the hands of the Shia” (Teather 2004).

AQI took an uncompromising position toward other systems as well. Sunni tribesman who would otherwise have found common cause with AQI often found themselves chafing at AQI’s attempt to redirect traditional tribal and family matters in line with AQI’s Salafist program. They also found themselves increasingly isolated from the Maliki government due to AQI’s denunciation of democratic participation (Philips 2009). In some cases, dissatisfaction grew to outright conflict. The Albu Mahal tribe in the Iraqi/Syrian border town of al Qaim began fighting AQI in late 2004 in hopes of saving the traditional social order AQI was trying to suppress (Carter 2007). AQI brutally put down the revolt, publicly executing the men and punishing those who committed religious crimes (Knickmeyer and Finer 2005). In Anbar, Mohammed Mahmoud Latif’s Anbar People’s Council fought to secure participation in December 2005 elections, but this too was defeated by AQI in Feb 2006, and Letif was forced to flee the country (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 109). The same fate befell Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-ISSawi of the Albu Issa tribe who preached against AQI, calling them criminals and foreigners. AQI responded by killing 37 of his family members and eroding his tribal support (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 90-91). AQI responded to these revolts by killing leaders and Iraqi Security Force recruits throughout Ramadi and Fallujah (West 2009: 3).

\[168\]The fighters in al Qaim failed primarily because the Shi’a-led government and the US forces did not note the significance of the uprising (Smith 2005).
Narrowly speaking, the triggers to these uprisings were local, dependent upon personal vendettas and familial killings. Theoretically, these initial uprisings were a reaction to the assertion of religion over traditional family structure of these Sunni tribes. This did not go unrecognized by AQI personnel, of course, but they never strayed far from their stated program. An internal document perfectly expressed the typical ISIS solution: “After we took a look at the situation, we found that the best solution to stop thousands of people from renouncing their religion, is to cut the heads of the sheikhs of infidelity and erratic” (Fishman 2006:1). The strategy worked, at least through 2005. A US Marine Corps report summed up the situation: “Although most al-Anbar Sunni dislike, resent, and distrust AQI, many increasingly see it as an inevitable part of daily life and… their only hope for protection against a possible ethnic cleansing campaign by the central government” (Devlin in Ricks 2006).

By the beginning of 2006 the situation in Iraq deteriorated markedly for AQI owing to a ramp-up of US activity following AQI’s bombings and desecration of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in Feb 2006. While this was in line with their general strategy of provoking a sectarian conflict, it did raised the level of US involvement. This changed the calculation for those tribes which had already chafed under the Salafist program anyway (Biddle 2008:6).

A letter written to Zarqawi by the future leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, highlights the growing frustration with Zarqawi’s strategy (Zawahiri 2006). In it he implored Zarqawi to be less brutal and more discriminate in his attacks:

Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable - also- are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages… And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the

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169 Fishman obtained this quote from the “Harmony Document IZ-060316-01,” Al Qa’ida in Iraq Situation Report, 1.
capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.

If Zarqawi could simply reduce their brutality against rebellious Sunnis and realize that attacks against Shi’ite are of “secondary in importance,” Zawahiri argued, they could capitalize on the American presence in Iraq. Additionally, Zawahiri suggested that restricting organizational membership would lead to the same mistakes made by the Taliban, which never had the support of the people and suffered as a result.

In spite of this and other correspondence, Zarqaawi remained committed to targeting, “rebellious” Sunni and Shi’a along with the Americans. His ultimate goal was to simultaneously cast his organization as the “defender of the Sunni community” and “use the chaos to usher in the Islamic state” (Lister 2014: 7). The organizational commitment to this program and strategy was pronouncedly single minded. As support among the Sunni population declined throughout 2005, Zarqawi made efforts to strengthen the coercive capacity of the organizations to compensate through increasing the organization’s economic foundation, appropriating between $70-200 mil per year between ransoms, extortions, and oil smuggling Sunnis (Samuels 2008; Levitt 2014). Zarqawi also attempted to cement AQI’s hold on the Sunni tribes through the formation of the Mujadeen Shura Council in January 2006, which purportedly centralized the insurgency in Iraq, granting decision-making legitimacy to AQI (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009:205).\footnote{The council was headed by an Iraqi, Abdallah Rashud Al-Baghdadi} Both were an attempt to make their program more persuasive but proved insufficient to overcome the pull of traditional family structure as a means to organization Sunni tribes’ social world.
The local sheikhs in Ramadi reached a breaking point after AQI bombed tribal recruits looking for work at the behest of their local leadership. They also assaulted the daughter of a local leader (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 109). They also kidnapped and killed a local leader, Sheikh Abu Ali Jassim of the Anbar’s People’s Council, angering his tribe to the point of insurrection and the declaration of war on AQI on Sept 17, 2006 and the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council – The Awakening [sawha]. Less than two weeks later, they met with representatives of al-Maliki and US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

Having lost Zarqawi to an airstrike in June 2006 and with an increasingly hostile Sunni population, AQI finally changed its standards for membership as a means to prevent the rejection of its message. On Oct 2006 AQI and five other Sunni groups merged to form the Islamic State of Iraq [al-Dawla al Islamiya fi Ira] with Ramadi as its capital. It was united to “unite the Sunni jihad fighters and prevent civil war among them, so that Allah’s word would reign supreme” (quoted in Jones and Libicki 2008; Hazan 2007). The territoriality was designed to both inspire Iraqis to their cause and invoke the principle of takfir so as to allow them to legitimately destroyed those organizations that rejected their rule (Fishman 2009: 4-6; Kohlman 2006). They named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Hamid Dawud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi) as their leader and declared their ownership of the governates of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salaheddin, Nineveh, Babel, and Wasit—the areas of Sunni residency in the area (Jones and Libicki 2008; Fishman 2011). 171

Although AQI claimed speak on behalf of all Sunnis, Fishman notes that AQI, “had neither the will nor the capability to actually provide for the population’s basic needs” (Fishman

171 They established a cabinet with Abu Abdallah Al-Rashid Al-Baghdadi as its leader and Sheik Abu Mamza al-Muhajer (al-Masri) remained as an advisor. The cabinet performed an executive function and the MSC became something of a legislature for the ISI (Kohlm 2006).
2009: 10). Partly this lack of capacity was due to simply not having enough and effective personnel. Zarqawi was avowedly anti-Ba’athist (due to its secularism), and thus dismissed from the outset the notion that much of the Sunni insurgency could be integrated into his own organization. In contrast, Al-Baghdadi released a video where he promised to halt the killing of other militants. “To my sons of the Islamic Army, please know that I will sacrifice my blood and honor for you.” He further promised that his organization would no longer “shed the protected blood of Muslims intentionally. If I hear otherwise, I will set up a council of judges ... so even the weakest person in Iraq could take his rights, even if from my blood.” He called for all fighters to be united under a single banner, saying "one group is essential to accomplish victory" (IHT 2007). This proved a wise strategy for its return, as it ultimately provided the future Islamic State with a strong baseline in intelligence and military doctrine. However in the short term the damage was already done However in the near term it was too little too late.

Although the Sunnis in Anbar did not desire US occupation, they were even less desirous of an Iran-backed Shi’ite takeover and afraid that the tactics of the ISI would bring it about (Phillips 2009: 75). Following their choice, the US surged 30,000 troops in the first part of 2007, increased Iraqi security to 600,000, and began conducted up-tempo operations in IS strongholds. US and Awakening troops managed to completely overwhelm the Islamic State in Anbar, and quickly deprived the Islamic State of Diyala, Salah ad-Din and Baghdad, driving AQI forces back to Mosul. Bereft of territory and capability, it quickly diminished. By mid-2007, they had suffered 2,400 deaths and 8,800 captured, including 50 AQI senior leaders captured. Decimated,

\[\text{\footnote{For example, a former colonel in Saddam’s air intelligence service, Haji Bakr, allegedly brought an entire Ba’athist unit with him. This same individual is also said to have been instrumental in ISI’s takeover of northern Syria. (Please see “The Terror Strategist” accessed at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html}}\]
they relocated to Mosul, where al-Maghribi and Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani refocused efforts at exploiting sectarian sentiment fomented by al-Maliki’s Shia–led government (CBS 2008).  

As a result of the Sawha and the Surge, the Islamic State was a state only in name, having devolved by that time into a more “typical” terrorist organization. Ousted from their territorial conquests, they shifted operations from Anbar province to the northern city of Mosul in order to exploit the added chaos of the Kurd-Arab ethnic mix in addition to existing religious conflict. In so doing, ISI centralized command and control for the organization to al Baghdadi and several deputies. Bagdhadi continued to control operational planning, economic planning was devolved to regional deputies. Nevertheless, many foreign fighters left by May 2008 and US downgraded AQI threat assessment (Mount 2008). In the latter half of 2009, ISI attacks netted only 400 casualties through a large number of low-level attacks.

By 2010, coalition forces operating against the last ISI stronghold of Mosul had killed or captured 34 of the 42 of its top leaders. This led their inability to recruit, and lack of credibility in organizational capacity. In April 2010, both al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamid al-Muhajir were killed in US operations and AQI was reduced largely to a shell of its former self (Shanker 2010). For all intents and purposes, the Islamic State in Iraq was destroyed.

Although AQI/MSM/ISI was initially successful at establishing what amounted to a religious state in Western and Northern Iraq, the communicative strategy was too ambitious in scope given its organizational capacity and its limited membership (Philips 2009:64). Much like the Taliban (which will be discussed below), a high degree of membership exclusivity coupled with a universal program generated animosity. Indeed, “rather than seeking to mollify local actors or accommodate their concerns, al Qaeda’s leaders condemned any who disagreed with

173 Day to day operations in Mosul was initially handled by Aby Qaswarah al-Maghribi and then transferred to Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani in Oct 2008 on the event of the former’s death.
them as un-Islamic” and excommunicating them (F Kagan 2007: 26). AQI/ISI often broke the fingers of cigarette smokers, punished those who watched satellite television, and reportedly executed women found to be inappropriately dressed (Laub and Masters 2014). They attempted to bully local leadership, stamp out traditional practices and customs.

Despite these extreme positions, there is evidence to suggest there was some fertile ground for the program itself. Toward the end of Hussein’s regime Iraq developed an indigenous Salafist program. In the wake of its collapse, Salafist elements had already begun to mobilize more openly, which occurred in tandem with the influx of foreign jihadists (Deneslow 2008:19). Iraqis likely constituted the bulk of AQI, suggesting that there were a large number of Salafists in Iraq (Hoffman 2007: 326). Thus is likely that a more inclusive membership strategy coupled with a more thoughtfully implemented coercive element might have yielded better results.

Nevertheless, other communication systems remained in use throughout their territory despite the effort to establish ISI’s program as solely legitimate (Hashim 2014:72). Both family ties and political self-understanding remained strong sources of counter-narratives for the Sunni tribes in the region, to say nothing of other Iraqis. One analyst notes, “the AQI leadership appears to have misunderstood the level of animosity felt by Iraqi Sunni Arabs towards any attempt to weaken the territorial integrity of Iraq” for the sake of sub an abusive program (Jane’s 2010). The result was fertile ground for a balancing effort on the part of other organizations.

An unnamed emir of the Islamic State in al Anbar province stated the problem succinctly:

“We helped them to unite against us… The Americans and the apostates launched their campaigns against us and we found ourselves in a circle not being able to move, organize, or conduct our operations” (Brennan 2008).

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174 Especially Omar al-Baghdadi’s direct ties to the ancient caliphate [through his Quraysh family ties] (Fishman 2011).
In other words, while there were some that might have found ISI’s program convincing, there were not enough of them. More importantly, there was insufficient material capacity for ISI to successfully cleanse the region of these other forms of communication.

Shortly after its defeat, the surviving leadership of the Islamic State’s recognized that its original failure was due in large part to its lack of credible response to the Sawha. Two surprisingly banal after-action reports -- *A Strategy to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq* and *The Management of Savagery: The Most Dangerous Period Through Which the Ummah is Passing* -- sought to make sense of the defeat. In *A Strategy to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq*, an unattributed document posted on a Salafist website in 2010 by an ISI member, the author cuts to the heart of the matter. In his view, the ISI should have developed a counter-movement to the Awakening. In the future, they should, he argues, endeavor to create “Jihadist Awakening Councils” designed to protect the population from US and Iraqi Army forces (39). In his view, these organizations would have encouraged the Sunnis to trust the ISI and reassure them of their capacity to create a caliphate. Additionally, instead of hit and run affairs, their primary military strategy should include the destruction of the best military units of the Iraqi military. This would reassure Sunnis of their capacity to defend themselves from the Shi’a while simultaneously undermining the legitimacy of the Iraqi regime under Maliki, demonstrating the capacity of the ISI to defend their territory. In the *Management of Savagery*, written in 2009 by Abu Nakr Naji (aka Muhammad Abu Khalil al-Hakaymay) written in 2009 by Abu Nakr Naji, argues that constant attacks will exhaust target states and eventually undermine their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the people, allowing the ISI to provide an alternative governing arrangement. He also concludes his review ends by arguing for a jihadist analogy to the “Sawha” as a means of destabilizing his al-Maliki government.
In short, the lesson learned by this organization was that it had insufficient capability relative to other organizations. Success would only be possible if it addressed this issue. In 2011 AQI/ISI returned in the form of the Islamic State and this time it was much more successful. Two factors featured prominently in this resurgence. The historical opportunities afforded by the Syrian civil war and the disastrous Maliki regime in Iraq allowed ISI access to a far greater coercive capacity and an enlarged membership base. The ISI also learned from their earlier campaign and enacted effective reforms that enhanced its capability (Hashim 2015: 73).

4.4.2 The Return of ISIS

The resurgence of the Islamic State has four principal components. The initial success of ISIS is undoubtedly linked to the anti-Sunni policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’ite whose persecution at the hands of the Hussein regime led him to adopt unnecessarily exclusive policies regarding Iraq’s Sunni population. The Islamic State could also not have risen without the organizational capacity garnered as a result of the ISIS involvement in the Syrian civil war, nor would they have been successful without implementation of the organizational strategy learned as a result of the failures. Most importantly is the program of the Islamic State – it never changed. The purpose of the Islamic State is not control territory to enrich themselves or to join the world as another nation-state. It is not a cover for killing. The Islamic State means to achieve the End Times and has since its inception. That is why they are successful. It is the only way they can be meaningfully understood. In other words – people really believe what the Islamic State communicates.

175 Maliki joined the Shi’ite Da’wa party as a young man. Believing that its goal was the establishment of a Shi’ite-based theocratic state in Iraq, Saddam Hussein banned the party, arrested, and tortured its membership. Maliki fled Iraq and spent the next several decade with the group that was responsible for bombings and assassination attempts against the Hussein regime and its supporters. For example, Da’wa operatives bombed the Iraqi embassy in Beirut during the Iran-Iraq war, as well as bombing American and French embassies in Kuwait due to their support of the Iraqi side.
After Saddam’s defeat in 2003, Maliki initially served as the advisor to the future PM Ibrahim al-Jafari and as head of the De-Baathification Commission. Maliki worked in relative obscurity throughout the early and mid-point of the Sunni insurgency, and then became the American’s top choice to quell the Shi’ite rebellion due to his connections and perceived malleability (Khedery 2014). Although early on he deferred to David Petraeus, he moved to eliminate rival Shi’ite power centers, including Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

After the Americans left and he was securely ascendant, Maliki set about purging the Sunni out of every major governmental position (Benraad 2011). He sacked professional generals and replaced them with loyal men, rendering the military poorly led and massively corrupt despite its US training and equipment (Dodge 2014). Maliki had his rivals barred from the elections in March 2010, essentially nullifying their results, allowing himself an opportunity to form a government for a second term (Schmidt 2011). By the end of 2011, Maliki had filled his government with Shi’ites and arrested those Sunni who posed a threat to him, including his longtime rival Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and Finance Minister Rafea al-Essawi (a year later). He took upon himself the role of defense minister and intelligence chief.

176 Maliki’s name surface among the American administration after the Feb 2006 bombing of the Askariya mosque in Samarra by AQI spawned a deadly reaction by Iraqi Shiites. When Prime Minister Jafari refused to halt the Shiite retributive campaign against Sunnis or allow the Americans to install a curfew, they began looking for a replacement. They selected Maliki as someone who was acceptable to the Shiite population, but would not be strong enough to political survive on his own (Khedery 2014). Maliki, chosen as a not-very-threatening compromise as prime minister, turned out to be a disastrous choice.

177 Maliki’s effort, along with the American influx of troops, has been described as “the true surge: a masterful civil-military campaign to allow space for Iraqi politicians to reunite by obliterating the Sunni Shiite armed groups that had nearly driven the country into the abyss” (Khedery 2014: see also Le Billion 2005, Looney 2008; Williams 2009).

178 Toby Dodge writes, “From 2007, Maliki set about circumventing the military's chain of command, appointing senior generals for their loyalty to him – not their skill or influence over their men. He then set about purging Iraq's intelligence services of those who were not aligned to his party. The result is an army with little information, no esprit de corps, and run by political appointees who fled the battlefield in Mosul leaving their men to fend for themselves.”

179 The elections brought a pro-Western coalition to power, which did not serve Maliki’s interests. Michael Schmidt (2011) argues that Malaki was pulled into a stable Iranian orbit, essentially locking the Sunni’s out of power for good. For example, Iraqi leaders met with Gen Wassim Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of Iran’s Republican Guards argued persuasively that Iraq’s future lay with Iran and not with the United States.
and gathered around him the Iraq SWAT and counter-terrorism units as his own personal police force. He also engaged in heavy-handed tactics against Sunni protestors, including alleged massacres in northern Iraq at the protest camp in Hawjia (Arango 2013). Maliki was no longer seen as democratic ruler by the Sunnis. Protests quickly spread across northern Iraq and in Anbar provinces (Gerges 2014).

If the choices of the Maliki government made the ISI argument appear more persuasive to many Iraqi Sunnis, it was the civil war in Syria that truly provided the oxygen for Baghdadi’s moribund organization. This is for two reasons. Firstly, and practically, it allowed ISI to gain physical control of oil fields and obtain Syrian and rebel weapons which would spur its offensive into Iraq in June 2014. Secondly, the Syrian conflict provided an opportunity to enable an aspect of the religious program previously unavailable to the organization when restricted to Iraq. In other words, along with organizational capacity it gained credibility for its religious program.

Greater Syria, which the IS often refers to as al-Sham in their literature, has a special function within the Islamic State’s millennial eschatology. Jerusalem (al-Quds), the third-holiest city in Islam, contains the Dome of the Rock and the Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount. Additionally, Damascus, the capital of the late Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), will be the site of Jesus appearance at the white minaret of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. This arrival signals the beginning of the apocalyptic final wars (malahim) led by Jesus which will precede Judgment Day. For a group like the Islamic State, its possession grants their argument credibility. In a letter to bin Laden in 2004, Zarqawi once wrote:

We know from God’s religion that the true, decisive battle between the infidelity and Islam is in this land, i.e., in [Greater] Syria and its surroundings. Therefore, we must

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180 ISI was reportedly offering higher salaries than both the Maliki government and Sawha councils (Williams and Adnan 2010).
spare no effort and strive urgently to establish a foothold in this land. Perhaps God may cause something to happen thereafter (Zarqawi 2004).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi did not want to miss an opportunity to capture this symbolism.

Subsequent to the chaotic events of the Arab Spring in 2011, Baghdadi dispatched Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani\(^\text{181}\) in late summer to establish an ISI branch in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah governate (Karam and Abdul-Zahra 2013). Once there, he quickly attracted other jihadists, and on January 23, 2012, conducted a suicide bombing attack that killed forty people to announce the existence of the Jabhat al-Nusra (Foundation for Media Production 2012).

Jowlani’s organization quickly became a formidable opponent of Assad’s regime, growing to over 2000 members operating throughout the Syrian theater -- Damascus and Dera’a in the south and Idlib and Aleppo in the north. By the beginning of January 2013, JN has scored several major successes, including the seizure of two major military bases in northern Syria – the Hanano barracks in Aleppo in mid-Sept 2012 and Taftanaz airbase in Idlib on Jan 11, 2013. These successes and others garnered the organization high praise among the Syrian rebels and population, a general global notoriety (France 2012).

On April 2013, capitalizing on the success of JN, al-Baghdadi declared that the Islamic State of Iraq, with its official entry into the Syrian conflict, would re-unify with JN to become The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi-l-Oraq wa-l-Sham). Given that he regarded Jowlani as his subordinate, he did not consult with either the JN’s head nor did he seek approval of AQ’s current chief, Zawahiri, for consent. If he had, he would have realized that, in the several years that elapsed, Jowlani had rejoined the AQ fold, making reunification impossible.

\(^{181}\) a previous associate of second-in-command Maghribi
A struggle ensued between the newly-proclaimed ISIS and the Free Syrian Army with whom JN had crafted a leadership position. Attempts at mediation routinely failed, including the infamous beheading of the AQ emissary, Abu Khalid al-Sure, sent by Zawahiri to stop the fighting (Lund 2014; Ostaeyen 2013). By the end of spring 2014, ISIS had been expelled from Al Qaeda, 6000 jihadists had been killed, and ISIS pushed back to Raqqa (which they hold as of this writing).

This setback proved to be short lived, however. ISIS slowly sheered soldiers off of Nusra and by the summer had driven JN and its allies from Deir al-Zor along the strategic Euphrates and Khabur river valley and is an access point for oil fields crucial for al-Nusra’s income (Al Jazeera 2014). In July 2014, for example, the bases of Assad’s Brigade 93 and Division 17 fell to

182 The Islamic Front (al-Jabhat al-Islamiyyah) sent an envoy to make peace with local ISIS units. Early encounters had resulted in fire fights, which puzzled the Islamic Front since all jihadist groups shared an interest in Assad’s ouster. After the envoy (Hussein Suleiman) failed to return, Islamic Front officials contacted local ISIS units who confirmed that he had been taken prisoner. Angered by the detaining of a peace broker, the IF demanded that, at the very least, their envoy should receive a fair hearing, a suggestion which ISIS ignored. A month later, IF officials managed to secure Hussein’s release through what they thought was a prisoner exchange, but ISIS delivered a badly mutilated corpse. Within days, most of the jihadist groups in Syria, including al-Nusra, declared war on ISIS and temporarily drove them out of Syria to the banks of the Euphrates. On 16 January 2014, Zawahiri’s envoy, Abu Khalid al-Suri, publicly stated that the Islamic State was damaging the jihadist movement. Militants should direct their bombs at the infidels, he warned, not at their fellow jihadists. Seventeen days later, an exasperated Zawahiri expelled ISIS from al-Qaeda (Lahoud and al-Ubayd 2014). ISIS’s refusal to participate with either AQ or Syrian rebel groups prompted this comment by Zawahiri in Feb: “ISIS is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions” By Spring 2014, relations had deteriorated to the point where al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi’s former teacher and one of the chief scholars of jihad, issued a fatwa against ISIS (Zawahiri 2014). The thinking on their part, according to an interview conducted in May 2015, is that it would have forced ISIS to come to a more reasonable position or face the collapse of its caliphate as potential jihadist reject the Islamic State’s approach. This expulsion has not had the effect of decreasing ISIS’ popularity or effectiveness, whereas Al Qaeda has all but been destroyed (Cambanis 2014). The rise of ISIS has both benefited from and resulted in Al Qaeda’s demise. As ISIS began to string together military success, they appear to be far more capable of an organization. According to Richard Barrett, a decade-long analysis for the UN terrorism monitoring team, young jihadists have come of age well after AQ’s greatest success — the attacks on Sept 11th. To these young men, Al-Qaeda increasingly seems “the scolding grandfather of terrorist groups…” and as a result “less and less a part of the global terrorism conversation” (Eichenwald 2014) Discontent to choose AQ’s more esoteric, post-modern caliphate, “They are looking for a leader who doesn’t sit back and cogitate but who acts on his beliefs, who understands their feelings of marginalization”—a leader who offers "promises of greatness" (Brooks 2006; Coker 2014). See “On the Relationship of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham,” Al-Fajr Media, 2 February 2014, <http://jihadology.net/2014/02/02/as-sahab-media-presents-a-new-statement-from-al-qaidah-on-the-relationship-of-qaidat-al-jihad-and-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham>. It is estimated that by March 2014, over 3,000 fighters had been killed in battles between ISIS and al-Nusra. See: Associated Press. (2014) ‘ISIL says it faces war with Nusra in Syria’ Al Jazeera, (8 March).
the IS onslaught, leaving the group in control of yet more military hardware from Kweiris and Tabaqa airbase, something that has had a profound effect on the military balance either side of the border (White 2014).

Their successful counter-offensive in Syria was matched with its expansion through northern Iraq down to Fallujah and Ramadi in Al Anbar province, essentially surrounding Baghdad on three sides. Violent actions by Maliki against Sunni protest camps in April and Dec 2013, followed by a brutal crackdown in January 2014, meant ISIS was not met with Sawha forces. In June 2014 ISIS launched an offensive that overran Iraqi army positions in Mosul, Tikrit, and halted within a few miles of Baghdad itself. On the way it routed four Iraqi army divisions and captured several weapons depots containing US military equipment, including 1500 armored Humvees and large number of mortars, heavy artillery including 52 GPS guided 155mm M198 howitzers (Bradly and Nabhan 2014). ISIS advanced to within 20 miles of the Kurdish capital of Erbil before being repulsed by a mix of US air power and Kurdish ground forces (Lewis 2015; Mofate 2015). Nevertheless, it was able to consolidate nearly the entirety of Northeast Syria and Northwestern Iraq by September of 2014, when their major offensive operations concluded (Mofate 2015: 25).

These battlefield successes prompted the announcement of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. On June 29th, 2014 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the spokesperson for the Islamic State, announced that the Shura Council had declared its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the eighth caliph:

We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of khilafah, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalifah Ibrahim and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations becomes
void by expansion of the khilafah’s authority and arrival of its troops to its areas (quoted in Spencer 2014).

All Muslim were to pronounce their loyalty. On July 4th, Caliph Ibrahim was officially designated and held his first sermon in Mosul’s Great Mosque. Dressed in a traditional black turban and cloak, he declared, “Obey me, as I obey God and his messenger. If I do not obey God and his messenger, you do not have to obey me.” On that same day they also published videos entitled “Breaking the Borders” and “the End of Sykes-Picot” that declared the national borders set up between Iraq and Syria as illegitimate and therefore void.

It is impossible to understate the importance of these twin declarations. In declaring a caliphate, the Islamic State purports to be the only legitimate jihadist group to which all other “emirates, groups, states, and organizations” are now subordinate. This is the literal embodiment of declaring programmatic superiority. Secondly, by declaring the Sykes-Picot lines void, they are also declaring their independence from the state system – and even its inevitable end. These are essentially the declaration of open conflict both within-system and between-system.

\[184\] The same color Muhammad wore when he recaptured Mecca in 630
\[185\] Other interesting parts of his speech:

“Verily your brothers the Mujahidin, Allah Blessed and High be He, has favoured them with victory and conquest. And he established for them after long years of Jihad and patience, and meeting in combat with the enemies of Allah, he granted them success, empowered them in order to fulfill their purpose. Verily they hastened to announce the Caliphate and appointing [sic] a leader, and this is an obligation upon Muslims. An obligation which has been made lost for centuries and was absent upon earth’s existence, and so many Muslims were ignorant of it. And those who commit sin; where Muslims are sinning by abandoning and neglecting it, for verily they have to always strive to establish it and here now they have established it, praise and favour is due to Allah. Verily I am in a trial by this great matter. I am in trial by this trust, a heavy-weighted trust. And so I was put in authority over you, and I am not the best of you nor am I better than you. If you see me upon truth, then support me; and if you see me upon falsehood, then advise me and guide me and obey me as long as I obey Allah in you. Verily if I disobey Him, then obey me not. I am not to promise you as how the kings and rulers promise their followers and their citizens from luxury, prosperity, security and wealth; but instead, I promise you by what Allah, Blessed and High be He, has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them. Just as He granted it to those before them and that He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, they worship Me, not associating anything with Me. But whoever disbelieves after that—then those are the defiantly disobedient [25:55]
In addition to the policies of the Maliki government and the opportunity afforded by the conflict in Syria, the return of ISIS owes much to the organizational strategies and religious authority of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who took over after the death of Omar al-Baghdadi and most of his staff. As the leader of the ISI, Baghdadi brought instant religious credibility owing to his PhD in Islamic Studies from the Islamic University of Iraq, which places him above either al-Zawahiri or bin Laden in scholarly heft. ISIS has claimed that al-Baghdadi belonged to the Qurayshi tribe from which the Caliph is supposed to descend (Fishman 2011). In his few public appearance and written statements, he has presented himself as the forerunner of the Mahdi, who will return with Jesus to rid the world of evil, establish Islam across the entire earth, and prepare for Judgment Day (see Wiktrowicz 2005). Baghdadi’s task is to establish the Caliphate in the Levant in anticipation of this coming. Although there is no evidence these documents were read by al-Baghdadi, there is ample evidence that his strategy closely followed that laid out by the two documents. His ascendance brought with it an up-tempo pace of operations. For example, in August of 2011, Baghdadi stepped up ISI operations significantly, carrying out twenty-two bombings in Iraq (Reuters Aug 2011). However, sustained operations required the creation of a cohesive, flexible command structure.

Many of these leaders were being held by the Iraqi government, so the Islamic State command would need to free them from their incarceration. In July 2012, this evolved into a

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186 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi grew up as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri in the Sunni triangle north of Baghdad that saw a great deal of action during the US invasion in 2003. Not much is known of al-Baghdadi’s upbringing. A quiet, studious man, al-Baghdadi was regarded as a quiet, studious individual who spent a great deal of time on religious education, allegedly earning a PhD in religious studies. It is believed that al-Baghdadi, who helped establish the Sunni terror group Jamaat Jaish Ahl al-Sunnag wal Jamaa, was captured sometime around the first Fallujah offensive by US forces engaging in an effort to capture al-Zarqawi and sent to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq. Although it is unclear how long he was detained at Bucca, his time spent at Bucca was likely educational given Bucca’s reputation as a “virtual terrorist university.” It is there he met Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (Taha Sobhi Falaha), the spokesman for ISIS, who likely convinced him to join his organization upon his release. “Who is ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” by Janine do Giovanni < http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/19/who-isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-290081.html>
year-long campaign referred to as “Breaking the Walls” that saw eight prisons liberated of former ISI leadership (Lewis 2013). Sept 2012 attack on Tikrit’s Tasfirat Prison freed nearly 50 ISI leaders from death row (Arango and Schmitt 2014). Their raid on Abu Ghraib July 21, 2013 freed 500 prisoners. The integration of experienced Iraqi military commanders, which included top military Ba’athist generals such as Haji Bakr and Abu ali al-Anbari, was particularly important for the future success of ISIS (see Prothero 2014) 187

These men combine the practical military training with dedication to the religious cause of ISIS. Coming of age during the American invasion, many of these Ba’athists are motivated and highly religious, products of Saddam’s “Faith Campaign.” Launched in 1993, the Faith Campaign greatly expanded the role of Islam in education and law. Amatzia Baram claims that after 1993, “Islam was suddenly omnipresent: in the schools, in the university, in the media, in the legal system, even in Ba’ath Party branch meetings” (Baram 2014:314). Young Ba’athists were required to study the Koran, and the state was active in its spread of Iraqi Salafism throughout society. It is these soldiers that now occupy positions within ISIS leadership, and for this reason they are likely highly committed to the Caliphate (Patel 2015: 3). 188

187 According to an ISIS defector, Baghdadi is very concerned with security and trusts only a small circle of military and operational commanders. As such, he relies heavily on this circle to execute ISIS strategy, a task made easier by the fact that the command structure is now comprised almost entirely of former Ba’athist security officers brought onboard by Haji Bakr (Prothero 2014). In fact, al-Zarqawi’s former aid claimed in an interview that it was al-Baghdadi (and not the other way around) that was the choice of the Iraqi Ba’athists who later comprised the inner circle of his organization (Malik et al 2015). Baghdadi reportedly relied heavily on the advice of Haji Bakr up until his death in mid 2014. According to the defector, “Haji Bakr polished the image of al-Baghdadi – he was grooming him to be the prince of the Islamic State” (Giovani 2014: Hashim 2015: 73-74). In addition to Nahi Bakr, other formerly high-level Iraqi soldiers populate ISIS’ ranks. For example, Abu ali al-Anbari, the chief of Syrian operations, held the position of major general in the Iraqi army. Fadl Ahmad Abdulla al-Hiyali, chief of operations in Iraq, was a colonel in Iraqi military intelligence and former special forces operative. In all ISIS has added over 1000 formerly top and medium-level field commanders, intelligence operatives, and technical specialists to their ranks. (Barber 2014; Sherlock 2014).

188 There are also Neo-Ba’athists in ISIS that are unaffiliated with the leadership. For example, the “Army of the Order of the Naqshbandi Men,” led by the leader of the Iraqi Baath Party, Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri. See Thomas Gibbons-Neff (2014), ‘ISIS: not alone in their conquest of Iraq’, Washington Post, (20-06). There are also groups affiliated with ISIS that do not always agree, such as the Jaish al-Mujahidin that had to be forcefully subjugated by ISIS forces. See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (2014), ‘Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq Statements: Clashes with the Islamic
Surrounding these key leaders is a core group of increasingly well-trained fighter. According to estimates by the Russian Head of General Staff, “Islamic State formations operating in Syria and Iraq now comprise up to 70,000 gunmen of various nationalities” with an estimated total personnel pool of up to 200,000 men (Cockburn 2014). They are now extremely effective on the battlefield, having copied the American strategy of short-circuiting the OODA [Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act] cycle through the use of rapid advance and psychological operations (Arnett 2014). ISIS uses small, flexible, highly networked land forces designed to work in both urban and rural terrain. Their high mobility allows them to stand against the numerically superior forces surrounding their territory, most notably their defeat of four American-supplied Iraqi divisions in the opening days of their assault in June 2014.189 They often attack targets from multiple vectors, as illustrated by their seizure of Jalula in Iraq on August 11, 2014 (Knights 2014).

ISIS couples their military capability with an ability to sustain themselves financially. The Islamic State has been nearly entirely self-financed since 2005, with external funding only comprising 5% of its income at any given time (Allam 2014; Prothero 2014). It levies a 20% tax on local areas and tariff levies on traffic through their zones of control. However, most of their revenue stream comes via their oil sales, which is estimated at 70,000 bpd providing over $1bil
of income per year (Chulov 2014; see *Dabiq Issue 4*). They have also had a bureaucracy to manage this income since 2010, when Baghdadi established a financial command council.

Their general management reflects the lessons learned during their years as AQI/ISI. For example, after they took Mosul on June 9, they had created a city charter by June 12th because their experience demonstrated that the most important period for establishing their rule was dependent on the opening days of their occupation. This includes the immediate implementation of their *sharia* code, which imposes strict punishment for crimes and for failing to observe religious rules (Otten 2014). Within hours, they performed ostentatious acts of control, including executions in order to provoke mass surrenders of armed men to “repentance centers.” This draconian policy is alleviated somewhat through the allocation of a significant amount of money to “tribal committees” whose purpose is to ensure local leadership have their financial needs met (Allam 2014).

The Islamic State has invested a great deal of effort into improving their local administration. One account from Manbij, a small city in Aleppo, relates that Islamic State rules is comprehensive, with police, courts, and administrative bodies that provide a range of services, include infrastructure development, welfare, free healthcare, public transportation, consumer protection, and even rent control (Lefler 2014; Lister 2014: 27-28). It has also begun to pump money into the education system.

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190 In addition to these sources, they also have agriculture, cotton, water, and electricity. They also have practiced a $36 mil selling antiques. Martin Chulov, “ISIS’s $2bn Jihadist Network

191 Among the most expensive items were relocation and payroll costs, survivor benefits comprising over 50% of its budget. Baghdadi established a financial command council in 2010 to manage the $12 mil monthly income.

192 This includes attending prayer five times a day, banning of drugs, alcohol and cigarettes, enforcing a strict dress code for men and women, forbidding dancing, non-Islamic music, and gender mixing, as well as the destruction of all non-Sunni Muslim religious artifacts and temples. Non-Muslim populations can live unmolested so long as they pay a protection tax and stay within the strict Sharia code, although any deviations result in punishment. Some groups, such as the Yazidis, are regarded as “polytheists” worthy only of death or slavery.
Coupled with this administrative capacity is a focus on education. One of this interesting things about their rule is how quickly the Islamic State moves to educate the populace as a means of increasing the chance that the content of their communication will be accepted. Every city captured by ISIS brings with it the introduction of new academic curricula in madrasas that support the Islamic State program, attendance to which is mandatory for both genders and supported by mass bussing (Tamimi 2014: 1-11). ISIS has opened schools with mandatory attendance, complete with bussing. According to IS fighter Abu Dujana,

> When ISIS entered Homs governorate, the people were very scared of us, but after four or five months, the majority of village chiefs had pledged allegiance to us and hundreds of their men had volunteered to join our ranks…. We had educated the people, taught them how to read, run vaccination clinics for children, stopped bandits and highwaymen, and allowed trade to resume properly.” (Lister 2015: 10)

They also hold public *da’wa* (proselytizing) which allow ISIS to publicly expound upon the benefits of living under IS rule (Lister 2015, chp 2; Tamimi 2014). Additionally, they provide gifts and food for children when their region bends the knee to ISIS.

In all, the Islamic State credible controls roughly 70,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq, although its nineteen administrative districts (*wilayats*) ostensibly cover nearly the entirety of the Levant. In addition to its core territory, it also has significant forces throughout the Middle East and Africa. Algerians terrorists calling themselves ‘soldiers of the caliphate’ -- former members of AQ in Islamic Maghreb pledged allegiance to IS when they gruesomely murder their French hostage Herve Gourdel. Further afield, Nigeria-based Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau appeared to proclaim that the Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno State had become “part of the Islamic Caliphate” in late August (Idris and Mutum 2014). At the same time,
a splinter faction of Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan known as Jamaat-e-Ansar announced its support for IS, but remained at least officially loyal to al-Qaeda (Mehsud and Walsh 2014). Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and a splinter faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group led by Isnilon Hapilon both announced their allegiance to IS (Mehsud and Walsh 2014). In Indonesia, the imprisoned former Jamaah Islamiyya leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged his allegiance to IS after allegedly facilitating the transfer of finances to the organization (Straits Times 2014). In Libya, the Mujahedeen of Libya in Dernia came to power in Dec of 2014. There is evidence that ISIS is active in Yemen and Libya which ISIS claims is evidence of their Caliphate’s reach (CNN 2015). ISIS recently conducted an attack on an Egyptian checkpoint in the North Sinai as they moved to control the city (Guardian 2014).

4.4.3 The Religious Program of the Islamic State

The final piece of the puzzle is the religious program of the Islamic State. Its entire purpose is to achieve radical social change on a level “beyond anything that we’ve seen” for a religious actor, according to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (DOD 2014). It wants to eliminate all other communication in favor of its own, including Al-Qaeda, and it will do anything, kill anyone, to achieve their final millennialist goals of salvation.

Rather than being grouped under the broad rubric of “terrorist organization,” the Islamic State represents an unusually ambitious strategy for achieving religious communicative hegemony. In this regard, its approach is similar to the approach of political organizations such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany insofar as each political organization a distinct program with universal ambitions for its application and membership. Nevertheless, it is a religious actor.
Moreover, it is rather typical to dismiss the Islamic State as political opportunists who advance a *perverse* interpretation of Islam.\(^{193}\) The Islamic State, some argue, is nothing more than the exploitation of the “deep disaffection with a world that an angry minority of Muslims” for political gain (Philip 2014: 496-497). Indeed,” it is not religion that lies at Al-Qaeda’s ideological base, but grievance and insecurity, with religion mores employed to justify the use of extreme violence. Thus, ISIL is but the latest manifestation of Al Qaedaists who seek to create turbulent and violent environments that lead to the narrowing of the marketplace of religion, ideas, and identities…” forcing people to either join them and benefit from the security they provide or reject them and die (Kfir 2014: 3, 8). Thus the way to defeat them is to remove the conditions that allow them to flourish – namely economic and physical insecurity, with the religious belief itself serving as mere window dressing.

This interpretation is especially prevalent among the political leadership, manifesting itself in an unusual amount of hand-wringing over what, precisely, we should call the Islamic State. In a letter written to the director of the BBC, 120 British MP’s wrote that "Islamic State, ISIL, and ISIS [give] legitimacy to a terrorist organization that is not Islamic nor has it been recognised [sic] as a state” (Chshti 2015). More bluntly, some British imams suggested the organization be termed the “Un-Islamic State” to deprive them of “the standing they seek by styling themselves Islamic State… it is neither Islamic, nor is it a state” (Cameron 2015a). David Cameron described the Islamic State as “a perversion of the religion of Islam and many Muslims listening to this programme will recoil every time they hear the words Islamic State”

\(^{193}\) As Graeme Wood writes, “Many mainstream Muslim organizations have gone so far as to say the Islamic State is, in fact, *un-Islamic*… But Muslims who call the Islamic State un-Islamic are typically, as the Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel, the leading expert on the group’s theology, told me, ‘embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion’ that neglects ‘what their religion has historically and legally required.’ Many denials of the Islamic State’s religious nature, he said, are rooted in an “interfaith-Christian-nonsense tradition.”
In a speech at the Summit for Countering Violent Extremism, President Obama declared that, despite the Islamic State’s pretentions,

> [W]e are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam. We must never accept the premise that they put forward. Because it is lie. Nor should we grant these terrorists the religious legitimacy they seek. They are not religious leaders, they are terrorists.”

The French government has even adopted a derogatory slang term for the Islamic State -- “Daesh,” [crusher or “sower of discord”] -- which acknowledges the Islamic State’s existence without acknowledging any of its claims (Taylor 2015).

A perspective informed by modern systems theory, however, rejects this view entirely as being far from reality. Religious belief is at the core of what ISIS does, just as it was for the Taliban and all religion actors that seek to achieve communicative hegemony. In a stunningly-deep report by Graeme Wood, the notion that there is anything un-Islamic about the Islamic State should be dismissed (Wood 2015).

There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse... The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and

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194 He went on to say, “I also believe Muslim communities have a responsibility as well. al-Qaeda and ISIL do draw selectively from the Islamic texts. They do depend upon the misperception around the world that they speak in some fashion for people of the Muslim faith. That Islam is somehow inherently violent. That there is some sort of clash of civilizations.”
Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam…Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do.

But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it.

And this is not just something that is restricted to a select group within the organization. As an expert on ISIS’ theology, Bernard Haykel, notes “Even the foot soldiers spout this stuff constantly… They mug for their cameras and repeat their basic doctrines in formulaic fashion, and they do it all the time.” Everything from their dress to their grisly executions are derived wholly from their interpretation of the Ku’ran and the Hadiths. An interpretation, Haykel adds, which has ‘as much legitimacy as anyone else.”

In keeping with its function as a religious organization, the Islamic State has clearly outlined its program, both relative to other religious programs as well as the communication of other functional systems. It does so through its publication *Dabiq*, a periodical translated into French, German, Russian, and Arabic alongside its English main publication. Its purpose is not to inspire lone-wolf terrorists to take action against Western powers, but to convince all Muslims (and perhaps non-Muslims) of the correctness of the IS program and entice them to join their messianic quest. Because their program is in direct competition with those of Al Qaeda and other mainstream denominations, the scholarly pedigree behind IS’ publication is meticulously crafted. Prominent theorists such as Abu Bakr Naji, Abu Muz’ab al-Suri, are frequently invoked, alongside extensive quotations of *sahânîn* [sound ones] *hadîths* (from al-Bukhari and al-

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195 Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, ‘the Prophetic methodology,’ which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail.
Muskimi and the Ko’ran, in published sermons that usually comprise roughly one half of each issue (see also Gambhir 2014:2). While the ISIS interpretation might be questioned, the content of its religious justification cannot.

The now seven publications carefully lay out the path toward the end times. There are five stages – *hijrah* (emigration), *jama’ah* (Congregation), *destabilize taghut* (idolatry), *tamkin* (consolidation), and *khalifah*. ISIS’s initial incantation (AQI) accomplished the first three, but the last two have been left for the Islamic State, which has the courage to do what all other Muslim organization either could not, or would not due to corruption and fear. The bridge is Zarqawi, who the publications are careful to note worked with, but not under, OB Laden. Zarqawi is depicted as having desired the caliphate all along, with all actions aimed at its instantiation. The immediate goal is to take the three holy places by force, which places them in direct conflict with Israel and Saudi.

To this point, the name of ISIS’ publication is a deliberate choice, calling to mind both a famous Ottoman victory over the Mamelukes and the well-known *hadith* about the End Times. Dabiq, a Syrian city in Aleppo, is where Muhammed declared that the armies of Rome will...
assemble and fight a titanic struggle against the armies of the caliphate and be defeated, leading to its global triumph and, eventually, the worldwide domination of the Muslim faith.198

The Islamic State sees the world and their religion in absolute terms. They assert that “Islam cannot be compartmentalize and approached piecemeal” – and their interpretation provides the only correct worldview, relative to other religious programs and all communication (Dabiq Issue 3:16). In its first issue of Dabiq, it lays this out clearly:

O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps… with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahid everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr [disbelief]; all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 10).199

The individuals responsible for the Islamic State messaging often invoke the metaphor of Noah’s Flood to illustrate the starkness of this choice.200 The issue takes pains to prove the existence of the flood as a real event, and then states that “the flood is a refutation of the pacifists” (Dabiq Issue 2: 9). For those who lived at the time, the choice was existential, since “only those who agreed with and followed the truth would be saved from the punishment” (Issue 2: 9). Likewise, those who live today face an equally dire choice. Here the writers offer perplexity at those who

198 In Graeme Wood’s “What ISIS Really Wants,” he quotes an Australian Imam who describes the aftermath of the initial battle at Dabiq: “After its battle in Dabiq, the caliphate will expand and sack Istanbul. Some believe it will then cover the entire Earth, but, its tide may never reach beyond the Bosporus. An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the caliphate’s fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus—the second-most-revered prophet in Islam—will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory.”

199 “There are only two camps: the camp of truth and its followers, and the camp of falsehood and its factions. So choose to be from one of the two camps” (Dabiq Issue 3: “A call to Hijrah”: 12).

200 Or more precisely, they refer to it as The flood of the Mubahalah [calling the curse of Allah down on to those that speak falsehood, which in the case of the original text, is Christians]. Note that they believe the world wide flood actually occurred as a matter of historical record. See Dabiq Issue 2: 9. They argue that if the unbelievers were to realize, they would understand the disastrous choice they are making so blithely.
advocate for “peaceful means of change” and “leaving [unbelievers] to choose for themselves without any pressure or force used against them” when such a strategy “every time… [results] in misguidance” (Issue 2:5). Noah was not polite or understanding of other views, he simply said “It’s either me or the flood.” (Dabiq Issue 2 “The Flood: It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood”: 9).

This binary mode of reality thus presents a clear mission for the Islamic State – achieving triumph for their program by making other communication seem impossible.

So until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it’s upon us all to work together to eradicate the principle of ‘free choice,’ and to not deceive the people in an attempt to seek their pleasure… rather we must confront them with the fact that they’ve turned away from religion, while we hold onto it, grasping its purity, its clarity, its comprehensiveness, without any blemishes due to shirk, misguidance or heresy, and that we’re completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all other religions, and that we will continue to fight the people of deviation and misguidance until we die trying to make the religion triumphant (Dabiq Issue 2: 11).

To the contributors to the magazine, the “all” refers to all Muslims, since the declaration of the caliphate removed, “any excuse to be independent of this entity embodying them and waging war on their behalf in the face of kufr.” Moreover, even benign neutrality “would doom him, as it entailed major sin (Issue 7: 55). The message from Muhammad, according to Dabiq, is one of division, not reconciliation. Choosing to be friendly with “apostate” governments through the

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201 The other meaning of the “mubahalah” also refers to a public hearing or debate which ends in the defeat of one side. According to the test, “Mubahalah is a matter raised to Allah so that he judges between two parties and exposes the deceitful party that claims it is upon truth when in fact it is upon falsehood and lies” (Dabiq Issue 2 “The Flood: It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood”: 28). And Allah makes this choice known publicly.
adoption of “the kufri religion propagated by Bush, Obama, Blair, Cameron, Sarkozy, and Hollnade in the name of Islam” may be easier in the short run, but those that do will share their fate (Dabiq 7:62).

The periodical series actually to some length at dismissing the “kufri” Islam practiced by many opposed to the Islamic State, and especially those who dismiss the Islamic State as “un-Islamic” in a doctrinal article entitled: “Islam is the Religion of the Sword, not Pacifism.” They begin by attacking those Muslims that claim Islam is a religion of peace.

There is a slogan repeated continuously by apologetic ‘du’at’ when flirting with the West and that is their statement: ‘Islam is the religion of peace,’ and they mean pacifism by the word peace. They have repeated this slogan so much to the extent that some of them alleged that Islam calls to permanent peace with kufr and the kafirin. How far is their claim from the truth, for Allah has reveals Islam to be the religion of the sword, and the evidence for this is so profuse that only a zindiq [heretic] would argue otherwise” (Dabiq Issue 7: 20).

On the contrary, they claim, now that the caliphate has been declared it is the duty of Muslims everywhere to fight “those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last day… [and those] who do not adopt the religion of truth.” As their proof, they point to the earliest days of Islam, when, “Allah sent down iron alongside the revelation to consolidate His religion by the sword forged with iron” in order to “make evident those believing in the unseen who support Him and His

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202 Or raise banners and slogans with the words ‘Je Suis Charlie’ on the? There is no doubt that such deeds are apostasy, that those who publicly call to such deeds in the name of Islam and scholarship are from the du’at (callers) to apostasy, and that there is great rewards awaiting the Muslims in the Hereafter if he kills these apostate imams…” (Dabiq Issue 7: 60). “Eventually, the grayzone will become extinct and there will be no place for grayish calls and movements. There will only be the camp of the iman versus the camp of the kufr. Then, when Isa [Jesus] descends, breaks the cross, and abolishes the jizyah, there will not be any place left for the camp of kufr to exist on the Earth, not even as humbled dhimmi subjects linving among the Muslims in the camp of truth” (Dabiq Issue 7: 66).
messengers” (Dabiq Issue 7:21). Given this, how can Islam be a religion of peace as claimed by Bush, Obama, and Kerry (Dabiq Issue 7: 22)? Peace will only come once, “no one will be worshipped but Allah… Isa [Jesus] kills the [Antichrist]…and kufr and its tyranny… destroyed” (Dabiq Issue 7: 24).

Indeed, those who choose not to follow Baghdadi as the leader of all of Islam do so because of the “secularism pervading the people’s intellects in our era, separating between religion and state… and treating the Qur’an as a book of chanting and recitation rather than a book of governance, legislation, and enforcement” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 24). Baghdadi and the Islamic state are following the same path that, “Allah chose for Ibrahim… and his progeny thereafter is the path of imamah – both religious and political” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 27). Anyone who challenges this path, and “rebels against its authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight him” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 27). Considering it considers the entire world its potential territory, this mandate is expansive. Moreover, even hindering those who would join the Islamic state is a sin.  

203 Allah also described what should be struck with the sword… “I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieved, so strike [them] upon the necks and strike from them every fingertop… He also… said, ‘So when you meet those who disbelieve, strike their necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens’” (Dabiq Issue 7: 21).

204 This section also contains a rather lengthy treatise on the oft-cited claim that the root word for Islam is that of the Arabic word for “peace.” They write, “One of the biggest [heretical lies] propagated by the heretics is the linguistic root for the word Islam. They calim it comes from the word [peace], when in actuality it comes from the words meaning submission and sincerity sharing the same consonant root” (Dabiq Issue 7: 22). After two pages of extensive ‘proofs’ they conclude that, “It is clear then that [peace] is not the basis of the word Islam, although it shares the same consonant root [s-l-m] and is one of outcomes of the religion’s sword, as the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, and sung until Isa [Jesus] kills the [Antichrist] and abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth” (24).

205 „The Islamic State is the entity that most emulates the millah of Ibrahim with regards to imamah in the areas where it exists. It has carried out the command of Allah – as much as it can – in the best possible manner. It established the religion in areas where it exists and continues to pursue this effort vigorously…. As such, it is not fitting for anyone, whoever he may be, to seek to demolish the building that the sincere men of the Ummah made so much effort to construct and strengthen… Furthermore, no one – regardless of his virtues – even dreams of convincing the .. soldier of The Islamic State to abandon this mission for the sake of some ambiguous initiatives or for the sake of nothing at all.. Allah… states in the Qur’an after granting imamah to Ibrahim… Truly, We chose him
That is because the Islamic State is on God’s divine mission to bring about the end of days. The startling truth of the Islamic State’s program is that it is entirely millennialist. Rather than being only for political gain, they see themselves as ushering in the End Times. The end times will be preceded, “not by peace, but by a confrontation with the enemies of Allah” (Dabiq Number 5: “Remaining and Expanding: 4). This is evident from the first page of the first issue, when the contributors declared that, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq” – Abu Mus’ab az- Zarqawi (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 2). As mentioned previously, this refers to the climactic battle between the Crusader [Rome] and of the newly installed caliphate. In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that the caliphates only purpose is to usher in this cataclysm:

“I have no doubt that this state, which has gathered the bulk of the muhajirin in Sham and has become the largest collection of muhajirn in the world, is a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the way for the al-Malhama al Kubra (the grand battle prior to the Hour)” (Dabiq Issue 3: “A call to Hijrah": 6)

Much of the fourth issue of Dabiq deals exclusively with this topic. What is particularly striking is that the entire purpose of the caliphate is to provoke Christendom, and at least temporarily, be defeated by them (Dabiq Issue 4: 32-35). There is a great deal of reference to the “treachery leading up to al-Malhammab al-Kubra” where the armies of Christendom will break a truce and turn on the unsuspecting forces of Islam, which will be slaughtered almost to the last man (Dabiq Issue 4: 37).206 Of course, in the end the armies of Allah will triumph.

206 For this reason, statements throughout the texts often have a certain defiance to them. For example, they claim that “With every kafir that is enlisted to fight the IS, every bomb that is dropped onto the homes of its people, every lie that is circulated against it by the international media, and every coin that is spent to try to halt its advance, the
As if that were not enough, there is almost no indication that the contributors to the publication believe this will necessarily be accomplished soon. According to the official spokesperson of the Islamic State, Shayk Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami

And so we promise you (crusaders) by Allah’s permission that this campaign will be your final campaign. It will be broken and defeated… We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah… This is His promise to us; He is glorified and He does not fail in His promise. If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market… therefore Allah will give [us] victory… then this weak, pitiful, and abortive crusade will be the final one encompassing the eventual truce and crusader treachery leading up to al-Malhammah al-Kubra, and Allah knows best. (Issue 4: 37).

This does not sound like a cynical political ploy to woo friendly governments.

Besides other religious programs, the Islamic State sees the political system as its biggest obstacle, both in terms of its infection of religious and religious views, as well as the goals and plans of states. They are plain about this perspective, claiming that “[their] boots…will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and unconcern its deviant nature” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 8) For example, in an endnote that accompanies the periodic message by John Cantle, a British reporter held captive for several years, they make the following pronouncement about democracy:

The major evil found in voting within the democratic system is not due to the false promises of the two-faced politicians, rather due to what it entails of ascribing the rights

Khalifah and its mujadinin only grow stronger, more determined and more defiant” (Dabiq Number 5: “Remaining and Expanding: 13).
and attributes of Allah – including the right of legislation – to men. Accordingly, it is a form of major shirk (Dabiq Issue 7: post-script).\(^{207}\)

More important to ISIS is mitigating the dangerous effect of national identities.

In their estimation, the failure of all other religious organizations has been their attachment or even subservience to national identities. The contributors claims of all of the obstacles in pursuit of the establishment of the caliphate, “The biggest of these distinguishing factors were nationalism that tainted many of the banners and parties in Afghanistan” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 35). It was also why the Sunni tribes involved in the Sawha ultimately failed -- undermined by “pride, envy, nationalism,” (Dabiq Issue 1: 40). Attachments to national identities created barriers that interfered with the proper functioning of religious unity, and those that do have such an attachment, who “insist that [national] division in better for the Ummah while have no practical aspirations for Islam!” (Dabiq Issue 2: 23)

In fact, the core philosophy of the Islamic State is that “imamah [ummah leadership] in religious affairs cannot be properly established unless the people of truth first achieve comprehensive political imamah over the lands and the people” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 25). That is, the success of their religious program demands the erasure of the political system and replacing it with religious administration. They claim that, “Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah’s… the land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims” (Dabiq

\(^{207}\) And then they reference this verse: “Or do they have deities who have legislated for them a religion which Allah has not permitted? But if not for the decisive word, it would have been concluded between them. And indeed the wrongdoers will have a painful punishment (Ash – Shura: 21) In an interview with Der Speigel, Islamic State recruiter was asked about democracy. He replied that, “Democracy is for infidels. A real Muslim is not a democrat because he doesn’t care about the opinions of majorities and minorities don’t interest him. He is only interested in what Islam says. Furthermore, democracy is a hegemonic tool of the West and contrary to Islam. Why do you act as though the entire world needs democracy? And when it comes to homosexuality, the issue is clearly dealt with by the Koran. It says it is forbidden and should be punished.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-interview-with-an-extremist-recruiter-a-999557.html
1435 Issue 1: 11) For this reason, one of the first tasks the Islamic State undertakes when it conquers an area is to dissolve its political boundaries into a religious administration, what they call *wilayah*. Their purpose is to, “eliminate any remaining traces of the kufri, nationalistic borders from the hearts of Muslims” (Dabiq Issue 4 “The Failed Crusade”:18).

And this is not some obscure secondary objective. This perspective is embedded even in their invitation for Muslims to make the pilgrimage to their land. Their opening periodical proclaims:

“O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights and leadership… It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the eastern and westerner are all brothers… It is a Khilafah that gathered Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi [North African], American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers by His grace, loving each other for the sake of Allah, standing in a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing themselves for one another…Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal, in one pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood…If kings were to taste this blessing, they would abandon their kingdoms and fight over this grace. So all praise and thanks are due to Allah.” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 7)

All seven currently published periodicals are filled with constant references to this dissolution of national identity, something that has never occurred in human history, except in the case of the Islamic State!” (Dabiq Issue 3:: 5). A section of the fourth issue was devoted to recounting the
decision of Ansar-al-Islam’s declaration of loyalty as being motivated specifically by this
dissolution of national identity (Dabiq Issue 4: 22)

Given the radicalism of their message, they anticipate conflict with not just Western
states, but all states. 208 “The expansion of the Islamic State into the Arabian Peninsular,” they
warn, “has caused the thrones of Al Salil and other Gulf tawaghit to tremble ceaselessly…. For
Allah will complete his light, even if the disbelievers despise such” (Dabiq Number 5::27).
Throughout all the texts there are constant references to beating the “crusaders” with lots of
pictures of Obama and his staff, David Cameron, members of Saudi Royal family, American
caskets, the Marxists of the Kurdish PUK and PKK, the Free Syrian Army, and pictures of
“Crusader ‘civilians’” with quotes always placed around the term (see especially: Dabiq Issue 4).

The antipathy with which the political system is regarded cannot be understated. In fact,
even the concept of “diplomacy,” the very foundation of statecraft, is regarded as polytheism.
According to the Imam interviewed by Graeme Wood, “To send an ambassador to the UN is to
recognize an authority other than God’s.” If the Islamic State were to ever gain official
recognition, sovereignty, or a seat at the UN, Bagdhadi would have committed apostasy and on
that basis warrant replacement. Accordingly, Baghdadi has reportedly said that “Our goal is to
establish an Islamic state that doesn’t recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology.”

The end goal for the Islamic State is nothing short of globe dominated by their Islamic
program, a goal they proclaim from the very beginning that a day will come when the Muslim

208 They present a surprisingly sophisticated analysis of US policy toward ISIS, including noting the contradiction
in empowering Russia/Iran, relying on proxies (PKK, FSA, The Pehsmerga) who cannot stand up to the ISIL forces,
and lots of quotes underscoring their expectation that the Americans intend to stay at this ‘crusade’ for a very long
time (Dabiq Issue 4 “The Failed Crusade”: 38-42).
will rule everywhere as a master” (Dabiq 1435 Issue 1: 8). Perhaps the most complete statement of their intentions is found in their fifth periodicals, where they promise the world that:

The flag of the Khilafah will rise of Makkah and al-Madinah, even if the apostates and hypocrites despise such. The flag of Khilafah will rise over Baytul-Maqdis and Rome, even if the Jews and Crusaders despise such. The shade of this blessed flag will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jahiliyyah [days of ignorance of Allah]” (Dabiq Number 5: :3)

What is most striking is that these periodicals are not hidden on some dark net website, but are free and available for anyone to download and read. The fact of the matter is they want the rest of the world to know that their intentions are unending expansion, which is why the gleefully report what the Western media and political establishment say about them. For example, they posted a flattering picture of George W Bush with the caption: ‘This prompted the enemy of Allah – Bush – to say after the blessed rise of the Islamic State, ‘They strive to establish an Islamic State stretching from China to Spain.; He spoke the truth although he is a liar” (Dabiq Issue 4 “The Failed Crusade”: 4).

4.4.4 Reaction of Political Organizations

As suggested earlier in this account, the reaction of the political system has thus far been decisive in substance (if not necessarily demonstrated through strategy) -- the Islamic State has been rejected by the political systems as illegitimate and deserving of destruction. Shortly after

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209 They even want a currency based not on “the corrupt, interest-based global financial system,” but on the “intrinsic values of gold, silver, and copper…” and following a Caliphate precedent such that they did “not contain any imagery of the Persians and Romans” (Dabiq Number 5: “Remaining and Expanding:18-19). In other words, they only want to create coinage with religious significance.
the four Iraqi divisions were routed north and west of Baghdad, the United States engaged in combat with the Islamic State.

On August 8, 2014, the United States launched Operation Inherent Resolve, which consists of conducting airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and (by Sept 2014) Syria, humanitarian efforts, and training for Iraqi troops (DOD 2014). The stated purpose of this mission, which is so named to “reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the US and partner nations” is to “eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international community” (DOD 2014).

Thus far, allies have quickly joined the fray. The British joined the operation on August 7 and on Sept 26 conducted its first airstrikes on targets in Iraq, and has up to this writing conducted more airstrikes (300) than any other country beside the US. David Cameron pledged to “do everything in our power to hunt down these murderers and ensure they face justice, however long it takes” (Cameron 2014). He called them an “existential threat” to his country. He also pledged SAS forces as part of the effort to “crush IS in Iraq and Syria” (McTague 2015). The French joined the air campaign officially started its campaign on Sept 19, 2014. The Canadians joined the fight first with the deployment of advisors to Iraq in Sept and airstrikes in Nov in Iraq and March of 2015 in Syria (Pugliese 2016). There are currently sixty-three states involved in the anti-ISIS coalition, of which a dozen have conducted at least one of the 5000 airstrikes since Operation Inherent Resolve began. The United States itself currently has

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210 The mission was designated “Inherent Resolve” on Oct 15 2014 and applied retroactively to all combat operations against the Islamic State from the beginning of hostilities.
212 The countries that have launched airstrikes in Iraq include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the United States have also conducted airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria. Twelve countries – Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, the UK and the United States have
3500 troops in Iraq and spent $3 billion to combat an “imminent threat to every interest we have,” that “is beyond anything we’ve seen” (Mazzetti and Cooper 2014). Accordingly, the US is prepared for a long-term campaign, but the final result is the Islamic State’s destruction, rather than a negotiated settlement. (Obama 2015).

In a speech laying out the strategy for its destruction, President Obama presented the path forward to reclaiming the territory held by ISIS. This one speech captures every element of the expected response from a political organization. The first point Obama makes is that the capability of the Islamic State is insufficient to stand up against the combined might of the military coalition arrayed against it.

ISIL’s strategic weaknesses are real. ISIL is surrounded by countries and communities committed to its destruction. It has no air force; our coalition owns the skies. In short, ISIL’s recent losses in both Syria and Iraq prove that ISIL can and will be defeated.

He then highlights that the Islamic State has no political support and has been utterly rejected by the international state system.

ISIL is backed by no nation. It relies on fear, sometimes executing its own disillusioned fighters. Its unrestrained brutality often alienates those under its rule, creating new enemies…

Obama is also quick to point out that the program of the Islamic State is a universal threat. The intimation is that, if left unchecked, it will gradually supplant political communication in the region, and perhaps further abroad.

contributed to the training program in Iraq
“… While the focus of our discussions today was on Iraq and Syria, ISIL and its ideology also obviously pose a grave threat beyond the region… So I’ve called on the international community to unite against this scourge of violent extremism. In this fight, the United States continues to lead…. 

Obama is also quick to point out that the program of the Islamic State is a universal threat. The intimation is that, if left unchecked, it will gradually supplant political communication in the region, and perhaps further abroad.

The last political point Obama the true solution to defeating the Islamic State is not necessarily through military victories, but the replacement of IS’s ideology with both a “more compelling” vision and the installation of good governance. Obama argues that:

Our strategy recognizes that no amount of military force will end the terror that is ISIL unless it’s matched by a broader effort -- political and economic -- that addresses the underlying conditions that have allowed ISIL to gain traction. They have filled a void, and we have to make sure that as we push them out that void is filled. So, as Iraqi cities and towns are liberated from ISIL, we’re working with Iraq and the United Nations to help communities rebuild the security, services and governance that they need. We continue to support the efforts of Prime Minister Abadi to forge an inclusive and effective Iraqi government that unites all the people of Iraq -- Shia, Sunnis, Kurds and all minority communities….It’s also true why, ultimately, in order for us to defeat terrorist groups like ISIL and al Qaeda it's going to also require us to discredit their ideology -- the twisted thinking that draws vulnerable people into their ranks… As I’ve said before -- and I know our military leaders agree -- this broader challenge of countering violent extremism is not simply a military effort. Ideologies are not
defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas -- a more attractive and more compelling vision… So the United States will continue to do our part, by working with partners to counter ISIL’s hateful propaganda

As chapter five will discuss in some greater length, this is standard political strategy – defeat the “de-differentiation” strategy of the Islamic State by opening up avenues of communicative reproduction for other systems.

This speech was in September of 2014. As of June 22, 2015, the coalition has destroyed 100 tanks and over three hundred military vehicles, as well as over 7,000 various buildings, staging areas, and fighting positions. It has rolled back the Islamic State from roughly 25% of its territory from its apex last August, but the core of the IS territory remains intact, including Mosul. Moreover, there is little progress on the installation of good governance and no evidence that the “twisted” ideology of ISIS has been defeated.

The success or failure of the coalition, is of course of less interest than the overwhelming response. To put the sixty-three state coalition in perspective, its size relative to the number of possible coalition members is greater than that of the Allied power during World War II. Although as of this writing there has been little commitment to a sustained combat ground force, it is extraordinarily likely to be the next step if the Iraqi and Kurdish militaries prove unable to mount a successful campaign.

Conclusion

This account is designed to demonstrate how the religious program, the communicative strategy, and the inclusivity of this organization has generated both within-system and between-system conflict. As a religious organization that has achieved hegemony over a wide swath of the

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213 http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/
Levant, the Islamic State provides an excellent example of the Luhmannian dynamics at work. Frankly, it is hard to conceive of a better exemplar of the type than the Islamic State. Their program is utterly devoid of compromise, putting them into conflict with all other organizations, but especially the political and other religious organizations. The Islamic State purports to be the leader of Islamic civilization, and they deny the validity of the political system’s right to exist. They have sparked alarm in practically every capital in the region, and have provoked a coalition that includes roughly a third of the nation-states on the planet.

Of course in the real world there is no such thing as a static organization. Changes in leadership, dynamic internal arrangements, and historical circumstance obviously play a role. The Islamic State began with a distinct program from its inception under al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi. Originally comprised primarily of jihadists from al-Zarqawi’s home state of Jordan, AQI’s bloody campaign in Iraq drew enough support from local Sunnis that it became a serious threat to the government of Iraq. Like the Taliban, AQI/ISI’s maximalist program guaranteed them more enemies than had the capability to defeat, and brought them the ire of their erstwhile allies in Al Qaeda. Their defeat, like the Taliban’s, was swift and decisive. However, the withdrawal of the United States, the unwise policies of the Maliki government, and, most importantly, the capture of significant material owing to the Syrian civil conflict, allowed an opportunity to regain and surpass their former capabilities. Nevertheless, throughout the entire history of the Islamic State its program remained the same.

4.5 The Taliban
Like the Islamic State, the Taliban is a religious organization that pursued a strategy of communicative hegemony. Due to its program it found itself in conflict with both other religious organizations – primarily the mujahidin – and political organizations. Their difference from the
Islamic State is comes down to scope and capacity. Unlike the Islamic State, the Taliban never seemed interested in claiming applying its program outside of its immediate region. Even if it did, the Taliban has always lacked the capacity to implement its program its native Pashtun geographical and ethnic base, whereas the Islamic State quickly gained the ability to defeat rival organizations.

4.5.1 The History of the Taliban to 2011

The rise of the Taliban can be understood as the response of the religious system to the de-differentiation policy pursued by a political organization. After the fall of Zahir Shah’s four decade rule of Afghanistan ended in 1973, the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan under Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the moderate, republican government of Daoud Khan in 1978 and installed a Marxist government that attempted to remove the influence of Islam from Afghanistan society. Taraki instituted land reform (limited land holdings by individual families), ended forced marriages, made compulsory education for women, and opened civil society for female participation (Sikorski 1990: 180-187). The backlash was immediate, culminating in the Herat uprising on March 29, 1979 that left an estimated 5,000 insurgents dead and inspired the country-side to rebellion. By the summer, twenty-four of the twenty-eight province were in some stage of open revolt, assisted by mujahedeen from abroad (Goodson 2001: 56-57). Facing an untenable situation, Taraki appealed to the Soviets for assistance, but was killed by his deputy, Hazifuzullah Amin, before receiving an answer.

What followed was a series of increasingly moderate, but non-religious, governments that were not accepted by Islamic forces in Afghanistan.

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214 Khan had overthrown the monarchical rule of his cousin Mohanmad Zahir Shaf while he was out of the country. Taraki was the leader of the Pashtun Khalq faction (which opposed Karmal’s moderate Parchamites)
Although Amin was even more of a Marxist hard-liner than Taraki, his desire for power overrode his desire to remake society. He began a campaign to convince the population that he was a devout Muslim, published a biography of himself wearing traditional clothes, and even obtained approval from a religious party, the *Jamiatul Ulama* (Barfield 2005: 222). He ended the Taraki’s Stalin-esque style of governing in favor of a politburo model. He even distributed Korans to the population. However he was unable to convince the population of his devoutness – they blamed him for the deaths of the Herat uprising and the approximately 45,000 deaths perpetrated by the Taraki regime in their short time together in power. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union despised Amin. Convinced that a more moderate government would stop the insurgency, the Soviet Union deployed troops in Dec 1979 to depose Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal, a moderate rival that had been exiled by Taraki after the Shah’s fall (Barfield 2005:222).

Thus began the disastrous and ultimately unsuccessful Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, to which it would eventually commit over 100,000 troops.

As Soviet commitment waned, and despite reforms, Karmal found himself in an increasingly precarious position, eventually forced to abdicate his position in 1985 to Mohammad Najibullah. Of all the post-Shah governments, Najibullah’s was by far the most moderate. He attempted reconciliation, coalition government, and national reconciliation – but the peace he negotiate was fragile. Despite his protests, the Soviets began drawdown in 1986

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215 Karmal proved equally unpopular. A famous poem was dedicated to Karmal’s irreligiousity – a night letter dedicated to discrediting Karmal for his anti-Islamic views. One read: O Babrak! Son of Lenin. You do not care for the religion and the faith. You may face your doom and May you receive a calamity, o! son of a traitor. O! son of Lenin! They also used these letters to coordinate massive “Allahu Akbar” wave protests after dark. Taken from Hafizullah Emadi, *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan* (London: Greenwood Press, 2005), p.98. [from Nelofer Pazira’s biographical story called *A Bed of Red Flowers*];.

216 Upon his accession, Karmal’s government installed a single-party socialist democracy, granted amnesty to religious prisoners, and pursued a policy of integrating the tribes into his Parchamite government, but ultimately he failed to make headway due to the brutality of the Soviet counter-insurgency (Kakar and Kakar 1997: 73). He responded by consolidating support among the military, spending 40% of government revenue – much of it Soviet aid -- on the military.
and committed to full withdrawal by 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the Afghanistan government without a benefactor. The Najibullah government, despite early success against the mujahedeen, collapsed by the beginning of 1991, controlling no more than ten percent of Afghanistan. The Communist government stepped down on April 1992 and the remaining mujahedeen forces stepped into the breach (Katzman 2008: 3).

The scars left by the conflict were significant. The 10 year Soviet counter-insurgency killed 1.3 million Afghans and forced another 5.5 million to flee, many to the autonomous FATA region in Pakistan (Grau and Gress 2002: 255-256). The destruction to infrastructure was significant and government services had ceased to function. Although they had proven to be an effective fighting force against the Soviets, if overly reliant on outside funding for their success, the mujahidin could not govern effectively.

Upon the collapse of the Najibullah government, fighting immediately began between when Pakistani-backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-i Islami refused to recognize the Peshawar Accord establishing the Islamic State of Afghanistan and began shelling the capital of Kabul which was defended by the forces of the newly appointed defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud.217 This violence quickly spilled out of control, as other factions, particularly among Iranian-backed Hazara Hezb-I Wahdat (led by Abdul Ali Mazari) and Saudi-backed Ittihad-i-Islami faction led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, all began campaigns to control the country (Rashid 2001; Saikal 2006). This led to chaos, rampant human rights abuses, and massive dislocation of people to neighboring Pakistan.

The rise of the Taliban was a response to this milieu. The invasion of the Soviet Union and subsequent civil conflict precipitated the collapse of the government educational system,  

217 Massoud eventually fled north in Tajikistan where he formed the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, an organization that would become better known as the “Northern Alliance.”
leaving the madrassas the only operational educational system for the country. The curriculum of these schools was loosely based on a conservative Islam that emphasized conservative interpretations of Islamic law (Sharia) and jurisprudence (fiqh) (Johnson and Mason 2007: 75; Rubin 1999:82). Their number exploded from 900 in 1971 to over 33,000 (registered and unregistered) schools by 1988 (Rashid 2001:89).

It is altogether fitting that “Taliban” is what they called themselves, since it is the Persian/Pashto plural of the Arabic an Arabic term for students seeking religious knowledge – Talib. An entire generation of young men were trained in this fashion, which tended to erase or submerge the memory of the tribal lineages, legends, or the complex ethnic mix of their homeland (Rashid 2001: 32-33). Many young men grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan, with only the memories of an Islamic state created by their teachers as their knowledge of Afghanistan – this Islamic state is what they wanted to emulate (Rashid 2001:23). The teachings in these schools also reportedly emphasized the failure of the Mujahidin leadership, implying “that the people were suffering because of the power struggle that was going on between their elders” (Matinuddin 1999:22). One of these madrassahs was run by Mullah Omar, a former mujahedeen and son of a lower-middle class family, whose school in Kandahar is the birthplace of the modern Taliban.

The story of the Taliban’s rise is largely shrouded in a self-mythos (see Rashid 2001). Mullah Omar, a madrassa teacher in his early 30’s, was reportedly alerted to the rape of a young girl that was happening at a local army base. He quickly gathered a number of his madrassa students together and went to stop the atrocity, proudly hanging the perpetrators from a tank

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218 The currently preferred term is “Salafism” from Salaf as-Salih, the “pious predecessors,” as propagated mainly by Ibn Taymiyya, his students Ibn Al Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and later by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab and his followers.
barrel. They refused all payments but the beneficiary’s adherence to Sharia. Word of their success quickly spread, and soon they were being called in to stop other abuses.

By November of 1994, this group of fighters had seized Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, taking it within 48 hours and reportedly inspiring twenty-thousand young fighters to rally to their banner. This spun off into more organized military campaigns, including extensive cooperation with the Pakistanis to gain control of weapons shipments and stabilize after a series of defeats inflicted on them by Massoud’s government forces (Rashid 2000: 27).²¹⁹ Despite these setbacks, by March 1995 the Taliban controlled one-third of Afghanistan and declared an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. By 1997 90% of the country had fallen to their rule and forced Massoud to flee to neighboring Tajikistan.

The rise of this regime was naturally an attractive area for other jihadists. Shortly after their rise, Osama Bin Laden, recently forced to leave Sudan, set up operations in Jalabad in eastern Afghanistan – this despite Mullah Omar’s wishes.²²⁰ It is estimated that roughly 20,000 jihadists were trained and supplied in those camps.

In the events following September 11th, the United States presented to the Taliban a series of non-negotiable demands, including the expulsion of terrorist organizations and granting access to terrorist camps (Bush 2002). Subsequent attempts by the Taliban to forestall an invasion by offering up Bin Laden failed (CNN 2001).²²¹ The UN followed with two resolutions which stated their unequivocal support of the United States, but stopped short of authorizing

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²¹⁹ It is widely known that Pakistan gave training, logistical and military support to the Taliban in the early phases of their campaign; some argue they continue to support the Taliban even after the Waziristan uprising (See Goodson 2002; Rashid 2000: 91; Barnes, Julian E.; Matthew Rosenberg; Habib Khan Totakhil (2010-10-05).
²²⁰ Given the attitude of the Taliban to other mujahedeen, it is not surprising that Omar did not want Bin Laden within his territory.
military operations.\textsuperscript{222} NATO, however, declared the attack an Article 5 event.\textsuperscript{223} On Oct 7, the US, UK, Canada initiated bombing. A US military force comprised of mostly Special Forces and close air support, working in conjunction with the “Northern Alliance,” then captured Marar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Kabal in a month’s time. By December, all major remaining Taliban had fled to Pakistan. On Oct 14, the Taliban again offered to hand over bin Laden if the US presented evidence, but the US rejected this offer. The Taliban was defeated and fled Kanadahar on Dec 7 2001.

Within two weeks, the UN authorized an International Security Assistance Force with 18 countries contributing forces, with eventually NATO taking the helm in August 2003. Hamid Karzai was selected as leader of the transitional government in December of 2001, and elected in 2004 as president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Felbah Brown 2012: 4-19).

After regrouping in Pakistan, Omar relaunched combat in 2003. Combat escalated through 2006 and 2007, when ISAF forces (primarily British, Canada, and Dutch) conducted a series of operations with the support of US airpower designed to halt strengthening forces in the southern Afghanistan. Although tactical victories were achieved throughout 2006 and 2007, the Taliban and related groups continued to conduct IED bombings and other ambush-type attacks. By the middle of 2008, the US increased troop levels from 27,000 to 48,000; UK forces increased to 10,000 troops. Regardless, the Taliban began attacked NATO supply lines through the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. As attacks continued apace, NATO continued upping the number of troops. At its peak combined forces totaled nearly 130,000 troops on Afghanistan,

\textsuperscript{223} http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm <access April 14 2015>
with the US contributing 90,000 of that number by the middle of 2010 after a second surge of troops.

By 2011, minor participating countries such as France, Norway, and Australia began winding down operations. Major participants such as the UK, Canada, and the UK also began to reduce the number of forces, and by May 2012 had an official exit strategy, with remaining forces moving to a training role. The UK and the United States officially concluded combat operations on Oct 26, 2014 and began withdrawing all combat troops in December with only 10,000 to remain. All told, 2,800 troops had been killed by hostile action on the coalition side and nearly 35,000 Taliban and related jihadists.224

4.5.2 The religious program of the Taliban

The Taliban has two competing goals: to conquer their region and establish a regional caliphate. This alone distinguishes itself from the Islamic State which has a much larger goal and a much more expansive view of membership, yet in its pursuit of communicative hegemony it is similar. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country that is the largest remaining tribal society in the world, yet the Taliban decision-making repeatedly chose stark imposition of their program despite over compromise (Rashid 2001:2).225 Although they quite plainly want to rule Afghanistan, the organization’s goal remains the spread of a version of Islam that is unique to themselves (Roy and Zahab 2004: 14, 210).226 That is, the purpose of their organization is to ensure the reproduction of their particular program to the exclusion of all other programs.

225 Its population is comprised of 4-45% Pashtun, 25% Tajik, 10% Uzbek, 10% Hazaras, and 10% Airmaqs. They are also divided into two religions, Sunni (80%) and Shia (20%).
226 According to those who watch the Taliban, commitment to these goals is not uniform throughout the organization. “The top tier of the Taliban leadership structure and key commander…are motivated by their interpretation [of] radical Islam, and see the insurgency as a fight with Western infidels, and the West’s ‘puppet government’ in Kabul. The bottom tier includes thousands of local fighters and their support network. The Taliban
Framed in the language of modern systems theory, the Taliban has clearly followed a strategy of de-differentiation, if somewhat idiosyncratically. Adhmed Rashid (2000:85) describes it this way: “The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own.” This probably is owed partially to the hostile relationship between the Taliban and the Mujahedeen, but it is also likely owed to the relative unsophistication of the Taliban themselves.\textsuperscript{227} The Taliban expressed this maximalist strategy vis-à-vis other Muslim factions early on. In 1996, before the capture of Kabul from the Massoud government, Mullah Omar removed the sacred cloak of Prophet Mohammad from a locked vault in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar, climbed to the roof of a nearby building, and held the cloak aloft to the present crowds. Believed to be possessed only by the true \textit{Amir-ul-Momineen} (Commander of the Faithful), the cloak signified to the Afghani audience his divinely ordained right to rule all Muslims.\textsuperscript{228} According to Thomas Johnson, this act provides, “ample evidence to suggest that Mullah Omar appeals to the global \textit{ummah}” (Johnson 2007: 332). Whether or not Mullah Omar’s message was broadly received is not known, but it was certainly his intention to communicate the superiority of the Taliban program. However, at this stage the Taliban were less concerned pays young men from rural villages to set up roadside bombs, launch rockets and mortars a NATO and Afgan forces, or pick up a gun for a few days. Most are not ideologically committed to jihad. Rather, they are motivated because they are unemployed, disenchanted with the lack of change since 2001, or angry because a local villager was killed or wounded by Afghan, US, or NATO forces” [68]. Midlevel and up are sacked according to the code of conduct (layeha) according to the rules of the emirate. See “Jihadi Layeha—A Comment,” National Center for Policy Research, <www.ncpr.af/Publications/LayehaJihad.pdf> (11 May 2007).


\textsuperscript{227} Taliban religious reasoning was often roundly criticized by scholars – sometimes in racist terms. For example, an Egyptian mullah refused to take the Taliban seriously “because of [the Taliban’s] circumstances and their incomplete knowledge of jurisprudence… they were not able to formulate rulings backed by theological evidence. The issue is a cultural issue. We detected that their knowledge of religion and jurisprudence is lacking, because they have no knowledge of the Arabic language, linguistics, and literature and hence they did not learn the true Islam” (Al Sharq al Awsat, March 23, 2001).

\textsuperscript{228} According to residents of Kandahar who were present, the crowds cheered. Many lost consciousness. Many threw their hats and other items of clothes in the air, in the hope that they would make contact with the cloak. Most importantly, as other mullahs shouted, “Amir-ul momineen!,” Mullah Omar gained the legitimacy he needed to pursue his conquest of the rest of Afghanistan” “A Tale of the Mullah and Muhammad’s Amazing Cloak,” \textit{New York Times}, 19 December 2001, <query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html
with putting forward a mission statement – their communication was primarily oriented toward the people who lived in the Afghanistan region.

Once they had seized power, they quickly moved to remove all traces of unacceptable communication. They conducted coercive efforts to indoctrinate Afghan youth by reconstituting the education system along religious lines. They banned television, music, dancing, and the arts; prohibited women from attending school and working outside the home. They also banned Christianity under penalty of death, and “anyone caught selling literature promoting Christianity or Judaism or degrading Islam, its personalities would be subjected to five years’ imprisonment” (Barfield 2005: 233; Hewad Jan 13, 2001). They required the Kabul Hindu community wear badges (Barfield 2005: 233). They also ordered the destruction of all symbols of other competing religions, such as the standing Buddha’s in central Afghanistan in March 2001 (Barfield 2001). The logic was explained in a Taliban newspaper editorial Shari’at (Feb 28 2001) “The objects of worship,” it said, “which had been considered as sacred and worshipped in their time in the past, are filthier than everything else and thus it is necessary that our beloved country should be cleansed of the existence of such false objects” (Barfield 2005: 232) Mullah Omar boasted that “Muslims should be proud of smashing idols. It has given praise to God that we have destroyed them” (Times, March 6, 2001).

Most importantly, the Taliban prohibited all political parties and all political gatherings. There was no need, since all organizational behavior was dictated by the Mullah Omar. As a Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir’s view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an
Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority, and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them (Rashid 2000:102).

For a semi-literate society, this perspective makes a great deal of sense. In contrast to the far more theologically sophisticated Islamic State, the Taliban’s insight into transcendence as through the one person capable of interpreting it.

Of course, this perspective stymied all attempts at negotiation or compromise. In an interview conducted before his death, Ahdma Shaw Massound discussed the Taliban’s inability to conceive of political compromise apart from their religious perspective:

The Taliban say: "Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us", and they would keep the highest office in the country, the presidency. But for what price?! The difference between us concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the society and the state. We cannot accept their conditions of compromise, or else we would have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system called "the Emirate of Afghanistan".229

It was not as if Massoud was not a devout Sunni Muslim. After all, this was a man who participated in early Islamic uprising against the Khan monarchy, and a man whose later military accomplishments against the Soviets earned him the honorific “the Lion of Panjshir.”

Nevertheless, the Taliban refused to contemplate power-sharing on any basis but that of their religious program. Ultimately, it was Massoud’s rejection of Taliban offer that ultimately led to his death, but it is not without a certain irony that it was his North Alliance that brought about the

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229 The Last Interview with Ahmad Shad Massoud , http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm conducted by Piotr Balcerowicz
Taliban’s first defeat – an easy defeat given the fact that acceptance of their Islam program took priority over all other concerns.

This blindness to defeat is not surprising, given that the very possibility of defeat was something they largely regarded as out of their control. In response to questions about their motivation, Omar replied that their purpose in taking up arms was “to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujahidin. We had the complete faith in God Almighty. We never forgot that. He can bless us with victory or plunge us into defeat” (Yosufzai, The News, 2 February 1995). Perhaps this is just rhetoric.

What is not rhetorical is their application of this blind faith to the actual governance of their controlled territory. That they quite clearly believe that religious correctness is the only litmus test for legitimacy is reflected in their laissez-faire attitude toward actually ruling their quasi-caliphate. (Rashid 2000: 92) observes that the Taliban has:

[No] central authority, state organizations, a methodology for command and control and mechanisms which can reflect some level of popular participation... mak[ing] it impossible for many Afghans to accept the Taliban… the Taliban are incapable of carrying out even the minimum of developmental work because they believe that Islam will take care of everyone (Rashid 2001: 212-213).

To be clear, the desire to establish religious rule does not require trusting the day-to-day governing to one’s chosen deity, a belief which borders practically on magical thinking. (As will be discussed later in the chapter, the Islamic State has an impressive capacity to govern their captured territory.) However, it is simply interesting to note that the Taliban program is so wholly closed off from other perspectives that they would never even consider doing otherwise.
Which is, after all, the point. The Taliban have pursued this caliphate, not out of some instrumental reason or desire for personal gain, but because they are on a mission from Allah, at least as they interpret it. Daniel Sullivan (2007: 102-103) argues that

There is no indication in the form of Taliban statements or core make-up to suggest that the movement was primarily politically based or that religion was used only as an opportunity… it was not an ideology adopted for political gain, given the prevailing conditions, that led to the rise of the Taliban, but rather changing conditions that brought popularity to an already established ideology and drove it to military mobilization (Sullivan 2007: 102-3).

For example, even though it would have been easier to tone down their extreme message once they controlled 90% of the country by May 1997, but the subjugation of women stayed core to the mission which was problematic once they expanded past their core ideological basis. “Sharia was chosen over compromise” (Sullivan 2007: 103). This suggests that the Taliban have not cynically chosen Islam because the population is Islam and that would play better-- a strategy which Amin rigorously attempted before his demise.

Nor is the Islamic fundamentalism of the Taliban some masquerade for Pashtun ethno-nationalism. The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan is not organized along strictly ethnic or linguistic lines (Ghufran 2009: 1093). It was not even popular among Pashtuns. It is unsurprising that despite initial support, Afghanis quickly soured on the Taliban’s rule. In polls conducted in 2005 and 2006, respondents were overwhelmingly opposed to the Taliban (92% unfavorable) and supportive of their ouster from power (87% favorable) (ABC; World Public Opinion). Just 1.6% of women are in favor of a return of the Taliban to power (ReliefWeb).
Indeed, the Taliban presents a classic example of a religious organization seeking to establish a region of de-differentiation.

Perhaps a more conciliatory position would have allowed the Taliban to persist in the face of the invasion of the American coalition, which swept them from power in a scant few months. However, even the resurgent Taliban did not change their fundamental outlook and remains as uncompromising as ever. We know this because of the narrative the Taliban has provided in the form of unsigned leaflets – known as “night letters” or *Shabnameh*.

These night letters, which were increasingly used after their defeat, provide some insight into their current worldview (Johnson 2007: 318; see Baker 2006 for content). This is a strategy they have followed since the Afghanistan Civil War, when they used these “night letters” to issue screeds against the ruling Marxist government. The Taliban readopted this form of communication during their protracted conflict with NATO and Afghan forces after their ouster from power in 2001. These letters are posted to Mosque walls and are typically aimed at threatening Karzai, the United States, and those that support them (Johnson 2007: 321). For example, one night-letter is titled, “One who lends a hand to infidels to transgress [against Muslims] is one of them.” It reads in part:

As you all know some countries in the Islamic world and specifically our dear country-Afghanistan are spending day and night under the grip of the crusaders in the last few years. During this time the cruel crusader’s army and their domestic servants have committed grave atrocities, barbarity and savagery against our innocent brothers and sisters. Their cruelties have not ceased. You have watched and heard of their ongoing savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq.... Therefore, the Afghan Muslim *Mujahedeen* have
initiated their sacred Jihad… [that] will continue until the end – until the defeat of the crusaders’ army, and till the establishment of a pure Islamic state (Inshallah)…

All those who work and are at the service of the crusader army, cooperate military or logistically with them and carry oil, food and similar things for them… will face serious consequences. All those who do business with the crusaders… [will] suffer during the exalted strike of the Mujahedeen on the crusaders… [T]hose Afghans who spy for Americans and for their Afghan slaves… will be punished at the hands of the holy mujahedeen according to Sharia. We ask all Muslims to cooperate whole-heartedly with their mujahedeen brothers and to join their ranks and to support jihads, so as to perform their religious duty properly… The mujahedeen’s power is not based on any foreign support, it is founded on Allah’s blessing, and the will of the Afghan Muslim people… Religious scholars say: Cooperation with infidels, under any circumstance and for any reason or excuse, in any form, is an open blasphemy that needs no deliberation.

This the longest night-letter, and as such there are three elements that are particularly relevant to our discussion here -- The Taliban define the “crusaders” and those who help as irredeemable enemies, they desire to establish a caliphate, and the belief that all Muslims have a duty to join. Which is to say, nothing about the Taliban’s programmatic mission has changed.

Their uncompromising position extends to every facet of what they consider the community. Any cooperation with state forces would have a transcendent consequence in addition to the earthly death.

Muslims should not work in organizations [NOGs] because Americans use those NGOs for their own purpose Muslims’ sons who are working with the current infidel
government should get out of it immediately. Those, however, who act in opposition to the above-mentioned rule bear the mortal and eternal responsibilities

--Night letter from Kandahar

Another letter declared that

The person who helps launch an attack with infidels is no longer a member of Muslim community. Therefore, punishment of those who cooperate with infidels is the same as the [punishment of] infidels themselves. You should not cooperate in any way – neither with words, nor with money nor with your efforts. Watch out not to exchange your honor and courage for power and dollar…

This is a really great note, because it perfectly encapsulates the kind of thinking that modern systems theory highlights. The Taliban, as a religious organization that can only see religious communication, believes that all individuals that reject their organizations by default can be excluded from society. This is underscored by the exhortation to not “exchange your honor and courage for power and dollar” – being excluded from society, which is naturally formed around religious communication, means that the symbolic media of the political and economic communication systems – power and money, respectively -- are, in essence, worthless.

4.5.3 Reactions from other organizations

From the beginning, the Taliban has had practically no support among political organizations and received little recognition from states. Only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE

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230 The so-called “Talibanization” of Pushtun culture and society has been resented by secular nationalist Pushtuns, including the left-leaning ANP, which points out that the Taliban are not the outgrowths of traditional Pushtun ethnonationalism. The ANP has, in fact, openly condemned the Pakistani security services for nurturing the Taliban movement over the past few decades. In the words of the present head of the ANP Asfandiyar Wali, “Pashtuns [i.e., Pushtuns] stand united for peace, but the fire of war is burning our land and we have to find the means to extinguish it. We are caught in the middle of warmongers, extremists, and militants.” Ahmed Rashid, “Pushtuns Want an Image Change,” December 2, 2006, <www.afgha.com>, accessed August 12, 2008.
recognized the Taliban government, and this support was generally limited to private funding, which lasted only so long as it was politically convenient to do so. While these states did play some role in the rise of the expansion of the Taliban in its expansionary phase, their “special role in the overall conflict should not be overestimated” (Maass 1999:69).

Pakistan has been by far the closest thing to Taliban’s most stalwart ally. It is estimated that there were as many as 28,000 Pakistani nationals in Afghanistan fighting against Taliban enemies during the Afghanistan Civil War (GWU 2007). Pakistan hoped that the Taliban would recognize the Durand Line and afford Pakistan ‘strategic depth’ given their anti-Shia, anti-India predilections (Ghufran 2009: 1103). They also hoped that the Taliban would draw the radicals out of Pakistan. None of these things actually occurred (Rashid 2001: 137). Pakistan wanted Taliban in Afghanistan for strategic regions, turning it into a vassal state (Roy 1998:210). They were instrumental in the early military armament of the Taliban, as well as facilitating military planning in the capture of Kandahar (Rashid 2001: 27), but the Taliban was never dependent upon Pakistan. Nor was there unified support within Pakistan, particularly within the military establishment (Rashid 2001: 184-185). In fact, “far from being Pakistan’s puppet, the Taliban exerted significant influence on its policies toward Afghanistan to the point where some feared the ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan” (Rashid 2001: 186-187).

Saudi Arabia’s support for the Taliban had much to do with internal politics. The Wahabi *ulema* who advise the monarch in Saudi Arabia influenced the royal family to support the Taliban and export of Salafism. Their reasoning was likely two-fold. Supporting the Taliban

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231 Initially, the United States did not oppose the Taliban as it was thought order was superior to the civil war ravaging the country. Moreover, there was hope that the Taliban would support a Unocal pipeline project from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan into Pakistan, but Taliban’s failure to do so evaporated what little good will there was (Rubin 1997: 288).

232 Largely a misplaced hope considering the many extremists originate in in NWFP and Balochistan – Maulana Sufi Mohammed led Tehreek-e-Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi [Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws] in Pakistan in 1995 in the area known as Bajuar Agency.
would have had the effect of keeping most virulently militant of the religious fundamentalists engaged in Saudi Arabia and not in their own country. It would likely have also prevented Iran from gaining a strong foothold in post-Soviet Afghanistan (Rashid 2000: 201-202). Regardless, their support was largely restricted to private financial flows as official support ceased after the bombings of US embassies in the late 1990’s, and recognition was revoked on September 22nd.

Of course, the relationship of the Taliban to the political world changed after September 11th. It is something of an understatement to suggest that the overall reaction to the Taliban was one of hostility. All states cut ties with them, NATO and an additional nineteen countries essentially declared war on them, and Afghanistan was occupied for thirteen years. Much of this was covered already in the history section, but it should be noted that the primary means of communication between the political organizations and the Taliban has been conflict, not negotiation, which implies a certain degree of recognition. Nor will there be a realistic possibility for negotiation so long as the Taliban remains programmatically consistent.

There has been little actual negotiation with the Taliban, a fact which is presaged by the history of dealing with the mujahedeen. Not wanting to commit more resources to a losing war, Mikhail Gorbachev encouraged Najibullah to resolve the “bleeding wound” to engender a national reconciliation plan (Gorbachev 1986; Wadan 2012). Najibullah offered major concessions, including a six-month unilateral ceasefire, approval of a new constitution that recognized Islam as the state religion of a multiparty democracy, granting amnesty and even government posts to opposition leadership, releasing 16,000 prisoners, creating ‘peace councils’ to integrate armed groups,, and reaching out to the leaders of Jamiat-e Islami and Hizb-e Islami Khalis for inclusion in the government (Wadan 2012:3, ft.3). The response of the mujahedeen was to declare the “armed jihad until the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, the
overthrow of the atheistic regime, and the establishment of an independent, free and Islamic Afghanistan” (Robinson 2011; Tempest 1987) 233

The Taliban has long proven unwilling to actually negotiate with political organizations (see Alam 2014; Rubin 2010; Semple 2009: 22-24, 2013). Despite extensive attempts by the Karzai government to induce negotiations and supposedly secret talks in 2011, the United States and Great Britain had little apparent desire despite rhetoric to the contrary. The reason was simple: Obama’s stated policy was that “there will also be no peace without reconciliation’ (Obama 2009). According to a recent Washington Post article, “The US goal is for the Taliban to publicly and substantively renounce ties with al-Qaeda, end violence in Afghanistan, recognize the Afghan constitution – including rights for minorities and women—and participate in the democratic process” For their part, “the Taliban has demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan… and the release of all Taliban detainees” (DeYoung 2013). Since reconciliation with an organization that is unwilling to compromise is impossible, he

233 There were a number of reasons the reconciliation ultimately failed – the withdrawal of Soviet troops would obviously weaken Najibullah, distrust of a central government so wedded to an outside power, and a safe power base in Pakistan to survive a protracted conflict, indecision within Najibullah’s camp about the extent of the reconciliation. In response, Najibullah once remarked that “The counter-revolution will not be satisfied with partial power today, knowing that tomorrow it can have it all (see Robinson 2011 and Tempest 1987).

234 The Taliban has proved equally reticent to actually come to any kind of compromise. Before political organizations really had a sense of what the Taliban actually was, the organization already had a reputation for turning on their partners that were “insufficiently Islamic” Such as Hizb-e Islami and Hizb-e Wahdat, who they killed during a ‘friendly’ meeting in 1995. After it disarmed terrorists for its allies, it turned on its government ‘friend’ Mullah Najibullah, future members of the Northern Alliance (Alam 2014; Semple 2009, 2013). They also reneged on a pledge with the US to not host terrorists before during their rise (Rubin 2010).

initiated a surge of 30,000 troops designed to bring the Taliban to the bargaining table from a position of weakness.

**Conclusion**

The Taliban presents an excellent example of ideal-typical organizational behavior. Its singular purpose has been and remains the establishment of a religiously-based society in the region of Afghanistan. This is clear from the fragmented statements early in their rise, as well as the “night-letters” released during the latter part of the Afghanistan War. A Luhmannian perspective expects that such an organization would stay “true” to this communicative program, and the Taliban has remained consistent in this regard.

The Taliban is an outgrowth of Islamic Salafism which achieved brief hegemony over a portion of Afghanistan. Although their origins are in Pashtun-dominated lands of Pakistan and northern Afghanistan, the characteristics of their organizations were purely religious – perhaps disastrously so. Compromise likely could have won the organization the support of the wider population in war-torn Afghanistan. Years of constant fighting rendered the population eager to accept anyone who might bring order to the chaos, yet the Taliban chose to pursue a society governed in all regards by the particularities of the Taliban Muslim faith. Their extreme impositions were matched by an equal ambivalence toward actual governance. Ultimately, it was this lack of capability that precipitated its fall to the overwhelming power of the United States and its political allies in the West and those in the Northern Alliance. Despite Mullah Omar’s claim to the leadership of the ummah, they were unable to ever truly evict the mujahedeen from the region, and were even forced to lend tacit approval of bin Laden’s actions by hosting them, with disastrous results.
The Taliban has also demonstrated an unwillingness to compromise, even in the face of overwhelming rejection by other systems. Although the Taliban had initially had state backers, these were few and did not last past the events of September 11th. They could have given up Osama bin Laden, admittedly with some difficulty, but nevertheless they stalled for time instead of surrendering him.

The defeat of the Taliban – and I would consider it defeated given it has yet to reclaim its perch atop the region – is due to its lack of capability. The Taliban did not express much willingness to govern, choosing instead to rely on the divine to supply their organizational needs. Their policy of de-differentiation also denuded their region of support for their organization. As a result, they were left extraordinarily incapable in the face of the Coalition attack. In other words, the Taliban attempted a hegemonic strategy without the capacity to sustain it. This is not the case with the Islamic State.

The rise and fall of this organization thus follows the trajectory expected of such organizations by Luhmannian realist constructivism. The rise of the Taliban followed closely on the defeat of a maximal political system by religious actors – both those imposed by the USSR the Najibullah regime that followed them. These religious organizations, which were not particularly friendly with each other in the best of times, then brutally competed for control of the region. In this regard, the Taliban were at the fore with their adoption of a maximalist position, which eventually provoked a counter by the scion of the political system – the United States.

4.6 The Historical and Modern Catholic Church
The final case is a familiar one to IR scholars. It is the mythological beast slain by the Westphalian state, the past defeated by the triumphant present of the nation-state. The historical
Catholic Church achieved religious hegemony over much of Europe. It was never complete nor was it doctrinally uniform – the technological limitations of the time made distance a significant impediment to successful reproduction of communication, yet it remains an instructive case and a useful when thinking about the different strategies taken to achieve communicative hegemony.

What I find most useful about this organization is that it depicts what happens after an organization, defeated in its bid for hegemony, still maintains such ambitions even as it works with the organizations of other systems. The idea of a communicative hegemony suggests compromise is not possible – and to be clear the Catholic Church remains interested in achieving religious. -- Yet the modern Catholic Church demonstrates how such ambition works within a politically-dominated, Westphalian space. It is still fighting to achieve its goals; it simply is doing so in an environment dominated by another system.

This case study is a bit different in format from the other two. Quite a number of pages could have been devoted to this section, but due to lack of space constraints the full story can only be hinted at. Instead, it briefly details the rise and the fall of the Catholic Church in terms of modern systems theory. The program and history are interwoven instead of separated.

4.6.1 The Historical Evolution of the Catholic Church

The hegemony imposed by the medieval church was not an inevitability in medieval Europe, but a particular communicative strategy developed in the middle of the period. The rise of the corporate-sovereign Church occurred on the heels of the “Gregorian revolution” and the

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236 In the 11th century, Pope Gregory VII championed the independence of the church from imperial control, asserting the spiritual responsibility of the clergy to pursue an ideal of Christian unity and justice that encompassed the European continent. At the same time, this independence established the papacy—the largest single landholder in Europe—as a distinct economic and military power. Structurally, the moral and political ambitions of the papacy imposed new antagonisms: between empire and church, reform-minded clergy and heretics, and Christians and those who resisted evangelization. New cultural institutions (the call to penance and devotional
development of the Church as an “autonomous unit” with an independent capacity to make war that is “just,” “holy” and “penitential” (see Cantor 1993: 243-276). The medieval organization of the Church was similar to that of the Islamic State. The doctrine of postestas absoluta placed the Pope at the pinnacle of the Catholic Church as judge, administrator and pastor within and over the Church. This corporate-sovereign Church, armed with the Augustine mission to “communicate God’s will and love to humanity,” did so through expansion and evangelization of near and abroad. Extending the bounds of Christendom its very raison d’être,” and it recognized no superior authority. The result were the Crusades and several centuries of unprecedented expansion by a single religious organization. It is difficult to overstate the significance of this time period for the international environment. The “crusades” were:

[A] distinctive and unprecedented feature of the geopolitical relations of the later Middle Ages. They were defining in that they ‘dominated the thoughts and feelings of western Europeans between 1095 and 1500’ Conducted on a vast scale, they touched the lives of people from every corner of Latin Christendom… They influenced the culture and politics of Latin Christendom, shaped its frontiers and powerfully conditioned its relations with the pagan, Muslim, and Byzantine worlds… They were… a near-ubiquitous element of life in medieval Catholic Europe… These ecclesiastical wars were also understood by contemporaries to be both distinctive – i.e., qualitatively different from the other wars of the era – and unprecedented. They were seen as distinctive in two ways: unlike other forms of organized violence, they were sanctified wars, authorized by the pope on Christ’s behalf; and they were penitential wars, involving a spiritual reward –

\[237\] Plena potestas was delegated power on behalf of laity for pope to act on their behalf. He was limited by the status ecclasiae, the bishops, and cathedral chapters with juridical authority. “pulling all these threads together, we have the constitutive ideal of the corporate-soveriegn Church:
the ‘remission of sin’ – not granted for service in any other form of war. They were seen as unprecedented in that, previously, popes had neither authorized wars nor offered spiritual rewards to those fighting in them. In fact, quite the opposite: prior to… the crusades, only temporal powers were viewed as having the authority to wage war; and killing involved therein was seen as inherently sinful (and therefore requiring atonement) – not something to be encouraged or rewarded by the Church… the crusade was thus understood…[as] a form of organized violence ‘of its own kind’.” (Latham 2012:130)

The late eleventh and twelfth century saw the Church become the central war-making power in the world. The Islamic State or the Taliban could only hope to achieve such a status.

During the twilights of its power in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Church remained a powerful organizational force in Europe. Charles V, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, swore allegiance to the Pope as the commander of his armies. The Church was widely responsible for education, raised revenue, administered poor relief, and monitored the allegiance of its members. It also determine essential calendars, sponsored expansion into the New World, and even decided disputes between states. As John Agnew (2010:41), notes, “dividing up the world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence in the late 1400’s and the Gregorian reform of the calendar in 1582 were designed to claim global cultural hegemony, not start a negotiation.” The Church held one-third of the land within the Holy Roman Empire and one-fourth its urban property (Philpott 2000:210). Rather than slowly sliding into irrelevance, the Church assumed a superior position to all other political and religious organizations of the time even late in the Renaissance.

Its superior position relative to the political system is evidenced by the consistent use of the religious authority against political and religious upstarts even as late as the 16th century. For
example, in 1538 Pope Paul III excommunicated Henry VIII of England for divorcing Catherine of Aragon and establishing the Church of England. Elizabeth I was excommunicated by Pope Pius V in defense of Mary Queen of Scots’ claim to the throne. Pope Sextus V excommunicated Henry of Navarre in 1585 to dissuade the Protestant prince from ascending to the French throne. In 1606 and 1607 Pope Paul V issued two breves condemning King James I for forcing his Catholic subjects to take Oath of Allegiance to his throne and issued an interdict against Venice for seizing church property and prosecuting Church personnel in its courts.

At the heart of this hierarchy was the claim by Catholic theologians during this period that the Pope had the right to depose heretical princes and the subjects of those rulers had the right to overthrow their monarch. One of the most important scholars was made by Cardinal Bellarmine (1542-1621), an Italian Jesuit Cardinal, scholar at the Collegio Romano (1576-1587) and leading theologian of the Counter-Reformation (Havencroft 2012:124-129). Addressing John Calvin’s claim that the Pope has no authority over secular princes, Bellarmine argued that it is true that the Pope rules no political unit directly, nor does he have direct temporal power.

Yet by reason of the spiritual he has a certain indirect power… [and] although this kingdom properly was spiritual, and through faith we belong to it… it cannot be denied that also it extends itself to temporal matters, so far as they are ordered to spiritual matters, as all theologians say (Bellarmine 1951: 56, 65).

Since the Pope’s power is absolute on matters of divine law, where divine law conflicts with temporal law, the Pope has the superior claim, such that, “the spiritual power can and ought to coerce the temporal with every reason and means which will seem necessary for this purpose”

238 [all quoted in Havercroft 2012: 124-129] In the first volume of the third installment of a collection of his lectures, entitled Controversiae Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos We know that Bellarmine matters because it is to he that James I and Thomas Hobbes refer to in their writings as the principal foil for their own arguments for secular superiority.
(Bellarmine 1951:88). Specifically, he has the right to prevent the laws of those secular authorities from harming the eternal souls of his subjects. It is on this basis, Bellarmine argued, that the Pope can depose princes and transfer their ruler-ship to another, as well as declare the laws formulated by those wayward princes as invalid. He writes that the Pope will not suffer his Christian subject suffer an “infidel.” “If he should attempt to draw away the faithful to his own heresy or infidelity, “Bellarmine writes, “it is the Pope’s duty to judge whether the King is drawing them away to heresy, or not, for to him is entrusted the responsibility for religion; therefore the Pope’s duty is to judge that the King should be deposed, or should not be deposed” (Bellarmine 1951:92). If the Pope makes such a determination, it would on that basis be proper and even required that those faithful who reside in those territories make this deposition possible through warfare and other means of coercion.

So why did the Catholic Church lose their grip on control of society? The argument levied by Daniel Philpott (2000, 2001), which echoes the argument of this chapter, is that it failed in the face of the challenges levied by both Protestantism and secular states in reaction to their hegemonic communicative project. To quote Anthony Kenny (2009), the Catholic Church prompted an alliance against themselves by “creating their own armies and excommunicating their enemies” (Kenny 2009:7). Specifically, they united Protestants and secular states against their forces through their hegemonic communicative program.

As Stephen Krasner and others have pointed out, Westphalia was not a radical break with the past so much as it was the culmination of a long trend in the assertion of sovereignty by political units (Krasner 1999:20; Tscechk 2003:3; see also Havercroft 2012). While the Swiss Confederation and United Provinces gained their independence as a result of Westphalia, by the early 16th century the monarchies in Britain, France, and Sweden had already established their
own state churches and moved towards a strong position vis-à-vis other territorial entities. The wars that culminated in Westphalia were in part of a long trend of political usurpation of the religious prerogative (Thompson 1909). In this respect, no state is more emblematic of the burgeoning realpolitik than the political agenda of Cardinal Richelieu of France who dedicated his foreign to the establishment a sovereign state system independent of any religious overtones despite the predominantly Catholic affinities of the population.

It was not simply material changes in favor of the political state -- shifts in economic and organizational structure, in trade class societal coalitions, wealth, technology, military might, the institution of domestic coercion, and the international balance of power – that led to the demise of Catholic hegemony, but the sudden rise of Protestantism in the 16th century (Philpott 2000:242). Following Luther, the Protestant program rejected the unification of the Church under a single human authority in favor of a doctrinally uniform aggregation of independent churches (Luther 1957; Philpott 2000:222). Devoid of the legitimation on the basis of religious authority, the claim of the Holy Roman Empire was greatly diminished and on this basis, political units throughout Europe rejected the HRE’s authority with martial vigor. Without the ideas of the Reformation sweeping across Europe, the Catholic religious program would have remained the dominant one and the Holy Roman Empire’s universal claim would have not been subject to widespread challenge (Philpott 2000:206).

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239 It is important to note, however, that it was not until well after Westphalia did you see the bureaucratic-military absolutism in France and Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussian of Frederick the Great. France, the quintessential state, did not achieve the ability to tax the nobles to pursue hegemonic war until the reign of Louis XIV

240 In France the Huguenots and the catholics fought a series of civil wars in the late 16th century, culminating in the Edict of Nantes under Henry of Naverre Henry IV which established zones of toleration. Catholic monarchs, between 1610-1624 when not preoccupied with Huguenot foment, would support the HRE.

241 This was formalized by Luther’s “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments” in which the two spheres existence – the spiritual and the temporal – should be governed separately. See Cameron (fn 51), 14555.
The Catholic Church of course condemned and rejected Luther at the Diet of Worms of 1521, and a decade later Charles V and the Catholic states fought the Schmalkaldic League in 1530’s. Thus began a series of wars where lines were drawn primarily along confessional ties (Philpott 2000: 233). The 1555 Peace of Augsburg which followed the first decade and a half of fighting allowed German princes to enforce their own faith within their territory according to the formula *cuius region, eius religio* (whose the region, his the religion), but its failure to address the religious demands of the Lutherans and Calvinists, or resolve the absolutist claims of the HRE or the Catholic Church led to the Thirty Years’ War (Holborn 1959:243-246). The Westphalian peace had the princes agree to allow a selected proportion of their population of catholic, Lutheran and catholic and refrain from attempting to convert or impose their religion on those subjects and religious disputes were settled by arbitration (see Osiander 2001:40, fn 13).

A complete history of the Thirty Years’ War obviously defies the simplistic summary of a few paragraphs, but the important point to note is that the conflict – especially early on – can plausibly be interpreted as an inter-religious programmatic conflagration even if it eventually spun out into an inter-systemic war as political states grew in power and pursued secular ambitions. However in broad strokes the war follows programmatic lines.

Without the capacity to protect themselves, Protestant churches and organizations turned to the Protestant political rulers to enforce their religious claims, but it was religious motivations behind much of the state action. (Philpott 2000: 223). As Philpott points out, “Sovereignty statehood was the carapace that would staunch the Counter-Reformation” (Philpott 2000: 223) Where the political rulers were resistant to the Protestant program, they faced rural proletariat rebellions (which were put down in 1520) and middle class/merchant class coups that in some
cases even resulted in armed resistance until they complied.\textsuperscript{242} And this conversion process, whether it was “from above” or “from below,” always began with the religion organizations themselves as Protestant churches were the source of the ideas behind the revolution (Philpott 2000: 228). Moreover, it was an intolerant, religious program that the political rulers installed. As Philpott (2000:231) notes, “where princes made Protestantism official, they generally also made it uniform, requiring worship in a single church, outlawing dissent, and making Protestantism constitutive of their order’s legitimacy.” This was seen primarily in Germany (including Saxony) and those states such as Sweden where Protestantism (Calvinism or Lutheranism) was imposed from above.\textsuperscript{243}

The Catholic Church, of course, did not accept this course of events. In response to Westphalia, Pope Innocent X famously issued the Bull, \textit{Zel Domus}, called the treaties “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time” -- a set of treaties that included a clause pointedly acknowledging and rejecting his objection (Maland 1966). The pope also banned the writings of Hugo Grotius, the intellectual godfather of Westphalia. Nevertheless, the events of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century effectively destroyed the Catholic Church’s communicative hegemony.

The following century was a low-point for the Church. The Josephinist reforms in the Holy Roman Empire, the decline of congregations and monastic orders, infighting among Jesuits, Jansenists, and the triumph the Enlightenment relegated the Catholic Church to a minor player in European affairs. In 1773, the Bourbon monarchs forced the suppression of the Jesuits, the intellectual voice of papal superiority, in Rome and elsewhere. The 1786 Synod of Pistoia challenged papal authority. The French Revolution unleashed a tide of anti-clerical and anti-

\textsuperscript{242} Cameron (fn 51), 199-318).
\textsuperscript{243} Barraclough (fn 10), 374).
Catholic that led to the death of 3,000 clergy and the exiles of over 30,000 more (Blackbourn 1991: 77). By the mid-19th century, most Catholic land and property had been seized – even in Catholic Spain, where 83% of clergy property was sold between 1836 and 1845 (Gibson 1989: 104).

Despite these losses, the Catholic Church did not fundamentally change, but it had to retrench its organizational capacity (Gibson 1989:78-80). It retreated to territories where there remained loyal population, mostly in areas that had been recaptured by Catholic princes and in the Catholic colonies in Latin America. It strengthened Papal hierarchy (Blackbourn 1991: 780).

Pope Gregory XVI’s encyclical of 1832, the proclamation of infallibility in 1870, the codification of canon law, the reintroduction of Peter’s Pence in the 1860’s to Papal finances, and the increase in the number of papal summons and feasts underscored the central role of the Papacy in the organization (Pope Gregory 1832). Acceptance of this organizational feature was mandatory. George Tyrrell, the modernist priest, once complained that “the tendency of modern Catholicism is to salvation neither by faith nor works but by machinery” (Perry and Echeverria 1988:62, 153).

Its centralization was partnered with greater inclusivity at local levels. The Church followed the “tridentine model” of growing professionalism which expanded the range of institutional inclusion of the clergy to the lower and middle classes in rural areas. The number of

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244 “Indifferentism” is the belief, in the Pope’s words, “that it is possible to obtain the eternal salvation of the soul by the profession of any kind of religion, as long as morality is maintained.”

245 Organizationally speaking, the Catholic Church is similar to the state. The doctrine of Papal infallibility, first enunciated in 1870 after the First Vatican Council, finds its analogy in the final authority of the state. To this point Carl Schmitt writes, “The law cannot be mediated without an undisputed state power, whose essence consists precisely in the realization of law, just as the Church cannot make truth visible without having a personal head, without being represented, in its unity, by a representative person, the Pope, whose decision must be recognized as indisputable and infallible.” Alexandre F. de Sà, “The Event of Order in Carl Schmitt’s Thought and the Weight of Circumstances’,Telos 147 (2009) p. 18. Schmitt’s argument about the Church as the model for the state dates from 1917. Many of his writings on the Church are collected and translated into English in Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form (Westport CT: Greenwood Press 1996).
parishioners exploded in the late 19th century with women comprising 3/5 of both the congregation and the lay clergy (Blackbourn 1991: 781).

Its role in the political was a collaborative rather than dominate one. The church in France, Spain, and Italy did their best to undermine fledgling democracy in the early 20th century, preferring to work with a political regime that suppressed those it considered its enemies and defended it from the dangers of pluralism (Lannon 1987:119). Although it never gave up its claim to universality it, operated primarily as a “Gramscian hegemon” working through shame and guilt instead of as the medieval Hobbesian Leviathan it once was (Agnew 2010: 42).

Today of course the Catholic Church is a much more limited organization, although its modern ambitions remain consistent with its prior position. For example, the Church under Ratzinger refused to acknowledge the “very appellation ‘church’ to many other Christian denominations… dogma thus rules and makes meaningful exchange with other religious views all but impossible (Agnew 2010: 49-50). 246 The view of Catholic universalism trumping the particular temporal authority of Europe was present even in Pope Benedict’s theological understanding of European history and its opposition to Turkey’s membership in the EU (Ratzinger and Pera 2006).

It has also sought to remain influential by interjecting itself into the political sphere, albeit in largely political terms. The Church’s official political status greatly increased under John Paul II’s administration, rising from 85 states in 1978 to over 174 by the time of his death. UN resolution 58/314 gives the Holy See has all rights except the right to “vote or put forward

246 This statement draws explicitly from a document written by Benedict when, as Cardinal Ratzinger, he was head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 2000. That document, Dominus Iesus, riled Protestant and many other denominations at the time because it said they did not have the “means of salvation.” In “clarifications” issued along with the 2007 statement, Benedict’s reason for issuing it was said to be that many theological interpretations of the Second Vatican Council had been “erroneous or ambiguous” thus prompting confusion and doubt about the one true Church. This language about clarifying the “ambiguity” of the Second Vatican Council was used in many news reports about the papal statement on 11 July 2007.
candidates,” but it is otherwise a full participant in the General Assembly – a status afforded to no other entity of its kind.\textsuperscript{247} It is also member of various UN subsidiary bodies, party to numerous treaties, observer at numerous specialized agencies of the UN, and is a financial contributor to the UN. This is both evidence of its acknowledged importance by the political system, but also a stark reminder of how far it has fallen.\textsuperscript{248}

Nevertheless, even in its diplomatic efforts it asserts a universalist perspective. What is now called the Holy See uses the UN to achieve its globalist goals by exploiting the commonality between the UN’s mission to “promote peace and justice” to promote what the “universal mission and apostolate” of the Catholic Church -- what Chung and Troy call “Catholic Christian idealism” (Chung and Troy 2011: 336, 338, 353).\textsuperscript{249} The Catholic Church also insists that states only have authority insofar as they are linked to the moral authority of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s apparent diplomatic successes are claimed to have been the result of the “spiritual authority” of the Pope, who has an even larger impact on his religious citizens through the “fungible discourse” of its “temporal government” (Chung and Troy 2011: 338).\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{247} United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 58/314’.

\textsuperscript{248} some of its agenda is achieved through private aid work. For example, Catholic NGOs such as Caritas Internationalis, which has 440,000 paid staff and 625,000 volunteers and a total asset value of $5.5 billion. This organization engages in peace training, racial outreach, peace activity outreach at the UN headquarters, holds dialogue between violent factions in Mindanao, Croatia, and East Timor.

\textsuperscript{249} Christ is the Light of nations. Because this is so, this Sacred Synod gathered together in the Holy Spirit eagerly desires, by proclaiming the Gospel to every creature, to bring the light of Christ to all men, a light brightly visible on the countenance of the Church. Since the Church is in Christ like a sacrament or as a sign and instrument both of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race, it desires now to unfold more fully to the faithful of the Church and to the whole world its own inner nature and universal mission. This it intends to do following faithfully the teaching of previous councils. The present-day conditions of the world add greater urgency to this work of the Church so that all men, joined more closely today by various social, technical and cultural ties, might also attain fuller unity in Christ. (The “Dogmatic Constitution of the Church” a central document of the 2nd Vatican Council (1962-1965))

\textsuperscript{250} Pope John Paul II has argued that there is a, “moral logic …built into human life and which makes possible dialogue between individuals and peoples…[a] universal moral law written on the human heart” (Pope John Paul II 1995 UN General Assembly Address). War and suffering is not the result of inefficient international institutions or a failure to balance a concentration of power, but in the evilness of men, the root of which, “lies in free and
Examples of its success, such as its work on women’s rights, are not as bountiful as they once were. Nevertheless they are examples of independent action. At several conferences in the mid 1990’s, the church famously took a stand against what it saw as an anti-Biblical agenda, famously allying with Iran, Libya – to which it reportedly offered support in the ongoing Lockerbie bombing issue -- and conservative Latin American governments at 1994 Cairo’s opposing women’s’ right to an abortion. According to Neale (1998:109-110), John Paul II applied convened a meeting of LA ambassadors to apply pressure. They also have substantial influence with LA political parties, including those in Brazil and Chile (Macaulay 2005).

It has also been a significant force in democratization movements, if only to provide itself space to operate (Hehir 2005:97-101). Huntington (1991: 76-85) observed that the Third Wave of democratization consisted primarily of states dominated by Catholicism – roughly three-fourths of the countries between 1974 and 1990. Philpott (2004) argues that it was in response to an initiative by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) which adopted what Philpott called a “doctrinal embrace of differentiation” that established an official church position on democracy, economic policy, and human rights (Philpott 2007: 510).

Where there was some degree of differentiation already, such as in Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, the church pushed for autonomy for their own self-governance and practice. In South Korea, the Catholic Church cooperated with the Protestant churches in defying the Park Chung

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responsible persons who have to be converted by the grace of Jesus Christ in order to live and act as new creatures in the love of neighbour and in the effective search for justice, selfcontrol, and the exercise of virtue” (Pope Benedict XVI, Let God’s Light Shine for the Spiritual Vision of Pope Benedict XVI, edited with an intro by Robert Moynihan (New York: Doubleday, 2005 quoted in Chong and Troy 2011: 50-51).

251. From the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth century, though, circles of Catholic intellectuals and Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America came to embrace what they saw as a friendlier liberalism that envisioned Catholicism to be neither established nor suppressed and that proclaimed religious freedom. In taking this position at the Second Vatican Council, the Church in fact preserved its censure of absolute state sovereignty, rendering the state’s legitimacy as real but relative to a larger moral order to which the Church would now demand conformity from its differentiated position (Hehir 2005, 97–101).
Hee regime (Yun-Shik 1998). The same is true in Chile (through the Vicariate of Solidarity), Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia, and Guatemala by 1980’s. It then fought to differentiate itself where it was integrated into the political establishment – Spain, Portugal, and in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{252} Whether or not a church would support or oppose dictatorships also depended upon their competition with other religious organizations. Where protestant churches competed for the poor, Catholic churches opposed the authoritarian regime (Gill 1998: 47-78).

Conclusion

Fundamentally speaking, the Catholic Church is the same organization with the same drive to achieve goals in line with their programmatic vision. The hegemonic impulse at the heart of its organization is only mitigated by lack of organizational capacity to see it carried out. The Catholic Church still sees the Pope as the central authority, still sees its interpretation of transcendent as the only “true” path, and as such sees all other logics as invalid. Its strategy shifted from outright domination to working within the structures created by the political system, but its overall program remains intact.

4.7 Chapter Conclusion

The origin of conflict in world society can be sourced to the contingency inherent in the communicative process of reproduction and the organizations that work to reduce that contingency. Conflict arises when one organization’s members reject another’s attempts to define some portion of the social world according to a particular distinction, and neither deviates from this stance. The potential for conflict is heightened if the organizations are able and willing to use force, promote an intolerant programmatic content, and aspire to achieve universal membership for their organization. At its most extreme, an organizational program can seek

\textsuperscript{252}However, not all churches were able to separate from their regimes. The Czech and Hungarian churches were coopted and suppressed or continued to enjoy their privileged status in Argentina and Uruguay.
complete communicative hegemony, whereby it seeks to impose a knowledge hierarchy that destroys functional differentiation. Organizations couple the universality inherent in systemic communication with a restricted interpretation of that communication, producing the potential for a kind of "communicative fundamentalism" that lends itself to a hegemonic communication strategy. This is the link between communication systems, which have at best only process-based agency, and traceable action within the social world.

Although organizations are the actors, the boundaries of the conflict are structured by the meaning produced by communication systems. Consequently, conflict between competing organizations is expected to appear both within a single communication system and between at least two communication systems. Within-system conflicts can occur when two (or more) organizations within a single functional system of communication advance programs with different interpretations of a communicative system’s distinction. Between-system conflict can arise when organizations seek to impose their distinction on a communicative space that is either unclaimed but contested or already defined by another distinction.

This conflict in a large part defines the role of the Islamic State, the Catholic Church and that of all other religious organizations because conflict defines world society. The blind reproductive process of communication systems entails an eternal series of exclusions which results in a functionally differentiated world. The religious system participates in the construction of this world via its attempt to declare through organizations that the world exists only as one side of a reality given meaning through programmatic transcendence. But it is no more entitled to such an interpretation than any other organization of any other system.

Two consequences follow from this dynamic. Some communication systems will outcompete other systems for control over communicative space. Relatedly, some organizations
of threatened communication systems will push back against this success. Both the success and push-back is likely to be heightened and intensified by organizational attempts at communicative hegemony.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate what the ideal-type organizational behavior and communicative conflict looks like in the real world. Once again I should note that this project is decidedly not engaged in a positivist enterprise. “Proving” the empirical generalizability of an ideal type is a misuse of the form. Instead, it serves a form against which reality is measured. It just so happens that there are a number of entities out there that fit the bill rather exactly, and so the ideal type moves from being a mere abstraction to something that can be observed. And as these historical studies bear out, these organizations have pursued a program that favored communicative hegemony.

The Islamic State, as has been mentioned several times, is the closet to a fit to the kind of conflict-generating behavior expected by modern systems theory. It has pursued a consistent program of communicative hegemony since its inception. It has been intolerant towards other religious organizations and entirely hostile to all other systemic communication except its own. Its success has largely been due to an increase in its capability and organizational strategy for inclusion. Because their goals are not sourced in some reaction to liberalism or some other mere anti-Western sentiment, the only impediment to their achievement is the balancing behavior by other organizations, an outcome that is ongoing.

The Taliban presents a more nuanced example of organizational behavior. Like the Islamic State, it pursued a program that sought to impose a communicative hegemony within the

\[253\] Moreover, it also bears repeating that organizations such as the Taliban or ISIS do not necessarily consciously pursue a goal of “communicative hegemony.” Because the theory is structural in nature, it only requires that units behave as if they were animated by this logic. In fact, it would be odd if they used this language since it is, technically speaking, third-order observation...
territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its history was marked by hostility to other religious groups, including other Islamic groups that stood in the way of the Taliban’s program of religious governance. Unlike the Islamic State, the Taliban never modified their inclusion/exclusion membership parameters despite claiming to be the religious authority within Islam. It also never significantly increased its capability or modified its organizational strategy to improve its governance. As a result, it has been far less successful at winning over converts than has the Islamic State.

Lastly, the Catholic Church presents an interesting historical example of how organizational strategies can change over time. The medieval Catholic Church imposed its communicative hegemony following the programmatic shift that followed the Gregorian revolution. Its defeat at the hands of rival religious and political organizations forced the Church to reassess its pattern of communicative hegemony. While its program maintains its hegemonic outlook, it has been forced due to lack of capacity to work in partnership or subtle opposition to political organizations. Where there are friendly political organizations they ally with them in order to promote their communication over others; where the political organization opposes them, they try to promote the least restrictive political program possible (democracy).

In all three cases, we see the generation of within-system and between system conflict come as a result of the programs pursued by these three organizations. The “balancing” mechanic discussed in chapter three is readily observable. This chapter has chosen for sake of brevity to focus on the reaction of political, religious and family (Iraqi tribal arrangements) organizations, but future research and with more space this account could easily be expanded to include other could easily include others.
Chapter Five: The Role of the United States in World Society

The subtitle of this dissertation is “the role of the United States in World Society.” Without knowing the specific meaning of the term “world society,” the reader could confidently assume that this project was going to be another in the long line of books addressing the special or unique place that particular country has in a “world order” of some sort or another. The usual scholarly debate centers on US power and the degree to which the United States has established and can maintain its “hegemony” through some combination of military strength, economic interest, and persuasion (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry 2011; see also this expansive footnote below).254 This chapter is not going to make this sort of argument. While it might be true that the United States has constructed a liberal world order and is perhaps unique among all political entities in that respect, it is not the only way to conceptualize the US role. The placement of this chapter at the end of this project was a deliberate choice to emphasize how unspecial the United States is when compared to other organizations. Like all other organizations, it creates a program organized around the single distinction of its communication system, which in the case of the United States, is the political system. This

program, which I define very broadly as “democratic,” has been a consistent hallmark of this political organization since its inception.

Two caveats should be noted here on this point. From a methodological perspective, this chapter serves as “another example of X” in keeping with its analyticist ontological mooring. Just as ISIS’s religious program has inspired within and between-system conflict, so too has the American democracy promotion.255 Relatedly, the purpose of this chapter is not to provide an empirical history of American foreign policy. Quite a number of simplifying assumptions have been deployed to illustrate the role of the United States as a political organization, including the idea that the US government should be seen as a single organization with a single purpose (see Waltz 1979:7).256 Specifically, the argument is that it generates within-system conflict with organizations promoting monarchist, fascist, and communist political programs. It has also generated between-system conflict itself and religious organizations as part of its War on Terror. Obviously the United States has done more just these things over the course of its history. Nevertheless, I believe something useful can be gained through the abstraction and application of the ideal-type.

This chapter resembles the previous one in terms of overall structure. The next section will discuss how I define the political system and political organization. It will the move to a

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255 There is a tendency to want to point to the American support of dictators as evidence it has betrayed its programmatic core. The only time the United States has ever supported a true programmatic competitor was during WWII. In that conflict, as a staunch ally of the Soviet Union, the United States supplied it with obsolete tanks and watched as their two principle programmatic adversaries bled themselves dry.

256 As Kenneth Waltz points out, “In another sense a model pictures reality while simplifying it, say, through omission or reduction of scale. If such a model departs too far from reality, it becomes useless. A model airplane should look like a real airplane. Explanatory power, however, is gained by moving away from ‘reality,’ not staying close to it. A full description would be of least explanatory power; an elegant theory, of most. Department from reality is not necessarily good, but unless one can do so in some clever way one can only describe and not explain. … Theory explains some part of reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it explains. If the distinction is preserved, it becomes obvious that induction from observables cannot in itself yield a theory that explains the observed” (Waltz 1979: 7).
brief discussion of the democratic program, following by a selected historical account demonstrating how the application of this program wrought both within-system and between-system conflict.

5.1 Defining the political system
Although the political system is a familiar field of study for political scientists, Luhmann uses a distinct vocabulary in reference to the political that varies slightly from the typical parlance of political scientists and thus might be unfamiliar.

The political system is organized around a single core distinction - government (superior) and governed/opposition (inferior) (Luhmann 2000:125; 1990: 167-86). Government (or superior) refers to those who can legitimately create knowledge through collective decision-making on behalf of human society; opposition/governed (inferior) refers to those unable to or prevented from legitimately creating knowledge on behalf of human society through collective decision-making. The overall function of the political communication system is thus the application of collectively-binding decisions (creation of collectively-derived social knowledge) about the human social world (Luhmann 1982: chp 3).\(^{257}\) The creation/decision-making is packaged into its symbolic media, power. As a symbolic media, power encourages acceptance of political communication by signaling that a collective decision is legitimate and that failure to accept it might result in sanction. It is important to note that “legitimacy” in this context is self-referential, and “can be claimed for any content so long as the political system can explain its

\(^{257}\)Just as there is no such thing as a definitive “religious” issue, anything can be made political. This is especially the case with issues that do not appear to be adequately addressed by other systems – which again is nearly all of them because the political system defines the entire world in terms of itself. A natural disaster such as a hurricane does not respond to the presentation of collectively binding decisions, but politicians often refer to “emergency management teams” to assuage public anxiety over this uncertainty. Economic disasters such as recessions do not bend to political will, yet the development of a welfare state provides the appearance that the risk can be processed through collective action. Scientific “truth” and artful “beauty” are not created through collective decision making, yet the state promotes the arts and sciences in order to appear active in these areas. At best, the political system can indicate that, politically speaking, a decision has been made to apply power to a particular problem
operations in a satisfyingly plausible and consistent manner” (Luhmann 1982: 131; see also Luhmann 1990: 78; Luhmann 2000a: 126).

Relative to other systems, the political system is new, historically emerging as a distinct sphere of communication once collectively-binding societal decisions made on that basis can be distinguished from family, religion, and law (Luhmann 1984: chp 8; 1995b:108; 2000a: 335). That is, the political system comes about once it “defines and conserves itself as a plausible unity of self-referring difference against its environments, and if it consistently maintains this difference” (King and Thornhill 2003: 75). This is not to suggest that societal decision-making is new. However the key difference is that, before the rise of political communication, decision made by ruling hierarchies were frequently justified or premised on other streams of communication, including family (e.g., *paterfamilias*) or religion.\(^{258}\) If a leader were today to appoint government officials on the basis of kinship or declare war due to a favorable interpretation of rabbit entrails, those decisions would likely be regarded as arbitrary – having little connection to the “political” as it is commonly understood. This “common understanding” of the capriciousness of such decisions becomes visible only as governmental decision-making slowly exempts itself from ritual or nobility, culminating in but not directly emanating from Westphalia (Luhmann 1995b: 108; Luhmann 2000a:335).

The tension in this system is centered on the interpretation of legitimacy. Whereas the religious system flourished once it successfully develops the concept of “deity,” the political system flourished once it established the *raison d’etre* embodied in the concept of the sovereign

\(^{258}\) The United States frequently draws comparison to the Roman Empire, however modern observers would be horrified to observe a declaration of war justified on the basis of burying individuals alive in the floor of Congress or the disposition of overly large babies in the Atlantic (Palmer 1997). Likewise, Rome’s expansion did not hinge on nationalism, but due to the need to secure familial success or please the gods (Finley 1973). The classic statement on Roman expansion, particularly in the economic sphere, is Moses Finley’s *The Ancient Economy* which argues that economic expansion was a byproduct of societal status rather than a response to pure rational calculus or a republican *raison d’etre*. 
state. Despite this resolution, legitimacy is not boundless. If the political system through the state attempts to take on too many issues and fails to address them, the spell of legitimacy can be broken. If this occurs, as with other systems, all that remains is coercion with its attendant problem of provoking balancing by other systemic organizations. (Luhmann 2012 [1997a]: 214. The political system is therefore at its most functional when it maintains its legitimacy through carefully crafted policies designed to maximize the appearance of success (Luhmann 2000a: 46). How precisely to maximize this appearance of success is the substantive focus of political organizations and their programs.

5.2 Defining Political Organizations
Treating the state as an organization of the political system—allows “for a concentration on [their] ability to represent the system in its environment as a system and, therefore, the structural ability to participate in communication with other systems” (Schirmer 2007: 127). Like all organizations, states have three related functions within the political communication system— as an address with physical capability, as a mechanism to determine inclusion/exclusion in the system’s communication, and as a creator of political programs (Luhmann 2000a: 186, 239). These functions heighten the possibility that political communication will be accepted.

The first element to the state’s function within the political system is its physical address as a “socio-spatial territoriality that refers to the realm of collectively binding decisions” (Messmer 2008:116-117). This physical address “generates visibilities, social spaces of exclusive affiliation [and] boundaries” (Luhmann 1997a: 776, 789, 2000a: 189ff; Schirmer 2007:140). Each individual state exists as an address for the attribution of collective decisions for that territory (Luhmann 2000a: 194; Schirmer 2008:140). This means that states are most often
held accountable in international politics because they are the most visible addresses of political communication (Schirmer 2008: 138, 141).\textsuperscript{259}

Secondly, states determine who gets to participate in political communication. In this regard, the political system claims universal application -- all people (or at least most) are claimed by a state, whether or not they want one. Conversely, states tend to restrict those who can legitimately govern (Schirmer 2008:140). Combined with its physical address, the state’s claim to universal membership allows it to make decisions that impact peoples’ ability to fully sample the meaning creation inherent in functional differentiation (Schirmer 2008: 137-138).\textsuperscript{260} This gives this role of the state an important role within world society -- the state constantly has “something to do” because it almost always under self-made pressure to act on behalf of its defined collective (Luhmann 2000a: 216). Conversely this ability to act can strain the legitimacy of a state due to overreach.

Thirdly, the tendency of the political system to understand itself in terms territorial units means that no single state represents the “true” face of the political system, and as such remains the collection of states is a “unity of diverse communication,” with each having the capacity to advance their own political program (Schirmer 2008:130). These programs advance a certain conception of legitimacy which posits some scope for what constitutes ‘the political.” Although programs can vary widely, they can be identified through consistency since programs are typically reinforced over time by decisions made by the organizations (Schirmer 2008:136).

\textsuperscript{259} It needs to be reiterated that the state is not even the center of political communication. Rather, it is merely one Self-regulative autopoietic system of power-application” among others (Luhmann 2000: 244). “Parties, independent agencies, social movements – can also be political organizations with equal ability to apply power to a political problem. Consequently, although the role of the state should be taken seriously, we should not reify its role in politics, let alone the entirety of a functionally differentiated society.” (Schirmer 2008:126).

\textsuperscript{260} Mathias Albert (2013:237) argues that the state has a special role as “the place that is potentially able to coordinate different function systems and integrate them into a whole” (Albert et al 2013: 237).
Added to individual programs defining the scope of the political, states also participate in the creation of a sort of “meta-program” of sovereign state-hood itself (cf Luhmann 1997a: 826, 847; 2000a: 41, 226; Albert and Hilkermeier 2004). Sovereign statehood acts as a means to reduce the double-contingency problem among organizations, helping states as organizations make sense of each other’s decisions, statements, and observable actions (Luhmann 1995a:109; Schirmer 2008: 130, 140). Events can be catalogued and attributed more easily if an address and decision-maker is attached to it. This success of the strategy is evident whenever we see that reference to Russian science or the Canadian economy, but this merely creates the appearance of decision-making attribution to their respective national polities (Luhmann 2000a: 216’ Schirmer 2008:130-31). World society cannot itself be reduced to a Westphalian mode of analysis. Far from contradicting the fundamental assertion that the functional systems of communication within world society are the fundamental units of analysis, the Westphalian model is only evidence of the political system’s claim to universalism.  

As with religious organizations, a number of factors can lead to a higher possibility of both within and between-system conflict as a result of this organizational functionality, including physical capability and address (proximity). However, at the root of much this conflict is programmatic differences, particularly regarding the extent or scope of the political. As noted previously, the “safest” way to go about convincing humans of the usefulness of your program is to simply limit access to all other programs. Given the unique capabilities of states, maximalist communicative programs are particularly tempting. In fact, this is precisely what happened during WWII and the Cold War. Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union attempted to bring

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261 Other functional systems do not recognize political demarcation. For example, Russian science cannot be distinguished from American science on a purely scientific basis. The communication of prices is not different depending upon where one lives (although certainly currency and local transaction laws might differ). Religion, art, and family do not have explicitly political characteristics.
all meaning creation under a single political program. This program clashed with those of the United States and its “allies” which had previously Great declared certain communication systems – notably religion and economics -- “out of bounds” for the political system. The United States interpreted both fascism and communism as undifferentiated, totalitarian programs and sought conflict with them on that basis. Of course the US democratic program is no less hegemonic than either of those programs, which is why democratic imposition is not necessarily more acceptable to the organizations of other systems.

The promotion of political programs is also at the heart of a current between-system conflict. The United States, along with the rest of the “civilized world,” -- which is to say, political organizations such as nation-states -- have been threatened since the late 1970’s with domination by religious extremism in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. That is, the religious communication system in areas of “de-differentiation” (areas where religious systems attempt to dominate) come into contact with the political system via its desire to transform things which are not understandable by the political system – and thus deemed “risky” – into identifiable

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262 In accordance with the general theory, if it was not defeated by a political organization, the dominance of the political system would have been resisted by other systemic organizations because it expanded the boundaries of the political beyond what could plausibly be maintained as consistent with previous programs and beyond the limits of the political system to handle the complexity inherent in overcoming the resistance from other communication systems (Luhmann 1990: 222).

263 Scholars of international relations will also recognize this question as an entry point into a discussion of hegemonic transition, particularly the wide-ranging debate over the motivations of “revisionist” powers. The actual motivations vary widely. Revisionist powers have been described as being dissatisfied with the distribution of material benefits (Carr 1946; Gilpin 1981), wanting to gain in power and prestige (Morgenthau 1948), the desire for “self-extension” (Wolfers 1962: 91-2; Schweller 1994; 2011), destroying the current international rule-set (Johnston 2003:11), contesting ordering principles (Chan 2004: 216), rejection of dominant norms and primary institutions (Buzan 2010: 17; Legro 2005: 9). For a recent developments see Buzan 2010; Chan 2004; Hurd 2007; Johnston 2003; Matthews 2012; Mearshemier 2001; Rynning and Ringsmose 2008; Schweller 1994, 2011; Schweller and Pu 2011. This insight can also be applied to the current preoccupation with a rising China. Theories of hegemonic transition predict war between incumbents and rising challengers. Despite the fact that the only example of a successful transition occurred peacefully, the counter-factuals presented by the attempts of “would-be” hegemons – Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – lead many scholars to believe that a war with a rising China is a near inevitability. Looking at the world through the lens of modern systems theory allows us to proffer a prediction on this account. Specifically, it suggests that war is likely so long as China differs markedly in its ideas about the scope of the political.
political objects (see Luhmann 1993: chp 8). The resultant War on Terror has gripped the world in conflict despite the low overall threat posed by these religious organizations.

5.3 The Role of the United States in World Society
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how the same analytical tools that can be used to explain religious organizations like the Islamic State can also be used to explain the generation of conflict by the United States. And more importantly, it demonstrates how the War on Terror and the Cold War are fundamentally part of the same process – conflict structured by communication systems and driver by organizational strategy. In the US case, that program is democratic promotion. This means that all communicative threats are interpreted through this singular lens.

This section will first detail what I mean when I refer to the democratic program (similarly to how the religious programs in the previous chapters were addressed). It will then demonstrate in a broad historical sweep how promotion of this program is at the heart of the conflicts caused by the United States.

5.3.1 Defining the Democratic Program
To paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, the central ambition and grand strategy of US foreign policy has been to “make the world safe for democracies.” It is the singular thread that connects American engagement with the international environment, and its quintessential contribution to world history. “Few other liberal great powers have their identity so clearly defined by their principles,” Michael Doyle claims, and “[these] principles… have translated into a national grand strategy.” (Doyle 2000:21).

So what is “democracy promotion?” Broadly speaking it is defined as an “array of measures aimed at establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country”
Generally associated with the aspirations of Wilsonianism, democratic promotion includes a law-based, multilateral order in international affairs, the establishment and maintenance of an open economic order, the enshrinement of the rights of the individual, and the promotion of national-self-determination. Most importantly, it enshrines the perspective that American security depends upon the expansion of democratic governance. All of these features, either independently or together, can be construed as democracy promotion.

A Luhmannian perspective highlights the tendency for a given organization to attempt to replicate its own program as part of communicative reproduction. Democracy promotion is the American attempt to understand and create the human social world according to a recognizable formula first applied within its territory before being exported abroad (Smith 2001: 615 see also Barnett 2006). Which is to say, the United States is quite literally attempting to pattern world society according to its legitimated program for collective decision-making (Quinn 2009:113).

The existence of what scholars call American hegemony and the liberal order it has created is the result of this programmatic drive. “Democracy is not just a consequence of American primacy, it is also a cause of it” (Owen 2006: 37).

To be clear, the argument of this chapter should not be taken to mean that I believe the United States is exclusively motivated by some pure mission of democratic benevolence. Democratic promotion has also included elements of racism, colonial paternalism, geostrategic calculation, naked economic interests to go along with its messianic purpose ((Ilkenberry 2011; 265)

My use of this term reflects standard usage: “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” and stands in contrast to illiberal democracy which is comprised of elections but none of the individual protections (Zakaria 1997:22).

It had its moment in the wake of WWI, in the same way the both communism and fascism also arose during that timeframe as a means to solve the problems associated with modernization (Smith 2001: 622).

Nevertheless, rhetorically American commitment to democracy does not reflect these negative elements. In a study of the Clinton and Bush presidencies, for example, researchers found that, on average, democracy promotion was justified twenty-five percent of recorded instances on the basis of America’s “special mission or purpose,” twenty-percent on the basis of national security needs, and on the general benefits of democracy eighteen percent (Poppe 2010: 17-23). And while not all administrations have featured democracy promotion strongly, quite often they do (Rose 2006: 187; Smith 1994: 30).

Of course rhetorical commitment or even follow-through does not speak to the efficacy of this program, and in this regard the United States as a political organization is no different from any other. Although it crafted stunning successes in Czechoslovakia, Japan, and Germany, the democratization efforts by the United States in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Philippines were either abject or partial failures. It remains to be seen whether the experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan bear fruit.

Regardless of its failures, David Carothers points out that promoters of democracy have historically been convinced, “that their work is unquestionable value and needs no assessing… democracy aid providers have accumulated almost no systematic knowledge about the long-term effects of their efforts” (Carothers 1999: 285-286). Despite the fact that “democracy aid aid

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267 Regardless of justification, democracy promotion has never been particularly popular. The share of the American public that says democratic promotion is very important has averaged no more than 25%, peaking at 35% during 2002, and reaching its lowest point at 14% in 2012. This is according to data compiled from Chicago Council surveys of American public opinion and US foreign policy, 1975 to 2012, reports available at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Studies_Publications/POS/Prior_Public_Opinion_Surveys.aspx, accessed 6 Dec. 2012.

268 Interestingly, the connection between democracy promotion and market goals is not strong—only 10% in Clinton’s presidency and practically none in Bush’s administration (Poppe 2010: 17-23).

269 There are two groups: “Exemplars” that are way of intervention for the cost and skeptical of the efficacy of democracy promotion; and “Crusaders” that are “optimistic about shaping political development elsewhere and more willing to bear costs in the attempt… and give history a push” (Rose 2006: 187).
generally does not have major effects on the political direction of recipient counties; regardless of whether the effects of democracy programs are usually “modestly positive, sometimes, negligible, and occasionally negative,” American policy makers, armed with a “simplistic model” eventually settle on democracy promotion as their preferred option (Carothers 1999: 88-90, 308, 332). There is an unsinkable, self-confident belief that democracy promotion was and is the only way the United States could relate to the world.

It is this democratic “messianic consciousness” that is oft-present in the rhetoric of presidents and policy makers (Holsti 2008:2-3). Secretary of State Seward expected that it was the American mission “to renovate the condition of mankind, “to lead the way to “the universal restoration of power to the governed” everywhere in the world” (Kagan, 2006: 264). Harry Truman suggested the only way to ensure the defeat of totalitarianism was for the “whole world [to] adopt the American system” (Pagden, 2005: 170). John F Kennedy famously proclaimed: “Let every nation know…that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty” (McCriskin, 2003: 24). Madeline Albright’s Community of Democracies would practice “muscular multilateralism” to promote democracy, and the United States would lead them, for “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall, and we see further into the future” (Madeleine Albright February 18, 1998). Bush’s NSS (2002:22-23) declared that “our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership….so as to bring about order and

\[270\] Failures are particularly evident in the areas of legislative aid efforts (181-182) and rule-of-law efforts (Carothers 1999: 250-251).

\[271\] In The Irony of American History Reinhold Niebuhr wrote that “There is a deep layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America… We were, as a matter of fact, always vague, as the whole liberal culture is fortunately vague, about how power is to be related to the allegedly universal values which we hold in trust for mankind” (Niebuhr 2008 [1952]: 69). “Fortunate vagueness” arose from the fact that “in the liberal version of the dream of managing history, the problem of power is never fully elaborated” (Niebuhr 2008 [1952]” 73).
justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy.” Thus the events of September 11th was another in a series of challenges to the democratic program, but it also provided an opportunity, “to lead in this great mission” (White House 2002:2). The invasion of Iraq was the “Big Bang” event in the Middle East that would transmit the American program throughout the region (Barnett 2005).

In short, the American democratic program has been a corner stone of American interaction with the world (Smith 2012: 202). 272 In fact, it seems to me that the United States government has long operated as if its program was destined to conflict with and ultimately triumph over all others. It was not until American power became unchallenged that the democratic program was allowed to take on its true hegemonic characteristic, at first through negotiation at the end of WWII and then through imposition at the end of the Cold War. Although the truly hegemonic characteristics of the programmatic content took a number of decades to reveal itself to its fullest extent, it was always present.

What now follows is a necessarily brief account of this program through American history. This account sacrifices depth for brevity, and nuance for clarity. It is not meant to be, nor should it be read as a complete history of American foreign policy since the founding. Its singular purpose is to establish the claim that democracy promotion has been at the core of American foreign policy. And it is an easy claim to substantiate – in nearly every presidency there are numerous examples, both through rhetoric and action, of the United States promoting this singular vision. Perhaps in the balance of a single presidency one may find the scales tipped

272 Tony Smith argues that there are three distinct stages, – a classic phase that extends until WWII, a hegemonic phase that broadened and deepened these efforts after WWII, and an imperialist phase in the post-Cold War. Before 1945, he argues, liberal international was premised on rather vague conceptual structures with only a democratic end-point defined (Smith 2012:204-205). “American sponsorship of democracy abroad: it was genuinely innovative politically, but it was not profoundly upsetting socioeconomically” insofar as established elites could adapt without worry of the socioeconomic order being overturned by American interference (Smith 1994:18).
against the promotion of America’s political program, but the weight of history is decisively tipped in, to quote George Bush, “a balance of power that favors freedom.”

5.3.2. The Democratic Program in US Foreign Policy History

Pursuit of a democratic program is evident from the country’s founding. The recently independent Americans considered the geographical distance from Europe an opportunity to pursue their goal “to create a more perfect social and political order” at home and promote its program abroad (Monten 2005: 115). Jefferson considered the United States a “democratic empire” and ‘the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government” that would “[light] up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence” (Tucker and Hendrickson 1990: 135-56). At least some key founders shared these sentiments. John Adams once predicted that, “many hundred years must roll away before we shall be corrupted. Our pure, virtuous, public spirited, federative republic will last forever, govern the globe, and introduce the perfection of man” (Kagan 2006: 156; Kohn 1957: 25-26).

It was getting to that point – a point at which its capability could sustain its programmatic ambition -- that was seen as the key variable by early policy-makers and prompted Washington to advise caution. Once their capability reached a level of competitiveness with that of the Europeans, the United States began to project their “morally superior” political program into the rest of the world to create, in Jefferson’s words, “an empire of liberty” that unite people under a banner of democracy (Kagan 2006: 129; Quinn 2009:59-60). This led to policies that would initially aggressively seek to keep European political programs out of the hemisphere, but would whenever possible promote its own (Hartz 1991 [1955]: 286).
This ambition did not go unnoticed in capitals across the Atlantic. Monarchist Europe grew increasingly hostile to democratic programs through the 19th century. Democratic movements were crushed in France, the German Confederation, and Russia. Even the British suppressed democratic protestors at the Massacre of Peterloo and passed the Six Acts. The “Holy Alliance,” led by Alexander, pledged to roll-back liberal revolutions by force and reestablish the rightful rule of monarchies (Kagan 2006: 160). The antipathy to the American program was widespread. John Q Adams wrote his father, “All the restored governments of Europe are deeply hostile to us… The Royalists everywhere detest and despise us as Republicans…Emperors, kings, princes, priests, all the privileged orders, all the establishments, all the votaries of legitimacy eye us with the most rancorous hatred” (JQ Adams 1816). Fearful of the American political program, many in Europe hoped fervently for its destruction or disintegration. In a letter to James Monroe, James Madison (1823) referred to this movements as, “the great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism.”

The potential domination of the Western Hemisphere by democracy frightened the European monarchists sufficiently that they contemplated full-scale invasion of the Americas. After restoring Ferdinand to the Spanish throne, France, along with Austria and Spain, planned to quell the upstart rebels in Latin America and establish new Bourbon monarchies among the former colonies there. The French would transport the newly reinstalled Spanish king to reestablish his rightful rule in the colonies (Kagan 2006: 162-168).

Americans quickly acknowledged this potential conflict. In his speech to Congress in 1821, JQ Adams presented a future where “for centuries to come… there will be contests between inveterate power, and emerging right.” On one occasion he directly called for democratic revolution in Europe, exhorting “every individual among the sceptered lords of
mankind: “Go thou and do likewise!” (Quoted in Bemis 1980:356-258, 363). Yet in the near term, Adams counseled caution, famously advising against “[going] abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” but instead “recommend the general cause, by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.” His feared the “ineffable splendor of freedom and independence” would be replaced by “an imperial diadem, flashing in false and tarnished lustre [sic] the murky radiance of dominion and power” if the US were to involve itself too early.

Fortunately, Prime Minster George Canning, desiring to keep other European powers out of the Western hemisphere, and perhaps in reaction to the ambition of the Holy Alliance, offered to assist the Americans in sealing off the West (Kagan 2006: 141). James Monroe considered it an opportunity to further the democratic program in the hemisphere by keeping the European monarchists at bay, buying time for liberal republics to flourish, and keeping American expansionist options open.

In his speech to Congress on December 1823, Monroe explained this logic, announcing America’s common cause with other nascent democratic republics and warning the rest of the world that the integrity of America’s republic was its key principle in foreign affairs:273

> It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own… this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations

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273 The liberal revolutions in Greece and Spain, specifically Address to Congress December 1823 Accessed at http://millercenter.org/president/monroe/speeches/speech-3604
existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety… It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.

Rather than building a wall on the basis of mere geography, Monroe built one on the basis of political program, and non-democratic programs were not welcome. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams instructed his ambassadors to the newly appointed Latin American nations to encourage the establishment of republican democracies and such join the United States in the “assertion of their natural rights” against the demanded allegiances of the monarchists (Kagan 2006: 165-167).

The reaction in Europe to the Monroe Doctrine was one of incredulity on the part of the Monarchists, including the French and the British. In a statement to Prime Minister George Canning, French Foreign Minister Francois Chateaubriand wrote to him fully expecting that Britain could not possibly support Monroe’s radical ideas about government, “Mr. Canning can have no more desire than I to favor military uprisings, the sovereignty of the people, and all the pretty things which Mr. Monroe says to us about actual governments”274. The British of course did not desire to see the Americans dominate the Hemisphere, and so it was British policy to discourage the newly independent states of Latin America to follow the American example (Kagan 2006: 170-182). This policy was perhaps borne of some concern. Canning wrote that,

274 May, Making the Monroe Doctrine, 245
“The great danger of the time — a danger which the policy of the European System would have fostered — was a division of the World into European and American, Republican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out Governments, on the one hand, and of youthful and stirring Nations, with the United States at their head, on the other” (quoted in Robertson 1912: 562).

The activities of the American government between the Monroe Doctrine and the Spanish-American War are not well known for their expansionist democratic program, but are instead typically marked by Westward expansion. A Luhmannian perspective highlights that indeed, the democratic program was alive and well, but it was directed toward internal “perfection” – a programmatic conflict between the democratic North and a racially despotic South (Freehling 2007). 275 John Q Adams, in a letter to John Calhoun (before he became a staunch defender of the rights of slave-holding states), considered conflict between the two systems not only inevitable but preferable:

If slavery by the destined sword of the hand of the destroying angel which is to sever the ties of this union, the same sword will cut the bonds of slavery itself. A dissolution of the Union for the cause of slavery would be followed by… a war between the two severed portions of the Union…. And desolating as this course of events must be, so glorious would be its final issues, that, as God shall judge me, I dare not say that it is not to be desired.

275 Kagan (2006: 212) writes, “The South became increasingly despotic, and not only toward slaves and free blacks. Preserving the southern master’s authority over his slaves required control of white behavior too. A nineteenth-century version of mild totalitarianism, not unlike that practiced by the absolutists courts of central and Eastern Europe, eroded southern democracy. Strict limits on the freedom of speech and thought were backed up by threats of violence. In the Deep South discipline was enforced through the selective lynching of whites deemed hostile to the slave regime. [121]. Antislavery agitators, when they were not hanged, were tortured, tarred, and feathered, and driven from Southern towns” see also Freehling 2007, Road to Disunion
Thus, from a certain perspective, it is reasonable to think that Adams believed America had no need to go abroad to find its monsters. Before it could project abroad, it had, to quote Seward, “qualify itself for our mission,” (Kagan 2006: 264).

This political dispute was the central mitigating factor in almost all attempts to promote democracy abroad. For example, American support under John Adams for Toussaint L’Ouverture’s slave revolt in French Haiti was reversed under slave-holding Thomas Jefferson for fears it would provoke a similar uprising in the South (Kagan 2006: 182-185). Daniel Webster’s proposed support for Greeks struggling to free themselves from Ottoman Turkish rule was opposed by southern democrats out of fear that the North would attempt to “square practice with principle” and inflict their liberal program on the South (Kagan 2006: 204). The Southern contingent opposed sending delegates to Panama to attend an inter-American conference, pushed by Monroe and JQ Adams, since the move would require legitimizing former slave colonies (Kagan 2006: 208). Attempts by future President James Buchanan to gut the Monroe Doctrine narrowly avoided passage in 1825. In nearly every historical instance of which I am aware, Southern states opposed the promotion of democracy. Interventionism abroad, it was thought, would inevitably lead to interventionism at home. In this regard, the Southern

276 A fascinating interlude occurred in 1851 when Louis Kossuth, a Hungarian freedom fighter who had been defeated by the Hapsburg Empire in 1848, arrived in America after escaping captivity. The response to Kossuth was nearly entirely based on sectional perspectives. In the North, politicians pledged their support to denouncing the Russians and Hapsburgs. No less than Abraham Lincoln, echoing Wilson’s language seventy years later, declared in 1852 that it was “the right of any people, sufficiently numerous for national independence to throw off.. their existence form of government, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose… to have resisted Russia in that case, or to resist any power in a like case, would be no violation of our own cherished principles of nonintervention, but, on the contrary, would be meritorious.” In the South, the reaction was cautious. If they pledged interference abroad, “we will be the first who will be interfered with,” wrote the New Orleans Bulletin, “the southern people are the last to think of, much less attempt to enforce, doctrines of this character.” Lincoln, The Collected Works of Lincoln, ed. Roy Basler and Christian O Baslet, Vol 9, p 110; Spencer, Louis Kossuth, 100.

277 John C Calhoun, who was originally a proponent of expansionist liberalism abroad, would eventually alter his position to reflect the geopolitical realities facing his home state of South Carolina.
slaveholder and the monarchists of Europe had common cause -- to stamp out liberty among populations whose freedom might jeopardize their political program (Kagan 2006: 187).  

The United States likely could not have offered much material support to either the Greeks or the newly independent colonies in Latin American, and so programmatic conflict in this area was unlikely to spill over into active conflict. The purchase of the Louisiana Territories, however, allowed unimpeded Westward expansion and raised the defining question of the antebellum period – which political program would prevail in the newly settled areas?  

The political furor over the admission of Missouri in 1820 was what Thomas Jefferson called a “fire bell in the night” that revealed for the first time the potential for real dissolution over the admission of new territories. Both political programs required expansion for survival, but owing to quirks of geography, the Southern strategy more fully depended on it. Northerners hoped to surround the South with abolitionist territory, adopting a policy remarkably similar to Kennan’s Soviet policy of containment against the South that promised “unyielding hostility to the spread of [slavery]” (Lincoln 1858). “Keep [slavery] within given limits,” David Wilmot explain, “and in time it will wear itself out. Its existence can only be perpetuated by constant expansion. … Slavery has within itself the seeds of its own destruction” (Wilmot quoted in Foner 1970: 116).

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278 On the destruction of the South, Adolph Hitler remarked, “the beginnings of a great new social order based on the principle of slavery and inequality were destroyed by [the American Civil War], and with them the embryo of a future truly great America”Adolf Hitler 1933 quoted in Harry v Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War (Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littefield, 2000) 73.  
279 Congressman James Tallmadge of New York proposed an amendment banning slavery in the newly created territories.  
281 The Wilmot Proviso, a feeble attempt to prevent further damage to the program of democracy, would have forbidden the expansion of slavery into captured territories through an amendment to the US-American peace treaty, but it was defeated along purely sectional lines.
The potential admission of Texas was the first test of these strategies. Northerners welcomed Texan flirtations with abolitionist Great Britain if it meant keeping southern hands off the territory (Kagan 2006: 218-223). Adams wrote that, “the freedom of this country and of all mankind depends on the direct, formal, open, and avowed interference of Great Britain to accomplish the abolition of slavery in Texas” [161] (Kagan 2006: 222). When given the chance, Southern Presidents, John Tyler of Virginia and James K Polk of Tennessee, put into motion plans to annex Texas and half of Mexico through war and quickly establish this territory as slave-holding. In other words, the war with Mexico came about as the result of programmatic dispute between the North and the South. (Morrison 1997: 41; Potter 1976:22).

Undaunted, the Northern states kept to this strategy. The Southern desire to annex Central American territory and particularly Cuba as a slave-holding territory was rebuffed by northern politicians, resulting in the Gadson purchase but not much else. The Crittenden Compromise, which would have acknowledged all territory gained beneath 36° 30, was soundly rejected and again blocked by northern politicians, including Lincoln. Again the two programs clashed over the incorporation of Nebraska and Kansas. A short, brutish proxy war fought over the incorporation of Nebraska and Kansas concluded in a democratic victory. Defeated by the North’s containment strategy, the South prepared for war (McPherson 1998).

The Civil War was fought by two of the most ideological armies in all of history (McPherson 1998: 98). It was also the bloodiest war in American history, but just as with other ideological wars, the cost was seen as just. Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address is well known for proclaiming his “malice toward none,” yet it also contained this passage:

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282 along with pro-expansionist Secretaries of State Abel Upshur and John Calhoun
283 Hawai‘i, which sought statehood in 1854, was rebuffed until after the Civil War because its population refused to be admitted as a slave state as its latitudinal position would have determined.
If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed
time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war
as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any
departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe
to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may
speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the
bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every
drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was
said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord are true
and righteous altogether."

Often this is read as Lincoln accepting with grace a sort of national punishment, but it should
more properly be read in the context of the time – as pledging the utter destruction of the South
for causing a war for evil purposes. In a very real sense, it was an ultimatum that the South
would be destroyed if it did not yield.

The North’s programmatic victory proved the superiority of the democratic system, and
political leadership in the Gilded Age often drew on its example. "As our fathers fought with
slavery and crushed it, in order that it not seize and crush them,” Theodore Roosevelt urged, “so
we are called on to fight new forces.” Hamilton Fish, Secretary Seward’s successor, spoke in
1873 that “the rapid increase of the means of communication around the globe have brought into
almost daily intercourse communities which hitherto been aliens and strangers to each other, so
that now no real social and moral wrong can be inflicted on any people without being felt
throughout the civilized globe” (quoted in Keller 1977: 89). President Grant declared in his 2nd
inaugural that the “world is tending toward republicanism, or government by the people… and that our own Republic is destined to be the guiding start of all others” (Grant 1873).

Despite being free internal programmatic, competition the ambition for programmatic expansion ran up against its lack of capability. The American navy was overwhelmingly designed for coastal combat and its military, despite being large in number once fully mobilized, was in the eyes of Europe nothing more than, “two armed mobs chasing each other around the country.” Simply put, it had insufficient capacity to export its program (Swann 1965). It failed to end continuing Spanish dominion over Cuba in the 1870s. It stood helplessly by while the Germans imposed ownership of Samoa in 1885. These failures (and others) prompted a large naval buildup in the 1880s—the Great White Fleet.

It is important to note that the reason for this build was not that the United States was threatened by outside powers. The German imposition on Samoa would not have prevented docking there and certainly would not have threatened mainland US holdings. Spain did not constitute a mortal threat to the American coast. The military build-up was not oriented toward defeating threat, but enabling programmatic expansion (Kagan 2006: 346). It is thus no coincidence that it was after the fleet had been constructed that American once again became aggressive abroad in pursuit of its democratic promotion.

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284 Slavery rebellions in Cuba in the late 1860’s and early 1870s prompted American demands that Spain abolish the institution and inspired private citizens to fight on the slaves’ behalf. One such group aboard the Virginian was captured and executed while running supplies to the rebels (Bradford 1980: 38-45, 60). Contemplating war, Grant realized that he had only thirty-six wooden ships with which to prosecute the conflict against Spain’s modern navy (Swann 1965: 138-142). The US offered to purchase Cuba for $100 million.

285 In 1885 the Germans sought to impose a government on Samoa through force, a move which the United States vigorously opposed in favor of their self-rule and autonomy. A fortuitous storm destroyed the American and German ships in Apia harbor in 1889, otherwise the US might have gone to war over the matter – a war it would not have had the capacity to win. (Kagan 2006: 335-339).

286 Cleveland sent gunboats to Korea and China to protect Americans there and again to Brazil to support the republicans against the monarchists in 1893, but there was always an acute awareness of too many conflicts and not enough ships.
In the 1890’s Cuba was once again rocked by slave rebellion. Rebel leader Maximo Gomez, who claimed he would “raise the banner of a true democracy,” scored several early military successes, including the capture of Havana, despite a brutal response by colonial governor Valeriano Weyler (Kagan 2006: 375). Encouraged by Cuban “sympathy rallies,” the Republican caucus called on the Democratic Cleveland administration to recognize Cuban independence and offer support to the rebels, and passed resolutions expressing support for the Cuban cause in both chambers (Foner 1972, 1: 170). By December 1896, the Spanish reconcentrados camps had killed an estimated fifth of the Cuban civilian population, prompting the Cleveland administration, owing to their “higher obligation” to democracy, to inform the Spanish government that they faced an American response if it did not stop its brutal counter-revolution (Morgan 2003: 254; Kagan 2006: 381, 384). McKinley, who assumed office three months later, shared this sentiment (Morgan 2003: chp 16, 254).

In a letter written to the Spanish foreign minister, Secretary of State John Sherman declared the Spanish policy toward the Cubans one “of devastation and interference with the most elementary rights of human existence” and informed him President McKinley’s intention to enforce “a righteous peace” upon the island (quoted in Fuller 1907: 307; Morgan 2003: 259-260). The Spanish responded with an insulting letter and (what was originally believed to be) their February 15 sinking of the dreadnaught USS Maine (Offner 1992: 150-155). McKinley’s April 11 address to Congress asked for a war that would be waged, “In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there” as a matter of American duty (McKinley 1898). Although there were some few material possessions at risk, the principal reason the Americans went to war was that they felt empowered

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287 Weyler attempted to depopulate Gomez’s natural population base by force relocation to concentration camps on the Eastern side of the island.
to prevent a humanitarian crisis, end slavery, deprive autocratic Spain of its possessions, and replace it with Cuban self-rule on republican values (Kagan 2006: 407). In the ensuing war, they also gained possession of the Philippines.

European monarchists and imperialists feared that with this victory the Monroe Doctrine’s expansive democratic project had finally arrived. Even fairly liberal Britain was alarmed -- “They might just as soon declare Ireland independent!” Queen Elizabeth was reported to have exclaimed (Hilton and Ickringhill 1999: 29). They had good cause to be concerned. “No war has ever transformed us quite as the war with Spain transformed us,” Wilson wrote for The Atlantic (Wilson 1902). The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines proved that its program could be successfully advanced through military conquest, but the potential for the establishment of “constitutional self-rule” and eventual democracy had yet to be proved.

The US Cuban policy was relatively hands off – it reserved the right to interfere in their affairs only if constitutional self-rule was threatened by either bad economic policy or insurgency. Following the 1903 Platt Amendment and his “Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt proclaimed that “chronic wrongdoing or impotence” would require the “civilized” United States to “exercise [its] international police power” to beat back the forces of “barbarism,” seen then as the “handmaiden and forerunner of tyranny and despotism” (Roosevelt 1901, 1904). This pattern prevailed in its relations with Cuba -- it intervened after democratic

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288 There was never too much enthusiasm about direct governance. On one occasion Roosevelt was famously reported to have remarked to his Secretary of State Elihu Root, “I have about as much desire to take over more territory as does a gorged boa constrictor to swallow a porcupine hind end to.” (Morrison 1951: 235).

289 This term, barbarism, is a code word that contains racist overtones but also the impulse to democratize. Constitutional self-rule was seen as the most important element leading towards democracy and progress, thus intervening for “civilization” was equivalent for intervention on the basis of democracy. In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt informed Latin American leadership that, “If within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy.” (Roosevelt 1901, 1904).
breakdown, governing the island directly after conquest until 1902, again between 1906 and 1909, and military supporting the elected regime in from 1917 to 1922.\footnote{The Platt Amendment was only rescinded in 1934. (Smith 1994: 39).}

The Philippines, on the other hand, saw a forty-eight year effort at direct democratization.\footnote{After it was granted its independence on July 4, 1946, the US worked to defeat the communist Huk rebellion post WWII, and assisted Ramon Magsaysay in his election of 1953 (Smith 1994: 39).} This process began with the brutal suppression of an uprising that left 220,000 Filipino and 4,000 American soldiers dead, ultimately convincing the Americans they needed to frame their occupation in terms of their own internal democratic development (Smith 1994:41-43). President McKinley explained this commitment as the product of a revelation that the Cubans were “unfit for self-government” and would soon devolve into “anarchy and misrule” without American help. Therefore the Americans must stay and govern in order “to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them” (Rusing 1903; Taft 1902). \footnote{In testimony before the Senate Committee on the Philippines, William Howard Taft, governor of the Philippines, declared that, “it is the duty of the United States to establish there a government… which shall gradually change, conferring more and more right upon the people to govern themselves, thus educating them I self-government until their knowledge of individual liberty shall be such that further action may be taken either by given them statehood or by making them a quasi-independent government” (Taft 1902).}

As with Latin America, the hope was that the establishment of constitutional self-rule would lead to democracy, and thus they moved quickly to establish these self-governing organs. By 1907 elections were held in the national legislature, an independent judiciary was created by 1916, near complete bureaucratic devolution was accomplished by 1921, the Catholic church was stripped of most of its lands through purchase and deprived of its role in education. The United States installed the full apparatus of democratic government, including a civil bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, and a free press; but left economic arrangements and land-ownership as they found it (Smith 1994:46-51). Adam Quinn argues that the management of this “liberal quasi-imperialism” within the Western Hemispher and the Philippines, “provided… a
laboratory within which to develop the alternative ideas of international order that it would later seek – via Wilsonianism – to apply on a global level” (Quinn 2009: 75).

Woodrow Wilson’s ideas emphasized what at the time was thought to lead to democracy – constitutionality and self-rule. His ambition for democratic promotion was clear well before he took office. While President of Princeton University, his frequent articles in the *Atlantic Monthly* argued that the United States need to aggressively promote American-style governance abroad (Wilson 1901). “The world is no more convinced of the benefits of democracy as a form of government at its end than it was at its beginning,” he wrote. America had yet to demonstrate “amidst the contest of nations” the applicability of the model, and worried that, “if we suffer [it] to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress,” there would be no redemption. For this reason he considered development of the Philippines a “natural point in [American] development…whether we had a material foothold there or not” that revealed its “real relationship to the rest of mankind.”

Once he took office, Wilson aggressively promoted the rejection of autocracy and the institutionalization of constitutional self-government via American paternalism (Smith 1994: 61, 67). In a response to a question on his Latin American policy, he would answer that it was “to teach the South American republics to elect good men” (Smith 1994:60). Wilson did not extend American recognition to non-elected governments and frequently intervened to put down

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293 The effort was more properly seen as preparation for future programmatic expansion, to lead the “change in the order of the world” and the “opening and transformation of the East” (Wilson 1901).
294 For example, regarding those who were in favor of Emilio Aguinaldo’s independence uprising in the Philippines, he wrote “If it were enough to give [them] independence, if be independence you mean only disconnection with any government outside the islands, the independence of a rudderless boat adrift. But self-government? How is that ‘given’? Can it be given? Is it not gained, earned, graduated into from the hard school of life…” (Smith 1994:63-64). Likewise, he expressed great zeal for the Mexican rebellion in 1913, yet he also believed that without constitutionality, democracy would not come unless the United States “instructed” them first.
295 –President Wilson to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey (Smith 1994:60).
the “barbaric” regime, as he did with Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and several other Central American states (Smith 1994:64). 296297

The most notable example of aggressive democratic promotion during Wilson’s tenure is the American involvement in WWI, which Wilson famously entered in order “to make the world safe for democracy” from the autocratic Central Powers (Kagan 2006: 290-292; Link 1956: 337f see also Wilson 1917). 298 Victory meant the possibility of remaking the world along American programmatic principles – a “community of power… [and] an organized common peace” (Wilson 1917b). Echoing the sentiments of the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson argued that “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic

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296 Regarding extra-constitutional means of attaining power, Wilson stated that “we hold… that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon public conscience and approval… we shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government… we can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition, we are the friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances.”. See “A statement on relations with Latin America” in Arthur S Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton University Press 1978), 27: 172.; Colliers June 13, 1914, quoted in Henry Morris, Our Mexican Muddle, 122

297 Wilson refused to recognize the government of Mexican General Victoriano Huerta. In a letter circulated among the powers, he claimed that non-constitutional regimes such as his “menace the peace and development of America as nothing else could” and on that basis aggressive policies would be followed in order to “secure peace and order in Central America” (USDS 1914). After Huerta refused, Wilson armed the general’s opponents and occupied the port of Veracruz in order to effect his Huerta’s capitulation the next year (Smith 1994:70). In the Dominican Republic, Wilson ordered an American occupation of the capital in Santo Domingo from 1916 to 1924 in order to reestablish constitutional self-rule and develop governance institutions. The US sought to improve the prospects for stable government through modernizing the agricultural system and the reorganization of the bureaucracy in hopes of creating family farms and incorruption; they modernized the judiciary and treasury; they also created an independent police force that ended caudillismo. As soon as the Americans left civil strife broke out anew, not settled until the dictator Rafael Trujillo assumed power in 1930. Wilson often appealed to the forces of international law, but the core of his program was the radical reconstitutionalization of the governments along the American political program. For example, He accepted Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean mediation in the dispute with Mexico in 1914.; and in 1915-1916 he promoted the notion of Pan-American Pact . (Smith 1994: 68-69).

298 By the middle of WWI, the American people and Wilson had come to view Germany as an enemy of democracy. Germany, which under Bismarck was considered a democratic experience by many Americans of the time, enjoyed widespread approbation up to the end of Franco-Prussian War. Shortly after its defeat of despotic Napoleon III, approval of Germany waned as trade battles and the Samoan affair soured Americans perceptions. “German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples in the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them” Link, A. S. (1956).
nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe it covenants” (Wilson 1917). For this reason Wilson believed it was his business to fight for a new order at the Peace Conference, ‘agreeably if we can, disagreeably if necessary’ that would enshrine democratic principles. (Smith 1994:90). If not, Wilson feared, other political programs would take hold.

At the very moment that Wilson contemplated the expansion of the Pan-American system to the entire planet, another political program – communism -- was developing in Russia. Although Wilson was not in principle opposed to its larger points about capitalism,299 he worried that the democratic would lose the race for the hearts and minds of the downtrodden souls in the autocratic states. “The conservatives do not realize what forces are loose in the world at the present time,’ he observed while aboard the SS Washington in December 1918, “Liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization from chaos… liberalism must be more liberal than ever before, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon” (quoted in Smith 1994: 92). Unfortunately for Wilson and the American political program, Europe was not destroyed sufficiently to force acceptance, and ultimately democracy promotion would fail in the inter-war period, with only the democracy in Czechoslovakia established through his efforts.

Although the majority of the American public favored joining the League, many in Congress felt Article X of the Charter would too greatly constrain US action in the Western Hemisphere (Braumoeller 2009: 9; Vinson 1961; Starrt 1965). Wilson’s principle opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, even denied that Washington’s entreaty to avoid entangling alliances

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299 Regarding communism, he asked, “ … before we commit ourselves irreconcilably to an attitude of hostility to this movement of the time, we ought frankly to put to ourselves the question: is the capitalistic system unimpeachable?... have capitalists generally used their power for the benefit of the countries in which their capital is employed and for the benefit of their fellow men? Is it not, on the contrary, too true that capitalists have often seemed to regard the men whom they used as mere instruments of profit?... if these offenses against high morality and true citizenship have been frequently observable, are we to say that the blame for the present discontent and turbulence is wholly on the side of those who are in revolt against them?” (Smith 1994:92) [18]
“meant for one moment that we should not join with other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace” (Bartlett (1944, 50-51 cited in Claude 1962: 137). Nevertheless, Wilson’s efforts, both at home and abroad, failed.  

The mid-20th century brings with it much clearer, and much more well-known, examples of the democratic program. It also ushers in the existential struggles with fascism and communism. As the next section will show, those with a liberal bent tended to conflate the two under the banner of totalitarianism, and in this regard saw them as competing political programs. In terms of democracy program, there is little doubt that WWII was waged, not just to destroy fascism, but to install a liberal world order (see also Ikenberry 2001; 2011: chp 5).

By January 1939, the United States faced a formidable challenge to its political program. Aroused to the idea that Hitler’s aggression was not something that would simply go away, FDR began a sustained political campaign to convince the nation that Hitler’s “philosophies of force” threatened “the tenets and faith of humanity… on which… their very civilization [is] founded.”

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300 The United States did what it could to enforce peace in Europe. Warren Harding and Secretary of State Hughes, representing by Charles Dawes, concluded a treaty between France and Germany that convinced the French to pull out of the occupied Ruhr Valley in exchange for rescheduling German debts and a guaranteed American $100 million loan (the Dawes Plan), actions which Hughes believed likely averted a German domestic and European international catastrophe (Pusey 1951: 581). The American Ambassador Alanson Houghton obtained German consent to the treaty by promising to withhold future loans (Kolb 1988: 61). Later that decade Coolidge issued “America’s Peace Ultimatum to Europe” which warned that the absence of security would endanger American money sent to the continent. This prompted the Treaty of Locarno between Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Belgium that mutually guaranteed the German-French and German-Belgian borders as well as demilitarized the Rhineland (Hogan 1977: 213). The Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed originally by France, Germany, and the United States in August of 1928 (and would eventually add an additional fifty) pledged the countries to peacefully resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them." The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 and the subsequent Five Power Naval Treaty was the first-of-its-kind international agreement that produced a ten-year reduction in the number of ships and their tonnage. (Braumoeller 2009:10; Link and Catton 1974: 86).

301 The lingering political effects of the Great Depression in the mid to late 1930s brought one of the very few lulls in democratic promotion in US history. The United States also began a much friendlier policy toward its Latin American neighbors, repudiating the Roosevelt Corollary at the Seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo in 1933, effectively ending its intervention in Haiti, the DR, Nicaragua, and Panama. The outbreak of hostility in Europe was initially met with a wariness that manifested itself in the three Neutrality Acts, but they were not observed with either fidelity or for very long.
Calling upon the same fundamental outlook expressed by the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt warned that the US could ill “afford to be surrounded by the enemies” that so thoroughly rejected the concept of an open and free society (Roosevelt 1939).

Beginning in 1939, FDR attempted to convince Congress to repeal the Neutrality Acts and allow the United States to arm threatened democracies. Failure to do so would prove “most vitally dangerous to… American security, and American peace” (FDR 1939, quoted in Divine 1969:27, 28). Unwilling to wait Congress, he committed the United States to seriously arming the British through the transfer of warships and other materiel in exchange for a ring of Atlantic naval bases in August of 1940, a move he described on September 3 as the “most important action” taken in defense of the nation “since the Louisiana Purchase.” Although he did not join the war, and there were fits and starts in the coming months, he committed the United States to its position as the “arsenal of democracy” which “no dictator” or combination of dictators “will weaken.” He expressed his belief that “the Axis powers are not going to win this war.” and thus “We have no excuse for defeatism… I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined… to meet the threat to our democratic faith” (Roosevelt 1940). Later he proclaimed, “There must be liberty, worldwide, and eternal…” and “the American people have made an unlimited commitment that there shall be a free world” (Roosevelt 1941).

However to engage in actual conflict, Roosevelt had to convince the American people that Hitler posed an existential threat. To do so, he gave a series of speeches that recalled the historical menace to American democracy – autocrats infringing on the American hemisphere. In a speech at the commencement of the University of Virginia on June 10 1940, he reminded the graduates that America would always have much to fear from the designs of autocrats and
despotisms, which wanted to trap the United States in a “helpless nightmare… of a people lodged in prison,” maintained by “unpitying masters of other continents” (Roosevelt 1941b). In a radio address on July 4, 1941 he warned the United States, “will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship” (Roosevelt 1940).

Following the U-boat attack on the destroyer Greer, Roosevelt claimed in his “shoot first” speech that the Nazis would eventually attempt to dominate the United States and the Western Hemisphere, and “create a permanent world system based on force terror and murder” (Roosevelt 1941d). This charge he would make repeatedly until the Japanese attacked the United States and finally brought it into the war (Divine 1969: 46-48).

From nearly the beginning of the war, the United States made plans to construct its global democratic order and expand the role is played in Latin American to the global stage. Perhaps the most significant event to occur during the war in this regard was the enshrinement of the Atlantic Charter in the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942, which committed the signatories to eight points highly reminiscent of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.302 Although it did not affect the conduct of the war, it shaped the course of the peace that followed thereafter, as did the “Declaration of Liberated Europe” (see Offner 2002).303 At Yalta, Roosevelt issued a joint declaration with Churchill and Stalin that committed them to the establishment of constitutional self-rule and democracy in Europe (Roosevelt 1945). Issued at Roosevelt’s insistence at Yalta, they were a demonstration of American resolve on this matter “to solve by democratic means

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302 No territorial gains were to be sought by the United States or the United Kingdom; territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of the peoples concerned; all people had a right to self-determination; trade barriers were to be lowered; there was to be global economic cooperation and advancement of social welfare; the participants would work for a world free of want and fear; the participants would work for freedom of the seas; there was to be disarmament of aggressor nations, and a post-war common disarmament.

303 Pledged the three governments to assist people in former Nazi-occupied territory and committed the three to the establishment of government that would be “representative of all democratic elements” derived from “free elections … responsive to the will of the people.” Truman clearly expected that Stalin would abide by the treaty.
their pressing political and economic problems” and was, in essence, a direct counter to Soviet and British post-war claims and further designs on imperialism (Dallek 1995: 506-525, 528).

That the United States worked with the Soviet Union at all can be chalked up to Roosevelt’s perception Stalin as someone who “wouldn’t annex anything and would work with me for a world of democracy and peace” (Bullitt 1948: 94). The private assessment of character belied his public assertions that the Soviet Union was “a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship,” and that any assistance was a matter of convenience (Roosevelt 1940e). Moreover, it was FDR’s opinion that the Soviets would not last long, and even if they did, he “did not think we needed to worry about Russian domination” (quoted in Divine 1969: 81). Nevertheless, aid to the Soviet Union was initially as secret as possible to avoid the inevitable anti-communist reaction in Congress and in public, only officially added to Lend-Lease well after Roosevelt made the case for Nazi designs on the West (Divine 1969: 84). Of course, it is certainly not coincidence that both the Americans and British held off assaulting the continent, despite constant haranguing by the Soviets starting in 1942, until well after the Soviets and the Germans had bled themselves dry (Divine 1969: 62-68).

Furthermore, the matter of national self-determination had repeatedly been a sore point with both the Soviets and British. Stalin pressed British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on his visit to Moscow in 1941 that any alliance with the West was premised on recognition of Soviet war-time acquisitions and brought it up again at Tehran in December 1943 (Dallek 1995: 341-345). The British agreement with the Soviet Union in October 1944 to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, was met by quickly by Roosevelt’s insistence that “We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any postwar spheres of influence” (Quoted in Smith 1994: 130). Reneging on the promised elections in Poland and subsequent Eastern
European powers demonstrated to the West that Soviets had no intention of following through (Dallek 1995: 503-524). 304

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the advancement of the American program once more faced a dilemma of capability. The sheer size of the Soviet military meant that they could not force the elections in Eastern Europe as they might have in Latin America. What they did do is rely on the policy of non-recognition. After Roosevelt’s death in the immediate post-war, Truman refused to sign peace treaties recognizing the governments of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary because their composition and conduct did not correspond to the assurance of the declaration (Smith 1994: 131) Likewise, the Truman administration tied its recognition of Poland to “old free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot,” (quoted in Smith 1994: 131).

Where they could intervene effectively, they did so, but it was not always an optimal result. In Greece, the Americans favored a weak republican center against strong communist left-wing and autocratic right-wing elements. Despite years of attempts by American ambassador MacVeigh to bolster democratic forces, ultimately were not strong enough to hold the results of the 1946 election. Ultimately the monarchy, supported by the military and Great Britain, was declared government by plebiscite (Smith 1994: 138-139). This dilemma would be faced frequently throughout the world, where the United States would often be support authoritarian regimes in the absence of a credible democratic presence. Where capability lacked the United States were forced to their second-best option – self-rule.

Nevertheless, it is easy to be cynical about the proposition that democracy promotion was the central ambition of the United States when the history of the Cold War reveals numerous

304 With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland; British domination of Greece, Soviet domination of Rumania and Bulgaria.
instances where authoritarian states were propped up. Yet such cynicism belies the expansionist potential of the Soviet systems. Like the American democratic program, communism gained power in governments as diverse as China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and North Korea. This was intentional. In a speech in April 1945, Stalin once remarked that:

This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise. If now there is not a communist government in Paris, the cause of this is Russia has no army that can reach Paris in 1945 (as quoted in Conversations with Stalin, 1963, by Milovan Djila).

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov put it, “Stalin looked at it this way: World War I has wrested one country from capitalist slavery; World War II has created a socialist system; and the third will finish off imperialism forever” (quoted in Weeks 2003: 5). To preserve the chance that its democratic program would “take” in countries, the United States first had to preserve at a minimum self-rule and autonomy. Nevertheless, the promotion of democracy remained a central plank in the immediate aftermath of WWII.

The Truman Doctrine was premised on the idea that it was America’s role to “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes” (Truman 1947). The Marshall Plan was intended to shore up democratic governments in Western Europe, an objective reiterated by the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1948 and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. Truman committed the United States to building and defending democratic government in Korea (Truman 1950).
The clearest statement of America’s new mission was laid out by an NSC paper in March 1950. This document identified communism as an intractable, global menace that threatened democracy everywhere, and linked the fates of the democratic world together (NSC-68). The “defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere,” the document proclaimed, and thus “we must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world… [and] and foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system” (NSC-68:8-9). In this regard, this approach was not radically different from the perspective shared by many American policy-makers of the 19th century. Any of those statements could have been uttered by John Q Adams about autocracy or Lincoln about the Confederacy. The solution in all three cases was the same – the preservation of democracy via containment.\(^{305}\)

Of course, the promotion of democracy was not only about the opposition to communism. The United States created virtually *ex nihilo* the democracies in Germany and Japan. That the United States pursued democratization is both instances is significant, since opposition to the Soviet Union could have been achieved without any significant democratization effort. Moreover, there was a strong sentiment seeking permanent damage of both countries as retribution for their warmongering.\(^{306}\) Secretary of State Cordell Hull, General Lucias Clay, General Douglas MacArthur on the other hand, advocated for the reconstruction of Germany and

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\(^{305}\) Truman also worried the competition would be negatively transformative. The proximity of non-democratic states might damage America’s democracy, Truman famously worried, “If communism is allowed to absorb free nations, then we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take defense measures which really bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we couldn’t recognize it as American any longer--- it would require us to become a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.”

\(^{306}\) In fact, retributive occupation was the option anticipated by George Kennan and FDR regarding their captured foes early in the war (Dallek 1995: 472-481). At Tehran FDR announced a plan for the division of Germany into five parts with an additional two under international control. Secretary Henry Morgenthau was to make Germany an agrarian society. In 1944 the State Department issued JCS 1067 which called for Germany to be “occupied… as a defeated nation… to prevent Germany from every again becoming a threat to the peace of world… [thus] you will take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany or designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy” Likewise, Japan was considered resistant to democratization due to its war culture and deference to the emperor.
Japan, believing that German and Japanese democratization would be key to resisting Soviet aggression and likely result in demilitarization (Smith 1994:154).

The controlling documents for the reconstruction, JCS 1067 and JSC 1779, set out Washington’s intention to “eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.” In these documents, the US government defined as its primary objective, “fundamentally that of helping to lay the economic and education bases of a sound German democracy, of encouraging bona fide democratic efforts and of prohibiting those activities which would jeopardize genuinely democratic development” (740.00119 EW/8-2048). Similarly, the US government declared that its objective would be “to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government” (143, 1945).

To this end, they attempted to “deprogram” the peoples of Germany and Japan. MacArthur considered Japan “the world’s great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule” and “for the liberalization of government within.” He wanted to free the Japanese of the “condition of slavery” that was their “almost mythological belief in the strength and wisdom of the warrior caste” that were interwoven throughout their society” (MacArthur 1946). Likewise, Washington informed Clay that the “psychological disarmament” and “the reeducation of the German people is an integral part of the policies intended to help develop a democratic form of government” (JCS 1779).

307 Similarly, at Potsdam the Allies declared that they would construct for Japan, “a peacefully inclined and responsible government. established in according with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people… freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.” Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945. Accessed at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html
Although both the French and Soviets objected, the West German state was reconstituted by May 1949. Bundestag elections were held in August, and on September 20, 1949 Konrad Adenauer of the CDP was elected as the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Smith 1994:159). The Japanese state was also reconstituted quickly and first elections were held in April 1946 on the basis of a constitution written by MacArthur’s government. This included the famous Article IX which forbid the use of war as a legitimate tool of government.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles frequently used familiar rhetoric to describe the American duty to protect the free world from communism. Dulles told Life that, “We have always been, as we always should be, the despair of the oppressor and the hope of the oppressed” With respect to the “captive nations” of East Central Europe, Eisenhower privately mused that “In the long run, the United States must back democracies” (Schmitz 1999: 185-186). In the GOP 1952 party platform, Dulles took an aggressive position against communism that would be echoed by Bush administration a half century later:

We shall again make liberty into a beacon of light and hope that will penetrate the dark places. It will mark the end of the negative, futile, and immoral policy of ‘containment,’ which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism, which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives in a weapon of our destruction… the policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue their monstrous way and mark the beginning of the end (Dulles 1952).

In his 1957 State of the Union, Eisenhower reaffirmed American commitment to apply democratic principles to, “nations as well as to individuals… in its activities at home and abroad”
Where the material realities of post War Europe did not favor the naked pursuit of democracy promotion because it would damage its conflict with the Soviet Union, the US pursued the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination (Smith 1994: 180). Thus the policy of the US was one of anti-imperialism and anti-totalitarian with the hope of democratization as a result of these policies (Smith 1994:181). In an October 1956 interview, Dulles explained the Eisenhower policy as “Anything which weakens this great structure [the Soviet empire] and leads to its breaking up into its constituent parts…so that these countries can exercise their own independence and their own freedom.” (Smith 1994:190-191). Whether or not that freedom would be achieved through democracy was something that would only be determined gradually.

This led to, at least for the purpose of our analytical tool, some awkward historical moments where fighting communism often meant failure to support democratic movements deemed too weak to viably survive Communist infiltration (Smith 1994: 197). In Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh (1951-53) and in Guatemala, President Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54) attempted to establish constitutional democracies and nationalist economic systems (expropriating foreign assets). They both faced stiff opposition from rightist authoritarian elements and leftist communist elements. In each country, the US disregarded the potential of democracy for the short-term stability of the powerful right-wing authorities and brought both governments down through CIA action (Smith 1994:192). In the case of Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration invoked the Monroe Doctrine – the belief that Jacobo Arbenz was ultimately a pawn for imperial Soviet designs on the region (Smith 1994:198).

308 Shipments of weapons from Czechoslovakia scared Washington cemented their perception that its was communism, not democracy, that had taken hold in Guatemala. Dulles argued that the events there “expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-Amerian system, and they test the ability of the American States to maintain the peaceful integrity of the hemisphere. For several years international communism has been probing every possible enclave and corner for ensting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics. This intrusion of Soviet
However, wherever possible, the United States would attempt to set up constitutional regimes that at least had some level of democracy. Eisenhower argued that in Manichean struggles certain calculating strategies were permitted, but at some point rhetoric must match action. To do otherwise “would be futile, foolish, and for us immoral, and lies so employed would bewilder and divided the nations of the West… credibility in our informational programs is the first essential and it cannot be achieved by falsehood and hypocrisy” (Eisenhower 1966: 624). Eisenhower decided to take a stand in Indochina, and tried to establish a government that could resist communist incursion, to provide what Kennedy called a “cornerstone” that supported the region (Smith 1994:200-201). The US, following the nation-building program of Edward Lansdale of WHAM (winning hearts and minds), tried to create successful teamwork, stronger free Vietnamese, and a population willing to fight for their freedom. They turned to Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic mandarin who had stood up to both the Japanese and Communists, but was utterly disastrous as a nation-builder. He personalized his rule and removed all obstacles to his authority, simultaneously making communism attractive and depriving Americans of any replacement (Smith 1994:203). His assassination in Nov 1963 brought a series of military governments who could win neither heart nor minds, and ultimately fell to the communists from North Vietnam after a bloody struggle.

Kennedy came into office with the same vigor regarding democracy promotion that he demonstrated during his Congressional career (Kennedy-Cooper 1952). In his 1961 Inaugural Address, he promised the world that, “whether it wishes us well or ill…we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. …not because the communists may be doing it, not because despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies” (Smith 1994:198) [20].
we seek their votes, but because it is right” (Kennedy 1961). Where he differed from many of his predecessors was his commitment to institutionalize democracy promotion through aid rather than imposition, and a focus on bolstering the capability and capacity of self-governance and encouraging economic growth (Carothers 1999:20). This commitment manifested itself in the Alliance for Progress that was designed as a counter-weight to forces that led to Castro’s success in Cuba (Carothers 1999:23). The Alliance promised to address socioeconomic concerns as a means of creating democracy, including an assistance on land reform as a means of breaking the power of landed elites in favor of reformers (Smith 1994:220).

This effort continued through the administration of Lyndon Johnson. In 1966, two US congressmen, Donald Fraser and Bradford Morse, both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sponsored Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which directed USAID to emphasize the “participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions” (quotes in Carothers 1999:23). Title IX approved programs include the institutional capacity strengthening of South Korea, Brazil, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Costa rice in the early 1970’s. Title IX also spurred increased involvement of USAID in legal and “civic” education. The international work of the AFL-CIO was also sanctioned under Title IX as a means to develop indigenous labor institutions (Carothers 1999:25).

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309 WW Rostow’s Modernization theory reconciled the two interests – countries that developed economically would be able to resist Communism.

310 The Alliance was formalized by the Charter of Punta de Este in August 17, 1961. It promised to “Improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people” and ascribed to the notion that “free men working through the institutions of representative democracy can best satisfy men’s aspirations, including those for work, home, and land, health and schools. No system can guarantee true progress unless it affirms the dignity of the individual which is the foundation of our civilization” Accessed at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam16.asp

311 Congress added a specific component of “civic” education to Title IX in 1967
In truth, democracy was in retreat in the 1960’s with the United States playing catch-up to perceived advances by communist forces. In Latin America, a coup by the Peruvian military against Raul Haya de la Torre in 1962 was met with economic and diplomatic sanctions (leading to return of democracy under Fernando Belaunde), but Kennedy acted alone and was dissuaded from doing so in the future (Smith 1994:227). US reaction to military takeovers in Honduras, Guatemala and Ecuador in 1963, Brazil in 1964, the DR in 1965 was muted at best (Smith 1994:227). Moreover, Alliance for Progress and other initiatives roundly failed to materialize positive results. For example, one study of USAIDs municipal program found that more than 750 of the rural leadership that had participated in Guatemala had been killed by the US-backed military government (Carothers 1999:27). Afraid of leftists in the Brazilian Congress, Americans worked through local leadership instead, strengthening traditional structures at the expense of genuine change.

Following the perceived defeat in Vietnam and the apparent failure of the Alliance for Progress, amongst other efforts, “Kissingerism” led to a decade of democratic retrenchment in American foreign policy. But in the context of the sweep of American foreign policy, this ‘amorality’ proved short-lived. Jimmy Carter’s human rights campaign and Ronald Reagan’s “democratic revolution” returned democracy promotion to its pride of place in American foreign policy. At their heart was their belief in the superiority of democratic program.

Jimmy Carter came into office intent on outcompeting the communist program. In May 1977 he was asked whether he intended to draw the Soviets into a more intense ideological dispute. He replied:

We have our democratic form of government which we feel is best. In everything that I do concerning domestic or foreign policy, I like to try to make other people realize that
our system works… I am sure the Soviet Union has always maintained that an ideological struggle was legitimate, and they have never refrained from doing so. I don’t feel any inclination to refrain from doing it either (Carter 1977:768).

Carter’s intention was to promote a program that emphasized human rights and an end to political repression -- enemies and friends alike would be criticized on the basis of their adherence to American ideals of democracy (Smith 1994:241). Carter believed that doing so would induce positive change among American allies, which would in turn reduce the likelihood of a destabilizing, and potentially security-reducing, revolution (Carter 2013: 147). In his inaugural address he laid this vision as one where the United States would have a “clear-cut preference for these societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” Not just communists were threats, but political programs in “which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people.”

Consequently, Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance elevated the human rights coordinator at the State Department to Assistant Secretary level over the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Stuckey 2008: 112-116). The State Department, to show its serious commitment, began publishing a human rights country report on any country receiving US aid across individual, juridical, sociopolitical – essentially holding other governments accountable to the US Bill of Rights and associated freedoms (Smith 1994:242). He also created an interagency group on human right and foreign assistance in 1978. NSC-309 announced that ‘it shall be the major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights

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312 Since 1973, Donald Fraser and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements held forty hearings on the topic and restricted American funding from those countries that demonstrated “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” “ (Smith 1994:241) [3].
throughout the world’ (Schmitz and Walker 2004: 135). Also that year, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to include funding authorization for human rights projects.

Although Carter provided military aid to both the Shah and the Philippine’s Marcos, Carter’s administration often squared their behavior to their rhetoric, believing firmly that dictatorships in the long run posed a threat to American security. For example, they forced Joaquin Balaguer’s resignation by threatening to withhold aid after Balaguer refused to accept his democratic ouster. They also sanctioned a South African apartheid regime engaged in a shooting war with Angola and Cuba, cut aid off from a Somoza regime battling the communist FSLN United Front in 1979, and pushed the dictatorships in South Korea and El Salvador by threatening to withhold military aid and criticizing their treatment of political prisoners.

Secretary of State Vance cut funding Argentina, Ethiopia, Uruguay, El Salvador, Chile, and Nicaragua for human rights violations, ultimately reducing aid sent to those countries by 75% due to human rights offenses (Smith 1994: 243, 245).

If Carter did have one weakness in his democracy promotion credentials relative to other administration, it was that he was perceived as reluctant to engage in military force to promote the American program overseas. For example, he allowed the New Jewel movement to come to power in Grenada. Additionally, events largely outside his control, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Shah heightened perceptions of American as, in the words of Reagan, a “helpless hostage” prone to “handwringing, defeatism, [and] decline” in the face of aggression (NYT 1984).

The Reagan administration assumed office and declared that it was “morning in America,” although substantively his administration’s focus on democracy promotion did not

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313 Actions against south Africa include the Byrd amendment which forbid purchase of chrome from the cash-strapped regime
differ overly much from that of Carter’s. Rhetorically, of course, it was a bit more muscular. In a speech before Parliament on June 1982, Reagan announced a “crusade for freedom” and a “campaign for democratic development.” In his 1985 State of the Union, Reagan boldly declared that because democracy is a universal right, “Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy, and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can.” For Reagan, this meant “[standing] by our democratic allies,” and rolling back the communist program, “on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua” (Reagan 1985). Underscoring this promotion was a clear statement of the democratic peace, where governments which “rest upon the consent of the governed” remained at peace, and “are not driven toward the domination of others.” In his mind, the “quest for peace” was a “question for freedom” (Reagan 1987). Reagan’s democratic promotion featured three pillars: the continued emphasis on democracy in foreign aid, constructive engagement with both friends and foes on issues related to democracy, and the Reagan Doctrine.

Democratic promotion in the 1980’s became one the pillars of US foreign aid owing to the heightened anti-communism of the Reagan administration and was aimed at vulnerable states in Latin America and Asia. In 1981they began promoting activities such as international conferences on democracy, exchanges, book translation programs, increased radio broadcasting under the aegis of “Project Democracy” run out of the cultural outreach arm of the foreign policy bureaucracy, the US Information Agency (Carothers 1999:30). The return to democracy in many LA countries and the Falkland Island conflict changed this policy and shifted US policy to assisting elections and strengthening the administration of justice. The first program was the El

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314 Although there was some success, much of its early budget actually went to fund the stridently anti-communist AFL-CIO. It was also victim to internal administrative politics. Contributing to the failure of Project Democracy was the influence of Kirkpatrick as UN ambassador and the resumption of anti-communism as the central plank in Central America (which included funding anti-communist Sandinistas). “Project Democracy” was phased out by Congress after two years in favor of NED which was awarded an operating budget of $18 million.
Salvadorian elections in 1984 – USAID paid for voter registration and computers and the CIA provided covert funds to ensure Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte won the election (Carothers 1999:35). 315

At the same time, the late congressman Dante Fascell (D-Fla) and a coalition of interested individuals created what would become the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization based on the German political party foundations [Stiftungen] that were key in the democratic transitions of Spain and Portugal in the mid 1970’s. It began operations in December of that year, with bipartisan public and private support of non-profits such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, the Free Trade Union Institute and the Center for International Private Enterprise” (Bouchet 2012: 47; Carothers 1999:31).

The Reagan concept of constructive engagement aimed at creating a climate of confidence that convinced regimes undergoing democratic transition that the United States understood the risks of transition but insisted that elites engage in liberalization (Smith 1994:274). This process was usually micromanaged across economic, social, and political dimensions by Chester A Crocker who served as undersecretary of state for African affairs (Smith 1994:275). The administration assisted the transitions from Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, South Korea’s transition from Chun Doo Hwan in 1987, Pinochet’s defeat in Chile in 1988 (McFaul 2009: 67). The NDI sent election teams to Taiwan and Pakistan. This was also used in South Africa, and most famously with the Soviet Union.

It is of course impossible to separate the democratic program under Reagan from his position on the Soviets. According to Reagan communism was a threat that could only be

defeated. “The West won’t contain communism,” he declared in a 1981 speech at Notre Dame, “it will transcend communism… it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written” (Smith 1994:273). He famously referred to the Soviets as an “evil empire” on his famous speech March 8, 1983 and set about defeating them.

The resulting Reagan Doctrine pledged support to typically nationalist, and certainly anti-communist fighters, sanctioning “contras” in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. Its immediate purpose was a response to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which experienced a resurgence following Castro’s successes in the horn of Africa and southern Africa after 1976, and Central America after 1979, and its invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979. It also occupied formerly American bases in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s (Smith 1994: 299).

Despite the rhetoric, Reagan was not a warmonger. Although he rolled back the communist victory on Grenada through force, he was perfectly willing to achieve his democratic aims through negotiation and was willing to engage with the Soviets when it looked as if they were willing to compromise. As Jack Matlock, a former Reagan aid, put it, Reagan would engage with the Soviet Union if he believed that he could “convince the Soviet leaders that cooperation could serve the Soviet peoples better than confrontation and…encourage openness and democracy in the Soviet Union (Matlock 2005: xiv). His meetings first at Geneva and then in Iceland to negotiate on the INF Treaty convinced him, to quote Margaret Thatcher’s impression of the man, that Gorbachev was someone with whom they could do business. Although Gorbachev never met Reagan’s challenge to “tear down this wall,” Gorbachev did pursue glasnost and perestroika at home, and recanted the Brezhnev policy abroad. Unlike Stalin, Gorbachev indeed was someone the Americans could work with, but it was the superiority of the democratic system that ultimately led to communism’s collapse.
The disintegration of their chief ideological competitor finally freed American democracy promotion of its anti-communist component. At the UN, President Bush articulated his belief that democracy would expand worldwide. “Nothing can stand in the way of freedom's march,” he proclaimed.” For the first time, for millions around the world, a new world of freedom is within reach. Today is freedom's moment” (Bush 1989). On the eve of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush declared a “new world order” had emerged after “a hundred generations” of searching and “a thousand wars [had] raged” (Bush 1990).

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the opportunity to assist democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, the Philippines, South Korea, and Central America, captured by Jim Baker’s belief that “the time of building up news democracies has arrived” (Baker 1990). The most important target for democracy were former Soviet states, which were showered with over $300 million in aid per year via the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program. Between 1990 and 1998, $330 million was sent to Eastern Europe and $320 to the former Soviet Union (Carothers 1999:41). The US spent over $1billion on the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, with Poland and Bulgaria receiving a large bulk of the money destined for that region. Three quarters of the democracy aid under the Freedom Support Act gone to Ukraine and Russia (Carothers 1999:41).

President Clinton continued this tradition by making “democratic enlargement” a centerpiece of his foreign policy and expanding NATO to the states formerly under Soviet domination (Bouchet 2012: 47; Brinkley 1997:112). This involved case-by-case diplomacy and the institutionalization of democratization as political policy (Lancaster 2000; Windsor 2003). USAID was oriented around four areas of democratization work: electoral assistance, rule of law, accountability and transparency, and civil society. Taken together, these efforts were “the
most extensive, systematic effort the United States has ever undertaken to foster democracy around the world” (Carothers 1999:331).

During this time period, USAID and NED aid to Africa increased, with over forty African countries receiving assistance, but especially South Africa. Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, Mali, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, and Malawi also significant destinations. After the US military intervention in Haiti to restore the presidency of Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1994, they spent $100 million restoring democratic government there (Carothers 1999: 43). The other recipients have been El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Bolivia, Panama, and Peru. In Asia, democracy programs were directed at the Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. All told, the US government spent over $3 billion on democracy promotion in the 1990s through USAID. (Carothers 1999:45).

The Clinton administration also saw a return to aggressive democratic promotion. For example, it was prepared to order a massive invasion of Haiti in October of 1994 unless General Cedras relented to the elections bringing Aristide back to power (Clinton 2005: 197-203). Clinton also continued the operation in Somalia despite the events surrounding the Oct 3-4 1993 Battle of Mogadishu as part of Operation Restore Hope. In an address to the nation, he explained his rationale in terms of the America perception of itself as one which does not flinch from its leadership role to “promote peace and freedom” when faced with the action of “aggressors, thugs, and terrorists” (Clinton 1993).

Perhaps the most significant example of the American program during this time was its interventions during the breakup of Yugoslavia – an intervention justified on the basis of its

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316 Clinton argued that it was in the national interest 15.3% of the time, advanced a liberal democratic world order 16.2% of the time, and benefits people(s) 14.4% of the time. 22.3% of Clinton’s justifications for democracy promotion as a “special mission,” 15.3% of Clinton’s justification for democracy promotion is “national security. Interestingly, the connection between democracy promotion and market goals is not strong—only 10% in Clinton’s presidency and practically none in Bush’s administration.
similarity to Europe pre-WWII. The American involvement was in response to large-scale civilian killings – the most notable of which were Srebrenica and Markala – despite European foot-dragging. Clinton began a bombing campaign against the Serbs August 30 1995 in Serbs in March 1999 as a response to their refusal to withdrawn from Kosovo or respect the Kosovar right to self-govern (Clinton 2005: 510, 521-524). In an address to the nation, Clinton argued his case for intervention:

Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest. Take a look at this map…. All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the cold war ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division…. firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens there, too…. I have a responsibility as President to deal with problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national interests. America has a responsibility to stand with our allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe (Clinton 1999).

The “ingredients” for American intervention were also present – the prevention of self-governance and a dictator who was not capable of resolving the matter peacefully. Upon victory, Clinton reported that the United States had “achieved victory” for “our democratic values” and the right of Kosovar “self-government,” but that continued assistance for the “democracies of southeastern Europe” were still needed (Clinton 1999). He ended his statement by reassuring the American people that they had done the right thing: “Think of all the millions of innocent people who died in this bloody century because democracies reacted too late to evil and aggression.”
In addition to these conflicts, the Clinton administration also was the first to deal with the rise of transnational terrorism. Al Qaeda struck American targets, first the World Trade Center in 1993 and embassies in Africa in 1998. In response, Clinton authorized a cruise missile strike against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan (Clinton 2005: 439-443, 448-450). Despite authorizing missions to hunt down Osama Bin Laden, rhetorically they were committed to defeating terrorism through “law enforcement” and through “promoting democracy and human rights” (Albright 2000c).

Seen in the sweep of this historical context, the democratic agenda of the George Bush administration is not an outlier. The attempted construction of democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the “Freedom Agenda” recall similar efforts in Japan and Germany (Carothers 2007). And rhetorically, the administration made itself clear that the “pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace” (Rice 2000: 47). More specifically, the Bush administration made a strong case that “American power has been and could be used for moral purposes” (Fukuyama 2006: 48, 63).

This belief was first formally stated by President Bush in a speech at West Point where he outlined a national strategy -- the “Bush Doctrine” -- with aggressive democracy promotion at its heart:

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent... We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants… Sustained by
faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. Furthermore, the doctrine centralizes the role of other democracies in helping to change recalcitrant nations through making —freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future. (Bush 2002 West Point Speech)

On the heels of this speech, the National Security Strategy (2002) proclaimed the American mission would be to, “defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.” For nearly a decade thereafter, National Security Strategy documents would confidently link American security to the spread of democracy around the world. The Bush administration received a great deal of criticism from all corners for the simplistic assertion that those who opposed US goals must simply “hate freedom... and that’s where the clash occurs,” but it was not out of line with the core message of other presidents (Bush 2004: 536). The only real difference between Bush and other presidents is that he had a unique moment where the democratic program stood totally unopposed. The United States had never been more capable of achieving this program than it was at the beginning of the 21st century.

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317 President Bush’s 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights, as the first among six strategies aimed at winning the “War on Terror”, the necessity to “advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism” The White House: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006. A 2007 White House Fact Sheet entitled “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Around the World” also insists: “Expanding Freedom Is More Than A Moral Imperative – It Is The Only Realistic Way To Protect Our People. The 9/11 attacks were evidence of an international movement of violent Islamic extremists that threatens free people everywhere. Nations that commit to freedom for their people will not support extremists; they will join in defeating them.”
Unwilling to relinquish control of a “chaotic and dangerous world,” Bush asserted that the “call of history has come to the right country” (Bush 2002). His primary target was democracy promotion in the Middle East, but he quickly expanded the call to all “rogue states” and those that harbor terrorists (Bush 2001, 2003). He continued this approach into his second administration, stating that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush 2005). His goal was to create a cascade of democracies and render in one fell swoop the Middle East a pacific region of the world (Office of Press Secretary 2005). The US routinely admonished Middle East allies such as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco. In the case of enemies such as Syria and Libya, the United States resorted to military threats if they did not reform (Dalacoura 2005: 968-969).

Beside the invasion and subsequent democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration created new democracy promotion initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. Announced in December of 2002 by

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318 Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned the GOP convention that “the world is a chaotic and dangerous place” in which “no one will lead and that will foster chaos—or others who do not share our values will fill the vacuum”.

319 26.2% of Bush’s justifications for democracy promotion as a ‘special mission’; 23.85 of Bush’s justification for democracy promotion is “national security” Bush also argued that democratic promotion builds a liberal order 19.4% of the time and benefits other people(s) 20.3% of the time.

320 An excerpt of his 2003 speech at the NED stated: “Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace…. The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom — the freedom we prize — is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind.”

321 “The reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means... I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy”
Colin Powell, MEPI which was shaped by the UNDP Arab Human Development Report of 2002, which identified deficits in political freedom, women’s empowerment and knowledge. A second program was the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Partnership Initiative announced at the June 2004 G8 Summit – led by America but not exclusively American. The administration also launched Radio Sawa [Together], and Al Hurrah [The Free] TV station.

The Obama administration came into office wanting to move away from the policies of the Bush administration, committing itself to a more pragmatic pursuit of democracy abroad and toning down the messianic rhetoric of his predecessor. In his Cairo speech in 2009, Obama stated that, “America does not presume to know what is best for everyone” (Obama 2009). At the UN, he assured the world that the United States understands that “democracy cannot be imposed from the outside… each nation must chart its own course to fulfill the aspiration of its people” (Obama 2011). This sentiment was echoed by those in his administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked in 2011, “Situations vary dramatically from country to country it would be foolish to take a one-size-fits-all approach and barrel forward regardless of circumstances on the ground…. Over time a more democratic Middle East and North Africa can provide a more sustainable basis for addressing…challenges” The 2010 NSS states that “America will not impose any system of government on another country, but our long-term security and prosperity depends on our steady support for universal values” (NSS 2010: 36).

Thus far they have been content to complete the democratic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than begin new projects. There have been no new initiatives or expansion of democratization bureaucratization save the creation of a new office within the State Department’s Near East Bureau, NEA/AC (assistance coordination was formed to encompass
MEPI and more closely align U.S. aid to the region with policy goals. (Bouchet 2012: 48).\(^{322}\) As Stephen McInerney and Cole Bockenfiled note, in 2010 the United States provided $6.7 billion in foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa, with 73 percent of that amount allocated for military and security assistance and 7.4 percent for democracy and governance programming (McInerney and Bockenfield 2014). Five years later, the request are 76 percent and 5.8 percent respectively. However he has not cut existing programs, with budgets totaling $3.3, $3.1, and $2.8 billion in his first three years, including a $770mil ask for the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund to support transitions in the region (Bouchet 2012: 48).

Obama appeared to be caught relatively flat-footed by the event known as the Arab Spring that began December of 2010. Obama indicated early on that he wanted to pursue a “dual track” strategies of engagement with problematic regimes, opting to “gently nudge” over bludgeon (NSS 2010: 38).\(^{323}\) Therefore it is to its credit that the administration did not try to save long-time allies such as long-time Egyptian president Mubarak, although the degree to which it could have been successful if it truly wanted to is unknown. Moreover, Obama appeared totally unable to manage the pace or content of democratic transition in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. In a May 2011 address at the State Department, Obama declared that “it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy” (Obama 2011a). But as he chose to do with the Iranian democratic movement shortly after he assumed office, the Obama administration did relatively little but stand approvingly to the side.

\(^{322}\) The QDDR has led to the position of under-secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs being turned into a the under-secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights with wider responsibilities.

\(^{323}\) The goal is “to improve government-to-government relations and use this dialogue to advance human rights, while engaging civil society and peaceful political opposition, and encouraging US nongovernmental actors to do the same. More substantive government-to-government relations can create permissive conditions for civil society to operate and for more extensive people-to-people exchanges.” (NSS 2010: 38)
This is not to say the United States did not pursue action to support democratic movements when it had to. In Libya the administration intervened effectively against Qaddafi’s plan to destroy the democratic rebels in Benghazi. In a national speech, he warned that “The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power” (Obama 2011b). To refuse to act, he argued, would doom the nascent democratic movements.

Nevertheless, he was reluctant to assist a democratic transition, nor did he choose to intervene in Syria. The Egyptian transition to democracy has also failed. The military-backed interim government following Mohamed Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, and the administration of President Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi after his election in May 2014, has quashed democracy with little repercussion. 324

Despite the relative inactions of his government, the rise of the Islamic State has forced the United States to once again defend democracy from totalitarianism – this time in Iraq. America began its mission to degrade the capabilities of the religious organization in August 2014 and continues to present writing. This response was predictable and expected. Obama has mentioned American exceptionalism in regards to its democratic mission more than his predecessor (Schlesinger 2011). In his 2012 State of the Union address, he asserted that ‘America remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs— and as long as I’m President, I intend to keep it that way’ (Obama 2012).

324 40,000 people have been jailed (many of them Muslim Brotherhood). Few police have been prosecuted for their role in killings on demonstrators and the right to assembly has been suppressed. The only move the US has made is freeing the sixteen NGO workers held and briefly suspending military assistance.
That Obama thinks this way is not particularly noteworthy, in the context of American foreign policy. The history of American foreign policy is one of consistent promotion of democracy, a point that this chapter has labored to establish. With the exception of only a few periods of time, the desire to install constitutional self-rule and electoral democracy at home and abroad has influenced the grand sweep of American governmental activity. It has been at the center of nearly every major conflict it has fought.

Democracy promotion has also characterized the interaction between the United States and other organizations – even before there was a coherent plan to organize world affairs along the American domestic model. When he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2009, ostensibly for his stated desire to reduce America’s unilateral action in world affairs, President Obama included a personal reflection about the purpose of America in the world.

Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason … Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms…. America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal.

In this speech excerpt there is demonstration of the belief in the universality of the American political program and its mission to ensure its success. It is an oft-repeated refrain in such pronouncements. But there is also another interesting phrase: “evil does exist in the world,” in the form of “Hitler’s armies… and Al Qaeda.”
Such an assertion begs the question — are Al Qaeda and Nazi Germany evil? I am not trying to assert some sort of moral equivalency, of course, but I am interested as to why Al Qaeda and Nazi Germany would so effortlessly be linked together in such a way? This chapter has provided evidence that the sweep of history a foreign policy that favors freedom. Now it turns to how the US regards other organization, especially those advancing a certain political program. These programmatic rivals, both within the political system and without, are regarded by the United States as evil with whom there can be no peace.

5.4 The Democratic Program and Conflict
Modern systems theory sources conflict in the seams between programs and system. Organizations pursue communicative strategies that can make conflict more likely depending upon the aggressiveness of their exclusion/inclusion and universal applicability of their program. The organizations that tends to favor a fundamentalist approach to other programs are even more likely to generate conflict to the irreducibility of the perceived difference between them.

This project presents a rather Waltzian, top-down approach to understanding conflict, whereby, the actors themselves are not necessarily conscious of the structural imperative yet act as though they are. The next section will depart from this a bit by providing a more micro-level view of this process. It will substantiate the argument that, at the very least, those who promoted a democratic program viewed fascism, communism, and the religious programs alike in terms of their communicative threat. Ideally I would have liked to have integrated this within the previous narrative, but I wanted to hammer this point home. To make this case, the next section will
anchor its analysis in a term frequently used by Americans to depict hegemonic organizational strategies – totalitarianism (See Arendt 1966: 467-470).325

This term seems to provoke a special degree of anxiety. George Kennan writes that the very idea of it is a “nightmare” that impacts people down to their subconscious, the “state of mind it creates in its victims” (Kennan 1953: 20). These political and religious programs are, according to presidents from FDR to Obama, the very definition of that which is “evil.” It seems to me, aside from the fears of naked coercion, it is the prospect of being forced to confine the scope of human society to a single sort of program that most frightens people. That is, these programs attempt to monopolize all meaning-creation within a society.

Giovanni Amendola warned that totalitarianism “denies you the right to possess a conscience…of your own, not one imposed by others” such that the voice of the state would be in the heads of the citizen (Quoted in Gleason 1995:14, 19).326 Hannah Arendt’s noted that “totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means…[but]…has discovered a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within” (Arendt 1951: 325). The communist Chinese practice of *his-nao,* meaning “cleansing of the mind,” and commonly referred to as “brainwashing” that was directed at captured American soldiers during the Korean War, is the totalitarianism’s purest expression (Gleason 1995: 90-93).327

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325 Fundamentalist political systems “pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process… because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas…[and] insist on a ‘truer’ reality concealed behind all perceptible things… once it has established its premise… experiences no longer interfere with ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by reality” (Arendt 1966:467-470).

326 Giovanni Amendola was an Italian journalist and politician and the first to identify totalitarianism as a particular political program, wrote that totalitarianism

327 According to Albert Biderman, a social scientist studying the returning POW’s, “political indoctrination itself appears in large measure ot have been an ultimate objective of the communists rather than on instrumental to a more remot purpose. Communism is a proselytizing movement and proselytizes assiduously whomever, wherever, and however it can” (Biderman 1963: 74 quoted in Gleason 1995: 98).
That which they could not immediately coopt through attraction and inspiration, these totalitarian organizations cowed into submission through unremitting violence, all with the end goal “to absorb every sphere of life into itself” (Gleason 1995: 16; Dawson 1934: 1-2). Religious leaders were particularly alarmed by the totalitarian program of communism and fascism, which represented the “two greatest anti-Christian forces of the world” (Magden 1964:77) Liberal Presbyterian columnist, Reverend Abraham J Muste saw a merger between the anticapitalistic, anti-Christian, antidemocratic governments in a “vast historical movement” that would unite them and substitute democracy and religion for the “man-god” presented by totalitarianism (Gleason 1995: 48-49).

Reinhold Niebuhr, along with other eight-seven other scholars, penned a statement in 1943 declaring that they could not remain silent in the face totalitarianism’s push to remove their opportunity “to work toward a larger earthly fulfillment of [Christianity’s] destiny” (Gleason 1995: 55). Even more alarmingly, they warned that the Soviets and fascists were engaged in “religious liquidation.” Senator J Howard McGrath, later Truman’s attorney general, claimed that “over 400,000 believers in God and freedom have been killed, and 100,000 are in prisons and concentration camps” as part of an effort to exterminate the clergy in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia (Truman 1947).

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328 Christopher Dawson, a British historian, noted by 1934 the government in Russia and Germany were slowly extending their control over the entirety of social life eventually politicizing all aspects

329 By May 7, 1939, the antithesis of Christian and totalitarian values had reached the cover of the New York Times Magazine. In an article entitled ‘The Titanic Twofold Challenge,’ John Alexander MacKay, president of the Princeton Theological Seminary… argued that both religion and democracy were under siege by a ‘new mystic power… to which the ugly world ‘totalitarian’ has been given’ and that the entire ‘Hebrew-Christian religious tradition’… hands in the balance. An ominous cover illustration depicted two titanic figures poised for battle, one bearing a bludgeon and the other holding the shield of ‘religion and democracy.’ Beneath it a caption read: ‘the totalitarian church-state, presenting a species of man-god, presumes to offer a substitute for both religion and democracy’ (Gleason 1995: 48-49). 68, 38; see also Norman Thomas in Socialist Call, Sept. 2, 1939. Reinhold Niebuhr used the term totalitarian interchangeably with ‘rationalist utopianism’ in essays and speeches throughout 1939 and 1940.

330 “What Faith?” Time August 17 1942, p 46. American Catholics were divided. Catholic dislike of the Soviet Union ran very deep… Even those in favor of intervention felt that if the United States were allied with the Soviet Union, the war could not be described as ‘against totalitarianism.’ After June 22, 1941, almost all organized Catholics fighting the war in an alliance with ‘atheistic Russia’[84].
Moreover, these organizations extent their control over the economy, art, and all obstacles to their program.\textsuperscript{331} In the Soviet Union, those suspected of harming the political program, and its Five-Year Plans, were subject to show trials and sent to work camps. By 1938, over 330,000 Party Members, 34,000 soldiers, including eight generals, and over 250,000 of the intelligentsia and were purged from Soviet society. Likewise, following Hitler’s desire for “moral purification of the body politics,” Nazi Germany purged all elements from its society that contradicted its totalitarian program, including all rival political programs, non-Nazi art and science, the legal system, and all elements of ethnic Jews (see Gellately and Stoltzfus 2001)

Of course I would be remiss in my duties as a disciple of Luhmann if I failed to point out that “evil” does not actually register as a concept within modern systems theory. All organizations have, if not specific intentions or strategies, then at least the potential to pursue a maximalist communicative strategy. Even organizations which tout their commitment to human freedom in the form of democracy and capitalism achieve programmatic victory through an efficiency-oriented liberal governmentality – by literally writing its legitimacy into the very consciousness of humans (Foucault 2004a, 2004b).\textsuperscript{332} Whereas fascism or communism utilize coercion to eliminate other distinctions (at least at first), liberal democracy achieves the same outcome through manipulation individual decision-making. Individuals are trained to keep religion and family out of the public sphere, to be wary of “technocratic governance” through an emphasis on individual liberty, and to “carry freedom” into the economic sphere. When one of

\textsuperscript{331}Stalin heavily relied on CHEKA/OGPU as he came to power in the 1920’s, using them to arrest rivals such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin. They also eventually murdered Trotsky in 1940.

\textsuperscript{332}For Foucault, the United States is particularly notable as an example of this process in action. Describing the peculiarities of the American democratic program, he argued that liberalism seemed to be the basis of the American government, rather than the means by which the government limited itself (Foucault 2008: 217). It is not a choice so much as “a whole way of being and thinking,” so that “disputes between individuals and government look like the problem of freedoms” (Foucault 2008: 218). This utopian strand of American liberalism is “a general state of thought, analysis, and imagination” (Foucault 2008: 219). Coercion is thus almost never needed in the American context, nor is it needed in other places where its political program has taken root.
those systems intrudes into others, they are trained to turn them into political problems for processing.\textsuperscript{333}

Although I could expound at some length about the key distinction, for the purpose of this section I only mean to demonstrate that programmatic conflict was generated by the communicative strategy pursued by these organizations. I doubt for those who have a passing understanding of history there will be much here that is surprising. Yet I want to make the argument plain that fear of and reaction to totalitarian organization drives conflict.

5.4.1 Totalitarian Political Programs as Threat\textsuperscript{334}

It seems to me that the perceived threat of communicative hegemony has played a large part in driving American foreign policy. As the previous section details, the policy-makers within the US government have believed the country to be in conflict with non-democratic programs for nearly two-hundred years. Wariness of autocratic encroachment prompted the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine. It drove the country to war against itself and it prompted a war against Spain.

There is also evidence that key Wilson advisors perceived WWI in ideological terms. Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote that Germany should be opposed as it was “utterly hostile” to democracy due to its “absolutism” and its “ambition for world domination,” a category in which he saw potentially including Japan and Czarist Russia (Lansing 1915 in Graebner 1961). Likewise, Colonel Edward House wrote to Lansing he believed the United States could not permit, “a military autocracy [to] dominate the world” (House 1915).\textsuperscript{335} “If victory is theirs,” he implored Wilson, “the war lords will reign supreme and democratic

\textsuperscript{333} This is an inversion of what Foucault believed regarding modern goal of governmentality to make the individual an “entrepreneur of himself” and subject all political decision to economic logic. A modern systems perspective reveals that it is in fact the politicization of the economy through a distinct political ideology of economic freedom. (Foucault 2008: 243, 246, 247). (58).

\textsuperscript{334} FDR tended to use “autocracy” and “totalitarianism” interchangeably, and so I follow suit.

\textsuperscript{335} Other administration officials held similar views. Walter Hines Page, ambassador to Great Britain, specifically included Japan with Germany as a threat to the United States.
governments will be imperiled throughout the world” (House 1916). Wilson would later would call Germany a “selfish and autocratic power” whose defeat would ensure the world would “be made safe for democracy” (House 1917).

The Wilson administration eyed the nascent Soviet Union with equal alarm and refused to recognize the government. Lansing feared that the spread of Bolshevism, “would become a greater menace to the world than Prussianism” (Lansing 1917). He characterized the Bolshevik regime as an “intolerable tyranny… [of] intrigue, terror, informing, spying, and military power” (Lansing 1917). Within a decade, fears began to spread that the Soviet Union would usher in a new totalitarian model would spread to the United States. Similar models rose in Italy and Germany stoked this anxiety.

Programmatically speaking, Americans in the 1920’s and 30’s did not seem to differentiate between fascism and communism, insofar as both adopted a similar approach to other communication. Journalist William Henry Chamberlin, writing for the Atlantic Monthly, expected the two would converge into a “Red Fascism” and would usher in an age of tyrannical and totalitarian states (Gleason 1995: 42, 43) American intellectuals as diverse as Eugene Lyons, Elmer Davis, John Dewey, and Walter Lippman all regarded both programs as equally dangerous. Horace Kallen, a philosopher at Clark College in Massachusetts, remarked that both systems were to be castigated “for their tyrannical apotheosis of Unity.” (Lyons 1937: 621-622).

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337 After the American entry into the war, the “military masters of Germany” were castigated by Wilson in a speech on July 4, 1917. Regarding the population of these autocracies, Wilson argued that the “[make] every choice for them and [dispose] of their lives and fortunes as they will” Ray Stannard Baker, ed., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-1926, V, 235.
338 In April 1928, Filippo Turati, the “grand old man” of Italian socialism, predicted “worldwide conflict between fascistic totalitarianism and liberal democracy,” a perspective shared by many Americans (quoted in Gleason 1995:10).
American newspapers increasingly regarded all totalitarian states as alike in their hostility towards democracy (Maddux 1977).

On the eve of WWII, Americans still understood fascism and communism as linked in their denial of freedom, perceived them as international aggressors, and saw their leaders as comrades. Papers captured from the Germans regarding the Pact convinced many Americans that “the Nazis and the Russian had been essentially one and the same in their aims of world conquest.” (Adler and Paterson 1970: 1051, 1058-59). The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and mutual partition of Poland confirmed the similarity in the mind of many Americans. This was expressed by Collier’s magazine which argued that this removed, “all doubt, except in the minds of incurable dreamers, that there is any real difference between Communism and Fascism.” (Quoted in Adler and Paterson 1970: 1058). In his Jan 1936 State of the Union, FDR did not differentiate either. He told Congress that “autocracy in world affairs endangers peace…” In contrast, “Democracy,” he assured the Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires one year later, “is still the best hope of the world” (FDR Papers).

Germany’s June 22 1941 attack on the Soviet Union did tamp down some of this undifferentiation, but there was a strong desire to let the two destroy each other since the underlying programmatic content was unchanged. As then-Senator Harry Truman let slip, "If we see that Germany inning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible" (McCullough 1992: 262). Former Ambassador to Russia William C Bullitt saw the contest as one between “Satan and Lucifer” (NYT July 15 1941). FDR’s Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, in a speech he never gave at the

339 Christian Science Monitor concluded that, “Communism and Fascism are essentially alike, for each means the exaltation of force, the suppression of liberties, a regimentation and discipline by one will which brooks no opposition and which subordinates the individual to the demands of the State.”[70] (Gleason 1995: 47). …
University of Alabama, stated that “the universities of Italy and Germany are no more slavish mouthpieces of governments… than are the universities of Russia and of the Communist dictatorship that has regimented not only the lives but the very thoughts of its people.”

340 The notion of Soviet Union as ally did not even survive to the end of the war, by the spring of 1945 the American ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman warned of the Soviet intention to destroy any chance for democracy in Eastern Europe (Gleason 1995: 68)

In the minds of the American public and policy-makers, Soviet behavior was expected to conform to that of their fascist predecessors (Adler and Paterson 1970: 1046). The idea of “Red Fascism” as a common grouping for all totalitarian regimes persisted after WWII, as evidenced by J Edgar Hoover’s use of the term in 1947 (Hoover 1947: 24). “That the Communists were the successors of the Nazis and closely connected to them – was the most powerful political idea of the late 1940’s” (Gleason 1995: 74) In testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee on March 25, 1948, James Forrestal commented that “The record shows that despotism, whatever its form, has a remorseless compulsion to aggression” (Forrestal 1948).

Regarding cooperation and appeasing the Soviets, Secretary Forrestal said “it seems doubtful that we should endeavor to buy their understanding and sympathy. We tried that once with Hitler. There are no returns on appeasement” (Forrestal and Duffield 1951). George Allen of the State Department stated in 1949 that “in totalitarianism, of either the right or the left, lie the seeds of aggressive action” (State Bulletin XX 1949: 801). They both established total control over communication within their society, both used propaganda, and both could lead an
aggressive war on that basis (Adler and Paterson 1970: 1052). Eugene Lyons wrote in May 1945 that ‘the slogan ‘two world’ is closer to the dominant facts of our day, “and humans must choose between “freedom” and “submission” to totalitarianism. (Quoted in Gleason 1995: 64).

Unsurprisingly, the movement of Soviet troops into Eastern Europe was interpreted as evidence of global ambition, a perspective popularized by Churchill and George Marshall (Marshall, NYT 1948). HV K Altenborn called the Soviets, “A ruthless, totalitarian power which is seeking domination in both Europe and Asia,” and he warned his listeners to “Remember Munich!” The civil war in Greece was seen as a Hitler-like intrusion by the Russians (Adler and Paterson 1970:1055). In 1948 George Marshal made direct analogy to Germany’s swallowing of Eastern European states to the Soviet expansion (NYT 1948). Perhaps no document did more to convince the Americans of the existential threat posed by totalitarianism than Kennan’s “Long Telegram.” He wrote of the Soviet Union:

We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.

John Lewis Gaddis wrote that the Long Telegram was the means by which the Soviet Union was fused with Nazi Germany in terms of its existential threat. The autocratic tradition of the Soviets, combined with its permanent, ideologically-charged expansion, meant democracy itself was threatened by their ruthless expansion (Gaddis 1989: 262). The only option was to contain the threat and roll it back where possible.

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342 Acting Secretary of State Joseph C Grew told Truman in a memo that the “Communists have the same attitude as Goebbels did – that the civil liberties of the democracies are convenient instruments for Communists to facilitate their tearing down the structure of the state and thereafter abolishing all civil rights.”

343 “Have Britain and America Any Reason to Fear Russia?” ibid.,X I (Mar. 25, 1946), 5.
This expectation of conflict was particularly evident in the statements of President Truman and his White House. In his Navy Day speech of October 1945, he declared that the Soviets were evil and pledged no compromise with them (Truman 1945). Regarding their expansionist tendencies, “there isn’t any difference in totalitarian states. I don’t care what you call them, Nazi, Communist, or Fascist.” The aggression of the fascists, which began with small territorial gains, provided a telling lesson for the future of communist action. To surrender in one instance would be to surrender in all instances. The Truman Doctrine committed American foreign policy to defend against the inevitable expansionist designs of the Soviets. In his address before Congress on March 12, 1947, he argued that:

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

This expectation led to the creation and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 (Gleason 1995: 81 [43]). Truman also prepared the United States for a long ideological battle at home, issuing Executive Order 9835.13 that directed the AG to compile a list disloyal.

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344 There are a number of examples of those within the Truman administration of seeing the Soviet in the same light as they saw Nazi Germany. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman argued that the US faced an ideological was with the communists as “vigorous and dangerous as Fascism or Nazism.” Henry L. Roberts, “Russia and America,” in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven, Conn., 1962), 580-81; Collier’s, quoted in Paul Willen, “Who Collaborated with Russia?” Antioch Review, XIV (Sept. 1954), 262; Assistant Secretary of State William Benton pointed out, “we have learned that there is an essential connection between denial of freedom of expression on the one hand, and dictatorship and war on the other.” Speech, Feb. 11, 1947, Harry S. Truman Papers, OF 20, Harry S. Truman Library; Edward Stettinius, a State Department official, wrote in a memo that “no country can safely ignore the decline of liberty and the emergence of a totalitarian government in a neighboring country. Bitter experience has taught us that totalitarianism is too often associated with sudden and armed aggression.” Department of State Bulletin, April 22 1945, p 751
understood as “totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive” (Gleason 1995: 76). Any doubts or partisan debate about the global designs of the communists, at least from the perspective of some Americans, ended at the outbreak of the Korea War, at least until Vietnam (Krebs 2011: 14).

For those familiar with the history, they know that the anti-Communist fervor that characterized American political discourse cooled somewhat by the mid-1960 and continued on into the next decade. The experience of the Vietnam War, disagreement as to the extent of American military commitment, and the perception that Soviet global designs had faltered shifted public opinion in favor of detente (Holsti and Rosenau 1984: 230-232). This is the commonly accepted narrative. A closer examination reveals the fundamental framework for thinking and responding to the Soviets remained relatively coherent throughout the entire

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345 In his remarks on the order, President Truman equated the two, saying “there isn’t any difference between the totalitarian Russian government and the Hitler government… They are all alike. They are police governments – police state governments.” Press conference, Mar. 30, 1950, David D. Lloyd Files, Truman Papers, box 5, Harry S. Truman Library.

346 Before the Korean War there were two camps -- those willing to accommodate and those desiring to confront the Soviet Union. While they disagreed on the scope of intervention and the US commitment abroad, they both agreed on certain axioms – the indivisible nature of global security and the global characteristics of the conflict, the need for allies to oppose the Soviet Union, the importance of US leadership and the potential for ‘constructive engagement’ on certain terms. The outbreak of the Korean War damaged the accommodationist position such that a consensus about the nature of the Soviet threat emerged in American politics (Krebs 2011: 22). And many of those who were initially accommodationists pulled even harder to the right in order to “out-Cold War” Truman in the General election. On important accommodationists in Congress see Meyers 2007, 291-298.

347 The Vietnam in particular has been hailed as the “acid bath” that dissolved the Cold War consensus. For more on this see Holsti and James N. Rosenau 1986, 376-377. See also Holsti and Rosenau 1979; 1980, 264. While most scholars follow the conventional script, others, such as Bruce Russett, find evidence of its demise as early as 1960. However, even Russett still sees Vietnam as a key turning point in public opinion. Russett 1975, 11-17; Russett and Hanson 1975, 134-144. For information about public opinion surrounding issues pertaining to the Cold War consensus, see especially Holsti and James N. Rosenau 1986; Holsti and Rosenau 1979; 1984; 1986. See also Russett 1975; Russett and Hanson 1975; Wittkopf 1986; 1987; 1990; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983. For a partial reconsideration, see Wittkopf and McCormick 1990 See also Allison 1970-1971, 150, axioms #1-2; Halperin, Clapp and Kanter 1974, 11, shared images #1-3; Katzenbach 1973, 6.
conflict, both in government and the major media. Positive shifts regarding the communists typically followed perceived victories against the Soviets (Bacevich 2007: ix; Krebs 2011). 348

The success of the Cuban Missile Crisis – and it was certainly seen as such within foreign policy circles – buoyed expectations that the communists could be defeated within the framework for containment (Krebs 2011:35-36). John Kennedy’s private statements reveal a humanization of and even empathizing with the Soviet adversary, particularly when it came to dealing with hardliners at home which bolstered this perception (Beschloss 1991:20; see also Gaddis 1987). 349 His victory in the Cuban Missile Crisis also gave him a small window to publicly encourage Americans “toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home” (Kennedy 1963). However, it also proved the wisdom of staying the course since the Soviet Union did not alter its rhetoric or behavior to indicate renunciation of global expansion, an attitude shared by many within government, including Richard Nixon and George HW Bush (Krebs 2011:37) 350

The Sino-Soviet split, which should have painted a nuanced picture of the communist threat, was interpreted as either relatively meaningless or a success of American foreign policy. In his 1964 Presidential campaign, Barry Goldwater thought the split irrelevant: “I don’t care

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348 See also Green 1987, chap. 8; Ninkovich 2003, 39; Offner 2007. Krebs (2011) process traces the editorials of the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune across the Cold War years and finds stable opinion regarding the “narrative consensus” if not the specifics of policy (Krebs 2011: 55; see Krebs 2015).

349 He said of Kruschev during the crisis, “You have two people … who are both of goodwill, but neither of whom can communicate because of a language difference.” Quoted in Beschloss 1991, 20. He also identified with Kruschev’s problem dealing with hardliners – Kennedy imagined that Khrushchev “would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard-line crowd…I’ve got similar problems,” he told Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review Quoted in Beschloss 1991, 588. See also Gaddis 1982, 198-236; Halberstam 1969, 14-24, 60.

how you spell it, it’s still Communism” (Mohr 1964). At best it was seen as an “a strain, not a fracture,” as a limited disagreement over means, “a dispute over how best to bury the free world” (Chang 1990: 235). In his State of the Union Kennedy asserted that, “it was proof of the inevitable triumph of the American way, of the virtues of “free and open societies” and of “the seeds of internal disintegration” that inhere in “closed Communist societies.” For Nixon and Kissinger it was the triumph an activist foreign policy against a dangerous Soviet adversary.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in America’s commitment to South Vietnam and the consequent conflict there. After decades of pouring resources into establishing a viable self-governing state in South Vietnam, the US became embroiled in its war, not just because it desired for an eventual democracy, but because policy maker worried that a victory there would propel the communists to success throughout the world. The cost was seen as so high that Lyndon Johnson would risk the centerpiece of his presidency – the Great Society – in order to protect the world from a perceived communist victory in Vietnam (McPherson and Holbrooke 1983; Sorenson 1982).

Even after Vietnam, the belief that American defeat by communism in one place would affect its overall security was still evident in political discourse. For example, President Ford justified continued assistance to South Vietnam through an appeal to that domino theory. He argued that, “the rest of the world and particularly … the free nations of Asia … must not think for a minute that the United States is pulling out on them or intends to abandon them to aggression,” and he made similar comments after Congress cut off aid to Angola. Henry Kissinger also warned that Saigon’s fall would have “serious consequences” for “the general

351 Though this was at odds with a CIA report published that same month concluding that “the USSR and China are now two separate powers whose interests conflict on almost every major issue.” CIA report quoted in Chang 1990, 235.
ability of other countries to rely on the word of the United States” (quoted in Krebs 2011:45; Sunquist 1981: 278, 288). Regardless of their stand on the Vietnam, this over-arching belief in the shape of the Cold War was shared by two-third of Americans in polling (Holsti et al 1980: 263-301). Vietnam may have been a defeat, but it was a defeat of strategy, allies, allocation of resources, or served as a distraction of the “real” confrontation between the US and the USSR, but it did not represent a refutation of the general characteristics of the Cold War (Clifford 1969; Raymond 1964).352

The brief period of détente under Jimmy Carter is also not indicative of a general change in attitude. “Containment by negotiation” had replaced “containment by confrontation,” but containment of the threat and opposition to its political program remained (Hoffman 1978: 43; Suri 2003). As the section of democratic promotion detailed, Carter resumed a moralistic impulse in the American program not seen since Wilson, and thus the lines between totalitarianism and democracy were drawn a bit bright than they had been in a decade (Schmitz 2006: chp 5). If there was pressure to relent on the struggle, it was due to the perception of American decline in relative capability, and not any new revelation about communist intentions.353 Carter’s famous “Crisis of Confidence” speech was designed to renew the American confidence in its political program and sense of global purpose (Carter 1979). And as the previous section sets out, he was determined that the American commitment to freedom and

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352 On the failure of strategy see United States Senate 1966, 121-122 and passing. Kennan, however, also suggested that the damage might be short-lived (124). See also Matusow 1984, 378-382. On allies see Church, “How Many Dominican Republics”; Church later observed that “no nation—not even our own—possesses an arsenal so large, or a treasury so rich, as to damp down the fires of smoldering revolution throughout the whole of the awakening world.” On the prominence of excessive cost in the arguments see Averch 2002, 97-98, 108-111. See also Clifford 1969.

353 Arguably the Reagan and Nixon doctrines could be construed as shifting the costs of combating communism to allies.
human rights would defeat the forces of totalitarianism – forces that the American people even in 1980 considered a programmatic threat (Levgold 1980:79). 354

Even when criticizing Carter’s foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, the scion of realpolitik gave a talk at NYU in 1977 that could have reasonably been delivered by Carter. He told his audience that, “the difference between freedom and totalitarianism is not transient or incidental; it is a moral conflict, of fundamental historical proportions, which gives the modern age its special meaning and peril” (quoted in Gleason 1995: 193 [11]). For Kissinger, it was not the characteristics of the communist totalitarianism that was in question, only the lengths to which the United States should go to defeat it and “help preserve the balance of power in behalf of all free peoples.”

No presidency was more rhetorically committed to opposing totalitarianism in pursuit of America’s democratic mission than Ronald Reagan. In 1962 Reagan told an audience in Stockton, California that “the issue of our times is the contest between totalitarianism and freedom” [35] (197). He wrote for the Los Angeles Fortnight that “the real fight with this totalitarianism belongs properly to the forces of liberal democracy, just as did the battle with Hitler’s totalitarianism. There is no difference except in the cast of characters (Quoted in Gleason 1995: 197 [33]). He also believed that the best way to combat totalitarianism was to “roll it back”… the Soviet Union was the “focus of evil in the modern world” which he announced in a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals on March 1983

Reagan’s administration cast the communists as “savage barbarians” that was pouring every resources into “making instruments of destruction” while at the same time attempting to disarm its future victims through diplomacy (Ivie 1983:3). He referred to them as mentally

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354 Eighty-three percent of Americans polled believed the Soviet Union was expansionist and were skeptical of their intentions during the height of détente.
disturbed, fanatics, and ideological purists – it is ‘that religion of theirs, which is Marxist-Leninism— that makes them so immune to practical reason” (Reagan Jan 25, 1982). Thus the only proper response is deal with their “barbarous assault on the human spirit,” their “criminality,” and their brutal impositions is from a position of strength (Reagan 1981, May 17, 1982). As Reagan has put it, the Soviets ‘respect only strength and resolve in their dealing with other nations.’ … [therefore] the United States must rebuild its conventional and nuclear arsenals” to face (Ivie 1983: 7). It would be the only way for the “forces of good” to triumph over the “evil Empire” (Reagan March 9, 1981).

Of course it was during the Reagan administration that truly saw the end of the communist threat. And it was Reagan that eventually sat down at tables in Geneva and Iceland to negotiate with the Soviets, but it was always from a superior position. It was not Gorbachev who demanded that a wall be torn down, nor was it Reagan that enacted domestic reforms that adopted elements of the communist political program. If anything, the Cold War heated up, inasmuch as it ever did, with the enactment of the Reagan Doctrine. This is to say, negotiation occurred from a position of programmatic superiority.

The end of the Cold War brought a temporary end to obvious programmatic competition within the political system, with the American democracy program the victor. After nearly one-hundred and fifty years of tension and seventy years of outright conflict, all other major programs have been vanquished. It remains to be seen whether China and its statist program will seriously challenge the democratic program of the United States and its allies. If it does provide a serious alternative, expect conflict.

**5.4.2 The War on Terror as Between-System Conflict**
In addition to driving conflict within the political system, organizational strategies can drive conflict between systems as well. A Luhmannian perspective emphasizes that War on Terror is not some quixotic quest by an unmoored superpower, but precisely the response of a political organization threatened by the communicative strategy of a would-be religious hegemon. The reaction to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq are far outside the realm of what might be considered proportional to the actual physical threats posed by those organizations. Yet the language of policy-makers – likening these religious organizations to the fascist and communist organizations in the 20th century -- in the United States portrays deep discomfort with the communicative program promoted by these organizations.

Following the attacks on Sept 11th, members of the Bush administration determined that the perpetrators of the attack were members of Al-Qaeda. In a speech before Congress, President George Bush announced that, “The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.” Al Qaeda’s intentions, he argued, were ‘to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children.” Explaining their motives, Bush rhetorically asserted the conflict was sourced in programmatic differences:

They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope...
that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.

That none of the goals save perhaps the last one could be achieved through destroying some buildings in New York City was irrelevant. Bush portrayed Al Qaeda and the Taliban as existential threats to the United States and its democracy. On this there could only be two sides—“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush 2001).

Out of this “war on terror” emerged conflicts against the Taliban and the insurgency in Iraq in an attempt to create two nascent democracies as the principle means of vanquishing the threat from those religious organizations. Although one could quibble with both of those characterizations, the switch from the destruction of terrorist enemies as a rationale to invade Iraq and Afghanistan is not a cynical move so much as it reflects the long-term American mission of democracy promotion. And more to the point, it reflects the imposition of a political understanding of security.

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355 From this point, the Bush administration presented to the Taliban a series of non-negotiable demands, including closing terrorist camps and handing over all terrorists living in the country (Bush 2002). In response, Taliban stalled for time, floating the idea that bin Laden might be tried in an Islamic court presumably in Afghanistan or Pakistan (CNN 2001). Ultimately, the United States was dissatisfied with the Taliban’s response and began its invasion of Afghanistan the next month. A US military force comprised of mostly special forces and close air support, working in conjunction with the “Northern Alliance,” defeated the Taliban by December. Within two weeks of this outcome, the UN authorized an International Security Assistance Force with 18 countries contributing forces, with eventually NATO taking the helm in August 2003. Hamid Karzai was selected as leader of the transitional government in December of 2001, and elected in 2004 as president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Felhah-Brown 2012).

356 Meanwhile, the United State invaded Iraq on the pretext of Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. Hostilities commenced on March 19 2003 against Saddam’s forces, technically concluding upon President Bush’s May 1 2003 victory speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln. However, by the next year an insurgency, comprised initially of disgruntled and unemployed Iraqi Sunni military officers but soon expanding to include Al Qaeda, spread from northern and western Iraq to engulf much of the country. The combination of the defeat of al-Sadr’s Shi’a militia and the “Sawha” that destroyed AQI’s ground of operation, effectively ended main combat by 2009.
The Bush administration laid out its case for democratic unilateralism in the National Security Strategy (2002:2). The document argued for preemptive war and the muscular promotion of democratic promotion to establish the oft-cited “balance of power that favors freedom” – a cause “to which its sacred honor has been pledged for two centuries” (Krauthammer 2004). John Lewis Gaddis summed up the approach as “Fukuyama plus force” (Gaddis 2004:90, 107). Thomas Friedman of the New York Times painted the American War on Terror in heroic terms as the best hope for millions, a mission which, “pits us—the world’s only superpower and quintessential symbol of liberal, free-market, Western values — against all the super-empowered angry men and women out there. . . . [M]any in this part of the world crave the best of America, and we cannot forget that we are their ray of hope (2001: A27).

In his speech upon the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush noted that the “sacrifices of Americans” in WWII and the Cold War led to global peace, remarking that, “Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for — and the advance of freedom leads to peace” (Bush 2003). Similarly, the “United States has made an unbreakable commitment to the success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Bush went on to say that:

Our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan is…to secure the freedom of more than 50 million people who recently lived under two of the cruelest dictatorships on Earth. Our men and women are fighting to help democracy and peace and justice rise in a troubled and violent region. Our men and women are fighting terrorist enemies thousands of miles away in the heart and center of their power, so that we do not face those enemies in the heart of America… Our men and women are fighting for the security of America and for the advance of freedom, and that is a cause worth fighting for (Bush Nov 11, 2003).
The success of democracy in those countries would “send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran – that freedom can be the future of every nation… The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East would be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.” Success in the Middle East, according to Bush, would mean, “The world will be safer from catastrophic violence because terror is not the tool of the free.” Failure would be costly, “[extinguishing] the democratic hopes of millions in the Middle East,” and “[convincing] terrorists that America backs down under attack, and more attacks on America would surely follow.” To forestall this outcome, the US spent upwards of $3 trillion and lost 10,000 casualties. The cost of the War in Iraq alone ran to over $2 trillion (Trotta 2013).

The United States has returned to Iraq after its withdrawal in 2011 to fight the Islamic State. It has pledged the Islamic State’s destruction, but it has also once again made democracy promotion – a more inclusive regime in Baghdad -- the rhetorical centerpiece of its efforts. In a speech to the nation in June 2015, Obama declared that:

Our strategy recognizes that no amount of military force will end the terror that is ISIL unless it’s matched by a broader effort -- political and economic -- that addresses the underlying conditions that have allowed ISIL to gain traction. They have filled a void, and we have to make sure that as we push them out that void is filled…Ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas -- a more attractive and more compelling vision … Nations that empower citizens to decide their own destiny, that uphold human rights for all their people, that invest in education and create opportunities for their young people -- those can be powerful antidotes to extremist ideologies. Those are the countries that will find a true partner in the United States.

In other words, terrorism and the rise of religious actors more broadly, is a political problem that requires a political solution. If religious organizations desire to impose their vision, the natural means of defeating it is collective decision making which, coincidentally, is the function of the political system. For the United States this means advancing democracy.

5.4.3 Seeing the War on Terror “Like a State”

Seeing the problem of terrorism and the hegemonic ambitions of religious organizations “like a state” has consequences that can be observed in the rhetoric of the participants. Besides wanting to promote democracy, it also perceives the problem through the lens of state-backed coercion – war. Three of the last four National Security Strategies have explicitly included reference to the “War on Terrorism” or “war on Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” with only the most recent NSS (2015) shifting its rhetoric to focus to “degrading” ISIL’s military capabilities, but this is still a commitment to unmitigated warfare (2015:9).

In terms of modern systems theory, the response of a political organization was therefore predictable – the attack on September 11th was interpreted as if it were carried out by a state. “The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country,” President George W. Bush declared the next day, “were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” despite that fact that the United States was, “facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.” This perspective was institutionalized within government and in the media such that it became a “common-sensical” interpretation. (McCrisken 2011: 786). The 2001 The AUMF enabled the use of force against “nations, organizations and persons” involved in some way with

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358 An interesting point has been made by Alfred Fusman (2013:146) that the War on Terror as rhetorical device mirrored similar linguistic choices – the “war on poverty, war on cancer, war on drugs, or war on crime” – all of which denoted the assumed mastery of the state over social problems. It also indicates an intention to eradicate terrorism out of existence (McIntosh 2014: 24). This rhetorical choices frames any decision made on the conduct of the operation – one can strike a deal with suspected criminals, but enemies must be destroyed.
the attacks on Sept 11th remains in force to justify the actions that would appear ‘exceptional’ if they were not justified under the rubric of warfare.

Obama declared early on that he would “make the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban the top priority that it should be” because “this is a war that we have to win” (Obama 2008). And he followed through on this pledge. In December 2009 he committed 30,000 more troops to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The next year he reminded Americans that the fight required complete commitment in a 2010 speech, in which he warned Americans to “be clear about what this moment demands. We are at war. We are at war against al Qaeda, a far-reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us again” (Obama 2013). Obama’s speech at the National Defense University signaled a continued reliance on the frame of warfare to understand the conflict with Al Qaeda

We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war -- a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.

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359 During his candidacy, Obama lamented the relative lack of force directed against the true enemies in Afghanistan – the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In a policy speech on July 15, 2008, he lamented the expenditure of forces to Iraq. “We could have deployed the full force of American power to hunt down and destroy Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taleban, and all of the terrorists responsible for 9/11, while supporting real security in Afghanistan… [it is] unacceptable that almost seven years after nearly 3,000 Americans were killed on our soil, the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are still at large’. Obama’s remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan

In the face of such an implacable enemy he pledged to “to whatever it takes to defeat them,” mirroring the rhetoric of Cold War president regarding their programmatic foe (Obama Jan 7 2010).

The use of the “war” frame has had the added benefit of providing a neat historical linkage between the conflict against religious organizations and those against other political programs. The Sept 11th attack was a “second Pearl Harbor,” which meant that the War on Terror was another WWII (Barnouw 2009). In his Sept 21, 2001 speech, Bush famously linked Al Qaeda to other binary conflicts waged in the name of “progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom”:

We have seen their kind before. They’re the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.

As Michael Boyle (2008:193) points out, the linkage of “tyranny” to “terrorism” made the declaration of total war a common-sense approach (Barnouw 2009; Denike 2008; Zeleny and Cooper 2010).

The link to previous wars against opposing programs remained a constant through the Obama administration as well. In his speech at the National Defense University, for example, Obama also reasoned that, “we’ve faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda… we have overcome slavery and Civil War and fascism and communism.”

During his remarks at the opening session of the Nuclear Security Summit President Obama (2010c) explained that the

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361 The inclusion of slavery is likely not accidental. Tony Smith (1992: chp 1) cites the Union victory over the Confederacy, with its consequence reconstruction, as the first American attempt at democracy promotion.
very same existential nuclear threat faced by the United State during the Cold War remains to this day in the guise of terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{362} Linking the War on Terror to the often existential crises of the Cold War nuclear stand-off reveals the perception of a high-level threat.

It should be pointed out that these statement did not even reference the Islamic State, which is arguably a bigger threat than Al Qaeda or the Taliban ever were. Of course, linking the state of war to a conflict with religious organizations, poses a problem for states that attempt to wage it. Given the lack of any real, measurable territory to control, the victory can only be measured in body count and the perception of battlefield control.

The era of drone strike began the night of Oct 7, 2001 when an MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile as part of the opening of Operation Enduring Freedom. The CIA, Central Command, and Air Force Predator and Reaper drones have struck targets throughout the Middle East, beginning with the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, to the FATA region in Pakistan, to Yemen, and now the Levant as part of the Inherent Resolve. Since the Obama administration allegedly changed tactics from “detention and interrogation” to “kill-not-capture” program, drone strikes under his Presidency experienced a dramatic upswing from the last year of the Bush administration (Black 2015). All told, there have been between 583 and 733 drone strikes, killing between 3388 and 6085 individuals’ total, 502 to 1487 of which have been civilians.\textsuperscript{363} Of this, approximately two percent were considered high profile targets, including Algerian militant leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, secretary to Osama bin Laden and deputy to al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s son Saad bin Laden,\textsuperscript{364} AQI leader Zarqawi, and Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Tehrik Taleban Pakistan (TTP) who planned the assassination

\textsuperscript{362} “Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history: the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up…in short, it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security, to our collective security.”

\textsuperscript{363} https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/

\textsuperscript{364} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8164763.stm
attempt on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 (Bergen and Teidemann 2014:3; Black 2015). Most were low level targets.

Given that there is largely no infrastructure to destroy and no capital to conquer prior to the rise of the Islamic State, the only manner to conduct and win a war against a non-state enemy is destroy the only tangible target they present – individuals (McIntosh 2015:24-25). In a less than guarded moment in May 2009, Leon Panetta claimed that the drone attacks in Pakistan were ‘very effective’ noting that, “it’s the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership.”365 In other words, besides democratization, the only answer a political organization has for dealing with religious actors is coercion (Katsas 2015: 256-260)366 It is difficult to reconcile the notion that individuals are not being killed but terrorists are, but this goes back to the tension between the need to declare a war and the illegitimacy of non-political actors as targets of that war. Obama’s speech at the National Defense University bears this confusion out when he proclaims that, “America does not take strikes to punish individuals, “but, “[acts] against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.”

The purpose of the drone strikes is not simply to kill targets, but to impose control (and be seen imposing control) over regions that are not physically conquered – to render the uncertain known via the imposition of a collective decision to do so. The ever-present threat of sanction from twenty-thousand feet provides the illusion of political control. Stories of captured Taliban and Al-Qaeda who describe a fearful, paranoid atmosphere created by the drone campaign underscore this expectation (Bergen and Teidemann 2014:5; Mayer 2009; Rohde

365 US airstrikes in Pakistan called “very effective”, CNNPolitics, 18 May 2009,
366 In a 2011 White Paper prepared by the Justice Department, the Obama Administration set out a three-part legal test that determines who can be killed – the individual has to be an “imminent threat, that individual cannot feasibly be killed in any other way, and there has to be a tolerable risk to civilian populations (see Katsas 2012).
Yet regardless of body count or fear, the drone campaign reveals the paradox of political communication.

Early on the Bush administration decided that the War on Terror would not, “resolve in a signing ceremony on the Missouri” as was the case in WW II (Burns 2001). When dealing with a political entity, that end comes when one side submits to the collective will of the other -- a mutual decision to terminate hostilities, albeit one reflecting battlefield realities. Religious organizations, on the other hand, are not recognized as capable of negotiation due to deficiencies in political rationality. Anthony Lewis captured this tension in an op-ed shortly after the Sept 11th attacks. He writes, “There is no way to reason with people who think they will go directly to heaven if they kill Americans” (Lewis 2001a: A23; see also Browne and Dickson 2010).

The non-political nature of the adversary manifests itself in a familiar frame – the United States and its political allies against the evil barbarism of al-Qaeda and other “violent extremists” (Esch 2010; Leffler 2003; Torok 2011: 142). Conflict with religious organizations is framed as civilization (the political) against the “savage tribes” and “barbarians” of colonial yore (Mullin

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367 David Rohde of the New York Times called the drones a “terrifying presence” in South Waziristan, where children wait for cloudy days to play and militants sleep away from buildings and underneath foliage to escape death (Rhode 2009).
368 Although Pentagon council Jeh Johnson has asserted elsewhere that “we refuse to allow this enemy, with its contemptible tactics, to define the way in which we wage war. Our efforts remain grounded in the rule of law. In this unconventional conflict, therefore, we apply conventional legal principles – conventional legal principles found in treaties and customary international law” (Burns 2001)
369 Deepa Kumar identified five common frames used to discuss Muslims in the context of the War on Terror – “Islam is a monolithic religion, Islam is a uniquely sexist religion, the “Muslim mind” is incapable of rationality and science, Islam is inherently violent, the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism.” (Kumar 2010: 254)
When fighting the barbarians, the normal rules are set aside to fight the exceptional enemy and the only consideration is for the safety of the troops involved in the civilizing mission (Ringmar 2013:268). It is often noted that the United States touts its adherence to law and yet openly ignored the laws pertaining to detention and rendition when dealing with “enemy combatants” from religious organizations (Ringmar 2013:276). This seeming contradiction makes sense in the context of “civilizations” wars against “un-civilized,” non-European states and tribes, where the laws only apply within the former (Ringmar 2013:265). Yet the explicitly nonpolitical, and hence, unknowable nature of the enemy meant it was an existential threat. The National Security Strategy (2002) declared such an unlimited threat could be met only with an unrestrained, unilateral response (NSS 2002:5).

Over the entirety of the War on Terror, the moral goodness of the United States was often differentiated from the inhuman evil of the terrorists. President Bush freely and frequently referred to Al-Qaeda as “barbarians” and “evil.” For example, in his question and answer time with the media on September 16th, 2001 contained no fewer than six such references. The next

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371 The United States, “uses diplomacy, rational discussion and debate, ‘carrots as well as sticks’ and as a last resort ‘conventional warfare’, in which … smart bombs’, ‘precision-guided munitions’ and ‘surgical strikes’ target its enemies, not civilians, although admittedly its actions may incur ‘collateral damage’. Islamist terrorists, on the other hand, use ‘unconventional warfare’, to conduct indiscriminate, barbaric, bloody, violent acts of aggression against civilians, instilling fear in the population to attain their political goals.” Only Western governments are capable of moral action, and “terrorists” are immoral, unlawful and inhumane. (Mullin 2011: 273)

372 “The subsequent debate in the United States, just as in the wake of other small wars, concerned whether irregular armies best are defeated through legal or illegal means, and what impact, if any, the war has on America’s self-image and position in the world” (Ringmar 2013:276).

373 “[4c] We're a nation that can't be cowed by evil-doers. We will rid the world of the evil-doers. We will call together freedom loving people to fight terrorism […] …we're facing a new kind of enemy, somebody so barbaric that they would fly airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. […] The governors and mayors are alert that evil folks still lurk out there. […] No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft - fly U.S. aircraft into buildings full of innocent people … This is a … a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take awhile. […] … the prime suspect's organization is in a lot of countries - it's a widespread organization based upon one thing: terrorizing. They can't stand freedom; they hate what America stands for. […]That's why I say to the American people we've never seen this kind of evil before. But the evil doers have never seen the American people in action before, either - and they're about to find out.” Accessed at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html
week he began preparing the American people to understand that the United States was about to embark on a “crusade” that would “take a while” to complete (Bush 2001).^{374}

At a West Point graduation ceremony in June 2002, Bush rejected the concerns about his political approach and, more particularly, about the language he uses to express his enthusiasm for the opportunity to bring about peace:

Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree… There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it. As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war. (Bush, 2002)

Obama has continued this phraseology. Recalling his Nobel Prize speech once again, he argued that the problem of evil should be met by violence.^{375} Others in his administration also expressed similar undifferentiation. For example, the normally astute Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conflated the Taliban with Al-Qaeda. In a speech to NATO foreign ministers, she argued that “The extremists continue to target innocent people and sow destruction across continents. From the remote mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan, they plot future attacks” (Burns 2009). John Brennan, Assistant to the resident for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, went one step further, describing that Al Qaeda’s continued terrorist actions are “the final, murderous manifestations of a long process rooted in helplessness, humiliation and hatred” that would

eventually leads to the ‘global domination by an Islamic caliphate’ (Brennan 2009:0), Brennan equated all “extremists” including Hezbollah, Hamas and the ‘terrorist warlord in Somalia’, that take advantage of the poor and marginalized communities (Brennan 2009: 9).

Because the United States is a political organization, the problem of religious “extremism” is necessarily a political one – the absence of democracy and the failure of state capacity to process the demands of politically disconnected individuals. Where democracy is slow to develop, coercion is the substitute. Silent, enduring drones provide a way to impose the collective will on those who resists where outright invasion and nation-building is not possible.

5.5 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter examined the consistent application of this program throughout the history of American foreign policy. While not always successful, democracy promotion has arguably been the north star of American interaction with other systemic organizations. Whenever and wherever it could, it worked to promote its interpretation of democracy. Whether through the encouragement of constitutional self-rule, generous foreign aid, or outright invasion and nation-building, the United State has consistently pursued this program. The United States has been, and will likely continue to be “a vehicle of forces far greater than itself, the sponsor... of a single movement” -- democracy (Smith 2012: 208). American victory means victory for the idea of democracy with its attendant values and institutions, or so Americans have claimed.

Programmatic differences between organizations are a chief source of conflict within world society. Within the political system, this has manifested itself in conflict between the American democracy program and the autocratic, fascist, and communist programs of other organizations. These programs typically have a different understanding of the scope of “the political” and a different generation of “collective decision-making.”
This programmatic difference has also helped fuel conflict with religious organizations. Religious organizations that attempt to impose their religious worldview are met with violence and coercion where they do not submit to the collective decisions of political organizations because political organizations are capable only of “seeing like a state” when it comes to religious organizations. For the United States, it interprets the perturbation of religious actors such as ISIS and Al Qaeda via its democracy program. Osama bin Laden’s now moribund organization hated “freedom,” but it also hated communism and monarchism. Nevertheless the United States sees in them only “barbaric” enemies of its political program that can only be answered with death if they do not submit to democracy.

Future attempts at religious hegemony are forestalled through the installation of a political program that can successfully shunt those religious demands through political channels, if they are not relegated to the private sphere or altogether destroyed. For the United States, this meant democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is certainly not alone in this regard. Soviet Union support of the Marxist regime in Afghanistan and the elimination of the clergy in its own country as well as the kidnapping, beating, or outright killing a succession of popes in order install a politically-friendly religious leader by King Philip IV of France is part of the same functional process.376 This effort is not always successful.

While programmatic differences do not cause all conflicts, this chapter also highlights the commonality between religious and political organizations. The United States, while it might be dissimilar from ISIS in a great many respects, both are organizations the actions of which are structured by their functional role within their communication system.

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376 Boniface VIII and Benedict XI
Project Conclusion

Project Summary
The central claim of this project is that conflict within world society is structured by the differences provided by communication systems and precipitated by organizational strategy. Global communication systems provide a distinction which makes a difference. Organizations fight other organizations to ensure that the difference provided by their communication system makes the most difference. Conflict thus takes on an existential quality as competing visions of world order compete for dominance.

There are two caveats to bear in mind. The first is that the argument presented by this dissertation does not preclude explanations of conflict by other theories. Such a claim would go beyond the epistemological warrant of its analyticist ontological commitment. The second is that the logic of this claim is one possible endpoint to the evolutionary process that determines social reality as described by modern systems theory. Niklas Luhmann’s modern systems theory describes the process that depicts the creation and recreation of human society, but did not explicitly theorize organizational conflict. This extends the logic of modern systems theory.

According to modern systems theory, the human social world, what Niklas Luhmann calls world society, is comprised of communication systems. These communication systems are organized around a single distinction – the marking of the world into this/not this – which generates a difference. Although there is some disagreement over the total number of systems, both historically and presently, systems theorists frequently identify between ten and fifteen current systems of communication, including the political, economic, scientific, art, religious, legal, sport, health, education, and mass media (Roth and Schutz 2015: 44). These communication systems provide the language possible to understand and construct the human
social world, and so they are said to be *functional*. Quite literally, these systems of communication are the human social world.

Functionality does not refer to fulfilling some eternal human need that communication systems provide (cf Sewel 1966). Instead functionality is relational – they provide a single distinction that humans can use if they wish to see a single set of differences. It is through these single distinctions, these models, that humans interpret events, human activity, and construct future relations.

Because functionality is dependent upon human usage, communication systems’ existence is contingent. Communication systems were not simply fated to be functional communication systems, although it might certainly seem impossible to imagine a world without religion, sport, or law. Instead, they began as the result of chance communication between people. It is likely that there were thousands of still-born communication systems that never advanced far enough to develop full-fledged functionality. The ones that we have now, through happenstance of evolution, developed functionality over time and which have only in the last several hundred years gone global.

When I refer to evolution, I do not do so casually. What makes Luhmann’s contribution unique is that it relies on a blind evolutionary process to explain the development of these communication systems. Because it is the distinctions themselves that allow for communication, empirically it is the communication that is communicating about itself. For this reason, modern systems theory depicts these communication systems as process-based agents (like simple organisms). Just as organisms compete in an environment, which each successful generation the result of successful adaptation to environment and population pressure, so too are communication systems the result of centuries of adaptation.
The persistence of communication systems depends upon their selection by people as a useful means to construct the human social world. Distinctions that are no longer considered useful fail to reproduce via human selection, leaving only communicatively fit systems remaining. For this reason, communication systems are in a constant state of low-grade competition to prove their usefulness. There is no direction to this process. While we know that the communication systems we have today must have evolved effective and efficient means of ensuring their distinction is selected, there is no guarantee of future usefulness (Luhmann 1997b [2013]: 90).**377** The world society of one hundred years hence might not resemble today’s...

This dissertation focuses on the conflict-generating portion of the evolutionary logic. One of the outcomes suggested by this logic is the death or displacement of a distinction, where fitter communication systems can crowd out other systems, resulting in the ascendance of a particular distinction as a means of creating the human social world. This outcome is rare but possible, since it emerges from the same Darwinian logic that produces all communication systems. In this case world society would cease to be a functionally differentiated one, since all meaning creation would be subordinate to a single model.

The idea of a single distinction crowding out other distinctions is unlikely, yet history provides several examples of stratified, hierarchical systems of knowledge-generation. Examples of prior communicative hegemonies, even if not global, include the family system of the Roman Empire during the Classical Era and various religious distinctions in Europe and India (the caste system) during both the Classical and Medieval Eras (Luhmann 1984, Chp1; 1990c). In the twentieth century, the political and economic systems are also contenders for this role, particularly considering the ambition of Fascist Germany or the Soviet Union. Luhmann

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**377** While this seems tautological, please remember that there is still no good reason for homo sapiens sapiens to be the only human species let on this planet. Other species were stronger and smarter. Yet here we sit.
did not provide a specific explanation for how this could occur as he was mostly focused on establishing the historical evolution of various systems and of world society more broadly. The major contribution of this dissertation, at least from the perspective of modern systems theory, is the development of an organizational theory of conflict.

Although communication systems structure conflict, they cannot cause it despite their depiction as process-based agents. Instead, conflict is precipitated by the communicative strategy of organizations. Organizations are flexible adaptations that serve several functions in regards to communicative reproduction. The first thing they do is represent the distinction in the physical world via an address. This has the effect of reassuring individuals of the stability of a particular distinction and often brings with it ability to coerce individuals as well. The second function performed by organizations is the determination of membership. This has two parts – first, organizations determine who gets to make decisions for an organizations; second, organizations determine the extent of programmatic application. Lastly, organizations provide interpretations of a particular distinction. These interpretations are referred to as programs, which the organizations promote. In a vacuum, possessing physical capability, determining membership, and advancing a program does not necessarily have to lead to conflict. Yet if organizations pursue maximalist communicative strategies, it might.

Organizations that pursue a maximalist strategy, what I refer to as communicative hegemons, combine intolerant programs, exclusive decision-making, universal membership, and coercive capability. These organizations are not content to merely promote a certain program, but choose to ensure their program is chosen through coercion and, in some instances, the liquidation of other organizations.
I argue that conflict manifests itself in two ways. The first is what I called “within-system” competition. This is where an organization promotes a program that interprets a distinction differently than other organizations within the same system. This can result in clashes with other organizations, sometimes violently. The competition between fascism, communism, and democracy is a good example of political within-system conflict. The religious wars in Europe in the 16th and 17th century are also an excellent example of this dynamic.

I refer to the second manifestation as “between-system” conflict. This is where an organization promotes an aggressive communicative strategy that targets other systemic organizations for subordination. Unlike within-system conflict, this is a much rarer because it usually requires significant coercive capabilities. These capabilities do not have to have a global reach for the communication to be considered “hegemonic.” In fact, of the examples I provide in this dissertation, only the United States has truly had a global reach in terms of its communicative hegemonic strategy. Rather it is the strategy of suppressing other distinction that warrants the label.

To demonstrate this theory and the two dimension of communicative conflict, this project has offered four examples—three from the religious system and one from the political system. The Islamic State, the Taliban, and the historical/current Catholic Church provide excellent case studies to see how this rather abstract notion plays out in the real world. From the political system I chose the United States. To be clear, I could have really chosen any organization from any of the systems to demonstrate how these principles work in practice, however I wanted to choose contemporarily topical cases. This is because modern systems theory is not concerned with only one distinction – it is not an explicitly political or religious theory – but a theory of human social evolution.
The Islamic State is an ideal-typical example of an organization that has pursued this sort of communicative strategy. This religious organization, which has gone through several permutations, has promoted an aggressive Salafist Sunni program that seeks to “convert” people through coercion and the liquidation of other rivals – both religious and other systemic organizations. This program has stayed consistent since the organization’s inception, and it was only the lack in capability that blocked its full pursuit. Once it was able to attain the means, however, it moved swiftly to enact its policy of de-differentiation – systematically reducing the scope of people’s communicative choice within the territory it controlled. It is particularly keen on denying other religious programs and the political distinction from operating within its control, but it was also sought to apply its distinction to functions like economics, science, family, and sports.

Predictably, this has sparked conflict with other programs and systems. Within the religious system, the Islamic State has engaged in conflict with practically all other religious programs, including former ally’s al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda. The Islamic State’s program has also sparked between-system conflict. The largest political coalition assembled in the Westphalian era has united in an attempt to defeat the Islamic State. This is a between-system conflict – a competition between two separate world orders.

The Taliban is similar to the Islamic State except in scope and capability. While the Taliban did seek to establish a religious program that sought the installation of caliphate within the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, it did not seem interested or capable of expanding beyond that. Which is to say, whereas the Islamic State claimed universal membership for its organization (even if the decision-making was exclusive), the Taliban did not. Additionally where the Islamic State built up a formidable capacity, both in terms of governance and coercion,
the ability of the Taliban’s caliphate to actually control its territory remained a largely theoretical enterprise.

Despite these shortcomings, the strategy pursued by the Taliban prompted both within and between-system conflict. The Taliban began its caliphate by attacking the illegitimate mujahedeen that controlled the territory in the wake of the Soviet invasion. Mullah Omar claimed that he was the rightful ruler of all of the Muslims, legitimated through hid donning of the “cloak of Muhammad.” After the 9/11 attacks were linked to terrorists training on their territory, the Taliban became embroiled in a between-system conflict. The invasion of NATO forces sparked a conflict over who would get to control the tribal Afghani space – a democracy or a theocracy.

The Catholic Church is an interested addition to these two contemporary organizations. Following the Gregorian Reforms in the 11th century, the medieval Catholic Church wielded immense capabilities in the mid to late medieval period. No other religious organization has since subordinated all other communication systems to its single distinction. In fact, the Catholic Church presents the clearest example of an organization that has achieved a communicative hegemony. Of course, the limitations of communication technology likely prevented the sort of uniform de-differentiation we see in the modern Islamic State.

As with the Taliban and the Islamic State, the hegemony of the Catholic Church provoked a within and between-system response. A within-system conflict in the form of the Protestant Reformation, combined with the emergence of the political system, ended its domination. This forced the Church to adapt its communicative strategy. While it never wavered in its claims of universal applicability, it widened its decision-making membership and where it could worked within the constraints of the dominant political system. It allied with the Franco
government when that political organization made Catholicism the national religion. Where it was discriminated against, it allied with democratization movements as a way to ensure it could continue its program. On a macro-level, it now works within the political system as a member of international organizations. This presents an interesting deviation from the stark plan of the Islamic State, which considers state diplomacy polytheism.

Along with these three religious organizations, this project also examined the United States through the same lens. I handled this case a bit differently only because it is such a conventional history. My larger point is that the same theory that highlights programmatic consistency in religious organizations also applies to political organizations.

The United States has consistently pursues a program that emphasizes democratization as the means by which collective decisions are made. This focus is evident in American foreign policy from the founding of the country, from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror. It has also sparked every major conflict the United States has fought. The Civil War, the Spanish-American War, WWI, WWII, the conflict in the Cold War, and the current War on Terror were all fought to either protect or install a democratic program in other territories. Within the political system it fought competing political programs such as fascism and communism, and between system conflict came about in the form of the War on Terror.

This does not mean that the United States government only pursued democratization to the exclusion of all other goals. I am certain of objections that point to a decided “mixing” of these systemic boundaries. The US history of economic intervention and pursuit of free trade agreements, the role of the US government in scientific endeavors, and the limited role of the US in promoting Protestantism through its continued relevance in elections are just a few of the more obvious examples that come to mind.
The point I want to make in this regard to this objection is that this project provides an ideal-type model and not an empirical statement about the entirety of American foreign policy history. The purpose of this ideal type is to highlight certain behaviors at the expense of others (Tilly 1989:82). The United States is rendered here as a political organization pursuing a conspicuously consistent political agenda that promotes some conception of democratization, albeit one that is depends upon its historical contingent definition. The purpose here is to highlight a potentially useful point and not provide an empirically detailed history.

At several points throughout this project, I have referred to a notion of “usefulness” as a standard by which to judge my extension of Luhmann’s theory. It goes without saying that the organizational model is abstract. In keeping with my assessment that Waltz’s Theory of Politics is the best disciplinary example of an analyticist project, I have tried to follow his guidance on the matter:

In another sense a model pictures reality while simplifying it, say, through omission or reduction of scale. If such a model departs too far from reality, it becomes useless. A model airplane should look like a real airplane. Explanatory power, however, is gained by moving away from ‘reality,’ not staying close to is. A full description would be of least explanatory power; an elegant theory, of most. Department from reality is not necessarily good, but unless one can do so in some clever way one can only describe and not explain. … Theory explains some part of reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it explains. If the distinction is preserved, it becomes obvious that induction from observables cannot in itself yield a theory that explains the observed (Waltz 1979: 7).
Considering that his ideas remain controversial nearly forty years after he first formulated them, perhaps he was not the best guiding light. Nevertheless, I still think his thinking on this is relevant.

Following Waltz, I do not think this model is so far removed from the empirical record that it loses the ability to inform us about the human social world. For example, unlike its consistent focus on democratization, the United States has been remarkably inconsistent with regards to its economic policies. It has moved from a mixed pattern in the mid-19th century to a more protectionist stance in the late 19th (out of step with Western Europe), and only arrived at its more open stance when its capital and business advantages compelled such a move. Even now we see a possible change again with the ascendance of anti-trade sentiment in this most recent election. There is simply no way to distill a common theme on the economic side. Of course while I might be convinced of the utility of the abstraction, ultimately this can only be assessed by the reader.

Contributions
This book makes several contributions. From the theoretical side, it is the first book-length treatment that explores modern system theory’s application to the study of international affairs. Along with this, it is also an explicitly self-consciously analyticist project, a rarity in international relations. Substantively, it provides a new way to theorize conflict, religious actors, and the role of the United States in world order.

To my knowledge, while there have been several edited volumes that have addressed the potential for modern systems theory as an addition to our theories in international relations, there has been no major effort on thinking through a fleshed out theoretical application across a project of book length. As stated at the outset, the purpose of this project was in part to assess the
usefulness of modern systems theory. This is also in keeping with its analyticist ontological perspective as well.

The first thought I have on the topic of usefulness is in regards to Mathias Albert’s (1999; 2004) contention that modern systems theory presents something of a conceptual toolbox from which we can draw ideas and apply them piecemeal to the study of international politics. After writing this project, I have to disagree with this position. Just on a practical level, using modern systems theory requires an entirely new conceptual vocabulary. In this regard, it is something of a “closed system” – it sees all things in terms of its distinctions. For this reason, I am skeptical it will gain widespread use.

That being said, modern systems theory is very good at macro-scale analysis of conflict without relying on Westphalian convention. I have raised the point before in this dissertation, if not all that strongly, that the state/non-state distinction is an explicitly political distinction. Arguing that non-state actors are now “more powerful” than states essentially makes the argument through that a singular political self-understanding. Modern systems theory points us to the generation of macro-social conflict that does not depend on the state as a theoretical touchstone. These religious organizations are immersed within a religious, not political, world order. Their “power” (which in a technical sense does not apply to religious actors) comes from their ability to convince individuals to choose their communication.

Moreover, a modern systems theory of conflict can also be deployed without any levels of analysis bias – there is no meaningful difference between the “international” and the “domestic.” The same evolutionary processes that drive macro-social conflict can also be used to explain local conflict. The fight over school prayer or creationism in schools is a part of the
same process that drives the Taliban to outlaw music and movies. This means that in our study of “international” conflict its path does not necessarily route through the state.

In addition to disciplinary consideration, substantively modern systems theory provides a new way to theorize conflict and a new way to theorize religious actors. I have already written a great deal on these two topics, but I would like to make a few more points regarding theorizing religious actors in international affairs. To put it bluntly, the discipline is stuck with legacy ideas that do not handle religious distinctions overly well.

Realism is not well-suited to account for an overtly religious actor like the Islamic State due to its de-emphasis on moralism in international politics and its expectations about relevant actors. This is common with all of the “realisms.” States are the main actors in international relations and states (wo)men are expected to act on the basis of a rational (or quasi-rational) calculation of interest, power and material threat, and not on the basis of any moral considerations (Shimko 1992:299; Walt 1985). After all, the idea that morality cannot and should not play a role in politics is the animating purpose behind Morgenthau’s elevation of national interest over “religious ideals” in the first place (Morgenthau 1948:7). For this reason, it is axiomatic that states might be populated by the religious, but they cannot themselves be religious. Religion is certainly an important variable to explain the choices leaders of some states make, but a state only pursues power.

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378 “Realism maintains,” he writes, “that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place’ (Hans Morgenthau, 1948: 12). For those that claim that God’s will is on their side, disappointment awaits. “little do they know,” Morgenthau intones, “that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed” (Morgenthau 1956: 234). Seeing the world in terms of morality as opposed to interests, Hans Morgenthau argued, leads to ‘demonological interpretations of reality which substitute a fictitious reality—peopled by evil persons rather than seemingly intractable issues—of the actual one’ (Morgenthau, 1948:7)” (Hyde-Price 2009: 33-34). And this outcome must obviously be avoided.

379 Admittedly, the resurgence of neo-classical realist constructivism is tied to the paucity of structural realism to account for non-rational, so-called “reductionist” factors such as the influence of ideas or regime type. The emphasis on human nature as a causal factor – either directly or as a background feature – could theoretically accommodate
That is why the actions of the United States regarding religious actors is so puzzling, at least from this perspective. Realisms are oriented around theorizing responses to the arrangement of power in the international sphere. When thinking about the reaction to Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State, one has to wonder from whence the threat to the balance of power actually emanates. In the case of the Islamic State in particular, what threat or concentration of power could possibly have provoked a coalition larger than that during WWII? Small states do not matter to the balance of power. In the case of the United States, it has conducted a near 15 year campaign to eradicate a threat that is minimal at best while ignoring the “true” rising power in China (Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1998). Obama’s “pivot to Asia” was supposed to remedy this strategic lapse, yet the United States (along with other powerful states) sought a coalition not against China but the Islamic State.

In contrast to realism, liberalism does a better job theorizing religious actors. For one thing, it tends to see international politics as the outcome of numerous state and non-state actors competing to achieve their interests through non-hard power means (Sandal and James 2010: 16). It also captures the seemingly zero-sum struggle of Islamic terrorism versus “the West.” Besides the “Clash of Civilization” thesis, the best known post-Cold War policy blueprint was Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, which in part predicted the conflict between the liberal West and non-liberal forces. The struggle between the liberal order and so-called “islamo-fascists” fits this model. Since the attacks of Sept 11th, Western discourse has framed primary

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religion as (neo)classical realism connects individual interests and psychology to systemic outcomes (see Jervis 1998:988) Nevertheless while individuals and domestic interest groups can afford to have religious motives, states themselves are understood in a context that is devoid of moral consideration.
security dynamic of the 21st century as the “War on Terror” -- “good” democracies and their allies versus the “evil” terrorists and those that support them (Hyde-Price 2009:33).

That having been said, there is a strong duality in liberal thinking – a twin commitment to rationality and morality – that manages to only to awkwardly handle actors like the Islamic State. On the one hand, the commitment to rationality tends to whitewash the strong religious content animating these organizations, and often fall victim to some variation of the “no true Scotsman” logical fallacy (Pape 2003, 2005; Young and Findley 2011: 8). On the other, the theory of the democratic peace, which is both a strong empirical observation and also a normative commitment, lends itself to painting with a broad brush when it comes to these organizations (Levy 1988). There is only good “West” against the “evil” Islamic terrorists, without any distinction being made between these organizations. Inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely” (Crenshaw 199a: 116).

Portraying terrorists as intelligent strategists is certainly an improvement over dismissing them as “crazy people,” yet the laser focus with which the many scholars have tried to insist on the instrumental rationality of terrorist violence is perhaps not as helpful as it initially seems.

The Islamic State and other religious organization are not motivated by mere interests, as if what they are really after is assurances that their pension fund will remain solvent twenty-five years hence. They are not interested in achieving a political end at all, as a matter of fact, but a

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380 Bush has spoken of a ‘war on terror’ against an ‘axis of evil’; Tony Blair of an ‘arc of extremism’; Joschka Fischer of ‘totalitarian Jihadism’. Speech on the Middle East, the White House, 3 April 2002, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html (accessed 20 October 2008). There has been a great deal of handwringing by liberals over the damage this perspective has done to the overall “liberal order” (Ikenberry 2011). The “you’re either with the civilized world or with the terrorist” has done much to disprove the monadic version of the “liberal peace” (Dunne 2009: 113). Nevertheless, in terms of thinking about the contribution of Luhmannian realist-constructivism, liberalism has, I think, adequately captured some of the dynamics at play.;

381 Dictatorships are good at repressing violence (Pluchinsky 1998: 119._.
religious one. Thinking about them in terms of rational interest denudes – and deliberately so, I would argue – the religious characteristics of their motivation and goals.

Moreover, thinking about these sorts of organizations as “interest groups” fails to really come to terms with religious organizations’ structural antagonism toward the political as a whole. They do not want to be integrated into democratic power structures. The Islamic State does not just despise “our freedoms,” but the very concept of a democratic sovereign nation-state. It wants to destroy the very foundation of the international system; in some regards, it is fighting the same fight the Catholic Church failed to win the 17th century.

Conversely, there is a powerful teleological strain in liberal thinking that pits the inevitability of progress -- “the West” -- against regressive “Islamism” (Dunne 2009: 107). Before 9/11, the liberal argument emphasized the pacific characteristics of the Liberal order; after 9/11, the liberal argument emphasized the need to destroy terrorists and those states that harbor them. Just as there is an impulse to sanitize those who employ violence in the name of religion, so too is there an equally powerful need to paint them with a broad brush.

These religious actors are treated as if they Bond villains. “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table,” Matthew Morgan claims, “they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (Morgan 2004: 31; see also Gofas 2012: 288). Their religious motivation creates, “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality and a Manichaean world view” making compromise with them impossible (Hoffmann, quoted in Spencer, 2010: 6, 7). This description, while it does somewhat capture the maximalist strategy pursued by actors like the Islamic State, does not really capture the organizational logic. It reinforces the notion that the only good religious actors are those that stay out of politics.
The “us versus the Islamic terrorists” theoretical line struggles to make sense of why the Islamic State, a Salafist regime that curtails the freedoms of women, is a war target but Saudi Arabia, a Salafist regime that curtails the freedoms of women, is not. Realists obviously do a good job with this question since foreign policies are made on the basis of calculations about the balance of power and not moral considerations, but liberalism struggles to explain why the United States has historically been friendlier to Saudi Arabia than it has been to India.

A Luhmannian perspective emphasizes that the organizations of respective communication systems have higher affinity for each other than they would one of a rival communication system. Or more precisely, they understand political communication more readily than they would religious communication. This is likely why Saudi Arabia, the source of 15 of the 19 terrorists who took part in the September 11th attacks and is one of the most important funding sources for terrorism, gets what looks like a free pass from the United States. King Abdullah was constantly forgiven for the slow pace of his democratic reforms because he at least kept the radical religious from gaining control of the world’s largest oil reserve (Jones 2010). Saudi Arabia is also part of the coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria, which would not be expected of “Islamist who hate our freedom.”

Modern systems theory allows us to threat a very tight needle – actors like the Islamic State are motivated purely but their particular religious program but they are not motivated by Islam itself. Moreover, their interpretation is just as legitimate as any other, at least from the perspective of the secular or the scientific. Surely they want to dispose of the Westphalian system, but they do not want to “blow up the table” as it were. They just want to establish a world order with a different rule set.
Finally, modern systems theory provides a new way to theorize the role of the United States. Again, I have already written about this at some length and will not belabor the point more. However I would like to point out that most ideas about the US role prioritize talking about its status as the head of a liberal world order. This account provides some nuance regarding that role. Although nothing I have written here necessarily contradicts the conventional wisdom, there is a limiting feature not present in other models -- the political system is but one system among many. The “liberal world order,” such as it is, is therefore only one part of world society. So even if the United States stands astride the world as a colossus, it is only the political world where it casts its shadow. The role of the United States within world society is no more or less important than the role of the Islamic State in world society. Both are functionally undifferentiated insofar as their role relative to their communication system is concern.

Although this sounds like the classic argument made by liberal scholars (e.g., Keohane 1984; Rosenau 1992), there is a rather major distinction that I hope will not get lost. In the standard liberal formulation, the state wanes and non-state actors wax. The zero-sum power game applies as it did before, there are just more slices taken out of the pie. While this would certainly apply to political non-state actors (like ethnic separatists wanting to establish a political state), it does not apply to other systemic actors. Religious actors, for example, use a different reference point for their communication, which is why we see their bid for attempted communicative hegemony in the same forty-year period that saw the state system grow stronger than ever. The number of nuclear weapons in an organization’s possession grants them no more access to the transcendent than the amount of money they possess or the fidelity of their legal system. The strength or weakness of states is irrelevant to the rise or fall of other systemic
actors. This is why I can argue that the Islamic State and the United States are functionally undifferentiated.

Put another way, asking what the decline or ascent of the United States means for world order is a misleading question in the context of world society -- unless the United States is attempting to impose a communicative hegemony. This is the only condition under which a single organization can impose a hegemony of the kind typically discussed in IR circles. However, even there, the balancing mechanic that prevents such a rise indicates that this hierarchy of knowledge creation is unlikely to last. There is likely too much contingency in the world for it to ever fully return to the kind of limited stratified world society seen in times past, at least in an empirical sense. This holds true for so-called “hierarchy studies” that see the US on top of some global regime (Erikson and Parent 2009). Perhaps this dissertation is not nearly strong enough to support such a conclusion, but it seems to me that the liberal world order is a myth the political system tells itself about itself. No political order has ever been ascendant in world society.

Implications, Caveats, and Future Research
Modern systems theory is not a predictive theory. It can no more be used to prognosticate which systems will rise and fall than can Darwinian evolution inform us of the direction of human evolution in 10,000 years. All it purports to do is lay out the process for communicative reproduction. The direction that process takes is unknowable except in hindsight. Having said that, I wanted to finish this dissertation with one thought on the larger topic of conflict within world society.

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382 See also Goh 2008; Hobson and Sharmon 2005; Kang 2010 Lake 2003, 2007; Spruyt 2008
Modern systems theory is just one lens among many scholars can use to understand the source of conflict in macro-social perspective. Many realists believe that the desire for security or power lead to conflict, and while neither of those desires can be completely satisfied, their impact on the well-being of humans can be limited through careful attention to the factors that allow these elements of human nature to flourish. Liberals and many constructivists hold that egoistic behavior and identities, respectively, can be channeled in such a way as to mitigate the potential for conflict in the future. Both sets of perspectives have reasons to be optimistic about the reduction of conflict. Modern systems theory presents a darker picture, it seems to me.

Modern systems theory makes no real argument about human nature, except of course the assumption that humans desire to understand and be understood by others. Despite these seemingly benign intentions, difference in how humans see the world lead to conflict. Luhmann never made the connection since much the research was finished after his death, but the concept of motivated reasoning suggests humans very much prefer their familiar worldview rather than a new worldview imposed by others (see Redlawsk 2002; Gerber and Greene 1999; Lodge and Taber 2000, 2013). If the human social world is constituted by distinctions – models of the world – than conflict is woven in the fabric of society. This paints a rather bleak picture of humanity’s destiny.

The implication is that as the differences that comprise world society multiply, so too will the venues for conflict. Humans have a tendency to sequester themselves in ideological bubbles, a move reinforced, rather than eroded, by social media (see Flaxman et al 2016). Perhaps not all humans will do so, but many will. This is of course purely speculative, but it is possible we might be entering a new era of fundamentalisms.
Finally, I would like to mention some areas for future research. This project represents a “first cut” into the use of modern systems theory as a means of theorizing the international space. I have chosen to focus on one element of Luhmann’s ideas to develop an organizational theory of conflict, and used the empirical portion of this dissertation to demonstrate what I refer to as “maximalist” ideal-type strategies. While I am satisfied with elucidating this ideal types, there are several lines of future research not fully explored due to limitations on space and time.

The most interesting potential for future research covers cases that seem to defy easy classification. Given the topic of this dissertation, I find particularly intriguing the role of religion in governments, particularly those in the Middle East. For example, Saudi Arabia stands out as an ostensibly political organization that seemingly (and defiance of the expectations of modern systems theory) promotes a religious program.

One thing modern systems theory would immediately highlight is the inevitable tension this sort of “dual role” would cause. Caught between two distinctions, the government, like the double-minded man in the Biblical reference, will likely “be unstable in all of his ways.” In Luhmann’s discussion of the Soviet Union and the European welfare state, he noted that political organizations that try to “do too much” would make apparent the paradox at the heart political legitimacy – claiming to broad a mandate and trying to do too much will reveal how little the government could actually do, this eroding its self-referential legitimacy (Luhmann 1990:220, 1990c, 2000a:46, 2012: 214).

Modern systems theory would expect radical shifts in one direction or the other over time as the organization lurched towards legitimate footing. It would also expect conflict between “purer” types – political organizations and religious organizations unhappy with its current choice. Obviously this is only a preliminary assessment, but it seems to me that there is
certainly potential for a fruitful engagement with a Luhmannian approach here. So here I offer a few brief thoughts on the matter.

Of the House of Saud, Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab once remarked, “without the coercive power of the state, religion is in danger, and without the discipline of revealed law, the state becomes a tyrannical organization” (Hopwood 1982:33). His alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud reflected this. Wahhab wanted to spread Islam and Saud wanted to establish the political rule of the House of Saud (Niblock 1982:11). While they did not reap the benefits of this alliance, their descendants did. By the early 20th century Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al Saud finally established the modern borders of Saudi Arabia, and in so doing, brought the contradiction into sharp contrast.

Salafist Wahhabism is driven “by the religious belief that it was the duty of all true Wahhabis to carry the message of Islam to all peoples who were non-Muslim ‘infidels’” (Helms, 1981: 70). After the conclusion of WWI, local British and French dominance of the region made this a liability, and the monarchy established a firmer control over religion through military strength (Lacey 2009:14-16). This control accelerated with the discovery of oil and culminated in the 1970’s with the reign of King Faisal, who outlawed practices like slavery, introduced education for women, and created Saudi television (Trofimov 2007:22, 30). He used the ulama who functioned as state agents to legitimize these reforms (Nevo 1998:38).

Because the Saudi regime was still dependent upon the religious system for its legitimacy, however partially, it remained vulnerable to attacks from this vector. The rise of an Islamic government in Iran, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and crucially, Juhayman al-Otaibi’s capture of Mecca’s Grand Mosque all convinced the King Khaled that the state would suffer a political crisis that could only be solved by heading it off through “more religion” as a
way to maintain legitimacy (Lacey 2009:48; Trofimov 2007:100). This spurred official investment in Salafism—totaling between $70 and $90 bullion—primarily as a way of competing with the energetic Islamic revolution in Iran (Ayubi 1991:100-101; Clarke 2010:392).

As discussed briefly in chapter four, this explains Saudi Arabia’s early support for the Taliban. The Wahabi ulema who advise the monarch in Saudi Arabia influenced the royal family to support the Taliban and export of Salafism. Supporting the Taliban would have had the effect of keeping most virulently militant of the religious fundamentalists engaged in Saudi Arabia and not in their own country. It would likely have also prevented Iran from gaining a strong foothold in post-Soviet Afghanistan (Rashid 2000: 201-202).

But even here we see another lurch back to political legitimacy. Although the Saudi government promoted Salafism in the 1970s, since the 1980’s Saudi Arabia has not controlled the global Salafi-Wahhabi movement. “The Salafism that Saudi Arabia started exporting to the Muslim world in the 1970’s was, like the version the Saudis practice at home, politically passive” (Gause 2016; see also Ayoob and Koseblanan 2009). It sought only to convince believer to support governments that were nominally Muslim.

These tensions continue to characterize Saudi Arabia and its relations with the outside world. The Persian Gulf War served as a reminder to Saudi clerics of their dependence on the state to protect their territory, yet a 1992 law declared the primacy of Sharia (Lacey 2009:131; Jones 2010). Saudi Arabia was the source of 15 of the September 11th hijackers, yet, as the ISIS section in chapter four discusses at some length, the global jihadi movement despises the Saudi Arabian government. Although at one time Saudi Arabia funded Salafism, according to Congressional testimony, no Saudi government money goes to ISIL and Saudi clerics try to delegitimize Salafi jihadism (Swanson 2015). Saudi Arabia has conducted campaign against
Iranian-oriented separatist groups in the region, most notable the Houthi in Yemen, which has benefited ISIS-backed forces by destabilizing local governments; yet it is also part of the coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria, which would not be expected of “Islamists who hate our freedom.”

By all accounts the United States has grown tired of continued Saudi tacit support for Salafism and their regional cold war with Iran. The recent shift by the Obama administration might, as it did in the past, further shift the Saudi regime away from its religious orientation (Goldberg 2016). Then again, it might not. The US maintains the relationship because it remains one of the few actually functioning governments in the region (Gause 2016).

There is a great deal of uncertainty about how to characterize this regime, which indicates a Luhmannian approach might be beneficial. For example, John Fox (2008:227) unequivocally states that, “religion arguably controls the state as much or more than the state controls the religion” and points out that the Saudi monarchy still officially derives his official legitimacy from the Quran and Sharia. Others disagree. Jean-Phillippe Plateau argues that, “Even when political and religious functions appear to be merged, religion is the handmaiden rather than the master of politics” (2008:330). While the clerics might have some sway over domestic affairs, the clerical elite did not have the power to exercise political influence in matters of state, governance, defense, economy, or foreign affairs” (Milton-Edwards 2005: 42-43). Some argue that even the export of Salafism was merely soft power used strategically by Saudi monarchy to counter soft power of West (Hayne 2007:350; Mura and Teti 2010:98).

In addition to the problem of these sort of organizations, I would also like to tackle why some organizations choose a maximalist strategy and others do not. King and Thornhill (2003) in their work on the legal and political system, suggest that some organizations become aware of
the potential for pushback if organizational strategy pushes too far. In an earlier formulation of this theory I argued that the logic of reproduction almost guaranteed a maximalist strategy, yet clearly most organizations do not pursue communicative hegemony. So what are the mechanisms that go into that initial formulation? My sense is that this question is going to run up against the same sort of barriers in foreign policy analysis – e.g., why some countries seem to behave more aggressively than others. Right now, my instinct runs in a similar direction to that of realists – there is a baseline defensive posture that is also sensitive to turns to capability relative to perceived opportunity or external threat.

A related but different question concerns strategic change. In this project I present the Catholic Church as an organization that altered its communication strategy when faced with programmatic defeat. The rise of the political distinction effectively damaged this program’s chance at success, and so they were forced to a subordinate role. This follows from the assumptions I make about organizational behavior relative to threat or opportunity, but might there be other factors besides loss of relative capability that prompt strategic change?

A final topic of interest concerns systemic differences in organizational communicative strategies between systems. This project looks at the political and religious systems as homes for communicative hegemons. Do all communication systems harbor these sorts of organizations, or is it only a few? The economic system certainly has its share of hegemonic actors, as any good Marxist will assert. But what of the scientific system? The legal system? Of course, the absence of obvious hegemonic actors does not mean there could not in the future be one, but it is difficult to imagine a communicative hegemony in which all meaning creation is relegated to a truth/falsehood or legal/illegal distinction. That being said, it is equally difficult to imagine
meaning creation subordinate to the family distinction, and yet that is precisely how humans understood and created their society for thousands of years.

If given the opportunity, I will provide an answer to all of these questions. I am convinced the modern systems theory is a conceptually rich framework to grapple with the complexities of the international environment. I hope after reading this project, you are at least a bit convinced of the usefulness of modern systems theory as another way to understand the social world.

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