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INTRODUCTION

This paper draws together the record of regional law of the sea from recent regional developments, scholarly studies and recommendations, and the law of the sea debate. It analyzes the different roles which regional law of the sea might play and has played. It evaluates the prospects for regional law of the sea in different geographical areas and speculates about the contributions which regional law of the sea might make to the unfolding legal order of the oceans.

Regional law of the sea is, as this paper shows, increasingly important. In one sense, this new importance is a sign of failure, the failure of the nations and their diplomats to write a new global maritime order. The on-going law of the sea debate was initiated

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in hopes that coastal States might be forestalled from carving up the seas for reasons of economic interest and that an international oceanic authority might be constituted to authoritatively distribute the wealth of the oceans. But it seems that coastal States will effectively claim zones of at least 200 miles for at least economic purposes and that there remain great differences among the nations about the proper nature of any international machinery to govern the shrinking remainder of the seas. Regional law of the sea is increasingly important because global law of the sea is increasingly improbable.

But, in another sense, the new significance of regional law of the sea is a sign of optimism, an optimism based on hopes that regional maritime orders can avoid some of the worst effects of the legal chaos feared if unilateral national claims make up the new pattern of ocean law. Regional law of the sea, however, is not a single phenomenon. Rather it has developed in three roles as a means to deal with three sorts of needs. These three roles are examined in turn: first, regional law of the sea may be a means of promoting shared legal claims of regional States; second, regional law of the sea may be a means of providing for the efficient use of regional waters; third, regional law of the sea may be a means of sharing ocean resources with regional land-locked or shelf-locked States.

**Regional Law of the Sea as a Means of Promoting Shared Legal Claims**

In an uncomplicated way, regional law of the sea may be no more at times than the coordination and promotion of the legal claims of nations within a region. For reasons of similar historical background, shared geographical situations, or mutual political, economic, or security concerns, States within a region may be in much more of an accord with each other than they are with nations outside the area. By banding together in making international legal claims, regional States not only iron out differences among themselves for the sake of harmony, but for the purpose of facing the world together—acting more effectively as a unit.

The region which most traditionally has displayed this first sort of regional law of the sea is Latin America and its sub-regions. The most famous regional Latin American law of the sea claim is, of course, to 200-mile territorial seas. The first regional origin of the extended territorial waters claim is the Declaration of Panama in 1939, when, at the urging of the United States, the American States created "a defense zone of 300 miles around the hemisphere with the 'inherent right' to keep the zone free of any hostile act by non-
American belligerent nations. This concept of a maritime defense zone was again embodied in 1947 in the Rio Treaty. After the unilateral American claim in 1945 to jurisdiction over the continental shelf, the Latin American States followed suit with unilateral claims of their own to the shelf, and, in 1947 by Chile and Peru, to full sovereignty over 200 miles. The individual Latin American States argued that the Declaration of Panama demonstrated a hemispheric consensus favoring extended maritime jurisdictions. Individual claims to 200-mile seas were bolstered in 1952 by a sub-regional claim by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, known as the Santiago Declaration:

(I) Owing to the geological and biological factors affecting the existence, conservation and development of the marine fauna and flora of the waters adjacent to the coasts of the declarant countries, the former extent of the territorial sea and contiguous zone is insufficient to permit of the conservation, development and use of those resources to which the coastal countries are entitled.

(II) The Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru therefore proclaim as a principle of their international maritime policy that each of them possesses a sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast. . . .

As the Declaration of Panama was a regional maritime claim against the then-participants in the Second World War, so the Santiago Declaration was a sub-regional maritime claim against developed distant-water fishing States, especially the United States. By standing together, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru hoped to more effectively promote their respective 200-mile claims against the United States. The decision of these three States to stand together was made more explicit in the Lima Declaration of 1954, which provided for joint co-operation and legal defence:

1. Chile, Ecuador and Peru shall consult with one another for the purpose of upholding, in law, the principle of their sovereignty over the maritime zone to a distance of not less than 200 nautical miles . . . .

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2. Id. at 59-85.
2. If any complaints or protests should be addressed to any of the Parties or if proceedings should be instituted against a Party in a court of law or in an arbitral tribunal, whether possessing general or specific jurisdiction, the contracting countries undertake to consult with one another concerning the case to be presented for the defence and furthermore bind themselves to co-operate fully with one another in the joint defence.

3. In the event of a violation of the said maritime zone by force, the State affected shall report the event immediately to the other Contracting Parties for the purpose of determining what action should be taken to safeguard the sovereignty which has been violated. . . .

Now more than twenty years old, this sub-regional claim by States, the coasts of which make up more than 90 percent of the Pacific shore of South America, is an excellent demonstration of the creation of a claim to regional law of the sea for the sake of promoting regional preferences against other States. Although the United States has never accepted the claim to 200-mile territorial seas, other American States (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) joined with Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in the Montevideo Declaration of 1970, which endorsed 200-mile jurisdictions and declared their "right to establish the limits of their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with their geographical and geological characteristics and with the factors governing the existence of marine resources and the need for their rational utilization."

Thus, the sub-regional claim of the Pacific South American countries broadened into a claim of many States within the Latin American region. Indeed, it may not unreasonably be argued that all that prevents the principle from becoming one for all the hemisphere is the opposition of the United States. The declarations of Santiago, Lima, and Montevideo are attempts, if not to extinguish the antagonism of the United States, at least to disarm the opponent by making it clear that action taken against one claimant offends all claimants. Insofar as a non-signatory State like the United States seeks to minimize the hostility of the signatories, it will not take forceful measures against the emerging regional consensus. Perhaps one of the reasons why Iceland faced British gunboats and Latin America did not face American gunboats is that Iceland acted alone while the Latin Americans acted together.

6. Bath, supra note 1, at 85.
Regional legal cooperation to promote shared preferences has been a frequent occurrence in the course of the United Nations law of the sea debate. Not surprisingly, the Latin Americans have maintained their 200-mile claim not only against the United States but in the international context as well.\(^7\) And another region has joined the Latin Americans in this first category.

Since 1972, the Africans have made a regional claim for an exclusive economic zone. In that year the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea at Yaoundé concluded:

1. The African States have the right to determine the limits of their jurisdictions over the Seas adjacent to their coasts in accordance with reasonable criteria which particularly take into account their own geographical, geological, biological and national security factors.

2. The Territorial Sea should not extend beyond a limit of 12 nautical miles.

3. The African States have equally the right to establish beyond the Territorial Sea an Economic Zone over which they will have an exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of control regulation and national exploitation of the living resources of the Sea and their reservation for the primary benefit of their peoples and their respective economies, and for the purpose of the prevention and control of pollution.

   The establishment of such a zone shall be without prejudice to the following freedoms: freedom of navigation, freedom of over-flight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. . . .

   The Economic Zone embodies all economic resources comprising both living and non-living resources such as oil, gas and other mineral resources.\(^8\)

The Yaoundé Conclusions were seconded by the Council of Ministers, the highest body of the Organization of African Unity, in its Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea at Addis Ababa in 1973. The Addis Ababa Declaration also called for exclusive economic zones and added that the proper width for such a zone was 200 miles:

That the African States recognize the right of each coastal State to establish an exclusive economic zone beyond their territorial seas

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whose limits shall not exceed 200 nautical miles, measured from
the baselines establishing their territorial seas;
That in such zones the coastal States shall exercise permanent sov-
eignty over all the living and mineral resources and shall manage
the zone without undue interference with the other legitimate uses
of the sea: namely, freedom of navigation, overflight, and laying
of cables and pipelines. 9

The African position on a 200-mile exclusive economic zone not
only stands as a good expression of regional law of the sea as a
means of promoting shared regional preferences but is a realistic
compromise between the 200-mile territorial sea claims of the Latin
Americans and the narrow jurisdictional preferences of the de-
veloped countries. It is likely that the pronouncements at Yaoundé
and Addis Ababa were meant to serve these two purposes, both
to establish African regional law and to compromise the interna-
tional law of the sea debate. As such, the exclusive economic zone
might be the first law of the sea principle originally adopted on
an African basis which becomes general international law. Much
of the traditional law of the sea can be viewed as the broad adop-
tion of European regional principles and many 19th century modifi-
cations such as the laws of neutrality might be seen as American
regional preferences accepted on a global basis.

Some regions and sub-regions have been less successful than
Latin America and Africa in promoting shared legal claims. In
Asia, for example, where national maritime policies “vary very con-
siderably,” there has been very little regional co-operation in pro-
moting joint claims in the law of the sea debate. 10 Questions such
as archipelagos might find sub-regional support in South Asia and
the issue of passage through straits has been treated for the Straits
of Malacca by a joint declaration in 1971 by Indonesia and Malaysia
which claimed that the Strait was “no longer an international
waterway.” 11 But, as will be discussed in the following section,
most Asian sub-regions share the discord of the Asian region as
a whole.

REGIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING
FOR THE EFFICIENT USE OF REGIONAL WATERS

Regional law of the sea can be much more than an expression

10. Pinto, Problems of Developing States and Their Effects on Decisions
op ing C ou ntries 3, 5 (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the
11. Leifer, Continuity and Change in Indonesian Foreign Policy, 60 A S I A N
AFFAms 179 (June 1973).
of national maritime claims coordinated and promoted regionally. If the States within a region choose, regional law of the sea can be a means of providing for the efficient use of regional waters. In this second category, regional law regulates regional maritime activities, and, as such, is a form of supra-national law. The advantages of regional supra-national law of the sea are much the same as the much heralded advantages of international supra-national law of the sea. Waters regulated regionally as opposed to nationally can be better protected against over-fishing and pollution. In regional waters it is easier and more efficient to provide for the exploitation of non-living resources and for the enforcement of legal rules of all sorts. Especially where quite a number of nations share coasts of the same sea or ocean, regional law of the sea seems an obvious way to provide for the efficient exploitation and protection of regional waters.

Perhaps the best known examples of regional co-operation are the worst examples of how regional maritime governance should work, i.e., the regional fishery organizations. Of some twenty-three regional fishery organizations only eight really have any avowed management functions; only three attempt to divide the catch among their members; and none attempt to prevent non-members from fishing as they like.12 Little ventured, little gained; it is not surprising that the reputation of the fishery organizations is notorious.

The most successful example of regional law of the sea as a means of providing for the efficient use of regional waters is to be found in Western Europe. There, the most significant advance has been made in the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community.13 According to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the Common Market:

The Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. Agricultural products shall mean the products of the soil, of stock-breeding and of fisheries. . . .

... restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be

progressively abolished in the course of the transitional pe-
riod... 14

A common market in fisheries and freedom of establishment
means, in theory, that the territorial waters of every Member State
should be opened to the fishermen of every other Member State.
In practice, it took the European Community a long time to make
national fishing zones regional fishing waters. Less efficient
French and Italian fishermen were understandably reluctant to
welcome Dutch, German, and Belgian fishing fleets, but in June
1970 the Council of the European Community, the rule-making
body, made equal access Common Market policy. 15 And in October
1970, Regulation 2141/70 creating the Common Fisheries Policy was
issued, to come into effect in February, 1971:

(1) With a view to promoting harmonious and balanced develop-
ment of the fishing industry within the general economy and to en-
couraging rational exploitation of the biological resources of the sea
and of inland waters, a common system shall be adopted for fish-
ing in maritime waters, together with specific measures with a view to
appropriate action and the coordination of Member States' struc-
tural policies in this sector.

(2) The system applied by each Member State in respect of fishing
in the maritime waters coming under its sovereignty or within its
jurisdiction must not lead to differences in treatment with regard
to other Member States.

In particular, Member States shall ensure equal conditions of access
to and exploitation of the fishing grounds situated in the waters
referred to in the preceding paragraph, for all fishing vessels flying
the flag of a Member State and registered in a Community terri-
tory.

(5) Where fishing in the Member States' maritime waters as refer-
red to in Article 2 lays certain of their resources open to the risk
of over intensive exploitation, the Council may, acting on a pro-
posal from the Commission under the procedure provided for in Ar-
ticle 43(2) of the Treaty, adopt the necessary conservation mea-
ures.

In particular, these measures may include restrictions relating to
the catching of certain species, to zones, periods, methods and to
fishing tackle. 16

Although some 3-mile zones may be protected for national fisher-
men for five years "if that population depends primarily on inshore
fishing" 17 the Common Fisheries Policy has largely replaced na-
tional territorial fishing waters with regional territorial fishing wa-

14. European Economic Community, Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community and Connected Documents, Publishing Service of the
European Communities, 1965, at 47, 59.
15. Janis, supra note 13, at 278-81.
16. European Communities Regulation No. 2141/70 of the Council of 20
October 1970 on the establishment of a common structural policy for the
fishing industry, 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS
50-51 (Lay, Churchill & Nordquist eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Lay].
17. Id. at 51.
ters. Not only can the Community take conservation measures as mentioned in article (5) above, but it is able to restructure the fishing industry, as it did in 1972 when it encouraged, through incentives, Community fishermen to switch from cod fishing to tuna.\(^\text{18}\) In 1973 the Community considered conservation measures for Greenland and the Faroes and even proposed extending the 12-mile fishing limit off those islands.\(^\text{19}\) If fishing limits are generally expanded to 200 miles by the Geneva or second Caracas conference, most of the North Sea, much of the Mediterranean, and a good part of the north-east Atlantic will become the regional fishery waters of the European Community.

But there are some important limitations to the regional maritime organization of Western Europe. Many Western European States with important fisheries are not included. When the “Six” negotiated entrance for Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, the Common Fisheries Policy was one of the biggest stumbling blocks and the three new members gained ten-year transition periods. Norway rejected the Common Market by a referendum in which opposition to the Common Fisheries Policy was paramount; the “No” vote in Norwegian fishing areas ran up to ninety-three per cent.\(^\text{20}\) Iceland and Spain are not members of the Community. Thus, the regional jurisdiction of the Community does not encompass the entire region.

The other significant limitation to the maritime control of the European Community is with regard to non-living resources. The Community did decide in 1970 that continental shelf activities did fall within the realm of EC regulations.\(^\text{21}\) But there is no effective Community control of offshore oil or gas exploitation.\(^\text{22}\) And the Community, at this time, only seeks to provide for freedom of movement and establishment, not to govern offshore resources.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^\text{18.} \) EC Fish Priorities: Salt Cod Out; Tuna In, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, February 1972, No. 153, at 6.
\(^\text{19.} \) Community to Protect Fishing Grounds, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, December 1973, No. 171, at 4.
\(^\text{20.} \) Janis, supra note 13, at 281.
\(^\text{21.} \) European Economic Community, 3 BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES No. 11, at 48 (1970).
It is unlikely that any regional maritime policy will effectively control the shelf until the Community reaches an accord concerning energy in general.

The Community's record is somewhat brighter concerning pollution and environmental protection. According to a 1973 Declaration, the EC has begun a "Programme of Action on the Environment," part of which includes control of marine pollution.\(^{24}\) Although it is too early to judge whether the regional organization will successfully deal with environmental problems, there seem to be fewer internal disputes about the need and nature of pollution control than there are about an issue such as energy use and exploitation.

Outside the Common Market there have been other attempts to create European regional law of the sea, for example the "Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts transmitted from Stations outside National Territories" in 1965 by the Council of Europe and the new 1974 Baltic Pollution Convention by the Helsinki Conference.\(^{25}\) But these other accords are more similar to the coordinating mechanisms of the first category than they are like the governing mechanisms of this second category and the European Community. It is unlikely that any other European organization, at this time, can hope to be as effectively supra-national as the European Community.\(^{26}\)

And the record of regional activities outside of Europe does not show that there have been successful attempts to use regional law of the sea to provide for the efficient use of regional waters in other areas of the world. There have been, however, numerous proposals and arguments for the establishment of regional maritime communities. For the Caribbean, for example:

The application of the patrimonial sea concept could lead to an important example in regional cooperation for ocean development if it were to be applied in a creative way; that is, if the nations surrounding a semi-enclosed sea were to claim jurisdiction over a


\(^{26}\) Janis, supra note 13, at 284-88.
patrimonial sea to a maximum limit of 200 miles, and then create
an organization which would manage the major portion of this area
for the common benefit.27

However, in practice the Caribbean nations have been reluctant
to create an effective regional organization for maritime ques-
tions.28 In their Santo Domingo Declaration of 1972 the Caribbean
States recognized the advantages of regional organization while
committing themselves only to “periodic meetings” and coordina-
tion:

(1) Recognizing the need for the countries in the area to unite
their efforts and adopt a common policy vis-a-vis the problems pe-
culiar to the Caribbean Sea relating mainly to scientific research,
pollution of the marine environment, conservation, safeguarding
and exploitation of the resources of the sea;

(2) Decide to hold periodic meetings, if possible, once a year, of
senior governmental officials, for the purpose of coordinating and
harmonizing national efforts and policies in all aspects of oceanic
space with a view of ensuring maximum utilization of resources
by all the peoples of the region.29

Similarly, in Africa there are many good reasons why some type
of African regional maritime organization should be formed. It
could provide for the sharing of resources with land-locked and
shelf-locked States; it could protect extended territorial zones when
weak States with narrow coastlines might be unable to protect the
zones themselves; it could conduct negotiations with potential re-
source exploiters and secure higher prices; it could settle serious
jurisdictional disputes like that between Gabon and Equatorial
Guinea over the island of Mbanie surrounded by rich oil deposits.
But thus far the Organization of African Unity and the Economic
Commission for Africa have only ventured to coordinate national
policies. There are no signs of effective regional machinery devel-
oping.30

And the same good reasons exist for regional machinery in Asia
or in its sub-regions:

27. D. Krieger, A Caribbean Community for Ocean Development, 18
28. H. Gary Knight, Rapporteur’s Report, in GULF AND CARIBBEAN MAR-
TIME PROBLEMS 42-49 (Regional Workshop of the Law of the Sea Institute
1972).
29. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 7, 1972 in Lawy, supra note 16, at
247-49.
30. M. Janis, The Development of African Regional Law of the Sea, un-
published paper, at 17-21.
Thus it is simply imperative for the coastal States to realize the importance of regional arrangements for this area; since one of them can destroy what will take all of them to restore.\(^3^1\)

But Asian waters are especially troubled by disputes. South Vietnam and China battled over the ownership of the oil-rich Paracels.\(^3^2\) The Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans have long quarrelled about fishing.\(^3^3\) Now the same peoples are in serious disagreement about offshore oil rights.\(^3^4\) Asia may not soon be witnessing a growth of regional maritime machinery.

Thus, outside of Western Europe, though there are good reasons for the emergence of regional law of the sea to provide for the efficient use of regional waters, there are few hopes that effective organizations will be forthcoming in the near future. No matter how great the benefits of regional control, unless regional actors can settle outstanding political differences it is improbable that effective regional governments will be formed. It is illustrative that the only successful regional maritime regime, that in Western Europe, is the result not of recognition of the inherently good reasons for a regional maritime policy but of a larger process of regional economic integration. It is doubtful that the Common Fisheries Policy could have been established without the prior establishment of the Common Market.

This is not to say that regional organizations will not be used to coordinate national maritime policies. This process, described in one work as the creation of a “framework of demands,”\(^3^5\) does not demand regional governance or a great degree of supra-nationalism. Rather, the coordination of national maritime policies on a regional basis needs only a reasonable degree of shared legal preferences as described in the previous section of this paper. Indeed, if a regional organization were to regularly deal with coordination of national policies it would largely be no more than the institutionalization of the “promoting” activities already done by regions on an ad hoc basis. Besides promoting regional claims against outsiders, an institutional means of voicing regional preferences could be an effective way of settling inter-regional disputes. But there is a con-

\(^3^2\) N.Y. Times, February 6, 1974, at 3.
\(^3^3\) Park, supra note 31, at 1-23.
siderable difference between regional organizations used in this
fashion to coordinate and regional organizations used to provide for
the efficient use of regional waters. In the latter case regional law
of the sea is the result of a regional authority, in the former only
of a regional consensus. A regional authority could not only fulfill
the function of a regional consensus but provide for the efficient
exploitation and environmental protection of regional seas. Al-
though there are signs of regional consensus in several areas, e.g.,
Latin America and Africa, the only signs of regional authority are
in Western Europe.

REGIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AS A MEANS OF SHARING REGIONAL
OCEAN RESOURCES WITH REGIONAL LAND-LOCKED
OR SHELF-LOCKED STATES

A third role which regional law of the sea may play is in help-
ing land-locked and shelf-locked States share in the wealth of the
oceans. This role has received increased attention as a result of
the proceedings of the Caracas Conference. The delegation from
Paraguay spoke for the land-locked States:

Only when they enjoyed equal rights in the economic zones of their
regions beyond the 12-mile limit which should be the maximum
for the new law of the sea, would there be unanimous support for
the new law of the sea.36

The delegation from Uganda demanded “the right to exploit not
only living resources but others as well—including mineral re-
resources, be they manganese, tin, or diamonds.”37 Austria asked for
“participation” in the fishing zones of “neighboring coastal
States.”38 Nepal believed it should be compensated for its inability
to claim the ocean’s non-living resources.39 There are twenty-six
major States which are land-locked. Many others, like Zaire and
Iraq, have coastlines much shorter than those of most other coun-
tries. These are the States which will lose the most by the estab-
ishment of 200-mile territorial seas or exclusive economic zones

57, at 3 (July 12, 1974).
37. Statement of the Delegate from Uganda, U.N. Press Release, SEA/59,
at 2 (July 15, 1974).
38. Statement of the Delegate from Austria, U.N. Press Release, SEA/57,
at 3 (July 12, 1974).
at 2-3 (July 15, 1974).
in place of the creation of an international oceanic regime over most of the ocean's resources. Now that it seems increasingly unlikely that extensive coastal State jurisdictions can be prevented, land-locked and shelf-locked States are turning to a form of regional law of the sea to secure a share of ocean wealth.

The area in which developments for regional law of the sea as a means of sharing resources with land-locked or shelf-locked States is most pronounced is Africa. This should be no surprise since more than half of the world's land-locked States are African, fourteen in all: Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi, Southern Rhodesia, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Altogether, almost one-third of the African countries have no sea coast; if the resources of the ocean were divided by length of coastline they would get no share whatsoever.

The declarations of the African region, more than those for any other area, present the case for the land-locked States:

The exploitation of the living resources within the economic zone should be open to all African States both land-locked and near land-locked, provided that the enterprises of these States desiring to exploit these resources are effectively controlled by African capital and personnel.

To be effective, the rights of land-locked States shall be complemented by the right of transit.

These rights shall be embodied in multilateral or regional or bilateral agreements.

The African countries recognize, in order that the resources of the region may benefit all peoples therein, that the land-locked and other disadvantaged countries are entitled to share in the exploitation of living resources of neighboring economic zones on equal basis as nationals of coastal States on bases of African solidarity and under such regional or bilateral agreements as may be worked out.

Despite the good record of African pronouncements, there are no regional laws for sharing ocean resources at the present time. The problems faced by land-locked and shelf-locked States are many. Even the relatively generous African declarations provide only for sharing "living" resources; the coastal States are not at all eager to distribute the profits from offshore oil, gas, and minerals. Whether a disadvantaged country seeks living or non-living resources, it will be difficult to determine which coastal State should give up part of its share to which land-locked or shelf-locked State. This determination could be better made by a regional authority, but as the previous section of this paper demonstrated, the pros-

40. Yaoundé, supra note 8, at 210-11.
41. Addis Ababa, supra note 9, at 31.
pects for such an authority in Africa or most places are poor. If land-locked States are to use only their own capital and personnel, how will they find either? The coastal African States rely greatly on foreign capital and training themselves. Altogether, it seems that rights of use and transit will be of less utility to the disadvantaged African States than a simple direct share of the profits from ocean resources. But such an outright payment is not likely to be made by the coastal States.

If there are difficulties for African land-locked States, problems are only greater for disadvantaged States elsewhere. In Latin America attempts to have the Santo Domingo Conference even address the plight of land-locked States were frustrated.42 There are only two land-locked Latin American States, Bolivia and Paraguay, and they are relatively less important to their region than the fourteen land-locked States of Africa. The five land-locked European States (Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) and five land-locked Asian States (Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, and Mongolia) face the same problems of being severely regionally out-numbered.

Although it is possible that disadvantaged States will reach bilateral or multilateral agreements to share ocean wealth, it is likely that these will be gained through the normal process of diplomatic bargaining, that they will have to trade political support or some other commodity to win a slice of profit from neighboring coastal States. On a regional basis, only Africa seems to have sufficient numbers of land-locked and allied States to secure a regional accord assuring disadvantaged States some portion of the gain from the extended exclusive economic zones. In Africa on a continent-wide basis there might be some realistic hope that some provision is made for non-coastal countries, but even so, it will probably still be up to bilateral negotiation to determine exactly how great a provision will be made in each case.

For land-locked and shelf-locked States everywhere, though, a decision at the forthcoming law of the sea conferences to include rights for them in the economic zones would be of assistance in the regional negotiations which will almost surely occur. Developing coastal States, especially, are vulnerable to criticism if, after claiming economic zones to promote their development, they de-

42. Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea, in Alexander, supra note 28, at 163.
prive the land-locked and shelf-locked States of a reasonable share of ocean resources. These disadvantaged States, after all, are on the whole poorer than their coastal neighbors.

CONCLUSION

The development of regional law of the sea has had three discernible objects: the promotion of shared legal claims, the provision for the efficient use of regional waters, and the sharing of resources with disadvantaged regional countries. A different geographical area has been responsible for the principal development for each of the three objects. Latin America has seen the most effort to coordinate and promote a shared legal claim, i.e., the 200-mile territorial sea. Western Europe has witnessed the most successful venture to provide for the efficient use of regional waters, i.e., the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community. And Africa has generated the most advanced proposals for assuring regional land-locked and shelf-locked States a share of regional maritime resources.

The record for regional law of the sea has been and likely will remain very spotty. One of the advantages of a regional approach to maritime problems is that different regions will be able to handle their law of the sea matters in different ways. That Latin America is so engaged in promoting regional preferences against the United States, that Western Europe is developing a regional maritime machinery, that Africa is so concerned with the predicament of the land-locked countries, all these are healthy regional variations. That some areas, especially Asia, are so unable to agree, is indicative of the region's real divisions.

Regional law of the sea can supplement international law of the sea if the latter is ever drafted. It is doubtful that one hundred-fifty nations will be able to ever write a law of the sea treaty more detailed than that which could be written by two dozen or more regional States. However far international law goes in better ordering the oceans, it is likely that regional law, in most regions, will be able to go further. Not that regional legal solutions are likely to agree. They are not. As the laws of States vary, so regional laws will vary with regional preferences and so will the nature of regional laws differ. Some geographical areas, perhaps Western Europe, may evolve a regional law of the sea which is supra-national and governing. Other areas, perhaps Latin America, will simply coordinate national maritime policies. Certainly, the eventual legal nature of the oceans will be confused as a result. But it will be a good deal less confused than if no regional law existed to modify national jurisdictions at all.