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An Embodiment Constraint on Theories of Affect

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Abstract: Any good theory of emotions should, among other benchmarks, be able to accommodate that emotions can be embodied (I call this the embodiment fact). In particular, it should be able to show that; for every emotion type there is at least one emotion token that is embodied. With this in mind, I will in this dissertation review various well-known philosophical accounts of emotions with the intention of considering whether or not they succeed in capturing such benchmarks. If one or more theories do well on most benchmarks, but fail to do so in regards to embodiment, I will discuss whether it is possible to modify the theory or theories in order to help them do so. If not, I will consider further what a successful theory or theories might look like. To clarify, I am not trying to vindicate or establish a particular account of emotions; it could be that multiple theories are able to include the embodiment fact. Instead, my intention is to narrow down the range of available theories by seeing which ones, if any, can do so.

The first chapter focuses on elucidating what embodiment comes down to, and I consider examples where manifestations of the affective can be identified in someone’s behavior. I also discuss various features that these embodied tokens share such as being adaptive and the emoter: rather than experiencing the emotion as an emotion of a particular type is having experiences appropriate it, is not engaged in judgments or other cognitive processes either avowing the emotion to herself or expressing it, and is involved in conceptualization of a minimal kind; one that enables her to see something in a certain way and that demands action.

In the second chapter, I discuss some phenomena, or benchmarks, that theories of emotions ought to be at least consistent with and, ideally, able to explain.
The third chapter considers the leading current views of emotions. In particular, I discuss representative versions of: the feeling theory, the cognitive theory, the non-cognitive theory, the modified-cognitivist theory, and the hybrid theory together with some problems that can be raised against each of them. In my discussion of these views I at the end of each section, briefly assess whether or not a specific theory can account for, or at least accommodate, the embodiment fact as well as the other benchmarks.

In the fourth chapter I look at and discuss one of the most recent embodied views of emotions, namely, Rebekka Hufendiek’s theory of emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances. However, even though she presents an embodied theory of emotions, there are objections that can be raised against it, which in the view’s current formulation, renders it unacceptable. In particular, she falls victim to the Cinnamon-Nutmeg understanding of emotion phenomenology. This is the view that, just as for cinnamon and nutmeg, for every distinct pair of emotion types, they have different phenomenology.

Finally, in chapter five given the issues with Hufendiek’s account, the question becomes whether it is possible to adhere to a view somewhat like hers, without running into the Cinnamon-Nutmeg problem. I argue that Lisa Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions as being constructed offers hope along these lines. Although this view does not have the resources to accommodate the embodiment fact, we can draw something from it in order to modify what we learned from Hufendiek in characterizing a proper space of emotion theories. Specifically, Feldman Barrett’s account of affect may provide nearly what we need to account for the phenomenology of emotions.
After my discussion of Feldman Barrett, I take stock of where we are and reemphasize that for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, they often occur in the context of a somatic marker, they involve affect, and there is a construal right in the embodiment. Lastly, I consider the present emotion landscape and establish that it is possible to have two opposing theories of emotions that are both compatible with the embodiment fact: the Hybrid theories and the non-hybrid, Uniform theories. Lastly, I also discuss potential future research.
An Embodiment Constraint on Theories of Affect

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An Embodiment Constraint on Theories of Affect

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Chapter I

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1) INTRODUCTION

In the most influential philosophical emotion literature something important about emotions has received inadequate attention—I call it the embodiment fact. According to it, a creature can undergo an emotion in a way that is constituted at least in part by some combination of behaviors both of a bodily and “mental” kind; examples of the former are gross movements of the limbs, various facial expressions, and verbal tics (e.g., vocal fry and uptalk) whereas examples of the latter are the way one directs one’s thoughts and attention.

The embodiment fact is suggested by the possibility of a generalization from the way in which cognitive states are arguably embodied (i.e., as manifestations of intelligence in the behaving itself) to a view of affective states as embodied (i.e., as manifestations of the affective in the behaving itself). For instance, if embodied cognition means that my very fast and accurate

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1 When I talk about ‘emotions’ (or affect) I am going to use the notion in a broad enough way to include what some people call moods; being giddy, anxious, gloomy, exuberant, etc.
2 Vocal fry: In the recent study Habitual Use of Fry in Young Adult Female Speakers, Lesley Wolk, Nassima B. Abdelli-Beruh, and Dianne Slavin (2012), measured and investigated a vocal pattern prevalent in young American-English speaking women with no vocal pathology. The vocal pattern is described as “low, creaky vibrations,” and is often referred to as “pulse register, creaky voice, stiff voice, or glottal fry” (e111). Adopted by young women vocal fry most likely appeared toward the end of utterances, but never in sustained vowels (e.g., ‘aaa,’ ’oo’) (e114). Uptalk: Another vocal phenomenon has become known as “uptalk.” In her Atlantic piece “A Female Senator Explains Why Uptalk Is Part of Women’s ‘Nature,’’” Emma Green (2014) describes uptalk in the following way: “You know, uptalk? That oft-mocked conversational style, usually attributed to the “Valley Girl”? The one that implies a question mark at the end of otherwise perfectly declarative statements.” Basically then, ‘uptalk’ is an individual’s applying “a rising intonation at the end of a phrase or sentence” that is very similar to the sound of, say, an English speaker asking a question” (Seitz-Brown, 2014).
3 My use of ‘behavior’ above refers to things of an agentive type, i.e., it is under one’s control either directly or indirectly. Directly in the way that I am able to consciously choose to do something. Indirectly in the sense that were I to become conscious of the behavior (i.e., pay attention to it), I could modify it.
knitting (a form of intelligence) is constituted by the way in which I move my fingers,\footnote{Other examples of intelligent behavior are: First, the way in which someone, without measuring, can tell how much of a certain spice is needed for a particular food recipe by feeling the weight of it in their hand, or between their fingertips. Second, the way a person, say a nurse, can locate a blood vein in someone’s arm by feeling around for it. Pamela Olton, “who has been drawing blood at the Haight Ashbury Free Medical Clinic in San Francisco since 1976…” says that you have to “develop intelligence in your fingers…[she describes it as follows] Instincitively, you will look for the telltale blue of veins, but the veins of some people need to be felt rather than seen, including those of scarred intravenous drug users, the obese, the heavily tattooed and anyone with very dark skin. Learn to trust your fingertips by palating skin with your eyes closed. Even hidden under an inch of fat tissue, a vein will have a distinctly bouncy feel that Olton likens to pressing on a water bed” (Wollan, 2017).} so too, embodied affect can be constituted by the sensitivity with which I, say, move my hands as I stroke a person’s hair.

Any good theory of emotions should be able to accommodate both the embodiment fact and other important benchmarks (see chapter II). With this in mind, I will in this dissertation be reviewing various well-known philosophical accounts of emotions with the intention of considering whether or not they succeed in capturing such benchmarks. Moreover, if there are one or more theories that are not faced by any serious objections, and do well on most benchmarks, but fail to do so on the embodiment fact, I will then ask the question: Is it possible to modify the theory or theories in order to make them able to do so? If not, I will discuss further what a successful theory (or theories) might look like. To clarify, in this dissertation I am not trying to vindicate or establish a particular account of emotions; for after all it could be that multiple theories are able to accommodate the embodiment fact. But rather, my intention is to narrow down the range of available theories by seeing which ones, if any, accommodate the embodiment fact. By doing this we will in turn approach a more accurate understanding of emotions.

To add further nuance to the above discussion, as I am not defending a particular emotion view, what I am aiming to explain is what happens when we accept that emotions can be embodied. Once we have considered this possibility, then the question becomes: what form does
that acceptance take? A weak form would be that all emotion types are sometimes embodied, while a stronger form is that all emotion types are always embodied. To be clear, the weak claim asserts that for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, and the strong claim asserts that for every emotion type every token of that type is embodied. For our purposes we will be arguing for and defending the weaker claim while remaining neutral on the stronger one.

In an attempt to elucidate what the embodiment fact comes down to I am going to below begin by considering a couple of examples where manifestations of the affective can be identified in someone’s behavior, and I will then continue on by discussing various features those behaviors share.

2) **Embodiment in Cognition & Emotions**

   a. **Examples of the embodiment fact & common characteristics**

   Example 1. One night when Destiny is watching a movie with her 5-year old son Miles, he puts his head in her lap while the film is playing. When Miles does this, Destiny begins to *lovingly stroke* his head. We may assume further that Destiny is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to where and how her hand is being placed, the amount of pressure she is exerting, and how fast she is stroking his hair, but aside from that the majority of her conscious attention is on what is happening in the TV show. What is more, the “lovingness” here is in the *way* Destiny strokes her son’s hair and not in, say, the way in which she thinks about doing so. In fact, in this scenario Destiny need not be thinking any thoughts to herself at all about what she is doing (e.g., inner speech thoughts such as ‘I love Miles and I want to him to know that’), nor does she have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization (as some other views necessitate, see chapter V). All she needs to have is the perceptual experience (visual and tactile)
necessary for her to be aware of her environment, and conceptualization of a minimal kind.\textsuperscript{5}

Example 2. During her sophomore year of college, Jordan meets a man at a party. After two weeks he asks her out on a date, and later that same night picks her up in his car to take her to the movie theater. Jordan does not realize that something is wrong until he pulls into an unfamiliar parking lot and tells her to get in the backseat. When she refuses to do as he says and instead asks to be let out, he tells her that she is not going anywhere until she has sex with him. Then he climbs on top of her and rapes her. Several months later while socializing at her friend Jane’s house, Jordan begins \textit{fearfully clutching} the arm of the couch, as Jane utters words such as \textit{rape, molest, attack, trapped} describing the plot of a movie that she had recently seen (Waldman, 2016).

As in the case with Destiny above, in this situation Jordan is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to where and how her hand is being placed, and how hard she is pushing her fingers into the arm of the couch; however most of her conscious attention is on her friend and the words coming out of her mouth. What is more, in the example, the “fearfulness” is in the \textit{way} Jordan grasps the couch’s arm, and not in thoughts that she is entertaining. Indeed Jordan need not be having any thoughts at all (i.e., inner speech thoughts such as ‘I think he is a threat to me and I wish I could hide somewhere’), all that is required is the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) necessary for her to be aware of her surroundings. \textsuperscript{6} Jordan also does not have to engage in conceptualization and categorization of a complex kind, but rather conceptualization of a minimal kind is enough.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{5} In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on the TV show that she is watching and Miles’ head on her lap—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself.

\textsuperscript{6} In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on what her friend is saying and the couch’s arm that she is grasping on to—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself.
\end{flushright}
Example 3. Isabel is a first-year student at a private college on the East Coast. She is feeding her passion for German by majoring in German Studies, and she is picking up a minor in European Geography. As a High School student she loved her German teacher, and most of her best friends she met in her language classes. Finally in college she finds her German Professor rather boring, however, that is not the worst part. One of the people assigned to Isabel’s project group this semester is Christina, a young woman who also lives in her Residential Hall, and whom Isabel can barely stand. Not only is she loud and rambunctious whereas Isabel is quiet and careful, she also chews her snacks loudly in class and laughs a little too intensely at the professor’s jokes. One day while they are watching a documentary about the Berlin wall, Christina starts to loudly pull out a bag of almonds from her backpack. Even though Isabel doesn’t stop watching the movie, with the noise coming from right in front of her where Christina sits, her eyes contemptuously take one spin around the sockets and she moves her chair away from her. Her professor notices Isabel’s eye roll and thinks to herself that she needs to pay attention to this group; she refuses to have any teasing going on in her classroom.

In this example Isabel is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to the pressure of her hands against the seat of the chair as she moves it further away from Christina, how her eyes move in their sockets, and where her classmates are relative to her. However, it would seem that the majority of her conscious attention is still on what is playing out on the screen. The contemptuousness is in the way she moves her eyes, and not in any thoughts that she is having (such as ‘This individual is so stupid, I cannot stand her”). As in the other cases discussed above, she need not be having any thoughts running through her head about Christina, nor does she have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization. Rather, all that is required is that Isabel has the perceptual experience (tactile, auditory, and visual) needed for her
to be aware of her surroundings, and also that conceptualization of a minimal kind is present.

Example 4. After a long day at work during which Lauren clashed with one of her co-workers Mark, she comes home to a sink filled with dirty dishes. Before she gets started on the mess, she turns to the radio on the kitchen table and locates the latest news program. Even though she is not actively thinking about her argument from earlier in the day (e.g., how mean and unfair the other person had been to her, and that she wants to punch him), Lauren picks up the dish sponge and starts angrily scrubbing all the glasses and plates. In this example as in the above cases, Lauren is sensitive to her surroundings, e.g., she is sensitive to where and how she moves her hands, and to what she sees in the sink as she washes the dishes, but the majority of her conscious attention is directed toward what she hears on the news. Moreover, the “angriness” here is in the way she scrubs the glasses and plates, and not in thoughts that she is having. Lauren need not be thinking any thoughts to herself at all about what happened at work (i.e., inner speech thoughts such as ‘I am so frustrated with Mark and I wish it was his face that I was scrubbing with the sponge’), rather what she needs is the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) that makes her sensitive to her environment.\footnote{That is, with the majority of her attention being on the news program there is no room left for thoughts like: “I’m sure angry at person x,” but still her body seems to embody it.} \footnote{In this situation then, she is only focusing her conscious attention on the radio program that she is listening to and the dishes that she is washing—not on some thoughts that she is telling herself.} Lastly, just as in the other examples above, only minimal conceptualization is necessary here.

Example 5. It is the weekend and Clark has made plans to hang out with his friend Carole. Together they spend their Saturday morning looking for a new pair of shoes for Clark at the local market, and while doing so they incessantly discuss the fact that they will be living in Los Angeles next year. Both Clark and Carole put in requests for relocation a couple of months ago, and just the other day they were granted permission. After they buy Clark’s shoes they head
over to the nearby mall to have lunch and catch a matinee at the Imax Theater. When they sit down to eat, Carole with a concerned look on her face, asks Clark; ‘You seem so gloomy, are you OK?’ Clark answers; ‘What do you mean ‘I seem gloomy’?” Carole continues; ‘Well, you have been walking around in a hunched over posture all morning, and every time you talk to me you do so with a small and quiet voice. Also, you just seem to be moving slower than usual.’ As Clark thinks about what his friend has just told him, he realizes that, yes—in fact, he is gloomy (i.e., he is in a gloomy mood); he just had not noticed it before. In fact, he cannot even think of a reason for it.

In common with the previously discussed examples even though the majority of Clark’s attention throughout the day is on Carole and their conversation about moving to Los Angeles, one can still say that he is sensitive to his surroundings. For instance, he is sensitive to what he is saying (e.g., he both asks and answers questions about what living and working in Los Angeles will be like), what he sees in front of him, and where he is walking (e.g., he does not walk into things). Furthermore, the “gloominess” is in the way Clark behaves; in the way he hunches over as he walks next to Carole, in the way his voice is quieter than normal, in the way his pace is slower, and thus, it is not in any thoughts that he is having (i.e., he is not thinking to himself ‘I’m so boring, she shouldn’t be hanging out with me’ or ‘I don’t want to move away from my family’). Further, Clark does not have to engage in complex conceptualization and categorization in this instance. In fact, all that is necessary is that Clark has the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) required for him to be aware of his environment, and that conceptualization of a minimal kind is taking place.

After having considered the above five examples, a common structure begins to emerge. However, before I discuss this common structure more in-depth, I want to draw the reader’s
attention to something else important. Let us separate three different things; an individual can undergo an emotion, they can experience an emotion, and they can experience and emotion as an emotion of that type.

Now, in an attempt to make more apparent the particular distinction between an individual experiencing an emotion, and her experiencing an emotion as an emotion of a particular type, we can look to the philosophy of perception. An individual can perceive x, and she can perceive x as a y. The first does not entail the other. As an example, when I rode my bike and looked to the left, unbeknownst to me what I saw (what I was looking at and therefore perceived) was actually a nuclear reactor. However, I just saw it as a building. I did not conceptualize it in a more specific way, so I did not see it as a nuclear reactor. Now, of course I can do the latter too, but that would require the application of a more sophisticated conceptual apparatus. Consequently, it does seem that in everyday life we say things like, “I saw x, but I did not realize that what I was seeing was an x.” I saw without knowing that that was what I was seeing. I still saw something, but I did not conceptualize it in the way that I could have.

Based on my discussion in the above paragraph, we know that an individual can either perceive a nuclear reactor or perceive it as a nuclear reactor. The first does not guarantee the second. Similarly, you can also experience an emotion without also experiencing it as an emotion of that type. The latter twofold distinction will be made clear below as I explain the tripartition referred to previously, and which the former distinction is part of.

First, at level 1, an individual can undergo an emotion with no phenomenology present (a “what it is like” quality)⁹, and this might be the case with strictly unconscious emotions. The

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⁹ The point of talking about phenomenal aspects of mentality here is to distinguish them from cognitive and affective aspects of reality. In particular, some affective states need not have a phenomenal representation, and some phenomenal states need not have an affective representation (when I for example smell lemon there is nothing essentially affective about that).
reader might wonder if there are such things as unconscious emotions, and for present purposes I do not have to take a stand on it. However, nothing in the logic of emotions seem to rule out that there could be such things. That is, it is nothing in the nature of emotions that requires, for example, that they be conscious. Now, if an emotion is not conscious, then there is nothing that it is like to undergo that emotion. This appears similar to instances of blind-sight; i.e., perhaps blind-sight is a case in which you see things even though there is nothing that it is like to do so (Weiskrantz, 1990). So, if there were such things as unconscious emotions, then those would be cases of undergoing an emotion without experiencing it.

Second, at level 2, an individual can also experience an emotion such as anger without it presenting itself to her as anger. In such cases of experiencing emotions there is a phenomenology, and it is in this way that the individual is experiencing the emotion, but she is not experiencing the emotion as that emotion. In these instances then, the emoter is having an experience, and not just that; it is one that is appropriate (or a natural counterpart) to the emotion that they are undergoing. However, it does not represent itself to her as that emotion. The following would be an example of this. Think back to Jim Crow times in the Southern United States, and someone cringing with disgust when he for example do not want to touch the water faucet that a black person just drank out of. In this case, the individual is experiencing unpleasantness, but he may or may not be experiencing it as disgust. Here the disgusted person did not conceptualize his experience as a particular emotion (i.e., disgust). This means that, someone could cringe with disgust, and experience his disgust about having to drink from the faucet, but not yet be representing that experience as one of disgust for touching the faucet. Thus,

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10 For present purposes we need not settle the question of whether or not there are such things, we are merely making a tripartition; a distinction among three different things. It is a further question whether or not we are going to claim that that tripartition has any elements falling into its extension.
if we imagine that the individual cringes spontaneously, he may or may not notice that “yes, this is disgust.”

The following is another example of someone experiencing an emotion without it presenting itself to her as that emotion. In this case a young college woman who is implicitly racist fearfully moves away when an African American man sits down next to her in class. That is, she creates more personal space between herself and the man by moving her chair a couple of inches toward the right side of the room. In this case then, as in the other examples above, there is something experientially real (i.e., it is not purely behavioral), because she sees him as something to be avoided (i.e., he is somatically marked negatively, see below). Consequently, these kinds of inadvertent or spontaneous emotions (that someone is experiencing without thinking about what he or she is doing) are clear cases of when an individual could be undergoing an experience, but does not have to know that it is an experience appropriate to a certain emotion type.

Third, at level 3, an individual can experience an emotion as an emotion of a particular type. For instance, when Anna finds out that her boyfriend cheated on her with her best friend, she feels extremely angry. That is, she is experiencing her emotion as one of anger. She might even say to herself “Ahh, I’m so angry I feel like I’m boiling over inside” or “I’m so angry I want to punch him in the face.”

To see how the distinction between someone experiencing an emotion and someone experiencing an emotion as an emotion of a particular type connects with the emotion examples considered in the beginning of the dissertation, let us take a look at how it applies to the case of Lauren washing the dishes angrily. When Lauren washes the dishes angrily, she is undergoing an experience, although she need not be representing it to herself as an instance of anger. As the
reader now knows, this is a subtle, but important distinction. Moreover, when Lauren washes the dishes angrily there is not just the phenomenological experience that is important to notice, but also that the way in which she is washing those dishes is appropriate to the emotion that she is experiencing (i.e., she is not washing the dishes lovingly).

I will now return to my discussion of an emerging common structure among the emotion examples considered above. First, in each case there is a person who rather than experiencing the emotions as the particular emotion that it is, is instead having experiences that are appropriate to it. They are also not engaged in inner speech that describes or expresses, say, love, fear, anger, or gloominess.\(^{11}\) That is, it is not the case that they are engaging in judgments and other cognitive processes that in some sense either avow the emotion to themselves or expresses it. Further, no complex conceptualization and categorization is required, but rather, what is involved here is conceptualization of a very minimal kind. The form of conceptualization that I am referring to is one that enables the individual to see something as attractive or repulsive, satisfying or dissatisfying, enticing or un-enticing, appealing or unappealing, safe or dangerous, good or bad, etc. Hence, it is a minimal differentiation of the world that is not as demanding as other theories necessitate (see for example Lisa Feldman Barrett’s account in chapter V).

Now, when it comes to instances of an organism experiencing an emotion, and instances of an organism experiencing an emotion as an emotion of type E, all of these things are certainly possible (i.e., they could be describing or expressing some particular emotion, and conceptualize and categorize in a complex way), but it is not necessary for the organism who is merely experiencing an emotion. That is, it is going to take a rather high-level of sophistication, not required for level 2 emotions, to be able to at level 3 say; “this is shame,” “this is regret,” or to

\(^{11}\) An example of a person who, either in inner (or overt speech), is describing an emotion is him or her saying ‘I am angry at John,’ whereas an example of someone expressing (in inner or overt speech) an emotion is that individual saying, ‘John is an idiot’ or ‘I hope that a ton of bricks falls on him.’
have other emotion specific thoughts typical of these kinds of emotions (see discussion above under level 3 emotions). Moreover, as the reader has considered emotion examples 1-5 previously, I suspect that he or she is moved to agree with the claim that we do not have to represent ourselves as emoting in a certain way to have an emotion. Now, it is furthermore natural to suspect also that a pre-linguistic child or a nonhuman animal would emote at stage two and not at stage 3. Next I am going to consider two such cases; I will start with a case of a young child being angry, and then follow it with a discussion of a squirrel experiencing fear.

Example 6. Joan is the mother of 5 month-old Steve. One day when she has just given him his dinner-bottle the telephone rings, and she walks over to answer it. It is Joan’s coworker Betty, who wants to go over some details regarding a new project that they recently started working on together. The two women end up talking for 15 minutes or so, and when Joan comes back to Steve’s crib she leans over and takes the bottle away from him. She reasons to herself, ‘by now he must be done with his dinner anyway.’ However, this was not the case.

As a result, when she removes the bottle Steve angrily clutches his fists and moves his arms up-and-down. In this example as in the others above, it is plausible that Steve is sensitive to his surroundings; he is sensitive to where and how he places his arms and fists in front of him, but other than that, the bulk of his attention is on the bottle in his mother’s hand. Further, the anger in this case is in the way Steve clutches his fists and moves his arms, and not in thoughts that he is having. To be clear, Steve is not thinking any thoughts to himself at all about the situation (e.g., that he was wronged by his mother and that he wants the bottle back), after all, he does not possess language yet. But what he is having is the perceptual experience (visual and tactile) sufficient for him to be aware of his surroundings. Also, no complex conceptualization and categorization is required in this instance, but rather all that is needed is conceptualization of
a minimal kind (i.e., he sees his mother’s hand removing the bottle as negative, or un-satisfying, or bad, or threatening etc.)

Example 7. Imagine a squirrel roaming around a university campus looking for leftover food. One day as he is crossing the big lawn in front of the library, a hawk comes into his field of vision (it is circling right above where he is scavenging). When this happens, the squirrel *fearfully cowers*. Again, I want to say that in this example the squirrel is sensitive to his surroundings; he is sensitive to where and how he moves his body, but other than that the majority of his attention is on the hawk. In addition, the ‘fearfulness’ of the squirrel’s behavior is in the *way* he cowers to the ground, and not in thoughts that he is having (after all, the squirrel does not possess language). Instead and as in the previous examples, he is simply having the perceptual experience (visual and bodily) required for him to be aware of his environment. Lastly, the squirrel is here only engaged in conceptualization and categorization of a minimal sort (i.e., he sees the hawk as negative, or bad, or threatening, etc).

As in the first four cases with Destiny, Jordan, Isabel, Lauren, and Clark in the examples involving the pre-linguistic child Steve and the squirrel, they too have the marks of the common structure. There is an organism that rather than experiencing an emotion as an emotion of type E, is experiencing it. And further, neither the pre-linguistic child nor the squirrel is engaging in inner speech through which they are describing or expressing, in these examples, anger and fear. There is also no complex conceptualization involved (as some other view necessitates, see chapter V), but rather only minimal conceptualization is present (i.e., a minimal differentiation of the world).

*b. Somatic Markers & more common characteristics*
At this time the reader might wonder: If these affective behaviors are not the result of conscious deliberation, then what makes them happen? One answer to this question starts out with looking at what Antonio Damasio calls “somatic markers” as a source of their energy (Damasio, 2005). Damasio (2005) hypothesizes that many items of experience (where the notion of experience is used in a broad way to include hallucinations, imaginations, memories, as well as contemplated future scenarios, etc.,) are somatically marked so that perceptions are suffused with affect (p. 165-205). These phenomena are associated with what he calls the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Ibid).

As an example of how somatic markers are supposed to work, consider the uncomfortable feeling that you might have when seeing in your inbox an email from a student who you do not feel like dealing with. We can imagine that you cringe when you see it. In this case then, you perceive the email cringly, i.e., it is somatically marked negatively. Another example would be a professor waiting to hear back from an agency that he has applied to for a grant. When he sees the name of the organization in the subject line he jumps with anxiety (or perhaps excitement). We can say that in this instance as he perceives the email it jumps or stands out to him. Moreover, whether or not the email is marked negatively or positively will depend on the professor’s personality. That is, if it is marked positively that might be a manifestation of his self-confidence (“Oh good, this is an exciting prospect”), whereas if it is marked negatively it might be telling of his insecure character (“Oh no, I’m going to get wacked again”).

Let us also look at cases that involve assessment and evaluation. As an example, consider your contemplating excitedly the prospect of meeting up with a friend that you have not seen for years. Perhaps you imagine giving him a vigorous hug. Thus, in this case the imagined scenario of you embracing your friend is somatically marked in a positive way. Moreover, Damasio also
gives us an account for how somatic markers can help us make decisions and choose how to act in particular situations. For instance reflect on the following scenario: you are considering whether or not to enter into business with your best friend’s archenemy (Damasio, 2005, p. 170). You are consciously and deliberately forming a mental image of your friend walking by just as you shake hands with the business associate. When this image comes up in your mind you cringe as you think about the eventuality. And as such you are presumably going to evaluate that possible decision in a negative way, i.e., it is somatically marked strongly negatively. In this way your negative response informs your decision and subsequent action to decline the business deal (Ibid).

One question to ask is: What does it mean to have an image marked in a negative or positive way? Damasio (2005) is going to say that somatic marking is associated with neuro-chemicals of various kinds. For example, when you are either happily contemplating a positive prospect or angrily contemplating a negative one “domapine, norepinephrine…serotonin…[and]acetylcholine” are released in various degrees into your bloodstream making you feel in a certain way (p. 181). Thus, many somatic markers have both a physiology (i.e., the chemicals released) and a phenomenology (i.e., a way that they feel). Likewise, imagine that you have a negative association with a certain kind of food, because once it made you sick. And as a result, you are now associating the food with vomiting. Imagine also that when someone mentions the food years later it is still somatically marked in a negative way: that is, you say “ewwh” and make the facial expression characteristic of disgust. The phenomenology of the marker is that contemplating the food makes you feel bad, while the physiology of it is the chemicals released together with the facial expression.

In the beginning of this section I said that perhaps the reader might wonder; if the
affective behaviors expressed in the above examples are not the result of conscious deliberation, then what makes them happen? Moreover, I said that maybe Damasio’s somatic markers could account for their energy by introducing us to impulses. That is, the chemicals mentioned above can not only affect the way things in the environment appear to the individual, but they also produce the reaction (impulse), which itself tends to produce a behavior (e.g., the ones described in the examples above). Thus, they are physiological underpinning or anchorage of the affective behavior(s). For instance, when Destiny begins to lovingly stroke Miles’ head, we can think of Miles as being somatically marked positively (i.e., certain chemicals are released in her body as she looks at his hair thus influencing how she perceives it; it shimmers with wanting to be strokedness). And what is more, as this happens Destiny has the impulse (or reaction) to start stroking his head.

Further, on this picture, reflexive affective behavior such as when Jordan cannot help but fearfully grasping the armchair of the couch, happens when the individual is unable to (in any way) influence whether or not the impulse will produce the behavior. However, in the other examples considered before there is at least the possibility that the agent could.

An additional point that I want to make about somatic markers is that there is nothing about them that make them necessarily tied to visual imagery. Rather, it seems plausible that other senses can be involved in somatic marking as well. For instance, a friend told me that as a

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12 Throughout this dissertation I’m going to have to be allusive and gesture at how I’m thinking of this “wanting to be strokedness” (and similar experiences in other emotion examples), but I’m not going to be able to fully describe it. Below (towards the end of chapter 1) I will give some examples trying to explain how I’m thinking of this type of experience—what it is like for the person experiencing the emotion, etc.

13 This would be the case also when talking about moods, such as Clark’s being gloomy. In the latter case however, Clark’s whole perceptual experience would be somatically marked negatively (e.g., everything he sees cries out to him to ‘be kept away from’; as something to make yourself smaller in front of). And thus, bringing about impulses in Clark that in turn produces various gloomy behaviors (i.e., his hunching over, his talking with a small voice, his walking slowly).

14 Main point: you can explain Destiny’s behavior without appealing to judgments, but by appealing to a perceptual object that makes actions of hers spontaneous so that she would have to exert an effort not to do it. She does not lovingly stroke Miles’ head because she tells herself to do it, but because it is her natural impulse to do so.
child growing up in Los Angeles there was a restaurant that he and his family would go to, and that had a very particular smell due to the cleaning supplies that they used there. And so, my friend would come to associate that particular smell with the place and the times that he had spent there with his family. Fifteen years later when he was traveling around in England, a hotel that he was staying at used those exact same cleaning supplies, and consequently he was again exposed to that certain smell. When he smelled the smell, he was brought back to the particular restaurant in Los Angeles. In this case the aroma was redolent with feeling, not just smell. Hence in this example, it does not seem as though first my friend smelled the smell and then he had an emotion, but rather the experience itself (the aroma) was infused with affect (i.e., certain chemicals was released in his body). Moreover, it would not surprise me if, say, nonhuman animals also somatically mark objects of perception when those objects of perception are heard, or tasted.

Another characteristic of the embodiment fact is that the affective behaviors generally are appropriate to the situation at hand. They are consistent with the types of behaviors one would expect someone who is experiencing emotions such as anger, intimidation, love, or fear to demonstrate. For instance, when an agent feels scared it makes sense that she would try to make herself look smaller (i.e., cower) so as to avoid attention. Or, that when a creature feels love toward someone else that she would touch that person (e.g., stroke him or her) to show her affection.

One other feature of the embodiment fact is that even though in the cases where an individual cannot call to mind why she did what she did (i.e., give a reason or reasons for the

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15 Of course in some instances they might not be appropriate for the situation at hand, such as when someone due to a phobia of say, rabbits, experiences a pattern of fear behaviors as she sees a child playing with her bunny rabbit on the lawn.
16 For example, in the animal kingdom this type of reaction appears beneficial to one’s survival—if one sees oneself as weaker, why draw the attention of someone stronger to oneself?
behavior), there might still be an explanation for it. Here I am prepared to give the traditional emotion critic, who thinks of reasons in a more cognitive way, that reasons are only ever had at the person level where they can be articulated by an agent as part of a reason-desire rationalization explanation. However, I want to suggest that there is another concept that could be useful here, namely adaptiveness. Adaptiveness stands between sheer intelligibility (i.e., I can understand why it happens, i.e., I can tell the causal story; why water boils at a particular temperature) on one extreme, and rationalizability in the sense that an agent can give reasons for why she behaves in the way that she does on the other extreme. And so, this explanatory concept falls somewhere in the middle of the two sides; it helps meet the organism’s needs. Moreover, while something being adaptive suggests optimal, or better than other kinds of options, it does not require conscious, sentient, reflective attention, etc.

Now, an adaptation is something that makes sense both at the level of phylogeny (i.e., the evolutionary history of a species) and ontogeny (i.e., the evolutionary history of an organism), but it also makes sense in that adapting to your social environment can happen within an individual’s lifespan where there is no genetic change. You can see how a person might adapt to a social niche without paying attention to the fact that they are doing so. Rather, they just adapt by sharing in the upspeak, the vocal fry, clothing style and/or the postures within their peer group, and this without ever having a conscious thought about it whatsoever.

Based on the above discussion then, perhaps we can think of emotions as being adaptive in the following two ways. First, and here the thought is something like this; just as the bird’s beak is well-suited to help it survive in some particular biological niche (i.e., it is the right size for cracking nuts and getting maggots out of the rotted wood), a person’s extreme repulsive behavior upon seeing maggots in her trashcan (i.e., she starts retching and makes a disgusted
facial expression) is well-suited to help her survive in the niche that she is in. Second, and this similarly to the adaptiveness of upspeak and vocal fry within peer groups mentioned above, sometimes also emotions can be thought of as adaptive within an individual’s social environment (or niche). For instance, when I am at my grandparents’ house, which has always been a very strict and cold place, I experience my happiness differently than when I am with my friends. That is, when I am around my grandmother my happiness is less intense and animated, whereas when I am with my friends it is more all-consuming and expressive. Lastly, and importantly, here I could have adapted to this social niche without having paid attention to the fact that I was doing so.

Before I move on to considering the many other benchmarks that a good theory of emotions should be able to account for, I want to also briefly say something about what embodied cognition is and how it differs from the more traditional computational theories of cognition. Further, after having done so I will too discuss my previous suggestion that it is possible to move from embodied cognition to embodied affect (or emotion).

\textit{c. Embodied cognition to embodied affect}

According to the traditional account of cognition, the latter is best understood in terms of an appeal to rules and representations. For example, on this view for a baseball player to predict where the ball is going to end up “…a model of the projectile motion of the ball and some information about its initial conditions as it came off the bat (speed, direction, etc) [is needed]. Perception provides input, the brain uses a representation that implements the model to predict the landing location and then commands the body to move [to] the right location” (Thompson, 2012). In contrast, the embodied claim is that the baseball player manages to solve the problem at least in part by keeping his eyes on the ball and using his body to move in a particular way.
Thus, he is neither required to engage in any predictive calculations nor does there have to be an “internal model” at work. Rather, the outfielder is working out the difficulty “by moving in a particular way” in a specific type of environment (Thompson, 2012). And so embodied cognition is happening as the player’s body moves in relation to the ball: his brain, perception and body working together to solve the task.

A question naturally arises here. Surely, the baseball player must have some fairly complex neurological activity occurring. But is this not to say that there will be some internal cognition occurring? To this we can respond with the following. Embodied cognition does not claim that any cognitive events happen entirely outside of the brain (i.e., that it is entirely extra-cranial). It makes the weaker claim that certain cognitive states are constituted in part by events that are extra-cranial. In the case of the baseball player, the bodily movements are a part of his calculation of where to stand; this is what makes the cognitive state embodied. Furthermore, as in the above illustration with the outfielder, there are many activities that we would consider intelligent that do not involve the process described by traditionalists about cognition. But rather, that in part involve the organism having a combination of perceptual competence (i.e., visual and bodily perception) and her being in the right ecological niche (i.e., having her body within a particular environment).  

Before I continue on to motivate the claim that at times cognition is embodied, I want to first briefly highlight that there at least two strands of embodied cognition visible in the

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17 The authors of “Embodied cognition is not what you think it is” Andrew D. Wilson and Sabrina Golonka (2013) mention as one reason in favor of an embodied account of cognition over the traditional view, the fact that it is a simpler, more economical way for the organism to solve a specific problem: “Embodied cognition solutions solve specific tasks, not general problems, so identifying how an organism produces a given behavior means accurately identifying the task it is trying to solve at the time. Taking things one task at a time opens up the possibility of smart solutions. Organisms using smart solutions solve particular problems using heuristics made possible by stable features of the task at hand, rather than general purpose rote devices which apply algorithms to solve the task. For common tasks, smart solutions are typically more efficient, more stable, and more economical than rote solutions” (p.2).
literature. And second, I want to emphasize the strand that I am going to be concerned with as we move forward. One strand of embodied cognition is where the paradigm is the above-mentioned example with the baseball player catching a fly ball. He is working out a problem by moving in a certain intelligent way. Another strand of embodied cognition can be found in examples like the following. If I give you a mental image by means of a metaphor, for example I might tell you: “the knife is ripping the flesh” or “the velvet fabric felt soft between her fingers,” then, that will activate some mental imagery in you, and most likely something physiological as well. Or, imagine that you are telling a friend a story about how someone gripped the handles of a motorcycle very tightly. It would not be surprising as you were telling her this, if an fMRI machine caught your friend activating the muscles in her hands unintentionally.\(^{18}\)

The second strand of embodied cognition focuses on perception and imagery, whereas in the baseball example it is more about the individual being out in the world directly doing something. In this dissertation my emphasis on embodied affect it more aligned with the baseball paradigm, and less like imagining something happening in the mind’s eye with physiological changes being part of the process. It is not that we could not consider the second strand; in a more extensive discussion one might. However, in this dissertation we will be concerned with embodied cognition as in the case of the baseball player. As a result, in what follows when I use the term ‘embodied cognition,’ the first strand is the type that I am referring to.

In an attempt to support the claim that at times cognition is embodied, I want to consider the following. If we asked a traditionalist about cognition what he thought about a case such as the baseball example discussed above, we can agree that: firstly, he would not simply insist that

\(^{18}\) Apparently, something similar happens for ballet dancers when they see another dancer perform moves that they have rehearsed before; their brain and muscles mimics what they see in front of them in the other dancer. “If they see someone performing an arabesque, for example, certain motor areas of their brains respond as if they were themselves performing the step” (Solway, 2007).
cognition always has to be in the form of inner speech. And likewise, secondly, he would also not insist that cognition is a kind of platonc grasp of objects, namely, propositions. So, what is it then? As we saw previously, for a traditionalist, cognition is constituted by processes that do not have to be in conscious awareness, and yet they are internal in the sense that they are required to be in the central nervous system. Now, my question is, why could not an environment-modifying, jury-rigging kind of organism (human being, dragonfly, spider, etc.,) also use things outside of its cranium as part of its cognitive apparatus? That is, why would you expect such creatures to restrict these processes to what happens inside the cranium (or whatever other device the animal has) of the central nervous system?

Of course many cognitive types (states and processes) are ones which tokens can be realized purely intra-cranially, but there is no deep reason why certain other tokens of the same cognitive types (states and processes) could not involve something bodily. The responsibility then, is on the traditionalist to explain what the deep significance of the cranium (or whatever other device the organism has) is and why it is necessary to draw the line right there.

For an embodied cognition theorist, cognition is an application of intelligence; it is competence or skill as manifested in an organism’s behavior. To understand what this competence or skill is, think of a massage therapist’s, a knitter’s, or a glassblower’s expert hands. That is, she has expert, or competent or skillful hands in the way that they are sensitive to finding muscles that are in need of massage, to correctly and quickly working through intricate knitting patterns, or to moving the blowpipe accurately. In these examples one does not have to refer to cognition as constituted by complex processes to account for her intelligent behavior, but rather, she knows by touch what to do, and where and how to do it. For example in the case of a glassblower working on a new design, and similarly to the outfielder fielding the ball, he has
perceptual awareness of what is happening (i.e., he sees what he is doing), but it is not the case that he is merely following an internally represented rule. Rather, the way he moves his body in the environment is part of the solution to the problem of for the glassblower; to make the glass, and for the outfielder; to catch the ball.

As we have seen above there is no need to deny that in some cases cognitive states are wholly internally represented, however at other times it would seem that the proponent of embodied cognition has it right and that cognition, in fact, is embodied—it is competence or expertise realized in one’s bodily behavior. Now, as I said in the beginning of this chapter, I am suggesting that affect even though in some cases requiring cognitive occurrences as traditionally understood (such as judgments, beliefs, propositional acts) all emotions sometimes are embodied. That is, at times the occurrence of an emotion can be achieved, in part, by a physiological anchorage of some kind (such as a neurotransmitter or chemical, i.e., a somatic marker that marks your experience in a certain way) together with some physical behavior.\footnote{The way I’m thinking about this is as follows. Under certain perceptual and environmental conditions (more about these below) emotions can come in the form of various physiological changes together with a clenched fist, a shuddering, the looking enviously at someone, or the stroking of someone’s hair lovingly, etc.} \footnote{Perhaps as with embodied cognition, embodied emotions too can be understood as in a sense more efficient, more stable, and more economical solutions to problems. For example, evolutionary speaking emotions are problem solvers regarding things in an organism’s environment—the squirrel’s cowering solves the problem of something being a threat to the animal’s survival by making the animal smaller so as to not draw attention to itself. This affective behavior is more efficient than the organism performing various computations in its head and then acting. More about this below!} Examples of the latter would be the many cases of affective behavior described previously, namely, Lauren’s angrily washing the dishes, Destiny’s lovingly stroking Miles’ head, and the squirrel’s fearfully cowering when perceiving the hawk, etc. To crystallize the idea of embodied affect the following is the definiendum of what it is for an affective state to be embodied (i.e., the definiens):

\textit{Examples of the latter would be the many cases of affective behavior described previously, namely, Lauren’s angrily washing the dishes, Destiny’s lovingly stroking Miles’ head, and the squirrel’s fearfully cowering when perceiving the hawk, etc. To crystallize the idea of embodied affect the following is the definiendum of what it is for an affective state to be embodied (i.e., the definiens):}
An affective state \( A \) is embodied just in case some feature of the agent’s environment or behavior is in part constitutive of \( A \).

We can see then that body movement is to the mental process of calculation as, say, Destiny’s hair stroking is to the emotional event of “loving.” Before I continue on to discussing more precisely how I think of embodied affect here, I want to first consider and answer to a potential criticism that a critic now might not only raise to the embodied cognition account, but also to my suggestion of embodied affect.

The foregoing is a sketch of embodied affect, but as I said we should also notice what a traditionalist skeptic would say in response. The traditionalist will reply that these behaviors are manifestations or expressions of emotions, but that they are also distinct from them. For the traditionalist then, emotion itself (i.e., certain representations in the brain) causes the organism to behave in particular ways. That is, for such an individual the behavior in question is always a mere consequence of the emotion (i.e., the representation), and as such it can never be a constitutive part thereof. Below I will outline an answer to this criticism by first considering why embodied cognition in some cases wins over the traditional view, and then second, I am going to draw a parallel to embodied affect.

In general, intelligent behavior in the natural world is often the result of some lucky accident, jury-rigging, or repurposing of something that is already out there. For example, the bones in our ears are an evolutionary descendent of jawbones in lizard-like ancestors (“Homology,” n.d). Nature works with the material that is there, ties them together, and repurposes them into something that works. This appears to be a very common theme in evolutionary theory, and is often typified by saying: “nature is parsimonious.” At this time the reader might wonder; how does this have anything to do with traditional and embodied cognition? It is pertinent to it because it shows part of the attractiveness of embodied cognition,
at times, over the traditional view.

As we know, it is consistent with the embodied theorist’s claim that some internal representation guides the baseball player, the glassblower, and the massage therapist. That is, to say that some part of behavior is a constitutive part of the emotion or cognitive state is compatible with the claim that every time she emotes there is also something internal. However, the internal representation on the embodied view does not require such complex things as predictive calculations and internal models. Rather, on the embodied view the behavior is part of the calculation, and as such the kinds of representations demanded by the cognitivist are not necessary. Hence, the embodied theorist can explain what is happening in a more parsimonious way than the traditionalist. This puts pressure on the latter to explain why we should go his route—that is, what would it gain us to posit and rely on predictive calculations and internal models?

Similarly, for the embodied affect idea, one could say that what emotions are in cases such as when Lauren angrily washes the dishes or Jordan fearfully clutches the arm of the chair, are these internal complex representations. However, then the question becomes; what would that explain when you have another form of explanation where behavior is a constitutive part of the emotion? That is, why positing something that appears, given that nature is parsimonious, to be an unnecessary explanatory fifth wheel? Consequently, the onus is on the critic to justify why it is required that we do so. I will now return to my discussion of emotions and the embodiment fact, and further what such an idea consists in.

Based on my proposal that affect can be embodied (i.e., for all emotion types there will e at least one emotion token that is embodied), one question that I need to consider further is: how can we apply the embodied way of thinking about intelligence as expert or skillful behavior to
affect? One way of doing this is by saying that there are different levels of intelligence. For instance, perhaps we can say that there can be organismic intelligence, and that there can be individual intelligence. I will below discuss each of these levels of intelligence in greater detail.

Organismic intelligence is a rather basic-level intelligence, and further, it is not something that the individual has to build (or acquire) through training. Perhaps we can think of it as “first nature” rather than “second nature,” the latter requiring learning and skill-building whereas the former does not. Moreover, it also does not demand that the individual has any thoughts about what they are doing. Now, this is the type of intelligence that so to speak my whole body manifests as I sweat or get goose bumps from the air temperature around me. That is, my sweating when it is hot on the one hand and my getting goose bumps when it is cold on the other hand, are both in some ways intelligent responses to environmental changes. They are adaptive within my biological niche since they are beneficial to my well-being and survival.

Individual intelligence comes after, and sits on top of, organismic intelligence. It is something in which some but not all individuals learn to regulate their emotional expression in accordance with the social situation. Such learning will typically be conscious but it need not be. However, it is the type of intelligence that requires that the individual learn how to get by in his or her environment, and not everyone knows how to do that. Consequently, this form of intelligence requires skill. Furthermore, the emotional behaviors that we are concerned with here then (similarly to those discussed above) are intelligent responses to the individual’s environment. That is, they are adaptive within the individual’s social niche in that they increase his or her chances of being accepted within a social context.

Now, the reader might at this point ask, where do emotion examples like Lauren angrily washing the dishes discussed above fall? It seems appropriate to think of angrily washing the
dishes in this case as intelligent in an individual sense, because it requires social training to have a delayed response to your social environment (in this case your boss). Presumably what you are doing is sublimating your aggression into a different direction using the dishes as props (for your boss) since not doing so might get you into trouble. It would also seem that washing the dishes angrily is a rather individual form of intelligence in that it can be thought of as, if not intelligent in the sense of being therapeutic or helpful, at least as something that allows you to act on impulses (such as an impulse to attack). That is, the individual acts on impulses without doing something that gets her into a potentially dangerous situation, and this appears adaptive within the individual’s social niche. What is more, it is a better way for Lauren to redirect her anger in this way, than smashing the glasses and plates against, say, the kitchen wall.

At this point I want to also mention that there can be sophisticated individual learning for nonhuman animals as well. I am thinking here of the way in which an individual baboon for instance learns certain social hierarchies; who is allowed to groom whom? Who is allowed to hold whose baby? And, who eats first? All of these are very important to know for the individual’s continuous belonging to the group (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Now, since this is the case, one would not be surprised if baboons also learn to for instance redirect some of their expressions of, say, anger onto something else. And as such, that kind of emoting would also fall into the category of manifested individual intelligence. In contrast, the above example with the squirrel that fearfully cowers when the hawk enters into his field of vision appears to be an example of organismic intelligence. The squirrel’s emoting here is an intelligent response to an immediate environmental change. It is adaptive within its biological niche in that it ensures the nonhuman animal’s protection and survival.

Admittedly, many instances of affective behavior appear to be counterproductive, such as
my bodily manifestations of fear revealing to an audience that I am terrified of public speaking or their showing a potential killer that I am afraid of him. However, and in accordance with my previous discussion of emotions as being adaptive, they are still a byproduct of human evolution. That is, we can think of emotions as being imperfect tools for coping with our environment today; an environment that is much different than what it was thousands of years ago. Even though from an evolutionary perspective it makes sense that I would manifest fear in a potentially threatening situation, like the one described earlier (after all I could fail in my speaking endeavor and as a result be viewed as weak, or the killer could actually try to come after me next) from a contemporary point of view, it would appear more beneficial if I did not respond in such a fearful way. Thus, as the human nose is an imperfect solution given today’s pollen problems, affective behaviors are imperfect solutions to our contemporary environment.

d. The role of the environment in embodied affect

The last remark I want to make before moving on to talking about the other benchmarks is that the environment plays a crucial part in embodied affect. That is, someone holding that affect can be embodied would have to agree that for an individual to experience it in some form or another certain things have to be present in her surroundings. Likewise, for the outfielder to catch the ball it must be on the right kind of trajectory (it has to be within a range of possible paths). As an example of required objects in such an organism’s environment, consider the previous case with Destiny lovingly stroking Miles’ hair. Here the presence of Miles’ hair as a thing to be stroked is necessary. Similarly, for Jordan to experience bodily manifestations of fear, words such as trapped, rape, or attack, etc., have to be present (i.e., in this instance words spoken by her friend Jane are apart of Jordan’s environment).21, 22 What is more, it is not merely

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21 Physical objects, colors, tastes, smells, sounds, etc., are all part of one’s environment.
the case that the environment here is made up by particular physical things, but rather it is also
the case that the emoter highlights these things in accordance with its emotional significance.

The way that I am thinking about this ‘highlighting’ of objects brings us back to our brief
discussion before about somatic markers. The person experiencing the emotion ‘colors’ or
‘charges’ her environment in a somatically marked way.\(^{23}\) To see how this is so consider for
example again the case of Jordan. Suppose further that besides the above-mentioned words that
she associates with her rape there is a certain place on campus that she connects to her rapist,
such as, a seat in class in which he used to sit. We can imagine that this place now (i.e., the seat
or the general area of the seat) is colored or charged in a certain negative manner to her. That is,
certain chemicals are released in her body as she looks at the chair thus influencing how she
perceives it. Hence, when Jordan sees the chair as she walks into the room, her perceiving is not
merely the sheer perception of primary qualities, but rather she is perceiving it also as in a sense
screaming out to her with, something like wanting to be avoidedness. Moreover, as this happens
a certain fearful behavior is triggered in Jordan and she starts shaking and grasps on to her
friend’s arm. In this case then, the affect (i.e., fear) is manifested or realized in her behavior.

In an effort to explain what I mean when I say that Jordan is not only perceiving the
primary qualities of the chair, but also that she is seeing it as in a sense screaming out to her with
wanting to be avoidedness, consider the following example. If Jordan’s experience was made
into a movie, then as the camera is directed towards that particular chair the viewer might hear a
soundtrack similar to the shrieking sound of the shower scene in psycho. Thus, intensifying her
experience (her perception) of the piece of furniture. As an example of this, consider the

\(^{22}\) Side note: In the case of Lauren angrily washing the dishes it might be that if there is nothing she can wash angrily
(i.e., there are no dishes to be made, they are all clean), she perhaps will find herself throwing dishes on the wall.
That is, she will move on to throwing dishes on the wall if she finds it hard to find something to use as a medium for
her anger.

\(^{23}\) Physical objects, colors, tastes, smells, sounds, etc., can all be somatically marked.
shrieking sound of the shower scene in *Psycho*; as the woman is being stabbed to death with a knife the eerie score plays repeatedly. Now, by having the music accompanying what is taking place in the scene, the viewer’s visual experience of it is intensified. Similarly in the non-movie example with Jordan, due to the chair being somatically marked negatively for her she perceives it as standing out (as being intensified) from the rest of the furniture. In this situation then, not only can Jordan not but perceive the chair as ‘charged’ (i.e., intensified), but, she will also be motivated to avoid it.

I acknowledge that in my above comparison to film and film music there is another experiential dimension present besides vision, namely, the auditory dimension. However, even if my example of Jordan’s experience being made into a movie does not get me all the way to an account of what it means to say that an object is ‘colored’ or ‘charged’ emotionally, it is a step in the right direction. In the next paragraph I expand on this idea.

John Locke in an *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* talks about a blind man who (never having seen colors) one day exclaims that he knows what the color scarlet is like; he says it is similar to the sound of a trumpet (*Essay III. IV. 20*). In line with Locke’s view, the blind man here does not have a full understanding of what the color scarlet is like, however, we can say that he has *some* understanding—the color scarlet is loud and shrill (Ibid). After all, you would not want to say the same things about the color brown. Rather, it would be better described as the sound of a trombone—low and rumbling. Now, it is not as though these various sounds capture exactly what the experience of colors is, but it gets one in the general vicinity of it. Drawing from this idea in this dissertation, I am trying to do something similar when I use metaphors regarding what things such as Miles’ hair or the chair are like to the emoter; e.g., that Miles’ hair shimmers with *wanting to be strokedness* or that the chair screams out with *wanting*
to be avoidedness. For even though the analogy to film music above does not perfectly capture what Jordan’s experience when she sees her rapist’s seat in class is like (i.e., as intensified), as it would not fully capture Destiny’s experience when perceiving Miles’ hair (i.e., as intensified), it does put us in the general direction of it.

We all have experiences of perceiving things in an emotionally charged way, and further we know that it is difficult to verbalize such experiences. But, the reader will know that this is not anything specific to emotion; anything qualitative is difficult to verbalize. Indeed that is the point I just made in discussing the examples above. However, it is an aspect of emotions that we need to be able to account for, but for now the above is the best description I can give. Taken together, one sees that the environment and our perception of it are crucial parts both in the embodied cognition and affect story. However, they constitute especially important parts in the affect case with beings “coloring” or “charging” the environment in ways that are emotionally important to them.
Chapter II

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1) INTRODUCTION

Below I am going to discuss some phenomena, or benchmarks as I call them, that I think any theory of emotions ought to be at least consistent with and, ideally, able to explain. Now, the latter might cause the reader to raise the question: If you think that these are benchmarks, then why should not each theory have to accommodate all of them? To this I want to answer as follows; in philosophy often you have a theory that accounts for most of the intuitions or other phenomena that we want to consider, but not all of them. When this is the case the theorist is allowed to explain away the ones that are leftover. The theorist does not do this by making things up, but by saying that those are not real phenomena, or one of them, say, rests on a confusion, or, that they are really two different phenomena mixed into one. As we will see in chapter III, some of the emotion theories cannot explain all of the below benchmarks, however, this does not discount that theory automatically. I raise this since I want to acknowledge that there is room for theorists to navigate around some of the stated phenomena.

2) BENCHMARKS
   a. Some emotions have a cognitive component
Emotions often involve thoughts. Perhaps you come to understand that someone has intentionally wronged you, such a realization might involve the following thought or belief: ‘she [e.g., a close friend] knew that I liked John, and still she went ahead and danced with him at the party.’ This would be a thought usually connected to the emotion of anger. Or, maybe after finding out about the passing of a beloved relative you have the thought or belief: ‘Karl is gone and I will never get to see him again.’ The latter being a thought (or belief) commonly associated with the emotion of sadness.

b. Some emotions have a physiological dimension

Emotions often come with various physiological changes. For example, when you realize that your friend intentionally slighted you by dancing with your love-interest, perhaps your breathing rate and blood flow to the arms increase (preparing you to fight) (Ekman, 2003, p. 79). On the other hand, when you come to know that your family member has passed away, your heart might begin to beat faster, maybe you start sweating and turn pale.

c. Some emotions have a phenomenal character

Emotions often involve a phenomenology—a way the emotion feels to the individual. As an example, the angry person might feel something like a pang of heat in her body when seeing her friend with the person she is in love with. In contrast, the individual who finds out that her family member recently died might experience a sinking feeling in her stomach.

d. Emotions characteristically have behavioral signatures

According to some researchers on emotions, some emotions have certain universally recognized facial expressions. For example, surprise is said to involve, pan-culturally, “raised

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24 I take myself to make a rather weak claim here, namely, that some emotion tokens lack a phenomenology. There is a stronger claim, namely, that some emotion types characteristically lack a phenomenology (which does not mean that they could never have one. For instance, it seems that the emotion type ‘national pride’ lacks a phenomenology. However, that does not mean that you cannot be in a particular situation where you find yourself bursting with pride about your country, but it is not as characteristic. In contrast, the emotion type ‘fear’ has a phenomenology).
curved eyebrows; long horizontal forehead wrinkles...wide open eyes...dropped-open mouth...” (Ekman et al 1971a &b) as described in Griffiths, 1997, p. 54). Whereas disgust supposedly can be recognized on “brows drawn down but not together...lower eyelids pushed up and raised, but not tensed...deep nasolabial folds and raising of cheeks; mouth either open with upper lip raised and lower lip forward and/or out, or closed with upper lip pushed up by raised lower lip...” (Ibid). However, more recent literature argues that it is not the case that a Scandinavian and a Papua New Guinean express and otherwise display their, anger, fear, surprise and so forth in similar ways (Russell, 1994). Instead, there can be uniformity in the following sense: this particular person has a uniform way of manifesting her anger, fear, surprise, etc. Thus, other individuals who are experts on that person can read her emotions. That is, it is likely that you can see an emotion in, say, your partner in ways that someone else not as familiar with her is able to. As an example of this, Lauren Bacall would describe how her husband Humphrey Bogart, when happy to see either her or their children, would engage in a kind of chewing-gesture (Bacall, 1979, p. 314). Presumably, this is an emotion signature that someone who was not an expert on Bogart would not have been able to recognize.

Rather than committing myself to any kind of pan-cultural regularities among emotions, I want to make the weaker claim that there are regularities among emotional manifestations of emotional behavior, but that the regularities are idiosyncratic. It seems to me that emotions do have characteristic behavioral patterns that can look very different between individuals.

e. Non-human animals and pre-linguistic children can have emotions

A good theory of emotion should be able to explain how emotions can occur also in pre-linguistic children and nonhuman animals, whose thoughts do not have propositional content, but

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who nevertheless behave in ways typical of various emotion experiences. For example, such an account should be able to accommodate the emotion process behind, say, the dog’s apparent anger when he growls, shows his teeth, and walks toward someone he perceives to be a threat, or, the 5 month-old child’s happiness when he smiles and makes cooing sounds upon seeing his mother entering into the room.

\[ \text{f. Emotions can be irrational} \]

In an effort to demonstrate what this benchmark comes down to, consider the examples below.

Example 1: Phobias. Imagine a classroom of 10-year old students with a teacher standing in the front asking them to come up to the board and draw their favorite animal. One of the students, call him Corbin, raises his hand and walks up to the teacher. He grabs a piece of chalk and begins drawing his favorite animal, a bunny rabbit. When the teacher sees what he has drawn, her heart starts beating faster, her blood pressure increases, tears begin streaming down her face, and eventually she flees the classroom. It is later determined by doctors that the teacher suffers from leporiphobia—an extreme irrational fear of rabbits (Palmer, 2010).

Example 2: Obsessions. One example of obsessive behavior can be seen in someone suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Research says that OCD “is an anxiety disorder in which people have unwanted and repeated thoughts, feelings, images, and sensations (obsessions) and engage in behaviors or mental acts in response to these thoughts or obsessions” (“Obsessive-Compulsive,” 2018). The individual often engage in these behaviors because they reduce “the impact or get rid of the obsessive thoughts” (Ibid). However, doing these behaviors only gives temporary relief, and further, not carrying them out can bring about great anxiety (Ibid). The disorder can be mild to severe, and when not treated can hinder the person from
leading a normal social and work life.

The following is an example of what life can be like for someone suffering from OCD as told by John Monahan (2018), whom himself battled the disorder through his teenage and young adult years. John describes how as a 14-year-old, his mom once remarked that he must really like that song since he’s been listening to it everyday over the past year. John continues:

“Yeah, it’s a favorite.” I nod, smilingly, before turning back toward the television with what I hope is all the nonchalance of a typical 14-year-old boy. What I definitely do not do is glance back and say, “Funny story about that song, while you’ve clearly noticed I’ve listened to it every single weeknight this entire school year, would you believe I only ever press play at exactly 8:38 p.m.? “And check this out, once the cable box hits 9:52 p.m., I will casually retire to my bedroom to initiate the final sequence of what has recently ballooned into a near 90-minute nightly routine of humiliating compulsions: I’ll touch the same four CDs laid out on my dresser in ‘order’; turn the stereo on and off; move to the entertainment center; touch the ‘Twisted Metal’ video game case; turn on the TV; boot up the PlayStation; shut it off once the load screen finishes; press ‘channel up’ on the cable box until I hit channel 20, then 22, then 40; turn off the cable box, then touch nothing else until it’s lights out at 9:58 p.m” (Monahan, 2018).

Now, we can imagine further that all of these compulsive behaviors that John is engaging in above are the result of an irrational fear that if he doesn’t run through them, something is going to happen to his friends and family.

Example 3. Fetishes. What researchers call fetishistic disorder is described as “a condition in which there is a persistent and repetitive use of or dependence on nonliving objects [undergarments, footwear, gloves, rubber articles, and leather clothing] or a highly specific focus on a body part (typically nongenital [such as, feet, toes, and hair]) to reach sexual arousal” (“Fetishistic Disorder,” 2018). Further, it is only possible for the person to obtain sexual gratification when using the object or body part (Ibid). Now, an individual is diagnosed with the disorder if the fetish in some way impairs their functioning in social, occupational, or other important life areas (Ibid). However, if an individual identifies, as a fetishistic practitioner but is not clinically impaired in any of the latter ways, they have a fetish but not fetishistic disorder.
The following is an example of a young woman, Violetta, whom is a fetishistic practitioner (in particular she has a foot fetish) and thus can only experience sexual gratification if she is able to touch her sexual partner’s feet. Imagine that after a night of partying in one of the dorms on campus, she brings a guy with her home that she is interested in. Now, as they are getting undressed she cannot help but notice how “very soft and smooth-looking…[and how] masculine” his feet appear (Hills, 2015). And consequently, she has a strong emotional experience of elation. Furthermore, the way in which Violetta pays attention to the guy’s feet here is not in any way brief, but rather the body part becomes something that she cannot but fixate on.

Again, in each of these cases a convincing theory of emotion should be able to, if not explain the irrational emotions (i.e., the teachers fear, John’s fear, and Violetta’s elation), at least be consistent with them.

g. Some emotions result from careful reflection whereas others are the result of automatic responses to stimuli.

One example of an emotion resulting from careful reflection is the anger that Jane Austen’s character in Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet, experiences as a result of, first, having found out (and considered) that Mr. Darcy (a potential love interest) is the one behind the breakup between his friend Bingley and her sister Jane, and second, after witnessing the arrogant manner in which he boldly proposes to her.

“…When they were gone, Elizabeth, as if intending to exasperate herself as much as possible against Mr. Darcy, chose for her employment the examination of all the letters which Jane had written to her since her being in Kent…” (Austen, 2016, p.1)

“…In spite of her deeply-rooted dislike, she could not be insensible to the compliment of such a man’s affection, and though her intentions did not vary for an instant, she was at first sorry for the pain he was to receive; till, roused to resentment by his subsequent
language, she lost all compassion in anger. She tried, however, to compose herself to answer him with patience, when he should have done. He concluded with representing to her the strength of that attachment which, in spite of all his endeavours, he has found impossible to conquer; and with expressing his hope that it would now be rewarded by her acceptance of his hand. As he said this, she could easily see that he had no doubt of a favourable answer. He spoke of apprehension and anxiety, but his countenance expressed real security. Such a circumstance could only exasperate farther, and when he ceased, the colour rose into her cheeks…” (p. 3)

In the above quotations we see that Elizabeth holds a deep dislike of Mr. Darcy due to his involvement in the breakup, but that when his nonchalant tone and self-assured marriage proposal is added to the mix, she cannot but experience anger. Further, that Elizabeth is angry is emphasized by Austen when she points out that “the colour rose into her [Elizabeth’s] cheeks”—a physiological characteristic typical of the emotion (Ibid).

In contrast, an example of an emotion resulting from an automatic response to a stimulus is the fear a creature experiences when, for example, she mistakes a branch on the ground for a snake. We can easily imagine that as a result her heart starts beating faster, blood rushes to her legs, and further that she jumps to the side. Another example would be the fear response an individual has when mistaking a branch in the water for a shark’s fin. Again, the person perceiving this, most likely as a result, will have a change in heart rate, an increase in adrenaline throughout her body, and abruptly move in the water (something like a jump to the side). Lastly, a third example is the surprise you experience when running into someone you know at a place where you did not expect seeing them—most likely, you will display a surprise facial expression together with physiological changes, such as, an increase in adrenaline.

As we can see then, emotions can be brought about either as a consequence of careful deliberation, or as the result of automatic responses to stimuli.

h. Some emotions and moods are embodied
Examples of embodied emotions, as I have suggested, are the ones described above in section I—Lauren’s washing the dishes angrily, Destiny’s stroking Miles’ hair lovingly, the squirrel’s fearfully cowering at the sight of the hawk, etc. What is more, a satisfying theory of affect should be one that not only discusses how emotions can be embodied, but that also talks about how moods can be. This is so since, many mood tokens are ones that are body involving; for instance, an anxious person might squeeze a stress-ball in her hand, spin a fidget-wheel between her fingers, or tap her hands on the table. Lastly, for a view that can account for tokens of emotions such as, anger and fear being embodied, it should be an easy case to explain how mood tokens can be. After all, it is harder to explain how the former can be embodied, than the latter.

Moreover, it is natural for a philosopher to suppose that one can give a conceptual analysis of emotions by looking at “the right and central usage” of emotion terms (Brotheridge, 2004, 5). In the words of Paul Griffiths (1997) in his book What Emotions Really Are, for philosophers ascribing to conceptual analysis, the method “…can reveal to us the conditions for the application of various emotion terms [at this point in time]. Understanding these application conditions will allow us to frame “definitions” of these various emotions…using necessary and sufficient conditions…” (p. 34). For example, for Wayne C. Davis fear happens when propositional fear (“S is afraid that p iff S desires that not-p and is uncertain whether p, where S’s uncertainty is not based solely on his indecision about a course of action”) causes “both involuntary physiological arousal and “unhappiness” (Ibid). 26 However, Griffiths continues:

i. At the moment it is not clear that emotions are the kinds of things open to conceptual analysis. For instance, according to some authors some emotions are natural kinds.

26 Griffith (1997) stresses that for Davis empirical finds about fear are not important: “such facts are not generally known, and so could not be part of the meaning of ‘fear,’ which is my concern in this paper” (p. 3).
What are natural kinds? Philosophers and scientists often say that these are categories that “have boundaries that derive from nature” and not from the way human beings tend to organize or put things together (Prinz, 2004, 80). The metaphor commonly used to describe this is that nature has joints, or natural divisions. For example, lions, horses, birds, gold, and water all constitute natural kinds—they are classes of things that share certain properties, and which in nature are clearly separated from one another. In contrast, the things that we ourselves commonly sort into different categories, such as say, movies, works of art, and baseball games constitute non-natural kinds. Contrary to natural kinds, these do not exist or occur (i.e., have a reality) independently from us (i.e., in nature). One common scientific assumption is that emotions, such as anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness, constitute distinct natural kinds (Barrett, 2006; Griffiths 1997, p. 78). That is, each emotion can be identified by certain characteristics or features in, for example, the brain, face, physiology, and behavior (Barrett, 2006, p. 30).

Now, if the above theorists are correct and emotions are natural kinds, then, we can criticize the method of conceptual analysis by saying that it is inadequate. That is, if we really want to know what emotions are, “rather than about what is currently believed about emotion[s],” we have to take into consideration findings in the empirical sciences—we have to look at what happens in the brain, face, physiology, and behavior (Griffiths, 1997, p. 7). Since most emotion theorists appear engaged in conceptual analysis when putting forth their accounts, they should be able to provide a satisfying answer to why such a method is still valuable. And further, if it is, then how can it be reworked to account for the scientific evidence.
Chapter III

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1) Leading Current Views on Emotions

Below I will be considering the leading current views on emotions. In particular I am going to discuss representative versions of; the feeling theory, the cognitive theory, the non-cognitive theory, the modified-cognitivist theory, and the hybrid theory together with some problems that can be raised against each of them. In my discussion of these views I will at the end of each section, briefly assess whether or not a specific theory can account for, or at least accommodate, the embodiment fact as well as the other benchmarks. However, I am reserving chapter V for a more detailed discussion of the embodiment fact benchmark. What is more, when looking at the above theories the reader might wonder where current views more tailored to account for and/or accommodate the embodiment fact are considered. In chapters IV and V I will give a detailed discussion of these accounts by looking at Rebekka Hufendiek’s embodied theory of emotions, and Lisa Feldman Barrett’s “constructed” theory of emotions. I will then further explain why a view weaving its path between these two accounts is preferable.

To briefly introduce the views I will be looking at two test cases of emotions, namely: (1) A basic emotion; fear\textsuperscript{27}, and (2) a non-basic/not culturally specific emotion; national pride.

\textsuperscript{27} Other basic emotions are as identified by Paul Ekman in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise.
Imagine an individual, Sheryl, walking down a trail in the woods. Not paying attention to where she is putting her feet she fails to see the snake sunbathing on the trail in front of her. As a result, she comes upon it abruptly and when she finally sees it, she experiences a rush of fear. The agent jumps to the side, her heart beating fast in her chest and her palms sweaty.

Picture an American, Frank, watching the gold medal match between Serena Williams and Maria Sharapova during the 2012 Olympics in London. When it becomes clear that Williams has beaten Sharapova he is beyond himself with excitement. However, Frank does not only feel keyed up about the win, he also experiences a great sense of pride over his national heritage. He feels great about being an American: as his fellow countrymen he is someone who is, successful, strong, determined, and who works hard to achieve his goals.

a. The Feeling Theory

The Simple-Minded Feeling Theory. Let us imagine what a simple-minded version of the feeling theory might have looked like prior to its well-known James-Lange characterization. It would appear that it could be formulated as follows: an episode of anger is a particular qualitative experience, such as the feeling of a boiling up of sorts. By contrast, sadness is another particular qualitative experience, such as the feeling of being drained of energy, and so on for all of the emotions. To be clear, on this view each emotion has a distinctive qualitative aspect. Just as chlorine and sulfur have characteristic smells, so too anger, sadness, happiness, regret, etc., all have characteristic ways that they feel to the emoter.\(^{28}\)

However, for many pairs of distinct emotions it is difficult to see how they would differ in phenomenology. Even if there is a characteristic way that regret and shame each feel it is not plausible that the two emotions have a distinct characteristic phenomenology. For most normal human sensory systems cinnamon has a distinctive way that it smells that is distinct from the

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\(^{28}\) This account does not have to be given on a trans-species level; it can be given on an individual level. It is within the rights of the simple-minded feeling theorist to say that there are idiosyncratic patterns for the various emotions; e.g., for Julie there is a distinctive way that anger feels, a distinctive way that fear feels, etc. And further, those experiences do not have to be experiences that carry over to other individuals. For example, people suffering from panic-attacks usually claim that they can tell the signs when a panic-attack is coming on. But, those signs might be different from one person to another.
distinctive way that nutmeg smells. When applying this way of thinking to emotions, we get what I call the Cinnamon-Nutmeg understanding of emotion phenomenology. This is the view that, just as for cinnamon and nutmeg, for every distinct pair of emotion types, they have different phenomenology. However, the Cinnamon-Nutmeg understanding does not carry over naturally to emotions. For instance, regret and shame do not have distinctive phenomenologies. Rather, they both just kind of feel like bummers, i.e., negative experiences.

Other emotions that bring out the above problem are happiness and pride. For instance, consider the 2016 Cubs fan; he or she most likely felt both happiness and pride when their team won the World Series in baseball. These are different emotions, but how are they different? Again, since both happiness and pride feel pleasant to the emoter, it is difficult for the simple-minded feeling theorist to answer such a question. One might be tempted to say that they involve different judgments; however, this type of answer is not available to feeling theorist. And so, the forerunner to the James-Lange feeling theory is not satisfactory. As the dissertation develops, I will bring up the Cinnamon-Nutmeg criticism again against another emotion theory, and at that point I will expand on it further.

The James-Lange Feeling Theory. Looking ahead from the above naïve feeling theory, the James-Lange version distinguishes itself from the simple-minded account in that the qualia considered no longer are undirected. Rather, on this view the qualia are directed towards bodily changes; that is, emotions are (subjective) experiences of bodily responses, in which the emoter has a qualitative experience that has the bodily change as its object (James, 1884; Lange & James, 1967). On this account then, the claim is not merely that emotions are subjective

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29 Regret and shame both feel unpleasant, but if there is anything that differentiates regret from shame it is that when I undergo regret I am wishing I had not done something in the past (such as dropping my iPhone in the puddle outside of my house), whereas when I am undergoing shame it is usually “a response to something [that I did and] that is morally wrong or reprehensible” (Burton 2014).
experiences caused by bodily changes, but also that they are subjective experiences that are
perceptions of, or in some other way directed upon, the bodily changes. That subjective
experiences are caused by bodily changes is implied by, for example, the quote below describing
someone who is experiencing 'morbid fear':

“...Thus, to take one special instance, if inability to draw deep breath, fluttering of the
heart, and that peculiar epigastric change felt as “precardial anxiety,” with an irresistible
tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other
visceral processes not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a certain person;
his feeling of their combination is the emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is
known as morbid fear” (James, 1884, p. 199).

Moreover, that the subjective experiences are directed toward the bodily changes can be seen in
the following “of-ness” (or aboutness) claims:

“What kind of emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-
beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of
goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think” (p. 194).

A common objection to the James-Lange theory is that it fails to recognize the
intentionality of emotions. It is said that on this version of the feeling theory the emotions are not
intentional in an interesting enough way; i.e., they appear too brute. They are mere perceptions
of the body, “they represent the body as being in such-and-such a state” (Prinz, 2004, p.54).
However, this is not enough the critics say. Instead, any good theory of emotions has to be able
to say that emotions are intentional in that they at least seem to be about things in the external
world. For instance, you are angry at Bob, sad about your broken bicycle, or envious of that
man’s car. Further, this makes emotions subject to normative assessment; it is important that one
can say that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate.

It is correct that a satisfying theory of emotion should be able to account for the fact that
emotions can be subject to normative assessment; however, it seems the critics have been too fast
in dismissing the James-Lange view on this point. For James-Lange an emotion inherits its
propriety/impropriety from the propriety/impropriety of the bodily changes themselves. For example, suppose that the bodily changes typical for fear are activated by a perceptual experience of a small spider running across your desk. In that case, your body has an inappropriate reaction to the perception of the spider (it is not really posing a threat to you).\(^{30}\) And so, as a result, we can say that your body reacted inappropriately. In contrast, if the bodily changes typical of fear are activated by a perceptual experience of someone, say, about to attack you, your body has an appropriate reaction to that perception (the individual is posing a threat to you). Hence, your body reacted appropriately.

Taken together then, it appears too quick to say that we cannot get any purchase whatsoever of the notion of appropriateness and inappropriateness from emotions on the view. That is, even though the James-Lange version of the feeling theory might not get us all the way to a wholly satisfying account, it can at least make some headway in the right direction.

Before I consider some further frequently cited problems for the James-Lange formulation of the feeling theory, let us first look at how the view would handle the two test cases. Case 1: Sheryl perceives the snake on the ground. This brings about changes in her body, such as, an increase in heart rate and secretion of epinephrine affecting the sweat glands. These bodily changes cause in Sheryl an experiential state of fear that consists in the perception of the bodily change. Case 2: Frank perceives the situation (the U.S. winning Olympic gold) as reflecting positively on him as a fellow American. That is, by virtue of being from America he too is successful, strong, determined, and someone who achieves his goals. Consequently, certain bodily changes take place: e.g., adrenaline starts pumping through his veins, his heart is beating faster, and his muscles are activated. And so, the bodily changes excite in Frank a feeling state of

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\(^{30}\) This is similar to other improper bodily reactions. As an example, as the temperature rises from 67-70 degrees something in your thermo-regulation makes you sweat like crazy. Now, this would be an improper reaction to a minor temperature change.
pride which itself consists in the perception of the bodily change.

Early commentators to James-Lange objected to the view in the following way: they argued that the account’s claim that each emotion involves the perception of a unique set of bodily responses, is not correct. For example, Walter Cannon (1987) said that his research showed that the bodily changes for emotions such as fear and rage are, in fact, identical:

“The visceral changes wrought by sympathetic stimulation may be listed as follows: acceleration of the heart, contraction of arterioles, dilatation of bronchioles, increase of blood sugar, inhibition of activity of the digestive glands, inhibition of gastro-intestinal peristalsis, sweating, discharge of adrenalin, widening of the pupils and erection of hairs. These changes are seen in great excitement under any circumstances. They occur in such readily distinguishable emotional states as fear and rage. Fever and also exposure to cold are known to induce most of the changes…” (p. 572, my emphasis added).

“As pointed out earlier by Cannon the responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing emotions which are very different in subjective quality. Furthermore, if the emotions were due to afferent impulses from the viscera, we should expect not only that fear and rage would feel alike but that chilliness, hypoglycemia, asphyxia, and fever should feel like them. Such is not the case” (Ibid).

Moreover, work following on Cannon’s findings added to his conclusions by saying that it was only what the individual thought, i.e., how he or she interpreted the situation at hand, that distinguished one emotion from another (Schacter & Singer, 1962).

However, given the findings of more recent research it seems that the James-Lange position is in better shape than Cannon might have thought. For example, Ekman reports that:

“Recent research has found contrary evidence: not only distinctive expressions for anger, fear, sadness, and disgust, but different patterns of bodily changes for each of these emotions. Research with my colleague, the American psychologist Robert Levenson, has shown such emotion-specific changes in ANS activity. We believe that the particular changes that occur are preparing us to engage in actions which in the course of our evolutionary history have been most adaptive. For example, we found that in both anger and fear the heart rate accelerates. This prepares the person for strong exertions, as Darwin says, with the blood going to the hands in anger (preparatory to hitting), and to the limbs in fear (preparatory to flight)” (Ekman, 2009, p. 80, my emphasis added).
Thus, Ekman shows that at least some emotions can be distinguished in the way the James-Lange view suggested (i.e., in the case of fear the blood flows to one’s legs and in the case of anger to one’s arms). Now, even though a handful of emotions have different bodily profiles and hence will be distinguishable on the James-Lange account, not all emotions are going to be—specifically, the more cognitively sophisticated ones (such as regret and shame). Consequently, the James-Lange version is going to be struggling with the same issue as the Simple-Minded Feeling Theory from before. Both regret and shame plausibly involve some unpleasantness in the body, and both plausibly involve a perception of that unpleasantness. However, it is difficult to see how those perceptions will be different from each other.

**Peter Goldie’s Feeling Theory.** According to Peter Goldie, an emotional episode has a *sui generis* quality similar to the way experience has a *sui generis* quality (Goldie, 2009). To motivate this, he asks us to remember Mary the scientist who goes from living in a black and white room to life in a fully colored world. Imagine that Mary while living in the black and white room knows that the apple her friend is holding in his hand is red. However, once she enters the colored world she also knows what the red apple looks like, and what it is like to experience red. Thus, she has a different experience once she leaves the black and white room. Further, the experience that Mary has when she is let out into the world is not something that she could possibly grasp as long as she is still inside the room. For Goldie something similar is true of emotion episodes. To see this, we will next consider his showcase example of emotional experience. Namely, the ice-cold ice scientist, Gerda, who falls on the ice and for the first time

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31 Perhaps one can build in ‘imaginings’ to the phenomenology of the various emotions. If I regret dropping that expensive vase at my friend’s house, I may keep imagining how I may have held it or caught it. Likewise if I am ashamed about something I did I may keep imagining people pointing their fingers at me and looking at me in a harsh way. Now, if this is correct, then you can distinguish the emotions by your kinds of imaginations.

32 One might say that of course emotions are *sui generis*, because they have phenomenal dimensions. There is a way anger feels, and there is a way sadness feels. Beyond that, all I can say is metaphorical. Thus on this view, emotions’ *sui generis-ity* is due entirely to the phenomenological dimension. However, Goldie does not agree with this. For him, emotions in their very nature bring another level of *sui generis-ity* with them.
experiences fear.

Gerda has never felt fear before, but she knows everything there is to know about ice and the psychology of emotion. As such, Gerda is fully capable of coolly believing that the ice is dangerous, or judging that it is slippery. However, Goldie explains, it is not until she falls on the ice that she actually experiences fear (using our earlier distinction, she might also experience that fear as fear, but she need not do so). When this happens her thought that the ice is dangerous, her perception of what something dangerous looks like, smells like, and tastes like, and her phenomenology; the what it is likeness of the experience are united in one event (in experience) (Goldie, 2009, p. 234). Furthermore, on my understanding of Goldie, Gerda’s phenomenology consists of both bodily feelings directed at her body, and feelings-toward that are directed at things in the world beyond the surface of her skin.

This new way of thinking of the ice “subsumes and transforms the old way of thinking, so that the new way of thinking cannot be decomposed into the old experience plus something added” (Ibid). The latter a characterization of emotion views that Goldie ascribes to so-called add-on theorists, individuals who believe that feelings are mere additions to some other essential part of emotional experience. As we have seen, Goldie in contrast thinks that when Gerda is afraid of the ice, she is having a “whole, indivisible, experience” that is different from before (Ibid). This fear experience is truly sui generis.

Another dimension to Goldie’s view of emotions is that he takes feelings-toward and bodily feelings to be distinct. However, he thinks they are closely connected in conscious experience (Goldie, 2004, p. 92). Thus improving on the James-Lange theory, Goldie says that bodily feelings “borrow intentionality” directed at the world (beyond the body) from the individual’s feelings-toward (Goldie, 2000, p. 57). He also says that our feelings-toward gain a
bodily feel from the bodily feelings. To see that this is so, consider the following example. An individual is reading a philosophy paper and comes across a particularly difficult problem. As he struggles to get through the section, he becomes increasingly frustrated; he has a frustrated feeling-toward the section. As the frustration intensifies he furrows his brows in concentration and senses a tightness over his forehead. He also feels his body temperature go up, and his teeth clenching together hard. As Carolyn Price (2015) relates it in *The Emotions*, although the feeling-toward and the bodily feelings are distinct, in conscious experience the emoter takes them to be the same. They are “impossible to separate,” and he experiences them together as a unity” (Price, 2015, p. 30). As this happens, the person’s bodily feelings are directed toward the difficult paragraph, and his feeling-toward gains a “bodily feel” (Ibid).

As hinted at above, and as will be clear by the end of chapter III, most emotion theorists identify as their answer to the question what an emotion is, one particular component of an emotional response. In contrast however, Goldie takes a different approach. As Price summarizes Goldie, an emotion is a “whole response” consisting of many components such as episodes of emotional experience including perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, kinds of feelings (feeling-toward and bodily feelings), bodily changes and, dispositions to further emotion experiences, thoughts, feelings and behaviors (Price, 2015, p. 25-6). Goldie only excludes as components actions and behaviors done out of emotions, instead holding these to be consequences (Goldie, 2000, p. 12-3). He also claims that emotions are episodic and dynamic since the elements can come and go, “and wax and wane” (Goldie, 2000, p.12-3). Thus, for him, an emotion is a complex process unfolding over time.

33 That this is indeed how Goldie characterizes the closeness between feelings-towards and bodily feelings, is communicated in his statement that the bodily feelings are “thoroughly infused with the intentionality of the emotion; and in turn, the feeling towards is infused with a bodily characterization” (Goldie, 2000, p. 57).
34 “The actions which we do out of an emotion and the various ways of expressing an emotion, are also seen as part of the same narrative, but not themselves as part of the emotion itself”(Goldie, 2000, p. 12-3).
To add more clarity to this general account of emotion I am going to give an example of how Goldie would differentiate between an emotion and an emotion episode. Emotions are long-term and can stretch out over days and even years, such as when a married couple undergoes love; sometimes they touch each other lovingly (e.g., she strokes his cheek), they think about one another (e.g., she thinks about how beautiful he is when he brushes his hair from his eye), and when they are apart they daydream about being together (he fantasizes about holding her hand as they walk into a restaurant). Emotion episodes take place in the here and now such as when the wife experiences love for her husband as she sits down on his lap and smiles at him slightly.\(^{35}\) Taken together thus, an emotion can be thought of as a trajectory, and emotional episodes as the high-points or low-points on it. This makes sense since what Goldie calls an emotion stretches out over time; just like a trajectory, and it can have emotional experiences interwoven within it; just like the trajectory can ascend and descend.

Goldie’s account of emotions appears to be able to capture the distinctiveness of different emotions as well as their intentionality. By having the qualitative states being directed towards objects in the environment, he gives us both the appropriate intentionality and the relevant fineness of grain to distinguish between emotion experiences.\(^{36}\) Hence, the way to differentiate between them is in the way their experiential content is different. When I undergo fear my emotional experience is qualitatively different from the way it would be when I am happy, and

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\(^{35}\) The emotional episode is a component of the emotion, but it does not have to be. Goldie (2000): “An emotion is complex in that it will typically involve many different elements: it involves episodes of emotional experience, including perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds; and it involves dispositions, including dispositions to experience further emotional episodes, to have further thoughts and feelings, and to behave in certain ways” (p.13).

\(^{36}\) Since Goldie does not exclude thoughts and imaginings as potentially being part of an emotion episode, these can further aid in distinguishing the emotions. For example, in the case of shame and regret; besides the feelings towards being distinct, different thoughts and perhaps even imaginings can be different for each emotion.
therefore, the emotions are distinct.\textsuperscript{37}

On the other hand there is a problem with Goldie’s \textit{sui generis} account, namely that he seems to make things too fine-grained. With an account like his, according to which each emotion episode is unique and onto itself, we would seem to have to give up the view that there is something important that all cases of, say, fear episodes share in common. That is, Goldie’s appeal to \textit{sui generisity} gives him all the fine-grainedness that he might want, but it gives him too much. It provides no principled way of explaining how emotion episodes can all be episodes of a single emotion, i.e., how they can all be beads on the same pearl necklace. Moreover, in the previous case with Gerda falling on the ice and breaking her leg, if she, for instance, later in the afternoon thinks of the ice and says to herself, “I sure wish I had not gone ice skating today,” then, is that fear? Well, she still might have some physiological and phenomenological reactions to it, but there is something else present as well. Now, if Goldie responds that in the latter case Gerda is having regret and not fear, then he seems to be helping himself to a prior definition of emotion, which as the reader will agree, would not be acceptable.

Now, in response to our suggested fine-grainedness problem, Goldie might want to bite the bullet and say that actually distinguishing among the classic emotions like fear, sadness, anger, happiness, surprise, and disgust is not scientifically or philosophically useful, and hence that we should give it up. This would be similar to how at one point in time common sense told us to distinguish between the four humors, however, we eventually relinquished that view under pressure from scientific evidence.

Let us next take a look at how Goldie would handle the two test-cases. Case 1: when

\textsuperscript{37} In the beginning of his book \textit{The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration} Goldie (2000) says that emotion episodes involve perceptions, feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds (p. 12). However as discussed before, he also mentions that they can include thoughts. Based on this it seems to me that even though perhaps some of the more complex emotions, such as guilt and shame, might have similar experiential content, they can still be distinguished based on the different thoughts that they involve.
Sheryl experiences fear as she comes upon the snake on the trail, feelings (bodily feelings and feelings-toward) are bound-up with thought (she believes that the snake is threatening) and perception (she perceives the reptile as dangerous) in a way such that it constitutes an indivisible, whole, *sui generis* experience. Case 2: When Frank watches William’s win Olympic Gold in tennis and feels proud, feelings of various kinds (bodily feelings and feelings-toward) are bound up with thought (he believes that he too has certain uniquely American characteristics that Williams’ holds, such as being determined, and strong) and perception (e.g., he sees her as apt to challenge her rival), and together they make up an indivisible, whole, *sui generis* kind of experience.

Evidently, the most controversial aspect of Goldie’s theory is his commitment to emotions as being *sui generis*. While it seems clear that you cannot reduce emotional episodes to purely cognitive phenomena on the one hand, and purely qualitative phenomena on the other, perhaps we can challenge his *sui generis* account by suggesting a reduction to a combination of the cognitive, the phenomenological and maybe bodily types of states. Given that reduction is not reducing away (e.g., reducing lightening to electrical discharge does not imply that lightening is unreal), we can acknowledge the reality of emotions. The question is if the reduction that we have on the table is a plausible one. Speaking in favor of our suggestion is that it is more parsimonious. Goldie has to posit a new thing whereas all we are suggesting is that we reduce emotions to a combination of already established phenomena such as cognitive states, phenomenological states, bodily behaviors, physiological reactions, etc.

Our last criticism of Goldie will consider the fact that bodily behaviors do not play a substantial role on his view. As mentioned in the beginning of my discussion of Goldie’s account, he sees bodily behaviors as a mere consequence of emotions, meaning that they are not
part of them and do not seem important to the way he understands emotional experience. What is more, Goldie (2009) also says the following:

“[A]n emotional experience typically involves a wide range of different intentional states, often including desires, beliefs, hopes, wishes, imaginings, fantasies, bodily feelings, and so on, each one of which can be bound up with feelings towards the object of the emotion; we can see or hear with feeling, just as we can desire or hope with feeling” (p. 237).

With my claim in chapter I that any good theory of emotion should be able to account for the embodiment fact, were Goldie more enlightened he would have thought about behaving-towards as a possibility, and not just, say, hoping-towards or thinking-towards. As we will see in chapter IV this is what Rebekka Hufendiek’s embodied theory of emotions appears to do. Hence, at this point I am going to let Hufendiek take the baton from Goldie, and he will not be brought through to chapter V. However, some of the spirit of Goldie will be carried on in the work of Hufendiek, and by putting her under the microscope; we will still be assessing the spirit of his view if not the letter.

Next I want to give a brief overview of how the Feeling theory fares in terms of the benchmarks discussed in chapter II. Benchmark i: emotions can have a cognitive component (depending on the feeling theory you are looking at), benchmark ii: emotions have a physiological dimension, benchmark iii: emotions have a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have characteristic behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children can have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be both the result of careful reflection and an automatic response to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods can cannot be embodied, and lastly, benchmark ix: on this view emotions are natural kinds and not open to conceptual analysis.
Emotions can have a cognitive component
Emotions can have a physiological dimension
Emotions can have a phenomenology
Emotions can have behavioral signatures
Non-human animals & pre-linguistic children can have emotions
Emotions can be irrational
Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli
Emotions and moods can be embodied
Emotions are pen to conceptual analysis

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b. The Cognitive Theory

There are different interpretations of the cognitive theory; I will be considering the one proposed by Martha C. Nussbaum (2004).

For Nussbaum (2004) judging comes in two stages. First, an object appears to the individual in a certain way (p.198), and second, she accepts, rejects, or remains uncommitted to the appearance (p. 191). And so, when she embraces or rejects it, it becomes her judgment.

According to Nussbaum (2004), something is an emotion if and only if it is an evaluative judgment about something important. What is important depends on the emoter, and thus our emotions are connected to what matters to us—to our well-being. Consequently, George might have an emotion directed toward his ant farm, such as happiness, because even though it seems trivial to us, it really matters to him that ant x managed to carry the large leaf to the top of the ant-hill. Further, these judgments reveal something about us; namely, that we are the kinds of individuals that allow for our own well-being to depend on things beyond our control (Nussbaum, 2004, 193). Nussbaum (2004) gives the following example of an emotion. When she

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38 For Nussbaum her view of ‘an appearance’ is different from the traditional Stoic view. That is, whereas the Stoic thinks of a judgment as the individual assenting to an appearance, where the appearance has a propositional character or content, Nussbaum’s account allows also for the appearances to take the form of the world ‘striking’ the creature in a certain way. For example, for Nussbaum, an infant or an animal judges how things are in the world by assenting to how the world is presented to it—e.g., objects in the creature’s environment will appear important or significant (as having value) in relation to its goals/aims (see below).
found out that her mother had died it struck her “that a person of enormous value, who was central to my life, is no longer there… I see… her wonderful face—both as tremendously loved and as forever lost to me” (p. 192). The appearance in this case she says is propositional: “it combines the thought of importance with the thought of loss, its content is that this importance is lost,” and it is evaluative; it accounts for the fact that her mother is important to her (Ibid). 39 She describes how she embraced the appearance, and as such did have sadness (Ibid).

But, the reader might wonder, do we not need something more than judgments to experience emotions? After all, emotions usually feel a certain way to us, or as Nussbaum (2004) puts it; “even if one concedes that the seat of emotion must be capable of many cognitive operations, there also seems to be a kinetic and affective aspect to emotion that does not look like a judgment or any part of it” (p. 194). She foresees our question and answers it by saying that bodily feelings are incidental to emotion and that the feelings that truly matters might as well be called judgments (p. 195). For Nussbaum, judgments themselves hold many of the kinetic properties which emotion theorists use bodily feelings to explain (Ibid). 40 Thus, when she experiences sadness about her mother’s death this judgment is an “upheaval”; it is able to house the “disorderly motions of grief” (p. 193-4). Nussbaum emphasizes that she does not want to infuse thoughts with the kinetic properties of the arms, legs, or bloodstream (Ibid). Rather, she appears to think of the kinetic properties of thought as somehow unique; in the case of grief as intense movements, they are “feelings of pain and tumult” (p. 195). 41

Let us next take a look at how Nussbaum can explain the test-cases. Case 1: Sheryl feels fear when she sees the snake on the ground. First, it appears to her that her well-being, which she values is threatened; i.e., she believes that the snake could attack and hurt her. Second, Sheryl

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39 For Nussbaum the fact that emotions require thoughts explains their intentionality (their aboutness that is).
40 I assume that for Nussbaum this is the case also for infants and non-human animals.
41 She does not expand on why, and in what way, she thinks that the kinetic properties are unique.
embraces or accepts the appearance; “takes it into [her] as the way things are” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 191). She recognizes that the snake is potentially dangerous, and further, this makes her judgment evaluative (p. 189). Now, since Sheryl judges that she is endangered, she does have fear. Moreover, her judgment feels in a certain way to her; it has particular kinetic properties. The bodily and physiological changes described in the beginning of the chapter accompany Sheryl’s fear. However, they are not necessary for it.

Case 2: When the U.S. wins Olympic gold, Frank takes pride in his national heritage. It strikes him that something of great value and importance, namely his nationality, which he believes to be crucial to his identity is reinforced by Williams’ win. It appears to Frank that being apart of this group of Americans gives him distinctive qualities that cannot be achieved by other means, such as accumulation of wealth and fame. Frank embraces the appearance; this is in fact what the world is like. He judges that by being American he too, as Williams, is successful and strong, and this makes his judgment evaluative. Since Frank judges that he has these uniquely American characteristics, he experiences pride. His judgment feels a certain way—it has particular kinetic properties. Also, the bodily and physiological changes accompany the emotion, but are not required for it.

One objection to Nussbaum’s view of emotions can be put in the form of a dilemma. Either Nussbaum thinks of emotions as judgments in a relatively traditional sense of the word ‘judgment’ and in which case they seem anemic (someone could judge that they are in danger without yet necessarily becoming afraid), or, she thinks of emotions as dynamic judgments, and in which case her account is not explanatory. For example, if one were to ask Nussbaum what a dynamic judgment is, then the answer would seem to be that it is permeated with, say, feelings of “pain and tumult.” But, that answer makes it sounds like she is characterizing the notion of

42 I am assuming here that Frank’s nationality is closely connected to his well-being.
‘judgment’ that she needs in terms of the affective notions that we are trying to understand (she would be assuming what needs to be explained). This does not mean that what she is saying is not true, but it does mean that it is not going to be very helpful in understanding what emotions are.

Another objection to Nussbaum’s view is that she thinks judgments are evaluative and thus always bring with them something of the form ‘this is good’ or ‘this is bad’. But, this is much too restrictive. It is plausible that emotions like anger, fear, and sadness might sort their objects into these two categories. However, this is not the case for all emotions. Consider surprise for instance. This emotion can fall into either camp depending on its object. Sometimes you are pleasantly surprised about something, whereas other times you are unpleasantly surprised. An example of the former is the surprise that a child experiences when her father, a soldier, returns unexpectedly from the war. She is surprised seeing him walking through the door, but the emotion has a positive tone to it. In contrast, the military strategic planner who is trying to decide his country’s next move is unpleasantly surprised when realizing that the enemy has successfully entered into their territory. He is surprised to see that they managed to do it, but the emotion has a negative color.

A further common objection to Nussbaum’s view is that it fails to account for emotions in nonhuman animals and infants. After all, they do not have language and thus cannot make the required judgments to emote. The way she modifies her theory to make room for emotions in these cases is by allowing for the appearances to not be propositional in nature (Nussbaum, 2003). To make this suggestion plausible, she first has to explain what it is that enables the appearances to have value (evaluative content) (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 125-6). She does this by drawing from psychological research both on the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals and on
early childhood development (p. 89-125, 174-237). This kind of “work show[s] extensive
cognitive involvement by animals and very young children with objects in their environment,
despite their lacking language...” and further, by looking at the animal and child’s behavior the
researchers can conclude that certain objects present themselves as important or significant “in
virtue of its goals” (Deigh, 2000, p. 303, 304; Nussbaum, 2003, p. 126). Hence, when they
accept or reject these appearances, they are emoting.

Even if we agree with Nussbaum that it makes sense to say that objects will appear
important or significant (as having value) to organisms in relation to their goals, one can still
object to her overall modification of the view. This is so since, she says nothing about what it
means for someone lacking in language to be judging, to accept or reject appearances (Deigh,
2000, p. 304-6). Once we acknowledge this, another dilemma for Nussbaum becomes apparent.
Either she has to populate the minds of infants and nonhuman animals with fairly complex
cognitive acts, or she has to use the notion of judgment in such a broad way that it says almost
nothing. The latter is the case since it now seems that any creature that has an emotion is thereby
judging. This is just an empty stipulation; she needs an independent criterion for what a
judgment is, otherwise she is just asserting the truth of her own theory. Both of these options are
problematic, and thus the initial challenge to her view stands.

Next we will summarize how the Cognitive theory does on the various benchmarks.
Benchmark i: emotions always have a cognitive component, benchmark ii: emotions do not have
a physiological component, rather the physiological component follows upon the emotion itself,
benchmark iii: emotions have a phenomenology since the judgments have kinetic properties,
benchmark iv: emotions do not have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals
and pre-linguistic children can have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational,
benchmark, benchmark vii: emotions are the result of careful reflection, they are not automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods cannot be embodied, unless we rethink cognition in embodied terms, and lastly benchmark ix: emotions are open to conceptual analysis.

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c. The Non-Cognitive Theory

Jenefer Robinson, just as Goldie previously, takes issue with cognitive accounts of emotion, and she does so for two particular reasons. First she points out that a person can make a judgment of the right kind, yet not be in an emotional state. As an example, if someone is atypical in that something is wrong with their emotional system, perhaps they can stand by the side of the road and look at someone who just ran over their cat and think, “You wronged me, you killed my cat with your car.” However, because there is something off with their emotional system, they do not get angry. Or, when someone cuts you off in traffic as you are driving home from work, you may judge that they did so and that it was offensive and insulting. But, you might not get angry (Robinson, 2004, p. 29.) Instead, Robinson says, “[you] may be resigned or saddened or even cynically amused” (Ibid). Moreover, and characteristically of Robinson’s view, organisms can emote without judging in the traditional sense where “an emotion either is or
essentially includes a judgment or belief” (p. 28-29, Robinson, 2005, p. 77). For Robinson an emotion is a process started by a non-cognitive appraisal with a negative or positive valence, which focuses the emoter’s attention and “brings about characteristic physiological and behavioral changes,” such as a certain facial expression and changes in galvanic skin response (Robinson, 2005, p. 3; Harold, “Deeper”). The latter she says, may or may not be felt. Moreover, following upon the former is a cognitive appraisal that assesses the various physiological and behavioral changes in regards to their appropriateness to the situation at hand, or the individual’s belief(s) (Robinson, 2005, p. 3, 59). Further, because the non-cognitive appraisal is valenced it can bring about the physiological and behavioral responses typical of the emotion. The appraisal is non-cognitive for Robinson since it can “occur without any conscious deliberation or awareness, and [does] not involve any complex information processing” (Robinson, 2005, p. 45). Elsewhere she describes the appraisal as taking place “under the threshold of awareness,” and cites psychological research arguing for circuits in the brain able to compute the affective value of something without the organism having to recognize

43 With infants not having the cognitive abilities to judge that something is a threat, but then we still think they can be afraid, she says this supports her view that emotions don’t have to involve judgments. This would be the case for animals as well, she says; “...[T]he non-cognitive appraisals (in both humans and ‘lower’ animals) are themselves monitored or appraised by higher cognitive processes, and the action tendencies initiated by the affective appraisals are modified in accordance with subsequent cognitive appraisals” (Robinson, 2005, p.77)
44 Based on her writings and reviews of her book, it appears to me that only the non-cognitive appraisal and the physiological changes are necessary for emotions, whereas bodily behaviors and the cognitive appraisals merely typically follows.
45 The fact that she says that the physiological responses may or may not be felt puts her in opposition to the James-Lange view, which says that all physiological responses (bodily changes) must be felt.
46 One thing that Robinson says, and that I find interesting, is that “autonomic arousal typically continues even after cognitive monitoring has changed my appraisal of the situation” (Robinson, 2004, 38). This means that there is something like physiological residue leftover even after the emotion process has subsumed. I think we can recognize this in our everyday experience as well. For example, we can imagine that I have an argument with my mother about coming home late after a night out with my friends. We can also imagine that when this happens I undergo all of the physiological and behavioral changes typical of anger. Now, even though my mother and I stop arguing and we come to an agreement, I might still walk around for a time after with clenched fists and the surge of adrenaline pumping through my body.
47 It seems as though non-cognitive affective appraisals for Robinson are not guided by rationality, hence we can account for phobias as well. That is, someone who has a phobic fear of dogs will have an affective appraisal activated no matter if, say, the dog is small or large.
what the stimulus is (Robinson, 2004, p. 35).

We can see that Robinson holds a view of appraisals according to which they work fast and automatically “through lower brain-centers,” and that “in a rough and ready way” focuses the individual’s attention on, and evaluates objects in the environment of significance to its well-being (Robinson, 2005, p. 62). Robinson recognizes that since the non-cognitive appraisals are not describable in propositional terms, it is hard to know how to characterize them using ordinary language. The most successful way, she claims, is by saying that corresponding to each basic emotion (as identified by Paul Ekman) is a basic non-cognitive appraisal (p. 77). To use her example, fear is brought about by the non-cognitive appraisal, which would be expressed with such words as “this is a threat,” but the agent does not have to say any such words either out loud, or to herself (Robinson, 2005, p. 68).

To make this more intuitive, let us look at an example of what the emotion process would be like in the case of someone being startled from hearing what seems to be the sound of a gunshot. First there is a non-cognitive appraisal of the potentially harmful information (the loud sound) that not only focuses the individual’s attention on the direction where the sound came from, but also brings about certain physiological and behavioral changes (an increase in adrenaline and a jump) that might feel a certain way. After the response to the gunshot, the individual changes her behavior “as cognitive monitoring kicks in”; perhaps she realizes that the sound came from her cat pushing something heavy over on the kitchen counter and she smiles in relief, or she realizes that a gun was in fact fired outside her apartment and throws herself on the floor.

48 The environment here can be either internal or external.
49 This is intended to at least gesture at how the organism is likely to respond, but not necessarily at anything psychologically real.
50 Robinson wrote a paper arguing for startle to be considered an emotion. In her article she says that it was thinking about startle as an emotion that she came up with the above general emotion theory.
51 In other situations, the individual’s situation could be focused on a belief or an object.
ground in fear (Robinson, 2005, p. 60).  

Something else to reflect on is how the non-cognitive appraisals activated in the basic emotions, are preprogrammed to be elicited in connection to certain stimuli. A snake on the ground or a gunshot will always activate non-cognitive appraisals. However, Robinson also says that appraisals can be brought about by more complex, non-preprogrammed, input such as the recognition that your boss insulted you.

Next, I want to briefly discuss what Ekman has to say about emotions. This is so since, as the reader saw above, Robinson appears to get her intuition and idea about non-cognitive appraisals and the unfolding physiological and behavioral changes from his emotion account. By looking at Ekman’s view then, we can get a better grasp on how Robinson is thinking about her own theory.

For Ekman, objects in the organism’s environment trigger the essence of an emotion, namely an affect program, automatically. As summarized by Paul Griffiths (1997), Ekman’s affect programs have many different elements that unfold in a predictable and coordinated manner: “(a) expressive facial changes, (b) musculoskeletal responses such as flinching and orienting, (c) expressive vocal changes, (d) endocrine system changes and consequent changes in the level of hormones, and (e) autonomic nervous system changes” (p. 77). Griffiths adds that the phenomenological experience of the emotion and a change in attention are further good candidates for inclusion.

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52 Potential problem: When something, say a car, comes towards me suprisingly as I am driving, and I cognitivly monitor the situation: I might think that I’m too close I better slow down a little bit, but then the physiological change happens a little bit later and I can feel the chemicals being released inside of my body (like a quarter of a second later). In this case it is as though the actual perception and the cognitive response happens first and then the bodily changes happen a little bit slower. One way to think about this is by asking if there is something misleading about taking startle as a paradigm (as in the case with the gunshot above which is her example, and based on which she developed her view on emotions), especially when the startle case is one that understood as: I’m startle and I don’t even know what it is that is startling me when it happens.

53 The environment here refers to the internal or eternal environment of the individual.
Besides fear, other examples of emotions that have these distinct affect programs are: sadness, happiness, contempt, surprise, anger, pride, and disgust. These programs can be triggered by many different things: directly from an automatic appraisal of a person, place, image, memory, imagining, thought, smell, sound, or idea as being, say, dangerous, or, from a reflective appraisal of a situation as being, say, threatening with an automatic appraisal following upon it (as when it takes me awhile to realize that what my coworker is saying is threatening my job) ("The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions," n.d; Ekman, 2003, p. 31).

What Ekman calls an automatic-appraising mechanism (Robinson’s affective appraisal) constantly scans the environment for objects and situations relevant to the organism’s concern(s). It is looking for things that is similar to what is stored in the “perceptual database,” and when it does, an emotion is triggered ("The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions," n.d.). Likewise, this is what Robinson means when she says that non-cognitive appraisals are preprogrammed to be elicit by certain stimuli. The database is composed in part by “our biology…and in part by our individual experience” (Ekman, 2003, p. 29). Ekman explains that it allows for new information to be added, so that when we experience something similar to “a theme or variation” in it, we emote (p. 30). Thus, the database, similar to Robinson’s memory database, describes our “universal [and] hardwired responses and our individually acquired emotional memories” (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.).

With the hopes of adding more nuance to Ekman’s account I will next consider how he would explain an instance of fear. I will also introduce some new terminology that he, in his more recent writings, uses to more wholly describe the emotion “timeline” (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). The example goes as follows. Lately Kristi has been waking up at 5am every day, and as a result, has not been getting enough sleep and is tired. The latter is what Ekman calls
the “precondition” for an emotion (Ibid).

Kristi lives with her older sister Summer. One day as Kristi arrives home, Summer gets angry with her for having left dishes in the sink. Summer who is taller than Kristi towers over her and yells loudly. This is what Ekman calls the “event,” and it is automatically appraised as a threat. As we know, Kristi’s appraisal mechanism is continuously scanning her environment, looking for things crucial to some concern of hers (i.e., objects and situations similar to things stored in her perceptual database). In this instance the threatening situation of her sister yelling matches up with Kristi’s saved memory of her mother screaming at her for leaving her toys out, something which as a child would cause Kristi to feel scared. Together the precondition of Kristi being tired (which makes her prone to get agitated), and the automatically appraised event matching to her stored memory constitutes a threat, and thus trigger the fear affect-program. This program holds instructions for what facial expression she will exhibit, the physical changes she will undergo, what the mental changes will be (i.e., what the felt experience is), and what actions she will engage in.

The instructions that the affect program dictates produce impulses that bring about the physical changes; Kristi’s body becomes tense, her heart starts beating faster, she raises her eyebrows, her eye lids tighten, and her lips stretches back, and, the mental changes; she feels threatened. Also, “the emotional experience that is triggered includes [both] subjective feelings and physical sensation,” which color her perception of the situation (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). Together the physical and mental changes constitute her emotional state; she feels afraid. Consequently, just as Griffith suggested, Ekman includes in the affect program the experience of an emotion.

There are many ways that Kristi could respond to the state of fear she is in. She could
have a constructive response that helps her reach her goals. Kristi can remind herself that her sister is not her mother and that she loves her; she just wants to keep her house clean. Or, she can have a destructive response and start thinking about what happens if Summer kicks her out. She could also have an ambiguous response and yell back at Summer. This could be either helpful or un-helpful; it might be beneficial if it caused Summer to back-down, or it might be unhelpful if it caused the argument to continue. However, we can imagine that in this case Kristi reminds herself that her sister just wants to keep a nice home for them, and thus apologizes and cleans up after herself.

One important nuance to Ekman’s view is what he calls display rules, these explains why universal emotion expressions vary between cultures. They allow us to manage our emotion expressions depending on who we are, and what situation we are in. The display rules in Japan are different from the display rules in the United States, and we learn them socially. Here in the U.S. we learn that it is not socially acceptable to laugh at a funeral, and so when my friend relates a funny joke at my aunt’s funeral, I keep myself from laughing out loud. The rules decide when we “diminish, exaggerate, hide completely, or mask” the expression of the emotion experience (Ekman, 2003, p. 4). Another aspect of the emotion timeline that Ekman stresses is that during the emotion state and its resulting actions, i.e., the “selective filter period,” Kristi’s attention is more highly focused on the perceived threat (“The Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). She has an increased sensitivity to her sister yelling and towering over her than to anything else in the environment. Again, we can see that Ekman includes as part of the emotion Griffiths suggested addition; a change in attention.

In the Kristi example, what Ekman calls the “post-condition” is the time after she has calmed herself down and has acted constructively, but still might continue to be “jumpy” (“The
Ekman’s Atlas of Emotions,” n.d.). This is when Kristi should be reflecting on her fear and potentially understands its trigger better, how it felt, and its impact on her. This could also be an opportunity for Kristi to reflect on the fact that she is still carrying around emotional baggage from her childhood. And further, she can talk to her sister about why she must not yell at her in the way she did, or she can work with a therapist on how to move away from feeling threatened in these types of situations.

Now, since Ekman’s and Robinson’s views appear similar, it is important to keep in mind how they are different from one another. Based on the above discussion, Ekman is answering a slightly different question from what Robinson is trying to do. Namely, his question is: how do emotions develop and evolve over time? Whereas her question is: What is it for an event to be an emotion? Moreover, even though there are similarities between Robinson’s account and Ekman’s view of the basic emotions, she goes beyond him. As will be made clear below, she gives a story also about how we can have more cognitively complex emotions, such as jealousy, love, and embarrassment, whereas he does not.

We have seen Robinson explain how the basic emotions work, but what about the more complex ones? In these cases the cognitive monitoring that comes in after both the non-cognitive appraisal and the physiological and behavioral changes, plays a crucial role in how we ourselves label the response as one of, say, embarrassment or jealousy. Consequently, the emotion process could have been one of anger, but the emoter labels it as one of jealousy (Robinson, 2004, p. 38; Robinson, 2005, p. 80). After Julia glanced over at Lena’s exam and saw that she got an A, she snapped at her when she asked if she wanted to get coffee after class. When this happened, we can imagine that Julia thought to herself: ‘I see now why I reacted the way I did, I was jealous of how well Lena did on the midterm’ (Robinson, 2004, p. 39).
As we know, non-cognitive appraisals can be activated by, say, a thought or a belief (i.e., something more cognitively complex than perception), and they can involve relatively sophisticated cognitive appraisals and reappraisals. Even so for Robinson, “at the core of emotion will always be physiological responses caused by an automatic affective appraisal and followed by cognitive monitoring” (Robinson, 2005, p. 59). Now, as summarized by James Harold in his review of *Deeper Than Reason*, this quote is misleading since the cognitive monitoring is not required for an agent to emote. “According to Robinson…if a stimulus produces an affective appraisal, the appraisal will produce physiological changes whether or not it is accompanied by a cognitive appraisal,” and further the appraisal and physiological changes are enough for a “genuine emotion” (Harold, “Deeper”). Hence, emotions do not mandate cognitive states: they are unconscious experiences but they are automatic and so too fast to be judgments, however they do permit them: they might be provoked by judgments or they might cause judgments later on.

Another aspect of Robinson’s view is that the different parts of the emotion process can work to reinforce each other. The appraisal helps focusing the individual’s attention on something in her environment, but the bodily changes and behaviors following the appraisal aid in keeping her attention fixed. She also adds how the way the event feels (its subjective feel) can further focus the emoter’s attention on the relevant object. The cognitive appraisals and reappraisals modifying her physiological and behavioral reactions, not only can help changes and behaviors to subside, but can also incite them further. Just as when I see that what I took to be a spider on my desk, in fact, is merely a binder clip, I calm down, when I see that what I took to be a snake on the trail actually is one, I create more distance between myself and the reptile. In each instance cognitive appraisals (there is no spider, I am safe, or, there is a snake, I should move
away) are working to either subside or induce my physiological and behavioral changes (Robinson, 2004, p. 37-8).

Let us consider now how Robinson would analyze the test cases. Case 1: Sheryl experiences fear when she sees a snake in the periphery of her vision. It is not her conscious belief or judgment that there is a dangerous snake on the ground that brings about her fear. Rather, an affective appraisal does. Without requiring Sheryl’s attention, it determines whether the snake is posing a threat to her and activates the proper physical and bodily changes. In this case, as the latter takes place the cognitive monitor kicks in and determines that the response was in fact appropriate; it is a real snake and it is posing a threat to her. Case 2: Frank makes the judgment that a fellow American won gold and he acknowledges its positive effects. He believes that Serena’s success will rub off on all Americans, and thus that they have certain qualities unobtainable by other means. This realization triggers an affective appraisal in Frank and he experiences the physiological changes typical of happiness. However, based on his culture’s understanding of pride and when it is appropriate, Frank labels his emotion ‘pride’.

One question that the reader might have is if it is truly the case that there always have to be a physiological response(s) when someone is having an emotion? It seems clear that there will be physiological responses for, say, both fear and startle (e.g., an increase in various chemicals throughout your body, in blood flow to your legs, etc), but is it required for the more complex emotions? Could it not be the case that someone is hopeful about a future prospect (e.g., about what the new laws that the candidate they voted for, and that won, is going to do to for him) without having physiological changes such as an increase in adrenaline or a quickened heartbeat? It appears intuitive that this is a possibility, and as such Robinson should say something about it.

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54 This is a slightly revised version of test case 1.
Below is how the Non-cognitive theory accounts for the benchmarks. Benchmark i: emotions do not always involve cognitive components, but they allow for them. ii & iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions are sometimes irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be both the result of careful reflection and an automatic response, benchmark viii: emotions and moods can only be embodied in a shallow way (see Intermission section), benchmark ix: emotions are not open to conceptual analysis, they are natural kinds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotions can have a cognitive component</th>
<th>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</th>
<th>Emotions can have a phenomenology</th>
<th>Emotions can have behavioral signatures</th>
<th>Non-human animals &amp; pre-linguistic children can have emotions</th>
<th>Emotions can be irrational</th>
<th>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli</th>
<th>Emotions and Moods can be embodied</th>
<th>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not mandate cognitive states, but allow for them</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Possibly: only a weak notion of embodiment</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
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\textit{d. The Modified-Cognitivist Theory}

According to Robert C. Roberts, emotions are concern-based construals (Roberts, 2003). To explain this idea he asks us to consider the famous old woman/young woman gestalt figure (p. 70). Most people see this figure either as an old woman or as a young woman, and with effort one can switch from one way of seeing it to the other (p. 71). For Roberts the difference between these ‘seeings as’ is a difference in the way the figure presents itself to us. Therefore, there is a perceptual difference: it looks different in the two construals. Moreover, what distinguishes between them is not sensory (Roberts, 2003, p. 71). In fact, the sensory input in the seeings as is
identical; they are made up of the same lines and shades. However, we are having two distinct perceptions.

So, the reader might wonder: What is the difference between the ways we perceive the figure? Roberts responds that “[i]t is…the organization of the sense-perceptible lines” (Ibid). By this he means that even though the perception remains the same, the conceptualization has changed:

“We might say that construal is conceptual perception, as distinguished from sensory perception, inasmuch as it depends on how you conceptualize, in perception, the parts or aspects of the construal’s occasion…Still, there is sensory information involved in the construals of the [old woman/young woman figure], so the experience is a kind of visual (sensory) experience, despite its conceptual nature (p. 5).”

In seeing the old woman we are structuring the figure as an old woman; we are integrating various parts of the image so that they appear to us in a particular way. Furthermore, the way that we do this is by, in perception, assigning “old woman part” concepts to the various aspects of the figure (Roberts, 1996). The horizontal line in the middle of the image is in one case assigned the role of a necklace (young woman) and in the other the role of a mouth (old woman). Hence, it is the organization of the parts of the figure that produces the kind of perception. Roberts also emphasizes how resemblance plays a crucial role in how the old woman/young woman gestalt figure works, “it looks a little bit like both [an old woman and a young woman], and if it didn’t it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to construe it as such” (Roberts, 2003, p. 5).

In order to get emotions on Roberts view we need to have not just construals, but construals that are based on a concern. As such, there is an element in the emotion case that is not present in the old woman/young woman example. Roberts suggests that just as the old woman/young woman figure has various features so does real life situations. Hence, what we do when we experience an emotion is bringing these features together in a sense-making way.
Importantly, we do this on the basis of a concern; “‘interest’, ‘enthusiasm’, ‘desire’, ‘wish’, ‘attachment’, and ‘caring’ are all words for concerns” (Tappolet & Roberts, 2006, p. 146). As concern-based, the construals are affected by what the subject cares about, what matters to them. We can construe (or see) something as being in danger (which would be the case for fear) without caring about it; however in that case, we would not have an emotion (Roberts, 2007, p. 11-12).

In his Plantinga Fellow Lecture Roberts explains an instance of an emotion as follows. Coming into a situation the individual has certain concerns (2011 a & b, “Emotions, Perception, and Moral Judgments”). These can be active (in fear you might be thinking about how the well-being of someone you care about is threatened) or dispositional (you might not be thinking anything at all about what you are going to encounter). When you enter the situation, and because of your before-mentioned concern, the concern is triggered by the way you see or construe the state of affairs. Thus, you perceive “the whole situation (with its aspects thus perceptually assigned) through the lens of [your] care” (Roberts, 2007, 10). This is the emotion. Although when describing the emotion episode, we can talk about the concern and the construal as two distinct things, experientially they are synthesized into one appearance:

“Experientially the emotion is not a two-stage process in which I first perceive [the situation in some particular way, such as, dangerous]…and then add to this perception a concern that is somehow relevant to it. Rather, the concern enters into the perception so as to characterize the appearance of the object…Thus the concern is…taken up, or synthesized into, the appearance of the situational object and/or its salient elements” (Roberts, 2003, p. 80, my emphasis added).

When this happens you also have a desire to perform some action so that your concern is satisfied, and further the desire motivates you to act (Roberts, 2013, p. 46). When you are afraid

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55 Moreover and as in the case with Goldie’s account, it does not appear necessary on Roberts emotion view that the concern-based construals are guided by rationality. Hence, his view can account for the above benchmark regarding phobias.
you might remove the individual you care about from the dangerous situation.

To contextualize the above discussion, let us consider an example of fear. Kendall is the mother of 2 year-old Kim. One day while in the park Kendall looks up (and this without thinking anything to herself, like how much she loves her daughter) and sees Kim crawling right on the edge of a three-foot high wall. As a result, Kendall has an episode of fear. The fear for Roberts in this example is a combination of the integration of her concern for her daughter (she has a dispositional concern; she cares for her daughter even though she is not actively thinking about it), and her seeing the nearness of Kim to the edge of the wall as a threat to her. When this happens she perceives the whole situation through the lens of her concern, and experiences fear.56 Moreover, Kendall’s fear episode results in a fear desire; she wants to keep her child away from the danger. Further, she is motivated to run over and pull Kim out of harm’s way.

For Roberts each emotion has a set of concepts in terms of which you see the elements in the situation. In the case of fear, the terms are: threat to wellbeing, thing threatened, and avoidance (protection) (Roberts, 2013, p. 47). Thus, in Kendall’s construal of the situation above she sees it and organizes it in a meaningful way. The situation has a certain meaning because she is assigning roles to the elements, and she is doing this in the way characteristic of fear (e.g., the child’s nearness to the edge is seen as a threat to her wellbeing, and as such she desires that the threat on the behalf of her child is avoided). Roberts associates with each emotion a characteristic proposition outlining “the way in which the elements of the situation are sense-makingly ordered in an emotion of that type” (Roberts, 2013, p. 47).57 The proposition for fear

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56 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) (see discussion above).

57 Roberts explains that these propositions are what distinguishes the different types of emotions. “Human emotions come in a variety of more or less names types…and these are distinguished from one another by their defining propositions” (Roberts, 2003, p. 110). Moreover, he says “to think that such propositions are determining the individual’s construal of the [situation], we need not hold that he explicitly contemplates them or rehearses them to himself [even though he could do this]. They propositions he would utter were he to explain his [emotion x]. His
goes like this: “X presents a threat to Y of a significant degree of probability; may X or its threatened consequences for Y be avoided” (Ibid). Although the concern is not specifically stated in the definition, it is implied by the usage of the word ‘threat’ (Ibid).

Roberts briefly discusses affect, the way an emotion feels to the emoter, in perception. Affect arises from the concern on which the construal is based, and as such the perception is colored in value; negative or positive.

“As a concern-based construal—one in which the subject’s concern is integrated into his perception of the situation in terms of the concepts that structure the emotion type in question—the construal is a perception that is “colored” in value…in the case of emotions, affect is pleasant or unpleasant. Fear is unpleasant, hope pleasant” (Roberts, n.d).

Affect for Roberts then is the phenomenological difference between an emotion and a non-emotion construal; between Kendall’s concern-based construal of Kim on the wall (her fear), and say a stranger’s construal of Kim as being in danger (someone that does not have the same concern as Kendall for the well-being of the child) (Roberts, n.d., “Emotions, Perception, and Moral Judgments,” p. 11).

Let us look at how Roberts would handle the test-cases. Case 1: Sheryl has a dispositional concern for her own well-being. When she enters into the situation with the snake, she construes it as dangerous (e.g., she sees the nearness of it to where she is standing as threatening) and when this happens her dispositional concern (for her own well-being) is triggered. Sheryl perceives the situation through the lens of her concern, and experiences fear. Her perception of the situation as dangerous is colored with negative value; her qualitative experience is unpleasant. A desire is

[emotion x] (construal) is expressible in such propositions. Perhaps he is initially inarticulate about them; they need to be draw from him artfully, as in psychotherapy. But...even in such a case some propositions or thoughts determine the character of his experience: In inquiry about his emotion, they can be drawn from him, or could be drawn from him with the right prompting” (Ibid).

58 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) (see discussion above).
produced in her; she wants to remove herself from the situation, and she is motivated to run away.

Case 2: Imagine that Frank has the dispositional concern that it is important for him to have high worth (as an American he wants his country to do well in comparison to other nations). When he watches fellow American, Serena Williams, beat her opponent and win Olympic gold, he construes or perceives the situation (i.e., Williams’ athletic superiority over the other player) as rubbing off on him; he too as an American is stronger and more determined than the Russians. When this happens his concern for high worth is activated, and he now views the situation through the lens of this concern. Consequently, he has an episode of pride. Frank’s perception of the situation has positive value; the qualitative experience of pride is pleasant. A desire is produced in Frank to show off his superiority, and he is motivated to lift his arms up in the air and puff out his chest.

Next, we will briefly be considering how nonhuman animals and young children can have emotions on Roberts’ view. Because construals are not necessarily propositional (as is the case in the old woman/young woman figure), there is room on Roberts account for nonhuman animal and pre-linguistic infant emotions (Roberts, 2003, p.116). What is needed for the latter organisms to have an emotion is:

“A power of perception that is not merely sense perception, but some organization of sense perception that can impinge on and incorporate some concern (perhaps instinctual, perhaps learned) of the [emoter] (Ibid)”

This works as follows. A rabbit reacts with fear to a snake on the ground, but is indifferent to a stick in the grass (Ibid). Although the rabbit does not see the snake as ‘dangerous,’ after all it

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59 Roberts proposes the following formula for the defining proposition of pride: “It is important for me to have high worth; and X (attributem possession, accomplishment, associate), by its goodness and its association with me, confersm enhances, or confirms such worth” (Roberts, 2003, p. 277).
60 Again, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) (see discussion above).
does not have language, it does “see the snake in a different way than it sees a stick that has much the same sensory properties as the snake” (Ibid). To be clear, while there is a slight difference in sense perception, the main difference in perception is in the distinct construals involved.

In the animal and pre-linguistic infant case the slight difference in sensory input “triggers a qualitatively different perception, and this is a difference in the way the sensory input is organized—where “organized” denotes the kind of thing that has happened in the perception of the old woman/young woman figure when a subject sees one of the figures in the lines” (Roberts, 2003, p. 116). Instead of explaining how this organizing of sensory perception happens, Roberts merely says that nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic infants come hard-wired with construals for particular sensory input, and that it activates or triggers their animal instinct through which’s lens they perceive the object.\(^\text{61}\) The animal instinct thus being the animal analog of a human concern (Ibid).

One criticism of Roberts is that the states he call construals appear so different from each other that it is difficult to see what they have in common (Tappolet, 2006, p. 145). This is a problem since, he says that emotions constitute a unified category; all emotions are concern-based construals. As we know, he argues that human emotions appear to be largely dependent on concepts,\(^\text{62}\) whereas the emotions of nonhuman animals are not (as discussed before, they do not have language). However, he still wants to say that both human’s and nonhuman animals’

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\(^61\) Again, as in the human case, here the concern is taken up, or synthesized, into the appearance of the situational object (the construal) (see discussion above).

\(^62\) Except for our fear of heights that apparently is more like animal fear: “It seems instinctual in us that when, unused to the experience, we look down from a precipice, we recoil with something analogous to fear. As human beings, we probably also see the precipice as dangerous…but the experience precedes and seems to be largely independent of the concept of danger, and so it is natural to suppose that it is something like the animal reaction involving sense perceptions that we have been discussing. But with experience some people overcome this perception when looking precipitously down; rock climbers and roofers learn to see the precipitous drop differently” (Roberts, 2003, p. 117).

“[W]hat seems to happen when we experience fear of heights [or when animals experience emotions] is that we [or the animals] perceive the higher-order property of being a threat [this is captured by Roberts’ claim above that the rabbit perceives the snake in a “different way”]. The question is why we should say this is a construal and not simply a perception” (p. 145).

She says that even if we can, in some sense, say that this perception is a construal (although Roberts doesn’t explain how this would be so), it still seems different from the construals involved in human emotions involving concepts. It is fair to ask thus, what exactly it is that these construals share.

Tappolet (2006) also suggests that maybe the concerns are the unifying factor for Roberts. Perhaps all emotions, human and nonhuman, involve them (p. 145). But, this does not seem satisfactory either. After all, for him concerns can be many different things, such as interests, enthusiasm, desires, wishes, attachments, cares, etc (Roberts, 2003, p. 146). Hence, he also has to explain what concerns have in common.

Let us now look at how the Modified-cognitivist theory does on the benchmarks.
Benchmark i: the notion of a construal is cognitive, benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a physiological component and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can both be the result of careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods cannot be embodied. And lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are open to conceptual analysis.
Emotions can have a cognitive component

<table>
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<th>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</th>
<th>Emotions can have a phenomenology</th>
<th>Emotions can have behavioral signatures</th>
<th>Non-human animals &amp; pre-linguistic children can have emotion-ns</th>
<th>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli</th>
<th>Emotions and Moods can be embodied</th>
<th>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes &amp; no: has a cognitive notion of construals</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
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Yes: Roberts argues that his view is open to conceptual analysis.

63 At least in the sense that his view allows for the fact that the behaviors following on the desires can be typical for a certain emotion.


e. The Hybrid Theory

Similarly to the James-Lange theory, for Jesse Prinz (2008) emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, however, on his account “by perceiving the body, we also perceive losses, threats, achievements, and other matters of significant concern” (p. 707). In accordance with Richard Lazarus’ appraisal theory of emotions thus, he thinks emotions represent different core relational themes. By drawing heavily both from what Prinz (2008) calls James-Lange’s “embodied approach,” and the cognitive appraisal theory, emotions for Prinz are embodied appraisals (p. 707-8).

On the James-Lange conception of emotions, emotions are perceptions of changes in the body. “[F]ear is a perception that includes muscles freezing, respiration becoming constricted…hairs standing on end” and an increase in blood flow to the legs (Prinz, 2008, p. 707-8). By perception here Prinz refers to a state that is caused by and also represents bodily changes. Moreover, when afraid I can feel my muscles tensing up, my breathing getting shorter, my heart beating faster, and I might have a sensation of the hair on my arms standing-up. For
Prinz the job of the feelings of the bodily changes is not to let us know about the changes, but to inform us of the kind of situation we are in. The tightness in my chest might be caused by too much oxygen pumping through my body and my heartbeat raising, but what it tells me is that there has been a loss (that is relevant to me). Hence, the perception of bodily changes makes up an “embodied appraisal” of the situation (Price, 2015, p. 32).

To account for the objection that emotions for James-Lange are too brute (i.e., they cannot explain how emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate when all they represent are bodily states), Prinz follows Lazarus by evoking the idea of core relational themes.64

Prinz (2008) explains:

“An appraisal is a judgment about an organism-environment relationship that bears on well-being, such as the judgment that there has been a great loss or that there has been an offense against me. Following Richard Lazarus, I call the states of affairs represented by these judgments ‘core relational themes’” (p. 708, my emphasis added).

But how can it be that a perception of particular bodily changes can represent a core relational theme? Citing contemporary theories of mental representation, in particular Fred Dretske’s view, Prinz (2008) says that a mental state can represent in virtue of its causal relationship to the world:

“If a particular bodily perception reliably occurs under certain circumstances and was learned or evolved for that purpose, then that perception represents that situation. When dangers confront us, there are certain muscular, circulatory, and respiratory changes that take place in order to prepare the body for fleeing, fighting, or freezing. The mind has the ability to recognize this pattern of changes perceptually, and to use that pattern to inform decisions about what to do next. Thus, the perception of the pattern is…a representation of danger. Core relational themes are represented by perceptions of patterned bodily changes” (p. 709, my emphasis). 65

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64 See my discussion above regarding the criticism against James-Lange that their view is too brute. It appears that this objection might be slightly misguided.

65 It would seem that on Prinz’ view my phobic fear of snakes can be accounted for as well. This is so, since my seeing the snake on the ground triggers a certain bodily response in me that my mind perceives (the bodily perception could have been either learned or evolved to serve this purpose).
Prinz is drawing from both the feeling theory (ala James-Lange) and the cognitive appraisal view (Lazarus’ account) here. For Prinz, James-Lange were correct in their claim that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, but they did not account for the fact that the perceptions can represent “exactly what judgments (cognitive appraisals) represent. They represent via the body, rather than via disembodied, freely recombinable concepts that we use in thought” (Ibid).

As we are aware, an emotion does not represent a particular object, but rather a core relational theme. This means that when an individual for example is sad about the death of a child, her mental representation of the object is distinct from the emotion; “cognitions are prior conditions, not constituent parts of emotion” (Prinz, 2004, p. 98). Thus, the individual is going to have one mental representation “that corresponds to the child’s death and another, [her] sadness, that corresponds to there having been a loss” (p. 62-3). We should think of these two representations as constitutive of one “complex representation that means that the child’s death has been a loss to me” (p. 63). Further, to this Prinz ads a negative valence marker (I will discuss this below), and as a result, there appears to be three different representations at work at same time (Goldie, 2006, p. 455).

Prinz improves on the James-Lange view further by saying that although on their view emotions are feelings, a claim which seems to imply that they must be conscious, on his account they do not have to be. Since he wants to take contemporary research into consideration

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66 Goldie seems to agree with this interpretation of James-Lange as well. To see this consider his commentary on the following quotation of James’: “Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry” (Goldie, 2000, p. 53). Here is Goldie’s reply: “This reads as if it is the bodily changes which are required for there to be an emotion, not the bodily feelings, but James can put it like this because, he says, all bodily changes are felt ‘every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs’. So it is not really the bodily changes that are the emotion, as the above citation suggest, but rather the feelings which necessarily accompany them: ‘every change that occur must be felt’” (Ibid., my emphasis added).
and say that unconscious perception is possible, there can be unconscious emotions as well (Prinz, 2008, P. 711).

Another point that Prinz makes is that we need an explanation for how to account for some emotions being positive while others are negative. Why are some bodily patterns good (positive), and others bad (negative)? To explain this Prinz introduced ‘valence markers’ or ‘inner reinforcers’ (Prinz, 2004, p. 163-5; Prinz, 2008, p. 711). These are states that have “imperative content,” and as Goldie (2006) states in his review of Prinz’s Gut Reactions, “can be glossed by the instruction “More of this”…or “Less of this!”” (p. 455). The positive marker, tells the individual to remain in the emotional state, whereas the negative emotion marker tells her to get out of the emotion state. The emotion markers also motivate us to act in various ways: “If I am overjoyed by a chocolate soufflé that I am eating, then I will recognize that the “More of this!” command would be best served by having more soufflé. If I am tormented by an awful movie that I am watching, the “Less of this!” command would best be served by leaving the theater” (Prinz, 2004, 174). Thus, emotions are embodied appraisals together with a valence marker.

As we can see the valence markers complements the embodied appraisals; they mark the object or situation as being good or bad (Price, 2015, 32). And as could be gleaned above, the embodied appraisals and the valence markers together bring about the behavioral changes typical of the emotions. When I feel fear as I hear footsteps downstairs but know that no one but me is home, there is an embodied appraisal (i.e., I feel my heart raising and I can feel the adrenaline through my body) that tells me about the danger, and further, there is a valance marker signaling the badness of the situation and that I should withdraw. As a result, I hide in my closet. Based on all this, we can see that for Prinz, the embodied appraisal (i.e., the emotional feelings) and the
valence marker constitute the emotional evaluation of the situation, and “together they make-up the emotion” (Price, 2015, 32).

Let us now apply Prinz’s view to the test-cases. Case 1: When Sheryl sees a snake on the ground certain bodily changes are activated; there is an increase in blood flow to her legs, her heart starts beating faster, and she begins to breathe rapidly. She feels fear when she perceives an occurrence of this state (which represents the core relational theme ‘danger’). There is a negative valence marker connected to the latter perception, and thus, she is motivated to move away. Case 2: The feeling of happiness (i.e., perception of the bodily change) has been caused by Frank’s thought of the American as superior to other peoples in connection to various athletic pursuits. Beliefs about victorious people sharing “my” nationality are arranged in memory to be triggers for individuals’ experiencing national pride. Further, a positive valence marker goes with the perception of the bodily changes, and thus Frank is motivated to puff out his chest and raise his arms above his head.

My main criticism of Prinz’s theory is that it is not clear what he means when he says that appraisals are embodied. When he states that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, I understand him as saying that the perceptions simply are the appraisals (and by the same token that the appraisals just are the perceptions). This is so since, for Prinz to qualify as an appraisal “a state must represent an organism-environment relation that bears on well-being”; it must represent a core relational theme (Prinz, 2004, p. 77). And as discussed, emotions do just that. But, if this is so, the only thing that makes my appraisal embodied is that it takes place inside my

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67 This is how Prinz describes another complex emotion, namely jealousy: “When romantic jealousy occurs, there is first a judgment to the effect that one’s lover has been unfaithful and then an embodied appraisal. The emotion jealousy, is comprised entirely by the embodied appraisal. Under other conditions, an embodied appraisal of the kind that comprises a state of jealousy may qualify as another emotion. When an embodied appraisal occurs as a response to judgments regarding infidelity, it constitutes jealousy; when it has another cause, it may constitute another emotion. On this proposal, the cognitive concomitant of a cognitively elaborated emotion is not part of the emotion, but it plays a role in determining the identity of the emotion” (Prinz, 2004, p. 99).
body. However, standard accounts of embodiment require more than that emotions occur inside one’s body. It is one thing to say that the bodily change is embodied (of course it is); it is quite another thing to say that the appraisal is. There is nothing in Prinz’ theory that says: every emotion type must have a token that is an embodiment of that type by virtue of the agent’s behavior being a constitutive part of the emotion.

Next I want to briefly look at how the Hybrid view fares in terms of the benchmarks. Benchmark i: emotions can have a cognitive component; they can be cognitive elaborations of basic emotions, benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be the result both of careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods can be embodied, but the view suggests a weak notion of embodiment, and lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are natural kinds and thus they are not open to conceptual analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotions can have a cognitive component</th>
<th>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</th>
<th>Emotions can have a phenomenology</th>
<th>Emotions can have Behavioral signatur-es</th>
<th>Non-human animals &amp; pre-linguistic children can have emotions</th>
<th>Emotions can be irrational</th>
<th>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli</th>
<th>Emotions and Moods can be embodied</th>
<th>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: can be cognitive elaborations of basic emotions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes: but weak notion of embodiment</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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68 This observation appears supported by Prinz’ only quote about what he means when he talks about “embodiment” in his 2008 review of his own book: “Gut Reactions develops and defends an embodied theory of the emotions. The embodied approach emerged in the late 19th century when William James proposed that emotions are feelings of changes in the body” (Prinz, 2008, p. 707).
## 2) Benchmark Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmarks</th>
<th>Feeling Theory</th>
<th>Cognitive Theory</th>
<th>Non-cognitive Theory</th>
<th>Modified-cognitive Theory</th>
<th>Hybrid Theory</th>
<th>The Embodied Theory</th>
<th>The Constructed Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can have a cognitive component</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Do not mandate</td>
<td>Yes &amp; no:</td>
<td>Yes: can be</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>cognitive states,</td>
<td>cognitive</td>
<td>cognitive elaborations of basic emotions</td>
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<td>but allow for them</td>
<td>notion of</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>construals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can have a phenomenology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can have behavioral signatures</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animals and pre-linguistic children can have emotions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can be irrational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic responses to stimuli</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes, No</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions and Moods can be embodied, or the view can be changed to incorporate the embodiment fact</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Possibly: only a weak notion of embodiment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, but weak notion of embodiment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
<td>No: emotions are natural kinds</td>
<td>Possibly: emotions are not natural kinds, but social constructions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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69 The Embodied Theory is discussed in chapter IV.

70 This Constructed Theory is discussed in chapter V.

71 One can envision a radical revision of the cognitive theory on which one starts out with embodied cognition, and then build embodied affect on top of that. Moreover, an account like that is very different from the so-called cognitive theories offered at this time.
Intermission: Review & Prospect

In this section, which is intended to serve as an intermission in the dissertation, I briefly remind the reader what we have done so far, and indicate how we will be moving forward from here. What we set out to do in this project was to answer the question: what can we learn about emotions by accepting the embodiment fact, which I have understood as the claim that for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied. Along the way we laid down a number of benchmarks that any good theory of emotions should satisfy, and further, we considered prominent theories deciding that some of them are not going to be consistent with the embodiment fact, whereas others are. To refresh the reader’s memory, I will next review the accounts that we are not bringing with us to chapter IV, and then there will be a short discussion of Roberts’ Modified-Cognitive Theory and Goldie’s Feeling Theory and the aspects of each that will be carried through.

Standing in sharp contrast to Rebekka Hufendiek’s emotion theory, which as the reader will see in the next chapter argues that emotions can be embodied, accounts such as Prinz’ “Embodied” Theory of emotions and Robinsons’ Non-Cognitivist theory of emotions do not. At least not when we are considering embodiment in a substantial enough way. After all, these emotion theories only claim that emoting occurs inside the body. Unsurprisingly then, and as we know from chapter I, this would be a too weak of a view to get embodiment right.

Nussbaum's cognitive theory of emotions will also not be brought through into the next phase of the dissertation, and this because it comes up against some rather serious objections. In particular, we considered the dilemma that either Nussbaum thinks of emotions as judgments in a relatively traditional sense of the word ‘judgment’ and in which case they seem anemic (I could judge that I am in danger without necessarily becoming afraid), or, she thinks of emotions as
dynamic judgments, and in which case we said that she would be presupposing what needs to be explained (she would seem to have to characterize judgments in terms of the affective notions that we are trying to understand). As a result of this then, I am choosing to leave her account of emotions behind.

We now get to the first theory that we will be bringing aspects from with us into the next chapter; Roberts’ Modified-Cognitive Theory. As the reader knows from Chapter III, for Roberts a concern-based construal is a way of perceiving the world through a concern. In fear for example, a person might perceive though her concern for the wellbeing of someone she cares about, an object construed as a threat (such as the car coming toward her friend with great speed). What is more, as this happens a desire to behave in a certain way is brought about (e.g., she wants to keep her loved one away from the danger), and she is motivated to act (e.g., she pushes her friend out of harm’s way). Thus, on Roberts’ view, it appears the behaving itself is not necessary for an emotion, only the concern-based construal is. As such, construals for Roberts are always a cognitive phenomenon.

By cognitive phenomena I mean to say that on Roberts’ construal view, perception takes place in traditional narrow cognitive processes. That is, something external is registered, you perceive it, and you are aware of it phenomenologically as well as consciously. Now, in contrast to Roberts’ traditional view as described here, I want to suggest that we consider a more inclusive notion of perception. On this interpretation, the organism takes initiative from the environment, does something with it, but none of this happens to be located in conscious experience. Moreover, it also does not have to be located in traditional cognitive processes.

As we will see in the next chapter, and as suggested by my previous point regarding the more inclusive way of thinking about perception, Hufendiek puts forth a view of emotions
according to which the perception of what she calls affective affordances, can itself be in the form of bodily reactions. As the observant reader, who agrees that any good theory should be able to explain how emotions can be embodied, might think to themselves at this point: Is it possible that construals, in fact, are able to be in my affective behavior? My response to this question is that, yes, I think they can. On this understanding, my construing the situation fearfully, at least in some instances, is my running away from it (such as when I come across a snake on the ground and recoil). Or, to take another example, my construing a situation with jealousy, at least sometimes, is my eyeing something that I want to have, but cannot get (such as the sherry glasses that you bought in our favorite antique shop, and that I want, but cannot afford). In contrast to Roberts account where a construal must take place in perception, on the above interpretation an organism can be construing something also by behaving in a certain way.

Taken together, such truth as there is to Roberts’ view of construals I think we can plausibly say that it is subsumed by Hufendiek’s discussion of emotions. Hers then is a good way to make more precise and specific the notion of a construal as embodied. In a way, bringing Roberts back after the intermission, and this even though we are not claiming that his discussion of construals is completely wrong, would be like bringing back an outdated theory to explain something current.

The last emotion theorist up for consideration is Goldie and his account of emotions as always importantly involving feelings-towards. As the reader recalls from the beginning of chapter III, because Goldie do not consider bodily behaviors to be crucial components of emotions, meaning that they are not a part of them and do not seem important to the way he thinks about emotional experience, his view too will (at least in one sense) be set aside at this point. This is especially so since, for Goldie it seems clear that he does not think that an emotion
could ever be embodied in the sense that a suite of behaviors would ever itself be sufficient for the occurrence of an emotion, whereas we think that it can.\footnote{That is, Goldie does not think that an aspect of an agent’s behavior could ever be a constitutive part of emotion.} Now, as mentioned previously, had Goldie been more enlightened he would have considered the possibility of behaving-towards, and not just, hoping-towards and thinking-towards. However, as we will see in the next chapter, Hufendiek and her embodied emotion theory seem to do just this. In a sense then, Goldie’s theory is going to be carried on in the work of Hufendiek, and as such by putting her under the microscope; we will still be assessing the spirit of his view if not the letter.

Even though we have seen that aspects of Roberts’ and Goldie’s emotion theories fall under Hufendiek’s embodied account of emotions, as will become clear in the next chapter, she fine-grains the phenomenology of emotions too much. Just as the Feeling-theory, Hufendiek too holds the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of emotion phenomenology. Consequently, in chapter V we turn to Lisa Feldman Barrett’s account of emotions for an alternative. As we will see, although Feldman Barrett’s “constructed” emotion view is able to account for some of the shortcomings of Hufendiek’s theory, it is faced with others.
Chapter IV

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2) Rebekka Hufendiek’s discussion of cognitive accounts of emotions
3) Hufendiek’s position: Emotions are embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances

1) INTRODUCTION

As mentioned in the Intermission, in this chapter we will be looking at and discussing one of the most recent embodied views of emotions, namely, Rebekka Hufendiek’s theory of emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances. However, and importantly, as the reader will soon see, even though Hufendiek presents an embodied theory of emotions, there are objections that can be raised against it, which in the view’s current formulation, renders it unacceptable.

2) REBEKKA HUFENDIEK’S DISCUSSION OF COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS OF EMOTIONS

According to Hufendiek (2014, 2015), cognitive accounts are committed to two claims about emotions. First they say that emotions have a certain meaning that cannot be accounted for by bodily feelings and behavior. That is, emotions have “directions” or “targets,” they are about something, they are Intentional. To see what this means, consider a situation in which I am angry with my husband for eating the candy that I had saved from our date-night last weekend, and which I had told him not to touch. In this instance my anger is Intentional (it is directed at my husband’s action), i.e., it’s about his eating my candy knowing full well that he was not supposed to do so. Moreover, Hufendiek (2015) explains that the relationship between a person’s being angry and what he or she is angry about is representational. That is, the object of the emotion, in this case my husband eating my candy, is given to me in a certain mode of presentation; as an offense (p. 24).
The simplest way to make sense of the above mentioned representational relationship is by looking at another example. Imagine a young child, 2 year-old John-John (or JJ as his mother calls him), who is playing in the living room with his new toy car. As JJ is sitting on the floor pushing his car around in circles, his sister Marilyn runs into the room, grabs the car, and throws it against the wall. As a result of this sudden outburst of anger, one of the car’s wheels falls off, and when JJ sees this he starts crying uncontrollably. According to a cognitive view, JJ’s emotion (i.e., his sadness) is directed toward the toy car, but it has a formal aspect, which is the loss. That is, the emotion is Intentional (directed toward an object, the car), but it also has a formal aspect, or a “particular way” that it represents its object (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 25). In this case JJ’s sadness represents the broken car as being a loss. The latter is what Hufendiek describes as the “particular mode of presentation in which the object is given in experience” (p. 24).

The second claim that cognitive accounts make is that emotions are normatively assessable; i.e., they can be appropriate or inappropriate. Hufendiek (2015) explains that the phenomenon of normative assessability involves three different claims: semantic norms (whether or not the formal aspect of the representation is correct), rational norms (according to which the representational character of the emotions are “the result of reasoning processes that stand in certain rational relations to the situation, other thoughts, and other emotions”), and social norms (that the emotions “represent values that concern not only biological well-being but also social norms”) (p. 27, 33). I will discuss these various dimensions in greater detail below.
Hufendiek criticizes certain cognitive theories by pointing out that they over-intellectualize emotions, and furthermore, she holds up her own view as an alternative to such accounts. One of the first cognitive theories that she criticizes is Richard Lazarus’ characterization of emotions as representing core relational themes. Hufendiek ends up adopting the notion of core relational themes to her own positive approach, but tries to separate out the aspect of it that seems too cognitively sophisticated. Further, and this as a general overview, from here Hufendiek builds up to James Gibson’s (1986) account of affordances to make her own position successful. By doing so Hufendiek, as we shall see incorporates the embodiment component discussed in chapter I.

In line with her explanation that cognitive accounts are committed to two claims about emotions, Hufendiek (2015) turns to Lazarus’ view with these in mind. For Lazarus, she says, the first claim (i.e., that emotions are about something) is expressed in his previously mentioned conviction that emotions represent core relational themes. “Emotions seem to be about things that fundamentally concern us, that are relevant for our goals and well-being; when we are afraid we represent that we are in danger, when we are sad, we represent irrevocable loss” (2014, p. 355-6, my emphasis added).75 And so, ‘being in danger’ and ‘being an irrevocable loss’ are both core relational themes. Furthermore, Hufendiek (2014) gives the following helpful breakdown of what one can take the term core relational theme to express:

“(1) [T]he fact that emotions always represent things that matter or that are of core relevance, (2) the fact that emotions always represent things that matter to us or that their meaning is relational,76 (3) the fact that every type of emotion has a particular theme that is always represented when the emotion in question is present: I might be afraid of

75 It might be mentioned here that talk about ‘irrevocable loss’ is unnecessarily strong, for our purposes it suffices to say ‘loss.’
76 The notion of “emotions mattering to us” is worth spending a little time reflecting on, since it appears to me to be slippery. It seems like I can get emotionally involved in a movie that I’m watching (what happens to its characters, etc), just as it seems like I can care about a sports team because they are the underdog. However, do these things (the characters in a movie and the sports team) really matter to me? We want to avoid a view that says that well if you’re happy about it, it must have mattered to you. That seems very suspect.
many different things and in many different situations but no matter if I am afraid of a spider, a possibly coming war, or an upcoming oral exam, whenever I am afraid I represent a situation as dangerous” (p. 356).

The reader might wonder why Hufendiek thinks that representing a core relational theme is cognitively sophisticated? She explains that this is so because when, for example, someone is angry his representing an object or state of affairs as ‘being an offense’ is the result of a complex process involving “several appraisal dimensions and language-like judgments” (Hufendiek, 2014, p. 356). That this is what she thinks comes out in her writing in the following quotation, in which she explains what is required for a person to represent something as being a certain way:

“When a person is angry, he or she is representing a core relational theme (being an offense), however, doing so is the result of a complex process involving several appraisal dimensions and language-like judgments. “‘First one has to judge whether the current situation has any relevance for one’s goals and only if it does can an emotion occur. Second, one has to judge whether the situation is congruent or incongruent with regard to one’s goals. If it is congruent, any positive emotion can be elicited; if it is incongruent with one’s goals, any negative emotion can be elicited. The further evaluations further distinguish which kind of emotion is present: if an emotion is directed to the self it will be pride, guilt, or shame. Several other emotions such as anger and envy, are directed at other persons. If an emotion involves guilt it will be either anger or guilt depending on whether the emotion is directed at another person or oneself” (Ibid).

When Hufendiek above criticizes Lazarus’ view saying that emotions involve “language-like judgments,” what she is saying is that they involve concepts. That is, she believes that Lazarus’ judgments are concept involving, whereas what she wants is nonconceptual content. Later on in this chapter I will discuss in-detail what this type of content is. In principle though, an approach like this is one that we should find appealing since it is going to make sense of how animals and infants can emote. However, as the chapter develops, it will become clear that we have other reasons to think her view needs improving.

Next, I want to briefly discuss how Lazarus’ view, according to Hufendiek, is able to account for the normative assessability of emotions referred to above. In particular, how his
account can handle what she calls: emotions’ three normative assessability dimensions.

(Assessability Dimension 1) Semantic norms: for Lazarus emotions are concerned with relations between the individual and the environment, so the formal property in, for example fear would be ‘being dangerous.’ Thus, the dimension of normative assessability concerned with semantic norms would be satisfied if there actually were such a relational property between the individual and the environment. (Assessability Dimension 2) Rational norms: Lazarus’ appraisal structure explains how emotions can be subject to rational norms:

“When somebody seriously claims to envy herself for her brand-new car, we are at a loss to understand her. It is a conceptual truth that we can only envy the goods that belong to others, and it can be read off the appraisal structure that the rationally appropriate emotions in this case could either be joy or pride because these are emotions that relate valued objects or achievements to the self and not to others” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 31).

(Assessability Dimension 3) Social norms: some emotions for Lazarus are concerned with biological value, e.g., “if we think of fear as a response to “an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger,” it makes sense to “think of danger as something that is of [biological] disvalue for the organism and therefore should be avoided” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 32). However, others are not. Instead, these emotions have to do with social value. And thus, as a result, they are fundamentally concerned with social rules and norms. For instance, Hufendiek says that for Lazarus guilt is about violating a moral command, and jealousy is about resenting another individual because he or she is a threat to another person’s affection. He makes clear that this does not mean that the latter emotions have nothing to do with evolution, or that they have not played a role in the overall fitness of the individual. To the contrary, when looking at the development of shame and pride in apes, and their connection to rank-hierarchy within groups, it becomes clear that they developed by virtue of being “functional in social groups” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 32). Rather, the main difference here then is that guilt and pride differ from emotions
like fear and disgust, because in the case of the former, the social context within which the emotions take place are of the utmost importance; it is a necessary condition, or as Hufendiek puts it, it is “sine qua non” (Ibid).

Even though there are well-known positives to Lazarus’ account such as that it is able to explain what differentiates various emotions from one another (they involve distinct evaluations), and that it can account for their normative assessability, the fact that his account overintellectualizes them by claiming that they involve conceptual content, Hufendiek takes to be a serious enough problem for us to abandon his view and look for an alternative option. However, rather than just leaving the discussion here, she provides further reasons speaking against the claim that emotions are the type of judgments that Lazarus’ envisions. Hufendiek (2014) says:

1. Infants and animals have emotions, however, they “do not seem to possess the concepts necessary to engage in judgments.”
2. At times emotions do not go away even though we prove them to be wrong, i.e., they are cognitively impenetrable. “Judgments, on the other hand, simply disappear if proven wrong.”
3. In contrast to judgments, emotions come with “a distinct phenomenology.”
4. Emotions tend to motivate us to act in various ways, whereas judgment merely “purport to state matters of fact.”
5. “Emotions are fast and frugal; in contrast to judgments they are not the result of complex and time-consuming reasoning processes” (2014, p. 357).

Lastly, some of the above criticisms that Hufendiek wants to raise about a judgment-view like Lazarus’ are good ones, however others are not. One such example is #5; emotions are fast and frugal whereas judgments are not. For instance, it would appear as though some emotions, in fact, can be very slow and deliberate. While at first Betty was nervous about her husband’s promotion since it includes a lot of business travel, she over time comes around to being happy about his success. Or consider romantic love, this emotions is neither fast; it can develop over many years, nor frugal; it can be all consuming.
3) **HUFENDIEK’S POSITION: EMOTIONS ARE EMBODIED, ACTION-ORIENTED REPRESENTATIONS SET UP TO REPRESENT AFFORDANCES**

Erik Myin (n.d.), in his review of Hufendiek’s above-mentioned book, highlights the fact that she is a staunch realist about *core relational themes*. That is, for Hufendiek a dangerous snake or a poisonous mushroom, if present in the organism’s environment, constitutes an objective threat to his or her well-being. Thus, the properties of ‘being dangerous’ or ‘being poisonous’ are relational properties that existed in the world of our ancestors already before they were able to emotionally respond to dangerous or poisonous situations. Another way to think about this is to emphasize that part of what it means to say that they (the properties) are objective is to say that they would be there even if they were not noticed. For instance, if a dangerous killer is hiding in your closet, he or she would still have the property of ‘being dangerous’ even if you (or anyone else) were not at home. Thus, even though no one is in the apartment, in that moment, the apartment is still a dangerous place.

Based on the above discussion we can see why for instance, for Hufendiek (2015), fear represents danger (i.e., it represents something, such as the snake on the ground, as being dangerous), and danger (i.e., ‘being dangerous’) is a relational property existing between the emoter and the world (p. 90). She thinks that relational properties are objective facts; “That the snake is dangerous to certain organisms does not depend on subjective judgments or any representational capacity” (Ibid). Rather, it is dangerous because, it is disposed to harm the organism. More generally, Myin (n.d.) explains, “Hufendiek claims that core relational themes are ontologically real because some themes are objectively good or bad with respect to biological [having to do with, or being tied to survival and reproduction] or social [having to do with my standing within a social group(s)] norms” (para. 3).
Moreover, because Hufendiek (2015) takes the view that relational properties are objectively real, she can appeal to teleosemantic approaches to explain how organisms came to acquire their representational abilities (Myin, n.d., para. 4). Namely, they did so by developing representational capacities to the already dangerous and poisonous things (e.g., a snake or a mushroom) around them. And furthermore, the latter took place before they were able to actually represent the objects or things as such (Ibid). For example, snakes have the relational property of being dangerous to us, and since our ancestors found themselves repeatedly in situations where they were faced with such dangers, they eventually developed a detection system or mechanism (i.e., a fear reaction) that helped them avoid these dangers. As Myian (n.d.) states,

“Hufendiek understands these objectively existing CRTs [core relational themes] as operating in a causal way by exercising selection pressure on organisms...Thus, CRTs cause organisms to evolve mechanisms which at the same time represent the CRTs and motivate the organism to act with respect to them” (Ibid).

Hufendiek calls these special representational and motivating mechanisms action-oriented representations (Ibid). 77 She motivates their existence by, for instance, emphasizing that she thinks it counterintuitive to say that an emotion is a perception of a dangerous or offensive situation (object or state of affairs) where the bodily arousal and behavioral reactions do not enter into the picture until after there has been further cognitive operations, which evaluates whether the situation is good or bad for the individual. “It is counterintuitive that an emotion should be a mere perception of a dangerous or offensive situation that, only after further processing, is evaluated as being good or bad, which then trigger a certain pattern of bodily arousal and behavioral reactions” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 154). The latter here seems like a direct challenge to the more cognitivist accounts of emotions discussed previously, according to which

77 “These AORs, so Hufendiek argues, are constituted by an organism’s evolutionary appropriate embodied reactions to the CRT. Following the standard Millikanesque teleosemantic line, she takes these reactions to represent their normal conditions of functioning” (Ibid).
bodily reactions appear merely to follow upon the emotion (e.g., a concept involving judgment).

In contrast, for Hufendiek (2015), emotions are intrinsically motivating, and this character “structures their phenomenology” (p.154). She attempts to capture this motivational aspect of the emotions by describing how individuals usually feel when experiencing them; for instance, “in shame we feel that we want to vanish, in anger we feel like exploding, and when in love we feel the urge to be near to the beloved” (Ibid). Could we put this non-metaphorically? Yes, because a more careful formulation would go as follows. In shame we feel like we want to hide, in anger we feel like we want to hit, punch, throw, shatter, etc., something or someone, and when in love we feel the urge to be near to the beloved. 78

Moreover, Hufendiek holds the view that an organism’s bodily reactions represent the core relational themes in a particular way. When experiencing an emotion, she explains, we do not merely represent a core relational theme (by passively receiving information about it), but we also are simultaneously preparing for action, or simply acting. This is the case for Hufendiek since the bodily reactions that realize the emotions are skillful. 79 Further, they (the skillful bodily reactions) are what make, i.e., they constitute, the emotions being Intentional (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 157). As a result, this means that when an individual comes upon a snake while she is hiking in the woods, he or she does not only represent the snake as ‘dangerous,’ but as “a-danger-to-be-avoided” [this is the formal aspect of the emotion] (Ibid). What is more, the latter, i.e., the representation of the snake as “a-danger-to-be-avoided,” for Hufendiek is a representation of an affective affordance.


78 I will consider Hufendiek’s account regarding the phenomenology of emotions in greater detail below.
79 I will discuss this further below.
Hufendiek describes Gibson as conceiving of the affordances as “features of the environment that exist objectively but only in relation to the organism and its abilities” (“Affective Affordances,” n.d). The features hold a certain value to the organism, and further she explains, they offer possibilities for action and make more salient (i.e., “highlights”) things that should be approached or avoided (Ibid). For instance, for a chimpanzee certain fruits will look edible, and for you, the reader (a person of a certain size and shape) certain objects will look sit-upon-able. Moreover, she says, “Gibson assumes that perception always involves proprioception and thereby has intentional objects that are fundamentally observer-related, although the external information that is picked up through perception is assumed to be real” (Ibid).\(^80\) Consequently, a tree that has fallen across the road might look jump-over-able to a horse but not to me. Or, a fork might look graspable to me, but not to a snake.

The reader can see then, that Hufendiek takes her combined affordance theory of emotional objects and embodied account of emotions (see the next paragraph for a discussion of how her view is embodied) as able to explain the intimate relations among (or relationship) between bodily reactions, world-directedness, and emotions’ motivating character. In her post “Affective Affordances” on the blog Philosophy of Brains Hufendiek demonstrates how she thinks about this relationship by, first, describing emotions’ aboutness as constituted by the particular bodily reaction (specific to each emotion) (Ibid). And secondly, she explains that since the latter was set up by a learning history (either biological or social) to represent an affective external affordance, it is able to do so. To be clear, for Hufendiek (n.d.), it is the evolved or

\(^{80}\)“An affordance theory of emotional objects fits nicely with an embodied account as it offers a good prima facie understanding of the relation among bodily reactions, world-directedness, and motivating potential in emotions: the emotions’ “aboutness” is constituted by the bodily reactions they involve, and these bodily reactions can represent an external affordance, because they were set up by evolution (or a learning history) to do so. The bodily reactions, by preparing the body for action, also give an observer-relative shape to the intentional object of the emotion as it is grasped by the subject” (Ibid).
learned bodily reactions in response to the relational property in the organism’s environment that turns the relational property into an affordance: ”something that is not only related to us as organisms, but also to us as agents with certain abilities” (more about abilities later) (“Affective Affordances,” my emphasis added). Lastly and thirdly, she adds, that the fact that the bodily reactions are preparing the emoter for action makes it so that there is “an observer-relative shape to the intentional object of the emotion as it is grasped by the subject” (Ibid).

In my discussion of Hufendiek’s account above I said that for her, emotions are embodied, action-oriented representations set up to represent affordances. We have already discussed the latter part, but I now also briefly want to consider how she captures the notion that emotions are embodied. Hufendiek (n.d.) says that, roughly speaking, when she claims that emotions are embodied, what she means is that the bodily reactions that they involve, and through which the organism interacts with his or her environment, “realize, or constitute, a kind of intelligent behavior” (“Embodied Action-Oriented Emotions,” n.d).\(^{81}\) The evolved bodily behavior (or reactions), I take it, are skillful engagements with the world on her view, because she thinks of them as involving a certain amount of training:

“Skills are abilities that presuppose a certain amount of training. Yet the kind of training in question is not necessarily guided by a trainer, and does not necessarily involve reflective thought and intention. It is a skillful ability to be able to hold one’s head up and it takes a lot of training to learn how to hold one’s head up at a certain point in development, yet acquiring this skill does not seem to require explicit guidance or reflective thought” (Ibid).

The above means that for Hufendiek before an emotion’s evolved (or learned) bodily reactions “can successfully fulfill their purpose” (e.g., to prepare the individual to flee in fear, or to prepare him or her to fight in anger), certain things need to be learned (e.g., the ability to flee involves a certain amount of training, as do the ability to fight), and can be learned “in different

\(^{81}\) “The claim that emotions are embodied...is that emotions involve bodily reactions and that these bodily reactions realize, or constitute, a kind of intelligent behavior, or interaction, with the environment” (Ibid).
ways in different environments” (Ibid., my emphasis added; Hufendiek, 2015, p. 162). For instance, on her view, it is not until an infant is able to struggle against restriction (i.e., has learned to do so), such as a too tight embrace from a mother or father, that the emotion of anger can be present and fulfill its goal (i.e., to prepare the infant to fight back) (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 163). Moreover and along the same lines, only an infant, who has learned to empathize, by for example carefully touching the distressed person’s arm, and show other “recompensive” behaviors such as a slumped posture, can experience guilt (and have the emotion fulfill its goal of making amends) (Ibid).

A small correction needs to be made to my recounting of Hufendiek’s account above. Even though she specifically says that the infant empathizes when engaging in recompensive behavior, it seems more appropriate for her to describe what is going on in this situation as sympathy. I say this based on the following distinction between empathy and sympathy. I can sympathize with someone without empathizing with him or her. That is, I can sympathize with someone by telling him or her that I want to provide comfort and respite for their suffering. However, to empathize with another individual it is required either to undergo the same emotions they are, or that I am able to vividly imagine myself doing so (Green, 2017, p. 884-5). As an example, I can sympathize with a rape victim, but I am going to find it difficult to empathize with them since I have not had that experience (or something similar to it). Here I do not mean to say that to empathize with someone I have to have experienced the same thing as him or her, but

82 “[T]o empathize with another’s psychological state it is enough both to register or acknowledge it, and to draw on one’s acquaintance with states of that kind as an imaginative source for grasping what the other is going through (or what an earlier stage of myself did go through). Such acquaintance might come from a prior experience of an emotion (mood, or other psychological state or process), or from my engagement with an accurate and sufficiently detailed representation of that experience, for instance by reading a memoir or a work of fiction. It is compatible with this account that in some cases of empathizing with another, we find ourselves experiencing the same type of emotions they do. (This would help explain why empathizing with people who are experiencing morally troubling emotions, such as hatred toward certain racial or religious groups, can be fraught experiences). But that is an occupational hazard of empathizing with them rather than a requirement for doing the job” (Ibid).
I do need some basis such as knowing what it is like to be helpless, or to be terrified for my life. Thus, when looking at Hufendiek’s example with the infant, it seems more likely that what is going on in this example is that, rather than empathizing, the child is sympathizing, or otherwise showing concern for the other person.

However, even though Hufendiek thinks of the ability to have emotions as being present at birth, it still develops over-time through various social interactions. For example, she describes how guilt develops over time beginning with the child experiencing the emotional bodily reactions of distress, fear, sadness etc., in response to a punishment he or she receive in response to, say, his or cruel behavior. The child eventually makes the connection that these scenarios play out when he or she has violated some rule (such as, “do not bite a family member”). And further, the child learns, through trial and error, that behaving in certain ways (e.g., what Hufendiek calls recompensive behavior) will make reintegration into the social unit (the family) possible. “As a consequence, the child in the future will not (or not only) feel distress, sadness or fear when being punished but will feel motivated to make amends for what she has done” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 147, my emphasis added). For Hufendiek it is when the latter happens, and this with the emphasis being on the child’s motivation to make amends, that there is a fully realized guilt reaction present.

What is more, she explains, each emotion “gains an individual shape over a learning period,” something which I read as an explanation to why my, say, anger or happiness might look different from yours (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 146). Perhaps when I get angry my right eye starts intensely twitching, while you always stamp your left foot repeatedly. Or, when I am happy about something I bite my lip as I smile, whereas you usually smile more from the left side of your mouth.
As I explained previously, for Hufendiek (n.d.), relational properties occur in the biological environment. However, on her account, they are also present in the social environment of the organism ("Emotions and The Social World," n.d.). To see how this is so, consider again the previous example with guilt. Now, some philosophers would say that infants are unable to experience emotions such as guilt or shame, until they both have a concept of the self and a conceptual understanding of social rules and norms. Hufendiek (2015) does not agree; for her infants have an embodied sense of self, or as she calls it "a prereflective embodied sense of self," that does not require a concept (p. 148). And further, since children grow up in "socially structured contexts," they learn through various non-conceptual indicators (or signals) of naturally occurring information such as facial expressions, gestures, punishments, rewards, etc., whether or not they have violated a social rule. She explains that the rule violation (in the case of guilt in the above example, "do not bite a family member") is the relational property that needed to be detected (through say, the mother’s angry facial expression and raised voice) in guilt” (Ibid).

In an attempt to close out our consideration of how Hufendiek’s view is embodied, I want to leave the reader with the discussion of embodied emotion accounts that she gives in her paper “Affordances and the normativity of emotions” (Hufendiek, 2017, p. 4457). In it she says that embodied accounts agree (hers included) that emotions are best described as “embodied evaluations that evolved as direct responses to situations of a certain urgency for the organism” (Ibid). With this definition in mind, she goes on to present five general claims that the embodied accounts all concur on. First, and as we saw in her previous discussion, they explain embodiment as when bodily reactions play a constitutive role in emotions. Various bodily responses such as a

83 "A central claim of my approach is that sociall constructed relational properties exist independently of whether we represent them or not” (Ibid).
pounding heart, the increase of adrenaline throughout your body, and tensed muscles are all part of fear and together they make up a pattern that “is not just a consequence of some essential “cognitive emotional reaction” (Ibid). But rather, these bodily reactions follow from “an adaptive history” during which it “gained the function of constituting the emotions aboutness” (Ibid).

Second, just as traditional cognitivists about emotions, embodied accounts think that they are “intentional and evaluative” (Ibid). To account for emotions “aboutness” (as mentioned before in this chapter) these views often turn to Lazarus’ suggestion that every emotion has its own core relational theme. Hence, fear will be about something dangerous (the snake on the ground in front of me), while anger is about something being offensive (my husband eating the leftover candy even though I specifically told him not to). As we remember, Hufendiek’s own account took a unique approach to our representation of core relational themes saying that we not only represent something as being dangerous, but as a danger-to-be-avoided. Third, embodied emotion accounts tend to be “anti-vehicle-internalism.” This simply means that, as was discussed in chapter I, they work to replace the traditional view of “cognitive processes as consisting of complex inner representations realized by the brain alone” with an understanding of cognitive processes as “being constituted by the interplay” between a skillful body and its environment (Hufendiek, 2017, p. 4457). Thus, our earlier example with the outfielder trying to catch the fly ball, and the two ways that we can explain what is taking place here clearly represents the different explanations referred to above.

Fourth, Hufendiek says that embodied accounts “widely agree on methodological and ontological naturalism,” meaning that they try to align what they say about emotions with findings from fields such as developmental psychology, ethnology, and behavioral studies and thus “further develop a picture of intelligent organisms as the result of an evolutionary process”
(p. 4458). Lastly, embodied emotion accounts believe in Diachronic Environmental Externalism (or DDE); the claim that organisms develop the ability to respond to certain types of objects only if there is an adaptive pressure to do so, and Synchronic Environmental Externalism (or SEE); the claim that to interact with the world in an intelligent manner, we do not need “complex, world-representing inner machinery” (Ibid). This is so since, “the world is out there and organisms are well-adapted to it” (Ibid). All in all, we can see that Hufendiek’s embodied view of emotions is consistent with these claims.

In regards to how emotions are appropriate or inappropriate on Hufendiek’s (2015) account, she says the following: the reason why emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate is because they have been “set up to respond to relational properties” in the organism’s environment (p. 173-4). Hence, if the relational property is really present, the emotion is adequate, and if it is not, the emotion is inadequate. Furthermore, Hufendiek emphasize how she before had mentioned that emotions can be both about things that have biological value, and about things that have social value (that are about social rules and norms). She adds to this now, that they can also be about the former without “thereby necessarily entailing conceptual content or explicit knowledge of what is represented” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174). Instead, emotions for Hufendiek are about, or represent, core relational themes, such as “danger-to-be-avoided” for fear or a “rule-violation-to-make-amends-for” in the case of guilt. Now, since the adequate relational properties present in the world engage with the infant “through locally recurring natural information,” and which again-and-again bring about particular bodily responses that realize the action-oriented representation, nothing cognitive (such as judgment-like evaluations or conceptual knowledge) is required to explain it (Ibid). I will talk more about these different

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84 I think one can push back at Hufendiek here. For instance, what if I am extremely angry about a very minor slight. Maybe that anger is appropriate/adequate in some sense, but the degree of anger is not.
normative (or assessability) dimensions of emotions according to her view towards the end of this chapter.

We saw above that Hufendiek criticizes Lazarus of having an account that is partly right, but that also on her view is overintellectualizing emotion by relying on concepts. Now in connection to the above quotation, a natural question would be to ask; how is Hufendiek going to avoid appealing to concepts? Hufendiek thinks about emotions as being intentional without at the same time also having conceptual content. That is, for her emotions have nonconceptual content. To make sense of this Hufendiek (2015) draws from the debate about nonconceptual content of perception emphasizing the connection between “perceptions being about something and feeling a certain way” (p. 84, my emphasis added). She says,

“[F]rom phenomenological descriptions we gain a good understanding of the particular way in which perceptions present their objects to us. This is true of emotions as well. A description of how emotions feel offers a good prima facie understanding of the representational format that emotions have and the way that bodily reactions, aboutness, motivation, and valence are connected in emotions” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174, my emphasis added on “representational format”).

Hufendiek continues by identifying certain claims about the character of perceptual representation and how it is different from conceptual representation (such as judgments), and then she explains that the representational character of emotions are similar to the former rather than the latter.

Hufendiek (2015) first explains that we often think of perceptual representation as “different in kind” when compared to conceptual representation (such as judgments) (p. 174). In particular, the information that we get through perception cannot be described properly in words. That is, we cannot in precise detail express the input that we are receiving through sight, touch, hearing, taste, and smell. For instance, Hufendiek claims that you cannot describe things like the taste of an apple, what your favorite childhood stuffed animal feels like as you touch it, or what
the snow covered field outside your window looks like with enough detail to capture what our perceptual experience of those objects and states of affairs is actually like. Now, Hufendiek (2015) says that the same is true also in the case of emotions. “Even apparently similar emotions, such as embarrassment and shame, clearly differ in terms of how they feel, yet the difference can hardly be explained to somebody who has never felt the emotions herself” (Ibid).85 86

Second, visual perception in particular is more fine-grained than conceptual content. Hufendiek (2015) explains, “we can capture a part of what we see at a certain moment in a phrase like “there is a cup on the table,” but such an utterance will always reduce what we have seen to a very particular aspect…” (Ibid). That is, she says, when we saw the cup on the table, we also perceived things like it’s color and shape, the flowers painted on its side, the table that it was on and the room behind it. Moreover, even if we are able to put those details of our visual experience into words, we could never describe it in enough detail to someone else “to communicate [wholly] what we see” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174). The same holds true in the case of emotions for Hufendiek, and she asks the questions what it means to say that “we represent emotional content in [a similarly] fine-grained format?” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 84) Now, since she wants to argue that bodily arousal (the phenomenological experience of emotions) is constitutive of emotions (so emotions have non-conceptual content), she also wonders what “role it plays in their being fine-grained?” (Ibid).

Hufendiek (2015) explains that the fine-grained structure of “emotional feelings” is different from visual perception “insofar as it is not constituted by the processing of the rich amount of data entering the retina, but mainly by the rich amount of information stemming from

85 Because she says that shame and embarrassment clearly differ in how they feel to an individual (that each emotion has a distinct phenomenology), I take her to be holding what I before called the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions. Basically she thinks that just as cinnamon has one type of smell, whereas nutmeg has another, so does shame have one type of phenomenology, while embarrassment has another.
86 I will raise an objection to this claim below.
the various sources of bodily feedback involved in emotions” (p. 85). Hence, on her view the intensity of the emotion plays a central role in what makes the phenomenological experience of it so fine-grained. For instance, my anger can be more or less intense; sometimes I yell out loud and hit the wall in anger, other times I merely clench my fist angrily in my pocket. In both cases the phenomenological experience is going to be different as well; in the first case we can easily imagine that my feeling of anger is more intense, than what it is when I merely clench my fist in anger.

“Intensity is an abstract notion for particular bodily reactions that do not all have to be present and can vary in degree. Sometimes we feel our muscles tremble and our heartbeat increase; sometimes we feel only a pricking sensation in the stomach when we are afraid…Together with the heartbeat and muscle tension, breathing rhythm is another factor that contribute to the bodily orchestra constituting the feeling of being afraid” (Ibid).

To this discussion Hufendiek (2015) also adds, “an embodied account of emotions can include [in the notion of bodily arousal] fine-grained changes in facial expression, bodily posture, endocrine level, respiration patterns, and so on” (Ibid). And so, I think what she is saying is that emotions “involve a large number of bodily experiences such as trembling, sweating, feeling choked, being on the verge of tears, having a lump in one’s throat, blushing, having butterflies in one’s stomach, having one’s legs turn to jelly, and so on” and that these (i.e., the large number of bodily reactions) help explain the “fine-grainedness of emotional feelings” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 85). That is, it would seem that for Hufendiek, the various bodily reactions that go with different emotions (at least to a certain extent) together make up their distinctive feel (p. 87).

Something important to notice in connection to the above quotation about fear and how it can feel differently for an individual from one day to another (i.e., intra-personally, see below for

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87 “What I am arguing for is that all emotions fundamentally involve bodily arousal, which constitutes their intentionality and how they feel” (Ibid).
explanation of this term), is that for Hufendiek, the different cases of the emotion still must have more in common than not. That is, even though there can be changes between a person’s different instantiations of fear, they all fall into the category of fear in a unified way. To make this clear, consider the taste of cinnamon in bread (as in Swedish cinnamon buns), ice cream, and candy. When an individual treats herself to these things, they (most likely) will taste different from each other in subtle ways. However, they do still have a rather consistent unity. Similarly, in the case of emotions: even though my fear one day (I tremble) versus my fear the next day (I have a pricking sensation in my stomach) are different feelings, overall they also share a lot in common. For Hufendiek then, there has to be consistency across the subtle variations.

My reason for interpreting Hufendiek’s view in this way is the fact that she cuts the emotion landscape in a really sharp way. For instance, we see her above say that there is a certain distinctive way that shame feels, and a certain distinctive way that embarrassment feels. Since this is how Hufendiek portrays her position, she appears to be committed to there being a unity between the different instantiations of shame, and some unity between the different instantiations of embarrassment. However, given her previous explanation of different feelings of anger at different times, it is clear that she leaves open the possibility that tokens of an emotion type can differ in their phenomenology.

Moreover, in her discussion of the fine-grainedness of emotional experience Hufendiek (2015) also emphasizes the importance of their urgency:

“What is striking about emotional representations is not their fine-grainedness but their urgency. In this respect emotions resemble sensations such as pain or hunger that are intense, attention grabbing, and directly motivating…emotions…can be understood as embodied representations to situations that are urgent or matter to us. Emotional feelings owe their intense phenomenal character to the perturbations in visceral organs and adjustments of skeletal muscles constituting them. The heart beating faster, adrenaline rising, and muscles tensing constitute the feeling of fear and prepare the organism for
action” (p. 86, my emphasis added).

Her discussion here thus explains her previous claim that the emotions’ intrinsically motivating character, in part, structures their phenomenology.

Overall, in terms of the way the different emotions feel, I take Hufendiek to be saying the following. Just as there is a distinctive way that rotten eggs smell, and a distinctive way that sulfur smells, and a distinctive way that the corpse flower smells, there is a certain way that extreme anger (i.e., rage) feels, a certain way that grief feels, and a certain way that pride feels. As the reader remembers from our discussion of the Feeling Theory in chapter III, this is the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions. Again, what that means is that surprise has one phenomenological type, and regret has another phenomenological type and so on for every emotion word that we have. Hence, as in the comparison with the distinctive smells of rotten eggs, sulfur, and the corpse flower to the distinctive ways that anger, grief, and pride feels, cinnamon and nutmeg have distinctive smells, while embarrassment and shame have distinctive phenomenologies. Now, even though the Cinnamon-Nutmeg interpretation is plausible when discussing, say, smells of various kinds, we will soon see reasons to limiting its application to emotions. However, before we look at the latter, I want to ask the following question. Is there intra- or interpersonal consistency in terms of the phenomenology of the different emotions?

To explain what I meant by this question consider again the above discussion regarding the smell of rotten eggs. The claim it makes is ambiguous between a weak and a strong version. The weaker version (i.e., the view arguing for intrapersonal consistency) says, rotten eggs smell a certain characteristic way for Elizabeth (consistently across some substantial period of time), but it is an open question whether it smells a certain characteristic way for Richard. The stronger
version of the claim (i.e., the account arguing for interpersonal consistency) says that rotten eggs smell the same way for everybody. Now, the same holds true in the case of how emotions feel. The weaker claim (i.e., the view arguing for intrapersonal consistency) says that anger feels one characteristic way for Elizabeth (consistently across some substantial period of time), whereas it is an open question whether it feels the same for Richard. The strong claim (i.e., the account arguing for interpersonal consistency) would be that anger feels the same way for everybody. Hence, just as there is a potential ambiguity in claims about the way things smell; there is a potential ambiguity in the claims about how certain emotions feel. As I move forward in the dissertation, I am going to read Hufendiek as agreeing with the weaker version of the claim regarding the phenomenology of emotions.

Even if Hufendiek aligns herself with the weaker interpretation, one can still challenge her view. It is doubtful that whatever way, if there is one, that pride feels is different from whatever way, if there is one, that hope feels. Now, it is not only the case that an emotion like pride does not seem to have a distinctive feel, emotions’ phenomenology can also vary depending on the topics or objects they concern. Suppose I am disappointed socially, because someone that I wanted to hangout with rejected me. That phenomenology might be very different from the one I have when I’m disappointed financially, because I did not get the raise I wanted. Thus, it would appear that our emotions are bound-up with what we are focused on.

Moreover, on Hufendiek’s Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions it appears that we should be able to tell emotions apart on the way they feel. After all, you can tell cinnamon and nutmeg apart on the way they smell. However, consider and compare pride to hope. Perhaps we can think of hope as some kind of gladness about something beneficial in the future. Pride is different; it is a puffing up of sorts after you, or someone you care about, has
done something that reflects positively on you. So the two emotions have different cognitive dimensions, but do they have different phenomenological dimensions? We can reasonably doubt whether or not they must also feel differently.

One can agree that embarrassment and shame are different, just as one can agree that hope and pride are different (as discussed previously, they have different cognitive dimensions), but it does not follow that their parts (or aspects) differ as well. Instead, they might for example be relatively similar in their phenomenology. Further, even if pride has a different bodily manifestation from, say, hope, it could be the case but it does not follow, that they also have characteristic ways they feel. If that is the claim Hufendiek wants to make, and which it seems like it is, then she needs to do more work to defend it.

As mentioned above, I take Hufendiek to be holding a view according to which the different bodily changes, internal and external (such as facial expressions, bodily postures, endocrine levels, respiratory patterns, etc.), make up the distinctive phenomenology of the various emotions. However, if this is so, then we should ask her the following question; in the case of, for example, fine-grained bodily changes, does the individual always experience those (i.e., do they always register in phenomenology)? From her writing it is not wholly clear where she falls on this question, but statements like the following two makes it seem as though that is, in fact, what she is saying.

“The large number of bodily reactions involved in emotions is what explains the fine-grainedness of emotional feelings (at least to a large degree). Fleshing out a theory of emotional experience means describing the calmness and relaxation associated with sadness as an effect of decreased circulation...of the head hanging down on the contracted chest, and of the lips, cheeks, and jaw all sinking downward to make the whole body feel heavy and immobile rather than just calm and relaxed” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 85, my emphasis added).

“A typical case of a fine-grained difference between two emotions is the difference between embarrassment and shame. It is again a difference that can be described as a
difference in intensity. One can blush in a more or less intense way and the stress reactions guided by the HPA axis might also be more or less intense. But there might also be differences in behavior: embarrassment is typically accompanied by a coy smile, while shame is accompanied by a shrinking posture. The difference in intensity, plus the difference in behavior, can account for a difference in how embarrassment and shame present their objects and in how they feel” (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 85-6, my emphasis added).

As mentioned earlier there is a question whether or not any two tokens of distinct emotion types must be phenomenologically different. What is more, as shown in our previous discussion regarding pride and hope, I think that is implausible. Now, in connection to what Hufendiek says here, it appears likely that bodily differences, even of a fine-grained sort, can be constitutive of a particular emotional tokening of an emotion type; after all that is inline with an embodied account of affect. However, it does not follow that those fine-grained bodily changes are registered phenomenologically.

If we are correct in interpreting Hufendiek as having a view of emotions that says that each emotion type has a distinctive way that it feels (i.e., the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions), then my belief that an individual can experience an emotion by having a more general phenomenological experience (positive or negative) will stand in stark contrast to her account. For instance, let us look back at the case with Isabel from chapter I. In this example, when Isabel’s classmate Christina loudly pulls out a bag of almonds from her backpack while they are watching a documentary, she contemptuously rolls her eyes as she moves her chair away from her.

In this scenario we have physiological and behavioral changes, but none of it needs to be phenomenological in the sense described above (i.e., the experiencing of a particular “what it is like quality” of the emotion in question; a distinctive way that the contempt feels, and that is shared by all other cases of contempt). It might be that phenomenologically all that is happening
is that Isabel: perceptually registers Christina as she pulls out the plastic bag, somatically marks an item of her experience negatively (i.e., Christina), and senses the pressure of her hands against the chair seat as she moves her chair away. There does not have to be anything else present here such as a specific and distinctive feeling of contempt (again think the Cinnamon-Nutmeg view of the phenomenology of emotions). Rather, what Isabel is experiencing phenomenologically is a negative marking of her experience, and this is something that is much more general in (phenomenological) character than what Hufendiek is arguing for. Taken together then, since Hufendiek’s position appears to not be able to account for cases like Isabel’s, I find it worthy of questioning.88

As the reader can see, I am doubtful that there is such a thing as a distinctive experience of fear; there are distinctive experiences but they are not necessarily correlated with emotions, at least emotions as common sense posits them. Likewise there is no distinctive experience of shame as opposed to embarrassment; shame is not to embarrassment as cinnamon is to nutmeg. Rather, both shame and embarrassment are unpleasant, or negative experiences. And further, perhaps both of them make one want to, say, disappear or shrink. There might still be something that differentiates them, but that differentiation could be much more in terms of how they are embodied (the way you express the emotions in your behavior). While Hufendiek’s holds the Cinnamon-Nutmeg theory of emotional phenomenology, I suggest we think of the latter more in terms of the fundamental flavors that the human tongue can experience (sweet, salty, sour, bitter, and omani). That is, our emotional phenomenology is only as coarse-grained as such a differentiation.

88 Moreover, one thing to notice about this example is that Isabel’s behavior almost appears habituated, i.e., it is not novel. Most likely, and this due to past frustrating and annoying experiences with Christina in their Residential hall, the behavior exhibited above is manifested in Isabel often when Christina comes into close proximity to her.
Next, I want to turn to moods and discuss how they fare on Hufendiek’s embodied view of emotions. As the reader remembers from the benchmarks in chapter II, any good theory of affect should be able to account for moods as well as emotions. To see how Hufendiek might be struggling to include the latter, consider the following.

On Hufendiek’s theory there are some states that seem on a first glance like they should count as emotions, even though we do not want to count them as such. Namely, hunger, thirst, dizziness, and sexual arousal. To understand how this is so, take a look at the subsequent discussion. For instance, what differentiates so to speak emotional perceptions of affordances (including several social affordances) from what one would have thought were non-emotional perceptions of affordances (ala Gibson), such as an individual seeing a chair as “sit-upon-able” when he is tired or a rock as “throw-able” when he is impulsive? After all, it seems plausible that when I register the sit-ability of the chair or the throw-ability of the rock; in the former case my legs are ready to sit-down, and in the latter case my hand is ready to grasp it. If those changes give a distinctive phenomenology, then fine, but notice that that is not particularly emotional. Thus, what gives emotions, such as pride and love, their particular emotional character?

One potential answer to this can be found in Hudendiek’s above-described emphasis on emotions being intrinsically motivating, and that this character of theirs structures their phenomenology. Remember for instance her discussion about how in shame we feel that we want to vanish, in anger we feel like exploding, and that when in love we feel the urge to be near the beloved. Now, perhaps on her account what differentiates an individual’s emotions from the registering of the chair as sit-upon-able and the rock as throw-able is that in these cases the registering of the chair as sit-upon-able and the rock as throw-able are not intrinsically motivating. But, if that is the case, then what about an individual’s bodily urges such as when he
or she is hungry or thirsty? In those instances the sandwich sitting on the plate or the glass of water sitting on the counter do not just look eat-able and drink-able, but they are also intrinsically motivating. However, neither hunger nor thirst is an emotion. The same seems to be the case also in instances of sexual arousal, and feelings of dizziness.

Another point that I want to make here is that Hufendiek’s previously considered discussion of emotions as skillful abilities seems equally applicable to the above examples of non-emotional perceptions of affordances. For instance, she says that each emotion involves a particular bodily reaction pattern that evolved to prepare the organism for various actions. And further, that these are skillful because they required a certain amount of training that did not necessarily involve reflective thought and intention (Hufendiek, n.d., “Embodied Action-Oriented Emotions,” n.d). However, it appears that this could also be the case in regard to an individual’s holding a fork in her hand, drinking from a glass of water, kissing someone, or sitting on a chair. It is plausible that in all three cases, the individual learned the behavior from, firstly, merely being in a certain environment observing it being carried out, and secondly, because his or her body was developing in a particular way. Hence, Hufendiek’s thinking about emotions as skillful in some special way seems to get very close to a much broader category of perfectly reasonable, rational types of responses to things in the world that track affordances, but that does not involve anything unique about emotions.

However, Hufendiek has a response available to our above claim that surely we do not want to count states such as hunger, thirst, sexual arousal, etc., as emotions. She might reply that,

89“Skills are dispositions of agents. They enable living organisms to respond to certain situations in a spontaneous yet entrained way. Skills are abilities that presuppose a certain amount of training. Yet the kind of training in question is not necessarily guided by a trainer, and does not necessarily involve reflective thought and intention. It is a skillful ability to be able to hold one’s own head up and it takes a lot of training to learn how to hold one’s head up at a certain point in development, yet this acquiring this skill does not seem to require explicit guidance or reflective thought” (Ibid).
no, they do not count as emotions because they do not have core relational themes (i.e., it is a necessary condition for having an emotion). I say this because we know from the beginning of this chapter that Hufendiek thinks emotions always have representational content; they represent a core relational theme in a particular way. As a result of this, there is a question whether or not her theory applies to moods. Moods appear to be object and content permitting, but not object and content mandating. I can be anxious about the upcoming job interview, but I can also just be anxious and there is no answer to the question what I am anxious about. Rather, what happened was that I had three shots of espresso with my breakfast that day. In contrast, if someone is angry and you ask him what he is angry about, if he was to say that he does not know, then, that would not make any sense. Thus, by building in this notion of aboutness to her theory, Hufendiek is separating off emotions from moods.

Now, if Hufendiek responds that, yes she is committed to the view that moods do not have core relational themes (at least not always; you can be anxious about something, but you do not have to be), then, we can ask; would not a more satisfying view in this area (of embodiment) be one that discusses moods as well as emotions? After all, many mood tokens are body involving. For a view that can say that anger and fear tokens can be embodied, it should be a straightforward case to explain how mood tokens can be. It is harder to explain how the former can be embodied than the latter. As we have already seen in chapter II moods are relevant to a good theory of affect, and further it is clear that they are embodied. Consequently, if Hufendiek has nothing to say about moods, then that is a limitation on her view.

As promised previously, next I am going to consider how Hufendiek explains the Assessability dimensions of emotions (i.e., semantic, rational, and social norms) discussed above. We saw in section (2) that a cognitivist like Lazarus, who thinks that emotions can be
described as judgments, can explain all three dimensions. However, we also know that Hufendiek (2015) disagrees with his account, and as a result, the reader might wonder; how does she go about accounting for them? Below I will begin by considering how Hufendiek accounts for the fact that emotions are subject to semantic norms, and then I will continue on with my discussion by looking at how she explains also emotions’ rational and social norm dimensions.

For Hufendiek, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, her proposed account can explain how emotions are subject to semantic norms, i.e., whether or not the formal aspect of the representation (such as “danger-to-be-avoided” in fear) is correct, by saying that if the relational property (e.g., “being-dangerous” in the case of a person’s fear of snakes), which the emotion (i.e., the embodied, action oriented representation of the snake as “a danger-to-be-avoided”) has been set up to respond to, is really present in the organism’s environment, then, the emotion is adequate. On the flip side, if it is not present, then, the emotion is inadequate (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 174).90

In regards to rational norms, according to which the representational character of the emotions are “the result of reasoning processes that stand in certain rational relations to the situation, other thoughts, and other emotions”, Hufendiek (2015) explains that emotions’ formal aspects are logically and not causally restricted (p. 27, 174).

“But obviously, emotions are logically or rationally restricted: the formal object of an emotion restricts its intentional object by specifying the conditions under which having this emotion about this object is appropriate or reasonable, but not the conditions under which it is causally necessary” (p. 27).

To make her point clear Hufendiek (2015) explains that it is, for example, due to a causal law that human beings can only perceive things that are 0.1 millimeters and larger, but she continues,

90 “It suggests that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate because they are set up to respond to relational properties. If a relational property is really present, the emotion is adequate. If the relational property is not present, the emotion is inadequate”(Ibid).
no such law is behind the fact that a person can only envy “goods of others and not one’s own goods or another’s evils” (Ibid). For instance, for her, Evelyn cannot envy her own garden, because it already belongs to her (Ibid).\textsuperscript{91} However, she can envy her neighbor’s garden.

Moreover, Hufendiek (2015) describes how emotions seem to be connected to each other in ways that make sense” (Ibid). Here she is drawing from Bennett Helm whom she describes as emphasizing the connections between “backward- and forward-looking emotions” (Ibid). Hufendiek (2015) quotes Helm as saying, “it seems “rationally unwarranted, other things being equal, about feeling fear that one’s prize Ming vase is about to be destroyed, but feeling neither relief when it miraculously escapes unscathed not sadness or anger when one’s fear is borne out” (Ibid). And thus, she says that because emotions are connected in some particular way it is reasonable (i.e., it makes sense) that in a certain context we should “become sad if we had been afraid before, whereas in other situations it would make sense to be relieved instead” (Ibid).

As an example of emotions’ reasonable connections to each other, consider the following situation. Tracy realizes that she cannot unlock her IPhone, i.e., it keeps telling her that she is entering the password incorrectly. Since she is already running late for work and needs her phone to check when the next train is leaving, she can feel herself getting increasingly worried (after all, this would be the second time that week that she is late for the morning staff meeting). Now, if she suddenly was to realize what the correct password is, perhaps she before had by mistake been putting in her HBO-go account info, then, it seems likely that she would feel relieved. After all, now she will be able to make the train and get to the office on time. However, if she was not

\textsuperscript{91} It seems to me that a person could envy him or herself. For instance, could I not envy a previous state of myself? Perhaps I envy myself at some previous point in time when life was easier compared to what it is now. Moreover, couldn’t I also envy someone that unbeknownst to me is me? As an example, imagine that you put on a really nice watch and then forget that you have it on. Later that day you see a hand in the mirror (as you walk by say a mirror wall in the mall), and you don’t notice that in fact, it is your hand. Now, imagine further that you think to yourself; “what a nice watch, I wish I had one of those.” I don’t see what that should not count as an instance of envy.
able to remember the password, missed the train, and later found out that her best friend Heaven had intentionally changed her IPhone password to joke around with her, then, we can imagine her getting angry.  

Furthermore, Hufendiek (2015) explains that emotions are connected to other mental states as well. For instance, “a state of fear can vanish because I judge myself not to be in danger anymore” (p. 174). Or, my anger with my husband for taking my IPhone headphones with him to work yesterday morning will subside when I later in the day realize that they were in my backpack all along. Lastly, Hufendiek also discusses the fact that at least some emotions are subject to social norms. As we know from the previous discussion about children’s ability to experience guilt, for Hufendiek some emotions do not represent biological values or bodily well-being, but rather are concerned with (i.e., represent) social rules and norms. Thus, while fear represents “basic needs or biological norms” (e.g., in fear I represent the snake as “a-danger-to-be-avoided”) guilt represent a social rule violation (i.e., the individual represents the situation as “a rule-violation-to-make-amends-for”) (Hufendiek, 2015, p. 32).

Before I end my section on Hufendiek’s embodied view of emotions, I want to also consider how her account accommodates the different benchmarks. Benchmark i: emotions do not have a cognitive component in the traditional sense, benchmarks ii and iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be both the result of careful reflection, and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions are

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92 Hufendiek (2015) uses the following example to explain that emotions are connected reasonably to each other: “If I am afraid that I have lost my wallet, I should be relieved when finding it in my bag or angry and frustrated if I found out that it was stolen” (p. 174).
embodied, but moods are not, and benchmark ix: emotions are not open to conceptual analysis, they are natural kinds.

<table>
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<th>Emotions can have a cognitive component</th>
<th>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</th>
<th>Emotions can have behavioral signatures</th>
<th>Non-human animals &amp; pre-linguistic children can have emotions</th>
<th>Emotions can be irrational</th>
<th>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli</th>
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<th>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</th>
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Chapter V

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1) INTRODUCTION

As the reader saw in the previous chapter, there are issues with Hufendiek’s account. Thus, our next question will be whether it is possible to adhere to a view somewhat like hers, without running into the Cinnamon-Nutmeg Problem. Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions as being constructed offers hope along these lines. Although this view does not have the resources to accommodate the embodiment fact, we can draw something from it in order to modify what we learned from Hufendiek in characterizing a proper space of emotion theories. Specifically Feldman Barrett’s account of affect may provide nearly what we need to account for the phenomenology of emotions.

2) FELDMAN BARRETT’S POSITION THAT EMOTIONS ARE CONSTRUCTED

To understand Feldman Barrett’s constructed theory, we first have to consider the idea of interoception and the role it plays on her view of emotions.

Interoception is your “brain’s representation of all sensations from your internal organs and tissues, the hormones in your blood, and your immune system” (p. 56). It is the internal monitoring of the body’s status. Further, similarly to how the mechanics of hearing and vision are always operating, “even when you aren’t actively listening or looking at anything in particular,” interoception is continuous. At times the individual is aware of it, other times she is
not (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 72). She also does not feel (or experience) all of the movements inside of her (p. 66-7). Rather, she experiences interoception in a general way as “simple feelings of pleasure, displeasure, arousal, or calmness” (i.e., affect) (Ibid). This is due to the nervous system not being built for us to experience bodily changes “with precision” (p. 66-7). If we did, our attention would be overwhelmed (Ibid).

The idea of affect Feldman Barrett is discussing, she credits to psychologist James A. Russell who, “showed that you can describe your affect in the moment as a single point on a two dimensional space called a circumplex” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 73). The individual’s affect is a combination of valance and arousal portrayed as one point in the circle (Ibid). On this approach, everything that is objectively real about anything emotional can be captured by its position in this two-dimensional space. As an example, the affect of what would eventually be fear for Feldman Barrett, is located somewhere in the top left corner of the circumplex.

![Figure 1: An Affective Circumplex](image)

93 “Let’s be clear on one thing: interoception is not a mechanism dedicated to manufacturing affect. Interoception is a fundamental feature of the human nervous system, and why you experience these sensations as affect is one of the great mysteries of science. Interoception did not evolve for you to have feelings but to regulate your body budget. It helps your brain track temperature, how much glucose you are using, whether you have any tissue damage, whether your heart is pounding, whether your muscles are stretching, and other bodily conditions, all at the same time. Your affective feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and calmness and agitation, are simple summaries of your budgetary state.” (Feldman, 2017, p. 73).
With a grasp of the basis for interoception and affect, we can now move on to discussing how emotions are constructed on Feldman Barrett’s view.

In her book Feldman Barrett illustrates her idea of emotions as being constructed (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). You are standing by the gate at the airport waiting for a friend whom you have not seen for years. In this situation your brain puts into motion thousands of predictions based on your emotion concepts. These are concepts such as “happiness” and “fear”; both emotions you could experience in this situation. You might feel happiness upon seeing your friend and realizing she is just the way you remembered her, or you might feel fear upon seeing your friend and realizing you no longer have anything in common. Further, the predictions your brain is running based on your concepts include various past instances of these emotions. For instance, happiness will include things such as, smiling, high-fiving, jumping up-and-down, and being motionless (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p.92). In these situations you might also have had wide or narrow eyes, an excitedly pounding heart, or maybe your experience was a calmer, more soothing one. In addition, you have perceived others expressing happiness in different ways. These are all possibilities your brain considers based on your “happiness” concept; however, it runs similar predictions for your fear concept as well.

Your brain next “weighs its predictions based on probabilities…[and] [u]ltimately, the most probable predictions become your perception” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). Added pieces of context, such as, the fact that when your friend walks through the gate, she smiles and runs toward you, helps your brain “hone the probabilities” until it settles on the best fitting concept (p. 108). In this case, happiness. When the most probable predictions are calculated and simulated (e.g., an excitedly pounding heart, a large smile, your jumping up-and-down, and the accompanying sensations), they are confirmed or denied by the incoming sensory input from
“the heart, lungs, kidneys, skin, muscles, blood vessels, and other organs and tissues as they perform their usual duties” (p. 69). The consequence of this is interoceptive sensation; for happiness a general aroused feeling of pleasantness. It is also explained that once your predictions are confirmed your “sensations [are] categorized” and you construct an experience of happiness explaining your sensations “in terms of a goal” (p. 109). You also make “a mental inference to perceive” your friend “as the cause of your feelings,” and the jumping up-and-down and large smile “as their consequence” (Ibid).94

When Feldman Barrett (2017) talks about emotion concepts, she is referring to goal-based concepts. Although “happiness” comes with many different experiences and perceptions, “these sets of physical changes are equivalent for some goal” (p. 92-3). Your goal could be to feel accepted, to feel pleasure, or to have fulfilling friendships. When you are at the airport, your concept of “happiness” is focused, or “centered,” on such a goal; “binding together diverse instances from your past” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 93). Hence, the conceptualization you give of the phenomenology is not arbitrary; rather it is driven by your goal. If your goal is to feel accepted, you will have a predisposition to call the sensations a case of happiness, rather than one of disgust.

Taken together, it emerges that emotion concepts are what shape the affect of interoception. For Feldman Barrett (2017) thus emotions are constructed, and all that is objectively real about them are sensations of pleasantness, unpleasantness, arousal, calmness.

94 The conceptualization and categorization here happens quickly: “…[C]oncepts aren’t fixed definitions in your brain, and they’re not prototypes of the most typical or frequent instances. Instead, your brain has many instances—of cars, of dot patterns, of sadness, or anything else—and it imposes similarities between them, in the moment, according to your goal in a given situation” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 89-90, my emphasis added).

“Some individuals are more fit than others to pass their genetic material to the next generation. In a similar manner, some instances of concepts are more effective in a particular context to achieve a particular goal. Their competition in your brain is like Darwin’s theory of natural selection but carried out in milliseconds; the most suitable instances outlive all rivals to fit your goal in the moment. That is categorization” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 94, my emphasis added).
In contrast to Hufendiek, Feldman Barrett is not thinking about bodily behaviors as skillful per se. Rather, she emphasizes the brain’s work in conceptualizing and categorizing affect, saying this is what requires training over time. She does not mention that to experience particular emotions, one has to have gained certain bodily capabilities. Instead, she stresses the importance of learning different emotion concepts. She describes this learning process as follows. In infancy “the seeds of emotion are planted” when you begin to repeatedly hear emotion words in different situations. An emotion concept then holds “diverse instances together,” and the word invites you to search for the features that the instances have in common” (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 110). Once the concept has been established in your conceptual system, you begin to construct instances of the emotion (Ibid). On this picture, it is not until you have gained the concept that you can experience your sensations as a particular emotion.

One question the reader might have is: With her strong emphasis on individuals constructing their emotions through conceptualization and categorization, how will she explain that emotions at times are things that happen to us, that befall us, things over which we only have indirect control? For example, your fear when you are in bed and hear someone breaking into your apartment, or, your happiness after recently having applied for a large grant and receiving an email with the subject line “Congratulations!” Here surely you would be overwhelmed by fear and happiness; the emotion comes upon you without any active participation on your part. However as we have seen, Feldman Barrett would say that you actually conceptualized and categorized your sensations as such. Your sensations were explained and given meaning by your brain as an instance of fear, or as an instance of happiness.

However, if Feldman Barrett were to respond to the reader’s question that even in the fear
and happiness examples; conceptualization is taking place but just very quickly, we can say; it might be consistent with the data, but it is by no means mandated by the data.

3) Feldman Barrett on Emotions in Nonhuman Animals and Pre-linguistic Children

Feldman Barrett’s view of emotions commits her to denying emotions to nonhuman animals and prelinguistic children. Due to these individuals not being able to categorize with the kinds of emotion concepts that you and I use, all they have is affect. For instance, when a dog growls at a person he meets when out on a walk, he is not angry. Rather, he is merely experiencing negative, high arousal affect. Or, when a 2-year old smacks her friend in the face when he takes her favorite toy, she is not angry. Instead, she is experiencing negative, high arousal affect.

To say that in order for an organism to have anger, they must have a certain kind of mental concept seems contentious. After all, it is certainly not the case that in order to breathe an individual has to have a concept of “breathing.” Similarly, it is not the case that in order to metabolize I have to have a concept of “metabolizing,” or that in order to feel anxious from all the coffee that I just consumed I must have a concept of “anxiety.” If it is not the case that things like breathing, metabolizing, and anxiousness require concepts like the ones discussed by Feldman Barrett, then why is it a requirement for emotions? In the next section I will offer an alternative to her account that captures this intuition.

4) Weaving a Path Between Hufendiek and Feldman Barrett

What would be an alternative to Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization requirement? As mentioned in chapter I, for the embodied emotion tokens we are interested in, the conceptualization required is of a minimal sort. This more primitive form of conceptualization enables an organism to see something as; “shining out with to-be-strokedness” or “standing out
as to-be-pushed-away from/to-be spat upon/to-be wretched at/to-be touched,” etc. It engages my physical reactions in a particular, distinctive manner; it demands that I do something. It is a kind of marking of one’s environment in an affective way. Thus, it is a minimal differentiation of the world that is not as demanding as what Feldman Barrett suggests. On her understanding of conceptualization, although it can happen quickly, it still requires training prior to its actualization. On my suggestion, the latter is not necessary.

To describe the minimal conceptualization in more detail, consider the following. Philosophers of perception talk about aspect perception; e.g., one might see an image as a duck or one might see it as a rabbit. In seeing the image as a duck we are activating one aspect of the image as opposed to another. Seeing the shape as a rabbit versus seeing it as a duck demands conceptualization, but it is of a much weaker kind than what is implied by the constructed view. Likewise, in the embodied emotion instances the conceptualization might be as primitive as perceiving an object or situation as: “shining out with to-be-strokedness” or “standing out as to-be-pushed-away from/to be spat upon/to be wretched at,” etc. Both the conceptualization here and in the duck/rabbit example stand in sharp contrast to the perception involved when seeing an object as, say, “a nuclear reactor.” Seeing something as a nuclear reactor involves a more sophisticated concept, and as such it is the kind of conceptualization requiring training.

Instead of appealing to concept acquisition through training, which sounds like it is a collaborative, public, social process, the way we acquire minimal concepts is through learning. An organism can learn that a kind of plant she brushed up against bothered her skin so now when she looks at it, it appears or stands out to her in a certain way. In this case there would not yet be a concept of a particular type of plant, but rather she has simply learned that it is menacing. On this suggestion she has a minimal concept of the type of plant because it now looks menacing to
her. Further, she learned this on her own. No one trained her to know this in the way Feldman Barrett says we acquire goal-based concepts. Thus, what we are talking about is a more primitive form of concept acquisition since, the emoter does not have to know what “that” is; rather, all she knows is that it is one of “those.” She does not have a name for it, she does not have a biological description, but they hurt so she knows to stay away from it.

Similarly in the case of Isabel from chapter I, whom as a result of a classmate loudly pulling out a bag of almonds from her backpack, scornfully roll her eyes. Isabel might not have a sophisticated concept about Christina and her too carefree nature, but she can perceive her as standing out as “to-be-pushed-away from” since she has learned from experience that she should. Another plausible example of when minimal concepts might be at work is in the case of a young girl who has experienced her mother’s new boyfriend leering at her and/or trying to grab her. In a case like this, rather than appealing to Feldman Barrett’s sophisticated concepts; the young girl still sees the boyfriend as shimmering with “to-to-be-avoidedness.” Perhaps one way of thinking about minimal concepts thus is to say that they are concepts that are adequate to fulfillment of the immediate needs of the organism. For example, “threatening” so stay away, “edible” thus get close so you can eat it, or “providing safety” so approach it.

Lastly, and in contrast to what Feldman Barrett believes, because language and abstraction are not necessary for an organism to have minimal concepts; both nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic children are capable of emoting.

5) BACK TO SOMATIC MARKERS

Next, we want to consider how Damasio’s somatic markers connect with the above picture of minimal conceptualization. To do this let us again turn to Isabel contemptuously rolling her eyes as she moves her chair away from Christina. Isabel is sensitive to her
surroundings; to the pressure of her hands against the seat, to the way her eyes move in their sockets, and to where her classmates are relative to her. However, the majority of her conscious attention is still on what is going on in the documentary. The contumaciousness is in the way she rolls her eyes, and not in any thoughts she is having. All that is required is Isabel having the perceptual experience (tactile, auditory, and visual) needed for her to be aware of her environment. Further, no complex conceptualization and categorization is necessary. Instead, what is involved is conceptualization of the minimal sort mentioned before.

The reader might wonder: does Christina have to be negatively somatically marked? Strictly speaking she need not be, but typically she is. It seems a natural description of what Isabel is experiencing. Drawing from the notion of somatic markers then, certain chemicals are released in Isabel’s body as she looks at Christina; thus, influencing how she perceives her. To Isabel, Christina shimmers with “to-be-pushed-away from.” As the reader recalls, for Damasio when items of experience are somatically marked, they are “highlighted” in accordance with their emotional significance to the person. Isabel who is experiencing the emotion, colors or charges her environment in a negative way (Christina in this case). As this happens Isabel has the impulse (or reaction) to roll her eyes and move away.

A lot of weight is being put on the word “experience” as used above. Isabel is experiencing an emotion toward Christina, but she does not have to conceptualize and categorize it as such. Notice, we are not saying emotions are manifested in purely behavioral terms. Rather, there is still an experiential component, but it is an experiential component making items of experience somatically marked in a general way. Hence, for the embodied emotion tokens of interest here, the relevant items of experience are somatically marked as opposed to “labeled” as
being an emotion of type E. On this picture, Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization is not necessitated; rather a minimal kind of conceptualization is sufficient.

6) Why it is a mistake to argue that an individual has to be able to conceptualize her experience in the way Feldman Barrett suggests

Let us consider why I think it is a mistake to argue that an individual has to be able to conceptualize her experience like Feldman Barrett suggests. To make this point, I want to return to our discussion of the constructed view as applied to nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic children. If you start out with a controversial definition of emotions, of course you can get the result that these organisms do not have them. But, this is controversial since it assumes that in order to have an emotion, you must be able to conceptualize your experience in a certain complex way. However, this line of reasoning needs an argument, and Feldman Barrett appears to just start with it.

Another equally legitimate starting point is that emotions are better understood as affect programs in the sense Ekman suggested in chapter III; they just happen to you. For him as we know, there is no reason why we would need sophisticated concepts to have emotions per se. Feldman Barrett might respond to this emphasizing how she proved in How Emotions Are Made that views like Ekman’s could not be correct since, there is social variability in emotion expressions between cultures. However, it seems there are two possible responses someone could put forth to her. One could claim she overestimated the cultural variability, or one could say; even if there is variability, there is still an affect program. This is because for Ekman, as previously discussed, there are display rules.

One response Feldman Barrett could give here is pointing out that if we are allowed to appeal to display rules, then the position is not falsifiable. However, we can show that it is. To get to such an example, we first have to consider the following. Let’s imagine that we have a
situation where, first; we can rule out individual variation in emotion expression, and second; we have two individuals that are genetically just alike. For instance, picture we have two identical twins who are raised in the same culture, and as a result are exposed to the same display rules. Faced with such a case, Ekman’s prediction has to be that their emotional expressions are the same. This is so since, everything else has been held constant; both their genetics and environment. But, saying that the twins would have to express their emotions in the same way, does not seem correct.

As a result, if Barrett wants to undermine the Ekman position it is not enough to say that there is great variability in emotion expression across cultures. Rather, she would have to show an example in which people express their emotions differently in situations where we do not see any genetic or cultural variations that would make for a likely difference in experience. One such example would be the above twins actually expressing their anger differently (e.g., perhaps one of them tends to clutch his fists in anger, whereas the other clenches his teeth). Taken together, even though the latter might not be an easy example to find, it is possible, and that shows how Ekman’s view indeed is falsifiable.

If it is the case that not all emotion tokens require Feldman Barrett’s conceptualization, then there is room for a better theory of emotions that can account for nonhuman animals and pre-linguistic children. On this theory as long as infants and nonhuman animals can move through a particular affect program, which has as a dimension a particular somatic marker and a construal, they can emote. Consequently, such an explanation only asks for the minimal account of conceptualization; it is enough that the organism can mark their environment in an affective way.
Another important question to consider is how one can square the possibility of emotions as, at times, being embodied with Ekman’s account of emotions as affect programs. One interpretation of the Ekman view, and which I consider to be a limiting one, is that emotions happen in the central nervous system with bodily behaviors manifestations of them. On this reading then, the bodily behaviors are distinguishable from the emotions themselves. Now, someone, e.g., Hufendiek whom wants to hold an embodied view of emotions would of course disagree with this interpretation. For an embodied emotion theorist like her, it is crucial that the bodily behaviors are included into the emotion; after all they are what constitutes them.

The above is one reading of the account of affect programs. However, another way to approach this view is by emphasizing the affect program part of the affect program view. On such an interpretation it is natural to say that the central nervous system is one locus in which the emotion in question occurs, but it is not the only one. That is, emotions happen in the central nervous system, but they also happen in the bodily changes. On this understanding; if one were to “shave off” one part of the emotion, say by applying a display rule, one would merely have a partial emotion. For instance, imagine that you are at a conference and someone says something funny at an inopportune time. In this situation, and according to the second interpretation of Ekman; were you to apply a display rule to your emotion so the bodily behavior was suppressed, this would not be a full emotion of happiness.95 Thus on this interpretation, where somatic markers are one dimension of the affect programs, emotions can be embodied.

One last feature of Feldman Barrett’s constructed view that I want to highlight is that according to it, an individual cannot be mistaken in thinking they are in one emotion state when in fact they are in another. But this just sounds implausible; surely a person can do this. After all, people are well-known to mistake the emotion they are undergoing. Hence, if her theory implies

95 Moreover, this emotion would have become a full one had the behavior not been removed.
a negation of this, then most would say that there is a problem with it. This unfortunate consequence of the view is not a problem for us since it is possible to still acknowledge her affect idea, without having to accept her overall emotion theory. To be clear, when we say that we agree with her on the affect idea, what we mean is the following. Namely, that from a phenomenological point of view when someone emotes, all that might be happening is that they occupy a certain point on the affect circumplex. Further, this is how we avoid the Cinnamon-Nutmeg Problem. Now, we are not agreeing with Feldman Barrett that this might be all that is happening in terms of objective reality, but that on a phenomenological level it might be.

Moreover, I want to consider as well how the Constructed theory of emotions accounts for the benchmarks from chapter II. Benchmark i: emotions have a cognitive component, benchmarks ii & iii: emotions have both a physiology and a phenomenology, benchmark iv: emotions can have behavioral signatures, benchmark v: non-human animals and pre-linguistic children do not have emotions, benchmark vi: emotions can be irrational, benchmark vii: emotions can be the result of careful reflection and they can be automatic responses to stimuli, benchmark viii: emotions and moods are not embodied, and lastly, benchmark ix: emotions are possibly open to conceptual analysis since for Barrett emotions are not natural kinds, they are social constructions.

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<th>Emotions can have a cognitive component</th>
<th>Emotions can have a physiological dimension</th>
<th>Emotions can have a phenomenology</th>
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<th>Non-human animals &amp; pre-linguistic children can have emotions</th>
<th>Emotions can be irrational</th>
<th>Emotions can be the result of careful reflection vs. automatic response to stimuli</th>
<th>Emotions and Moods can be embodied</th>
<th>Emotions are open to conceptual analysis</th>
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At this point in the dissertation, let us take stock of where we are. From what we have seen; for every emotion type there is at least one token of that type that is embodied, they often occur in the context of a somatic marker, and when we have an embodied emotion token there is also going to be a construal right in the embodiment. Thus, a construal can take place in the privacy of an individual’s thoughts, in his cringing, and in the way he perceives something. Now, since we have learned our lesson from the embodiment fact, the core affect, the somatic markers, and the construals; in the next section I will be briefly consider the still acceptable logical emotion space. As will become apparent to the reader, I will not be presenting a specific emotion theory, but rather an emotion stage to consider.

7) **The Present Emotion Landscape and Potential Future Research**

One question to consider at this point is if we can have two opposed theories of emotions that are both compatible with the embodiment constraint as have been laid down in the dissertation. As a matter of fact we have found reason to think this is how things are; for example in the dispute between the Hybrid theories and the non-hybrid, Uniform theories. A Hybrid view might say that some emotions truly are constructed, whereas other emotions are things that just happen to us. On such an interpretation: if you think that you are not angry, you could still be wrong. This kind of hybrid account would be consistent with everything we have said so far. Moreover, Paul Griffiths (1997) made this point, arguing that emotions are not natural kinds.

On the second view, you can hold, as does Hufendiek that emotions make up a uniformed
category. There is no construction according to this interpretation. However, even if this would be a Hufendiek styled-view, it is her view approved upon by getting her out of the Cinnamon-Nutmeg problem. Taken together, more than one emotion theory survives after the embodiment fact filter, but the resolve of that debate is a topic for future research. Beyond the dispute between Hybrid and Uniform theories, there is also a further question about what embodiment is.

My conjecture is that clarification of the nature of embodiment will depend at least in part on clarification of the notion of behavior. I say this because of the following example. Imagine someone with what is called Locked-In Syndrome (LIS), “characterized by complete or near-complete loss of voluntary motor function with intact sensation and cognition” (n.d., “Mind Reading Computer System”). Now, research on this topic makes plausible that these authors could just as easily have referred to intact affect as well.

LIS is depicted as “being buried alive” and individuals suffering from it describe feeling “completely isolated from friends and family due to their inability to communicate” (Ibid). Researchers have been working on giving these people the ability to move objects, such as a computer cursor, using only their thoughts. Sensors that have been attached to the LIS person’s head can sense synaptic agitations of various kinds, and over time they learn to control the device to the point where by directing their thoughts (in different ways), they can move the cursor over different areas matched with certain vowel-sounds. The brain activity is thus translated into audio signals that can then be used to drive a voice synthesizer.

The weaker claim that all emotion types are sometimes embodied can completely bypass someone with LIS, but at the same time one would want to know if it has to, or, if there might be something useful to say here. As mentioned above, my conjecture is that one way of doing that is trying to understand if someone with LIS, who is directing their thoughts, at least when things
are going well is behaving.

The above example of a person working hard to learn how to direct their thoughts so they can move the cursor, seems like it should qualify as that person actually behaving. After all, they are trying, and sometimes they fail, and over time they get better at it. We can imagine that the first time they attempted to direct their thoughts in a particular way it did not work, but they did not give up and as time progressed, they improved and eventually were able to use the cursor like they wanted to. They are doing; they are performing actions. Further, directing your thoughts in this way seems different from an example in which someone is paralyzed and we, say, just flash a sentence in front of them and they understand it. In the latter case it happens to the individual, and they cannot help but understand the sentence. Thus, rather than being a behavior, it seems to be a case of processing information. However, in the example with the LIS person above, there is agency, and because of that there is behavior.

Further insight into the nature of embodiment will likely be facilitated or aided by thinking about the extent to which someone with LIS is behaving or not. One question to ask is what notion of behavior we can make sense of that would allow us to understand this kind of phenomena as behaving? Furthermore, if we can understand it as behavior, then it would seem that someone with LIS can also emote. That is, they can embody their emotions by doing such things as imagining, and thinking expressive thoughts etc. For instance, consider what the analogue of someone clenching their fist in anger would be for someone with LIS. It might be that person thinking negative thoughts about someone else, and this in a way they have control over. The latter would thus appear to be a discursive fist clenching.

Another example in this context of an embodied emotion, would be the analogue to Destiny, from chapter I, lovingly stroking her son’s hair. In this case, we can imagine that
tragically Destiny was in a terrible car accident that left her paralyzed. Now, as she is laying in her hospital bed she could be thinking of, forming mental images of her son’s hair and imagining herself stroking it. This appears like it potentially could be an embodied way of emoting, as long as we can make sense of those events being Destiny’s doings. Moreover, building on the example with Isabel rolling her eyes, we can imagine that later on in her teenage years she attempted to commit suicide by jumping off a bridge, but did not succeed and was left paralyzed. In this example, Isabel as she lies in her hospital bed might be thinking in an eye-rolling way about that stupid thing that her boyfriend said earlier when he was visiting. She visualizes herself rolling her eyes at him. In both of these cases Destiny’s and Isabel’s doings are not physical doings, but they are still doings. The point being that even though they cannot perform physical actions, they can still embody their emotions.

We previously clarified that all emotions are sometimes embodied; every emotion type has at least one instance in the universe that is embodied. Further, the latter is consistent with the fact that a person can go their entire life without a single instance of embodied affect. Given this weaker notion, there is a further, stronger, claim that might also be defensible. Namely, that for every individual, all emotions are sometimes embodied. What would be the argument for that? How would one go about establishing it? These are both questions worthy of consideration in future research. If it turns out that the Hybrid theory is correct after all, then perhaps we should dial back the above claim and say something like this: All non-constructed emotions are sometimes embodied. This is so since, even though for the basic non-constructed instances every person is such that their basic emotions are sometimes embodied, it is likely not plausible in the case of the constructed emotions.
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