

5-7-2015

Experiences of Slow Violence in Poor Kenyan Communities: Micro Disasters, Formalized Aid Responses, and Community Support through Social Networks

Jennifer L. Willett

University of Connecticut - Storrs, jennifer.willett@uconn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations>

Recommended Citation

Willett, Jennifer L., "Experiences of Slow Violence in Poor Kenyan Communities: Micro Disasters, Formalized Aid Responses, and Community Support through Social Networks" (2015). *Doctoral Dissertations*. 776.
<https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/776>

Experiences of Slow Violence in Poor Kenyan Communities: Micro Disasters, Formalized Aid Responses, and Community Support through Social Networks

Jennifer Willett, Ph.D.

University of Connecticut, 2015

Despite increasing focus on the physical environment within social work, the profession at-large is failing to integrate concerns about environmental degradation into research, education, and practice. Using a slow violence frame, this study applied a qualitative phenomenological design to collect data through interviews and field notes about environmental degradation and responses in 19 poor communities in Kenya. Rather than describe mega disasters as the source of their environmental problems, participants detailed “micro disasters.” Micro disasters were small and localized, exacerbated by injustices, and entrenched inequalities. Formal aid from non-governmental organizations, foreign aid programs, and the Kenyan government was either not available or was too problematic to meaningfully support participants during micro disasters. Nonetheless, participants were able to survive due to their social networks. However, successful support from social networks was dependent on the resources available. Because of the grinding poverty of participants, most had few resources to share with others. These findings expand the application of slow violence, add to operational definitions of disasters, and challenge the assumption that social networks have the resources to support community members as long as their social ties are adequate. This study also argues for the social work profession to develop programs that assist communities that are at-risk for environmental degradation and micro disasters, to participate in advocacy efforts that address the causative factors of slow violence, and to expand the inclusion of environmental degradation into the profession.

Experiences of Slow Violence in Poor Kenyan Communities: Micro Disasters, Formalized Aid
Responses, and Community Support through Social Networks

Jennifer Willett

B.A., The Ohio State University, 2004

M.S.W., University at Buffalo, SUNY, 2008

A Dissertation

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the

University of Connecticut

2015

Copyright by
Jennifer Willett

2015

Approval Page

Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

Experiences of Slow Violence in Poor Kenyan Communities: Micro Disasters, Formalized Aid
Responses, and Community Support through Social Networks

Presented by Jennifer Willett, B.A., M.S.W.

Major Advisor

Scott Harding, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor

Kathryn Libal, Ph.D.

Associate Advisor

Elizabeth Holzer, Ph.D.

University of Connecticut

2015

Acknowledgments

I am sincerely appreciative of all of the amazing people in my life. *Asanteni sana (thank you all very much)!*

Thank you to my family. Kimmy and Ben, it was so sweet of you to let my cats tear up your house while I was away in Kenya. I could not have done this project without knowing my kitties were in good hands. Also, thank you so much for live-streaming Ohio State football games by holding up your iPhone to your television for hours upon end. You sent us over a little piece of home. O-H! Bryan, thank you for always listening to my ridiculous stories without judgment and for not telling Mom and Dad about any of them. Mom and Dad, you both supported me during my first trip to East Africa that initiated my drive to return to the region again and again. Fred, you always nurtured my sense of adventure, which carried me through this project. Kim Turner, thank you for all of your love and support, and for not trying to talk Scott out of any of it.

Thank you to the members of the Advisory Board. Your support was invaluable to the success of this study.

Many thanks to my professors and friends at the UConn School of Social Work. You provided life coaching, assurances, advice, hugs, and beer when I needed it. It was all so much easier with your unfailing encouragement. It was all really fun too!

Thank you to my committee members. Kathy Libal, I deeply appreciate that you helped me find ways to finish my data collection in a challenging context, rather than abandon the project. Thank you for the support. Elizabeth Holzer, I have long considered your teaching style and work as wonderful models as I develop my own way. In addition, among your many roles on

my committee, you helped me pick up the pieces when I returned home. Your understanding was healing.

Finally, thank you to two awesome Scotts. Scott Harding, local celebrity and Committee Chair, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to you for believing in me and backing my ideas. Whenever I went off track, you always gently reminded me of my dreams. In fact, I kept track and you only ever said no to one plan—sneaking across the border into Somalia. I can now understand that decision, sort of.

Scott Turner, my love, I am so lucky to have you. Thank you for not bothering me as I wrote for three days straight during my coursework. Thank you for listening to me practice my proposal presentation over and over again. Thank you so much for standing by me in Kenya despite the intestinal diseases, the dangerous matatus, our rat-infested apartment, and the gang members on motorbikes who incessantly stalked us. Most of all, thank you for supporting my dreams and adopting them as your own. On to our next adventure!

Table of Contents

Approval Page.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii
Table of Contents.....	iv
Chapter One: Introduction.....	1
Social Work and the Environment.....	2
Theoretical Frame.....	3
Kenyan Context.....	8
Organization of the Dissertation.....	31
Chapter Two: Methodology.....	32
Rationale for the Research Design.....	32
Formulating the Study.....	32
Data Collection.....	41
Data Analysis.....	48
Research Sites.....	54
Ethical Considerations.....	62
Summary.....	62
Chapter Three: Micro Disasters.....	64
The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case Part 1.....	64
Literature Review: Disasters.....	66
Findings: Micro Disasters.....	70
Summary.....	90
Chapter Four: Avenues of Assistances.....	92
The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case Part 2.....	92
Literature Review: Avenues of Assistance.....	93
Findings.....	113
Summary.....	131
Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusions.....	132
Theoretical Additions.....	132
Implications for Social Work.....	141
Conclusion.....	152
References.....	154

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Environmental problems mirror oppressive structural forces in society, as the primary victims of environmental degradation are also the main victims of injustices related to class, gender, race, ethnicity, and locale. These groups, particularly the poor in developing countries, bear a disproportionate burden of environmental degradation. There is little formal support for those affected by environmental harm from local, national, and international actors, thus perpetuating these environmental injustices. However, despite their social locations, community members affected by these problems often survive and thrive in degraded environments by supporting each other.

This study explores the impacts of the physical environment in several poor communities in Kenya, and examines how community members use their social networks to survive and recover from environmental problems. Kenya faces widespread deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, droughts, floods, waste, and pollution, as well as a 47 percent national poverty rate (Maathai, 2009; Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, n.d.; Shankardass & Hassan, 2007; World Bank, 2011). Despite the large amount of external aid received in the country, many communities are outside the bounds of any formal assistance. However, Kenya has a long history of mutual aid and strong social networks (Bisung et al, 2014; Maathai, 2009). Using a phenomenological approach this study explores the following questions in the Kenyan context:

- How do poor community members experience environmental degradation?
- How do community members engage with formal state and international non-governmental organizations as they recover from environmental problems?
- How do poor community members engage with each other as they recover from environmental problems?

This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual frame to the research study. First, an overview of social work's involvement in environmental issues will be presented. Second, the study will be framed using the concept of slow violence. Third, the context of Kenya will be set.

Social Work and the Environment

Historically, social work was involved in mitigating environmental problems in poor communities (Huegler, Lyons, & Pawar, 2012; McKinnon, 2012; Miller, Hayward, & Shaw, 2012). Settlement workers in the United States responded to environmental problems formed in the wake of the industrial revolution and led citizen-arrests of polluters, advocated for the establishment of waste management systems, and lobbied for greater regulation of toxins (Gottlieb, 1993; McKinnon, 2012). Because of this work, the Environmental Movement credits Jane Addams for founding the cause of environmental protection (Gottlieb, 1993). Mary Richmond also stressed the importance of a healthy environment, which included the physical environment, and through this work laid the groundwork for the person-in-environment framework (Peeters, 2012).

Since the development of the profession, some social workers have remained involved in environmental causes. Most environmental social workers argue that the profession must advocate for healthy environments in all communities and against environmental injustice (Coates & McKay, 1995; Dominelli, 2012a; Hoff, 1994; McKinnon, 2008; Miller, Hayward, & Shaw, 2012; Peeters, 2012; Rogge, 1994; Silver, 1994; Soine, 1987; Tester, 1994). Many of these authors also support an expansion of the ecosystems framework that includes the physical environment as an influential context; the Life Model incorporated this argument along with content on ecofeminism and deep ecology (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). Others focus on developing practice techniques and curriculum changes to deal with issues raised by

environmental degradation in communities (Coates, 2003; Dominelli, 2011; IFSW, IASSW, & ICSW, 2012; Kauffman, 1994; Lovell & Johnson, 1994; Rogge, 1993; Shubert, 1994). Some environmental social workers argue for a proactive stance that encourages environmental, economic, and social justice through sustainable development interventions (Dominelli, 2012a; Tester, 1994). More radical environmental social workers demand a reassessment of profession-wide support for pro-capitalist growth processes, like sustainable development endeavors, in order to create alternative solutions (Coates, 2003).

Social work organizations are beginning to incorporate concerns around environmental degradation as well. The need for environmentally sensitive development is now considered a core issue within the international social work subfield (IFSW, IASSW, & ICSW, 2012). The Council on Social Work Education's 2015 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards (EPAS) also includes competencies on environmental justice (CSWE, 2014). Overall, however, the profession is failing to substantially integrate physical environmental concerns into research, teaching, and practice, thus breaching social work's commitment to social justice (Besthorn, 2012; IFSW, IASSW, & ICSW, 2012). Further, the few environmental social work studies have focused on building a conceptual literature, rather than exploring environmental problems empirically in affected communities (Miller & Hayward, 2014). This study aims to address these gaps and provide an argument for action in these areas.

Theoretical Frame

This study is broadly framed by the concept of slow violence. Slow violence refers to environmental degradation that occurs gradually and across time and space (Nixon, 2011). Conditions for sustaining life are not immediately destroyed, like in a tsunami, but rather slowly damaged over protracted periods of time (Nixon, 2011). Long-term casualties are high but

unnoticed due to the disproportionate impact of slow violence on marginalized and forgotten groups (Nixon, 2011). For example, climate change, an often-cited form of slow violence, has delayed effects like the slow rise in global temperatures that leads to the slow spread of deserts, which degrades the environment to the point of uninhabitability. Food insecurity, famines, and deaths result over time from uninhabitable land. Slow violence is silent, amorphous, un-dramatic, and hidden, but nonetheless dangerous and deadly (Cock, 2014).

The concept of slow violence was newly coined by Nixon (2011) but is built on several related concepts. Slow violence is influenced by ideas of structural violence. Rather than concentrating on violent acts where an individual can be held responsible, structural violence refers to social structures that create inequalities, like racism and sexism (Galtung, 1969). The combination of these systemic forces creates a violent but hidden system for oppressed groups (Galtung, 1969). Slow violence incorporates and further develops these arguments. Whereas Galtung (1969) broadened ideas about violence to include amorphous forces, Nixon (2011) expanded concepts of violence to include hidden environmental changes (Holterman, 2014). He argues that environmental problems that are publicized tend to be sensational, one-time events such as toxic spills, earthquakes, and hurricanes (Nixon, 2011). However, these events do not capture the majority of environmental problems as most environmental degradation occurs slowly over time in an invisible manner on a smaller scale (Nixon, 2011). These slow hidden processes are the focus of slow violence research.

Both slow violence and structural violence argue that hidden structural forces are violent and entrench unfair societal systems. Thus, slow violence focuses on groups that are more likely to be impacted by these forces and by environmental degradation because of their social position: the poor and the socially marginalized (Nixon, 2011). Slow violence also suggests that lack of

assistance for addressing the subtle forces of structural inequalities and environmental degradation entrenches inequalities. Nixon (2011) proposed that due to the lack of power and resources by the victims of slow violence, and the lack of outside assistance to address many of these problems, slow violence tends to be exponential and a “threat multiplier” for the poor. Thus, careful attention to communities that are likely to be disproportionately affected by environmental degradation and structural violence is important, but so is looking broadly at the impacts of these forces. The immediate environmental degradation is not the entirety of the problem; assessment of slow violence must include the associated long-term and secondary effects as well, like decreased habitability, and increased poverty and death.

There are two primary differences between structural violence and slow violence. First, slow violence emphasizes the unjust impacts of environmental degradation, rather than exploring all of the structural forces that create inequalities (Nixon, 2011). Second, slow violence heightens the importance of the temporal aspects of violence (Nixon, 2011). Nixon argues that the systemic forces discussed through structural violence are static. Although the harm from structural violence can accumulate over time, the forces responsible for structural violence remain largely fixed. In contrast, the primary force within slow violence, environmental degradation, does change over time and is becoming increasingly worse: desertification is spreading, climate change is unyielding, and floods are more common (Nixon, 2011). The complexity of slow violence lies in this constantly changing phenomenon of environmental degradation along with other interacting structural violence forces.

Slow violence is also reflected in the work of Rachel Carson (1962), a pioneering environmentalist and conservationist. Carson described death by invisible environmental degradation, namely through the accumulating toxicity of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane

(DDT). Through this work, the understanding of environmental degradation transformed from noticeable environmental changes to figureless threats that accumulated over time (Nixon, 2011). These threats are no less deadly. Carson focused specifically on pesticide-related environmental degradation; slow violence includes pesticide toxicity as well as other slow accumulating environmental threats like climate change. However, Carson's work focused on the effects of pesticides in birds and thus did not include analysis of structural forces that make some groups more vulnerable to environmental degradation. Slow violence applies Carson's work to human communities and combines the environmental concern with structural violence concerns.

Slow violence is also connected to the environmental justice movement, in that both emphasize the connection between environmental degradation and power imbalances (Martinez-Alier, 2014; Nixon, 2011). Thus, the primary victims of environmental injustice and slow violence are also the main victims of injustices of class, gender, race, and locale, with the poor in developing countries the most affected group (Nixon, 2011). Slow violence adds to the environmental injustice literature by framing these inequalities as a form of *violence*, rather than disparities (Nixon, 2011). In addition, scholarship on environmental injustice largely focuses on the decisions to house noticeable environmental burdens in disadvantaged communities and the immediate noticeable effects of such decisions. For example, environmental justice may address the decision-making processes of building a power plant in a poor community and the immediate effects for the community like increased asthma rates. Slow violence research seeks to document the subtle environmental degradation, rather than a noticeable environmental hazard, and hidden long-term effects of such phenomenon.

Slow violence is also influenced by arguments that link environmental degradation to reductions in security for communities (Nixon, 2011). This argument is multidimensional. First,

as resources deplete through environmental degradation, deaths rise due to environmental inhabitability, which scholars in this area argue is a form of violence (Maathai, 2009). Second, many global conflicts are fueled by competition for resources, which cause widespread deaths (Maathai, 2009). Third, many countries dealing with environmental degradation, like Kenya, are investing their limited resources in military actions against what are seen as dangerous foes, like al-Shabaab in Somalia. Maathai (2009) argued that if the reduction in human security due to environmental degradation was seen in the same light as the reduction in human security due to external threats, more resources could be invested in mitigating environmental problems. Slow violence enforces many of these points by emphasizing the dangers of environmental degradation and the likelihood of increased deaths over time (Nixon, 2011). In addition, Nixon argues that slow violence likely compounds social conflicts, like ethnic tensions, which also lead to physical violence and increased deaths.

Slow violence also uses Bales' concept of disposable people (2004), which highlighted the hidden modern day slavery of poor and vulnerable people. These unvalued people are used, thrown away, and forgotten (Bales, 2004). Slow violence intentionally focuses on unseen violence that disproportionately happens to already oppressed people. Because of their lack of importance and the invisibility of slow violence, victims are undercounted and the effects of environmental degradation are underestimated (Nixon, 2011). Groups that benefit from uncontrolled environmental degradation can also argue against the validity of the suffering of slow violence situations, postponing accountability for the environmental degradation and development of policies to change the structural forces that oppress these communities. Identifying and telling the stories of people impacted by slow violence is paramount to make the invisible environmental violence visible and to highlight its impacts on unvalued people (Nixon,

2011).

Slow violence helps frame an investigation of environmental degradation in poor communities through an explicit focus on environmental harms that are subtle but dangerous in communities that are typically ignored. In addition, this study also examines how environmental degradation scenarios in Kenya add to the slow violence literature. Because slow violence is a relatively new concept, few studies have applied the tenants of slow violence (Holterman, 2014; Martinez-Alier, 2014); thus few contexts have been explored utilizing this analytical frame. This study adds to the slow violence literature by exploring how these principles apply to the Kenyan context, how communities respond to slow violence with few resources, and how formal aid mechanisms support recovery from slow violence.

Kenyan Context

When compared to other countries in the East Africa region, Kenya seems like a success. Kenya never devolved into civil war like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, never supported a brutal dictator like Uganda, and never experienced genocide like Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan. Kenya supported pro-Western capitalism since independence in 1963, luckily landing the country on the winning side of the Cold War (Prunier, 2008b). Upon independence, Kenya had one of the most developed economies in the region largely due to British-built roads, trains, ports, and cities (Wrong, 2009). The country is famous among travelers and hosts millions of tourists every year. Kenya exports various raw products including maize, wheat, coffee, tea, flowers, and sisal (Hornsby, 2013). Kenya has endured many crisis points: the 1982 coup attempt, ethnic conflicts, and a substantially revised constitution, and throughout it all, maintained its political and economic systems (Hornsby, 2013).

However, Kenya is ranked in the top 20 states worldwide that are risk for failure (Owino & Jairo, 2013). Ethnic tensions are high (Prunier, 2008a), which leads to violence and marginalization due to the hierarchy of the social order. Half of Kenyans live below the national poverty line (Ndege, 2009; UNDP, n.d.). Kenya is an environmentally fragile country with increasing degradation (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, n.d.). The country must allot hundreds of millions of dollars of its budget every year to repay its international debt obligations, rather than investing that money into the country (Maathai, 2009). The social work profession in Kenya is underdeveloped (Mungai, Wairire, & Rush, 2014). All of these forces impact poor Kenyan communities, many of which are out of their control. These forces are explored in-depth below.

Political Legacies of Colonialism

In 1884, European powers held the Berlin Conference, which divided Africa and assigned a colonial power to the newly formed countries (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Britain pieced together many areas in the eastern region of Africa and declared the newly united territories protectorates. In one of these areas, 40 previously independent communities were brought together under one large territorial entity, which was named Kenya (Ndege, 2009). Many independent communities, like the Maasai, Somali, Swahili, and Luo were split among a variety of newly formed states including Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. The Kenyan colonial government held Kenya's communities together in the new state through force and authoritarian policies.

The explicit argument for colonialism from colonizing powers was to bring qualitative improvements to the lives of local populations (Horsnby, 2013). However, the realities of colonialism undermined this reasoning. Colonialism supported the Industrial Revolution of the West, providing new sources of labor, resources, and markets that were exploited (Maathai,

2009; Wa Kinyatti, 2010). These new resources supported the British government during tumultuous times including World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. Even though many Kenyans fought on behalf of the British, Kenyans were not people that had rights but were resources that were used and exploited (Hornsby, 2013). British officials were racist, referring to Kenyans as rabid dogs and ulcers (Elkins, 2005). Kenya was brutally ruled by the British colonial empire for 60 years.

In the newly formed Kenya, communities did not passively accept colonial rule (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). However, it was often a battle of spears against guns that resulted in massive slaughter of the local population (Hornsby, 2013). The colonial regime also organized and bribed select African Kenyans to support the colonists and elevated some ethnic groups in an attempt to limit a unified opposition (Hornsby, 2013). When communities rebelled against the colonial leaders or demanded to share in the benefits of their work, entire communities were tortured and killed (Ndege, 2009).

In 1952, groups within Kenya began formally lobbying and/or fighting the British for freedom (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). On one side, Jomo Kenyatta and his supporters sought a constitutional understanding with British authorities, which included enshrining the liberal economic policies that the British favored but which would also give Kenya its freedom. This view was highly influenced by Kenyatta's extended time living in the United Kingdom (Hornsby, 2013). Other more radical leaders like Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya advocated for a nationalist socialist state (Hornsby, 2013). They typically aligned with Kenyatta during the fight for independence.

Another group fought for freedom. The Mau Mau organized a combative, violent, anti-colonial movement comprised primarily of poor Kikuyus in reaction to the theft of their land

(Prunier, 2008a; Wa Kinyatti, 2010). From 1952 to 1960, the Mau Mau undertook a guerilla war to drive out the British (Prunier, 2008a). In response, the colonial regime declared this period the Mau Mau Emergency. During the uprising, nearly the entire Kikuyu ethnic group, almost two million people, was detained (Elkins, 2005). Men of fighting age were tortured. Others in their communities were beaten, raped, starved, enslaved, and arbitrarily executed. Nearly all were forced into “barbed wire villages” that resembled Nazi-style concentration camps (Elkins, 2005). Between 100,000 and 300,000 Kikuyus were killed, a massive crime against humanity undertaken just a few years after Allied Forces fought in World War II against similar atrocities (Elkins, 2005). In fact, many of the British soldiers who fought the Mau Mau also fought the Nazis and reportedly called themselves the Kenyan Gestapo, proudly. In the end, the British won the battle against the Mau Mau but the emergency set into motion independence for Kenya (Hornsby, 2013).

In 1952, Jomo Kenyatta was jailed for nine years as the colonial regime mistakenly charged him with leading the Mau Mau rebellion due to his linkage with a nationalist movement and because he was a Kikuyu, an ironic move considering his friendliness to colonial authorities (Prunier, 2008a). The trial was widely considered unfair as the British regime openly bribed witnesses and paid off the judge (Hornsby, 2013). Jomo Kenyatta and six other nationalist leaders were sentenced to seven years hard labor followed by indefinite detention (Hornsby, 2013). Rather than limit Kenyatta’s influence, the mythology of Jomo Kenyatta spread across the country largely due to Odinga’s efforts and Kenyatta became jointly the leader in waiting and the leader in exile (Hornsby, 2013). Due to the lobbying of other nationalists and political leaders, Kenyatta was finally released in 1961, to a hero’s welcome. To the horror of many of his colleagues, including Odinga and Mboya, Kenyatta vocally supported continued white settler

ownership of their lands and other colonial policies (Hornsby, 2013). The British regime slowly began transitioning power to him in order to keep these policies intact.

In 1963 after an 11-year struggle and slow transfer of power, Kenya gained independence. Jomo Kenyatta became the first president of Kenya (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). However, Kenya was not united, with various areas demanding autonomy and/or secession (Hornsby, 2013). The Mau Mau were systematically punished following independence. In fact Jomo Kenyatta and his followers arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and killed many Mau Mau leaders (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Mau Mau fighters were banned from political processes and their families were punished for generations (Prunier, 2008b).

The national leadership of an independent Kenya has mirrored the colonial regime. In the 52 years since independence, Kenya has had four presidents. Each has ruled with policies that enriched the elite and oppressed the many. Each has stoked ethnic tensions to prevent unity across the country. However, they have gone about their presidencies in different ways.

Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, ran the Kenyan government for 24 years through an authoritarian state-managed capitalism (Hornsby, 2013; Prunier, 2008a). During his tenure as president, there was one political party and no elections (Hornsby, 2013). Ethnic chauvinism became the norm. Kikuyus and their related ethnicities, the Embu and Meru, were elevated (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). After Kenyatta's friend and first vice president Oginga Odinga, a Luo, challenged him for more power, the Luos were marginalized forcefully (Verini, 2013). Daniel arap Moi, a popular figure at the time and a Kalenjin, replaced Oginga Odinga as vice president, which then elevated the Kalenjin (Hornsby, 2013).

During this time, many Kenyans were arrested and imprisoned without trial (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Democratic discussions, and independent and academic thought were silenced in the

name of nationalism (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Natural resources were looted by political leaders and outside interests (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Jomo Kenyatta ordered the assassination of old friends whom he deemed political threats like Tom Mboya, another Luo (Hornsby, 2013; Prunier, 2008b). Kenyatta's style of rule entrenched the colonial style of rule for a free Kenya.

Daniel arap Moi inherited the presidency after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 (Prunier, 2008a). Moi, nicknamed *Nyayo (Footsteps)*, often said he was following the footsteps of Jomo Kenyatta, and indeed he did with increasingly authoritarian rule. As tensions increased across the country, Moi responded through continued repression of dissidents, concentrated wealth in the hands of his supporters, the Kalenjin, removed many Kikuyu ministers from the government, and pitted ethnic groups against each other (Prunier, 2008a). Greed and corruption was so prevalent among the ruling class, that it pauperized the country; for the first time, living standards dropped below the colonial period, where they remain (Wrong, 2009). Fifty-five percent of Kenyans lived on less than a dollar a day. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (that were Western-funded) provided essential services, rather than the national government. Academics came under attack. Environmentalist, politician, and professor Wangari Maathai (2007) was targeted for assassination and charged with spreading malicious rumors, sedition, and treason for actions such as protesting the closure of a park and planting trees. Historian and professor Maina wa Kinyatti (2010) was charged with possession of a seditious publication because he was writing a history of the Mau Mau; his punishment was that all of his academic work was destroyed and he was jailed and tortured in solitary confinement for six years. Kenya became a near dictatorship (Prunier, 2008).

After 24 years of rule, Moi was forced to step down in 2002 due to a growing opposition movement (Prunier, 2008a). Moi's vice president Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, ran on an anti-

corruption, anti-tribalism platform and won with 62 percent of the vote. With Kibaki's election, ethnic tensions appeared to ease, democracy seemed triumphant because the election was deemed fair and uncorrupted, and the economy improved (Prunier, 2008a). However, the hopeful atmosphere quickly turned sour. It became apparent that most of the benefits of economic growth were going to the Kikuyu elite, crime rose, and ethnic groups began fighting for remaining resources (Prunier, 2008a; Wrong, 2009). In addition, John Githongo, Kibaki's protégée and assigned Chief Anti-Corruption Officer, fled the country in fear for his life after he blew the whistle on the Kibaki regime's corruption (Wrong, 2009).

In 2007, Kibaki faced off against Raila Odinga (a Luo and Oginga Odinga's son) who blamed Kikuyus for monopolizing all benefits, and highlighted the unacceptable levels of crime, violence, and poverty, particularly given the recent economic growth. A rallying cry from Raila Odinga was, "*Unga!*" (*maize flour, i.e. "We are hungry!"*) (Prunier, 2009). Odinga enjoyed a wide lead over Kibaki, as most ethnic groups united in an anti-establishment revolt (Prunier, 2008a). The election results were suspect. As soon as the results were certified to give Kibaki the win on December 27, 2007, violence began (Prunier, 2008a).

As a result of the violence, approximately 1,500 people were killed and 300,000 were displaced over several months (Prunier, 2009). The violence ended in February 2008 when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan orchestrated a power-sharing deal— Kibaki would remain president and Raila Odinga would undertake the newly anointed role of Prime Minister. In 2010, Kenyans passed a new constitution based on human rights in an effort to curtail future violence (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010). The Kenyan government also underwent a period of devolution in order to disperse power away from the president. Both Jomo Kenyatta's son, Uhuru Kenyatta (who orchestrated violence on behalf of Kibaki loyalists), and William Ruto

(who orchestrated violence on behalf of Raila Odinga loyalists) stood accused of crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their roles in the post-election violence (Kiai, 2013). In a surprising move, the two men united to run for president (Kenyatta) and vice president (Ruto) in 2012. Raila Odinga ran as the opposition candidate on a Leftist platform. Uhuru Kenyatta and Ruto ran on a message of freedom, sovereignty for Kenya, and anti-imperialism, and won the election (Kiai, 2013). The new administration attempted to avoid and discredit the ICC by casting its efforts as imperialist. In doing so, they have been able to unite East African leaders (who are primarily authoritarian rulers themselves) against the ICC, and use al-Shabaab terrorist attacks as reasons to temporarily ignore the ICC indictments (Kiai, 2013). Charges have since been dropped due to lack of evidence; the ICC collection of evidence was hinged upon cooperation from Kenya authorities, who did not cooperate. Authorities also allegedly exposed and harassed witnesses, who then refused to testify (Karimi, 2014).

The current administration is particularly adverse to other critiques as well. As evidence of police and military looting during the Westgate Terrorist Attack (a five day event that began on September 21, 2013) came to light through the media, the ruling party put forth a bill to stifle media critique and, though the bill failed, local journalists were still jailed (Kiai, 2013). In October 2014, the ruling party introduced a bill to cap foreign funding of NGOs at 15 percent, which would have closed nearly all NGOs (Kiai, 2013). All remaining foreign aid would be required to be channeled through a government body, which would decide which organizations receive funding and for what purpose. If it had passed, this law would have decimated civil society and could have been used to stifle political dissent and organizations that criticize the ruling party (governmental accountability organizations, free media organizations, human rights organizations, and environmental organizations, among others). The political elite had been

working up to this point for some time with messaging that civil society is the “evil society” (Waiganjo, 2013). They have cast human rights supporters as “money scavengers” and asserted that NGOs support “foreign values” (Daily Post, 2013). These slogans were promoted despite the widespread human rights protections in the new constitution, indicating a lack of real change from the post-election violence in 2007/8 (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010).

As Western governments and NGOs place more demands on Kenya to further the global fight against terror, end corruption, promote human rights, encourage democracy, and obey international law, Kenya has begun to look for alternatives for support. In addition to “looking in” (uniting East African rulers against the ICC), the Uhuru regime has institutionalized “Looking East” to China and Russia. This policy, although cultivated over many years, was finalized as Western pressure to comply with the ICC became stronger (Kwayera, 2013). In addition, while Barack Obama remains a popular figure among the Kenyan public, Kenyan leaders have become more vocal about their feelings of betrayal by the United States, as they believe Obama should bestow “advantages” to the home country of his father (Murithi, 2014). The long-term consequences of this policy remain to be seen.

The national leadership has been operated in many respects like the former colonial regime: authoritarian and corrupt. However, there have been alternatives. Through Kenya’s political history is a bitter debate of who should rule the country (Hornsby, 2013). Many leaders like Tom Mboya, Wangari Maathai, Oginda Odinga, and Raila Odinga believed in the inclusion of the masses in political decisions through vehicles like political education, voting, trade unions, civil society, and student organizations. Others suggest that the educated elite know what is best for the country and should rule accordingly, even if they rule with an iron fist. They included the colonial rulers, Jomo and Uhuru Kenyatta, and Daniel arap Moi. Thus many in Kenya live in

fearful obedience of the government. While the election of 2007 that led to the post-election violence was thought to be a water-shed moment where the masses took control of their fate, the most recent election of Uhuru Kenyatta indicates resignation that political power is for the wealthy and the elite (Hornsby, 2013). This historical debate is important to keep in mind as participants in this study discuss their anger over corruption, disappointment in their government, hope for outside assistance to solve problems, and their lack of willingness to get involved in social movements that impact systematic change.

Current Context of Kenya

The current context of Kenya is fueled by the ethnic, corrupt, and divisive policies that were engendered throughout colonialism and entrenched through 60 years of national leadership (Prunier, 2008a). Additional important factors of note for this study are ethnicity, religion and culture; Kenya's relationship with Somalia; poverty in Kenya; the environmental situation in Kenya; population growth; the limitations of the Kenyan state; global forces; and social work in Kenya.

Ethnicity, religion, and culture. Colonialism and the formation of the country of Kenya forcibly unified over 40 ethnic groups. These disparate groups are linked together into three larger groups by culture and language: Bantu (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Kamba, Luhya, Gusii, Mijikenda, Taita, and Pokomo), Nilotes (Luo, Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Teso), and Cushitic (Boran, Orma, Rendille, and Somali) (Hornsby, 2013). These groups, both the smaller and the three larger groups, have never been immutable or genetic. In fact, prior to colonialism, individuals often did not define themselves as belonging to one ethnic group, particularly people that lived with regular contact with other different groups. Thus there are many different experiences, histories, values, and traditions across Kenya.

Through the processes of colonialism, the cultures of these ethnic groups were “systematically exterminated” (Maathai, 2009, p. 21). Colonial education replaced local traditional education customs (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Western style education remains the standard across the country. The colonial regime implemented a capitalist economic system throughout the newly unified country, which has been further entrenched throughout the years of independence. This restricted traditional economic activities. During colonialism, Christianity spread, often through preaching against local customs, undermining the traditional culture (Wa Kinyatti, 2010). Now 80 percent of Kenyans are Christian (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.). Because of the diversity in the country and the forced unity through colonialism, there is no one “Kenyan culture.” However, there is a “culture” of sorts that exists around continuing ethnic tensions and divisions within the country.

Ethnic tensions remain strong within Kenya. There are many examples of this. Since independence, the Kikuyu, who long claimed a martyr’s status due to their treatment during the Mau Mau rebellion and have an ethnic privilege due to many presidents’ Kikuyu ethnicities, have “reclaimed” lands that were formerly occupied by the British, even though many of these lands traditionally belonged to other ethnic groups. As the Kikuyu fanned out across the country, communities began to refer to the Kikuyu as the new colonists (Prunier, 2008a). On the coast, ethnicity and religion is linked for the Swahilis. In response to years of complaints of social, economic, religious, and political exclusion, the Mombasa Republican Council formed in 1999 to advance coastal independence (Ford, 2013). Often known simply by their rallying cry “*Pwani si Kenya*” (*Coast is not Kenya*), the group has been periodically banned as a terrorist organization since its inception by the national government (which is comprised primarily of non-Muslims and non-Swahilis). The latest ban was enacted in October 2012 (Ford, 2013). It is

feared and assumed that *Pwani si Kenya* has been assimilated into al-Shabaab, which will likely increase the religious and ethnic tensions in the region (Ford, 2013). Politicians often also run for election and govern by pitting ethnic groups against each other, often violently (Prunier, 2008a). The contested election in 2007 set off countrywide waves of post-election violence along ethnic lines. In Western Kenya, Kalenjin slaughtered Kikuyu “colonists” (Prunier, 2008a). In Nairobi slums, Kikuyu undertook revenge attacks against Luos. The violence was not spontaneous, but rather carried out by militias and gangs organized on ethnic lines (Prunier, 2009). Despite calls for unity following the post-election violence, the ethnic divisions persist that were set into place as a colonist policy. These divisions help to provide context to the community collaborations and activism, or lack thereof, that are discussed in this study.

Although there are different cultures within Kenya and cultures have been changed through colonization, religion is important to Kenyans and a unifying aspect across the diverse country. Kenya is a conservative nation and one of the 10 most religious countries in the world (WIN- Gallup International, 2012). The belief that life begins at conception is enshrined in the constitution (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Women are typically expected to adhere to certain standards of conservative dress, behavior, and work; women who break these norms are harassed and can be “manhandled” (raped) as an acceptable form of punishment. Polygamy has been a common practice within Kenya (Zaimov, 2014). Homosexuality has recently been deemed “un-African” across the continent, despite the fact that anti-gay laws were introduced by colonial administrations; in Kenya, homosexuality is illegal and LGBT people face shunning, arrest, physical and sexual violence, and murder (Howden, 2014). Maathai (2009), a devout Christian herself, often argued that because of the high levels of religiosity, Kenyans are obedient through their deference to their religious leaders. This is important to keep in mind

when exploring reactions to environmental problems; for example, participants would often explain that they would pray when in distress, rather than demanding assistance or uniting with others in the same situation to collectively address these issues.

Somalia. There are also tensions between Kenya and Somalia. Around five percent of the Kenyan population is ethnic Somali, due to Somali land that was incorporated into Kenya through colonization as well as the migration from Somalia into Kenya since the outbreak of the ongoing Somali Civil War in 1991 (Abdullahi, 2010; Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.; Gathigah, 2013). Somalis live across Kenya including on their traditional land in the North Eastern Province of Kenya, in the refugee camps in Northern Kenya, and in ethnic enclaves around the country like Eastleigh in Nairobi (Gathigah, 2013; Odour, 2008; VOA News, 2013). All undocumented Somalis (a majority of the this population) are supposed to live in the refugee camps, not in places like Eastleigh. However, in November 2013, the Kenyan government ordered the closure of all Somali refugee camps, although the UN refused to comply with this decree (VOA News, 2013). In March 2014, the Kenyan government ordered all Somalis back to these camps (BBC News, 2014b) and detained thousands of Somalis from Eastleigh in the Nairobi soccer center for weeks, conjuring comparisons to the colonial regime's treatment of the Kikuyu.

Al-Shabaab (The Youth) is a militant Islamic group based in Somalia that was formed in 2006 around Somali nationalist issues (Rice, Burkeman, & Carroll, 2006). The group has aligned itself on and off with al-Qaeda (who blew up the United States embassy in Nairobi in 1998) and Boko Haram (the Islamic militant group in Nigeria that is famous for kidnapping girls at schools) and was designated a terrorist organization by the United States in 2008.

In 2011, Kenya declared war on Somalia to fight al-Shabaab, which the Kenyan government blamed for violence in Kenya and allied countries like Uganda (Odula, 2014). Al-Shabaab vowed to carry out more violence against Kenya and other countries that were involved until all Kenyan troops were withdrawn from Somalia. And indeed, they have done so. During the research period, it was quite common to hear of public buses, dance halls, markets, and bus stations attacked by grenades or IEDs, which were blamed on al-Shabaab, whether or not they took credit for the attack. From September 21-25, 2013, al-Shabaab conducted an effective terrorist attack on the upscale Westgate Mall in Nairobi (Howden, 2013). At least 67 people were killed and 39 are still considered missing. The attack marked an important psychological victory for al-Shabaab, beyond the large number of deaths, because the siege exposed the incompetence and corruption of local officials. Following the attack, it became apparent that the actual siege likely lasted only six hours and the perpetrators likely escaped by walking out the main entrance of the mall past soldiers. In addition, video footage emerged of soldiers and police looting the mall for days, including stealing off of the dead bodies, and drinking at bars in the mall (Howden, 2013).

This context is important to keep in mind throughout this study. As the Westgate Mall attack occurred during the research period, it was a frequent topic of conversation as people processed the tragedy. There was growing fear by study participants of additional al-Shabaab attacks, which occurred frequently and often in their neighborhoods. There was also a growing anger that while these attacks occurred because of Kenyan military activity in Somalia, the government could not protect Kenyan citizens from revenge attacks. As a result, many participants had frequent contact with Somalis due to the proximity of their neighborhoods with Eastleigh, but there were deep divisions and fear between them.

Poverty. Even though Kenya has been free from colonialism for over 60 years, Kenyans have poor living standards, low development, and little power in the international economy (Wrong, 2009). These conditions have steadily worsened since independence due to the economic system started by the colonial regime and continued by the Kenyan political elite. Living standards in an independent Kenya are actually lower now than were living standards in a colonial Kenya (Wrong, 2009). Nearly half of Kenya's 40 million citizens live in poverty, a number that has consistently grown since independence (Ndege, 2009; UNDP, n.d.). At independence, Kenya's per capita income was equivalent to Malaysia's (Wrong, 2009). Now, Malaysia's is ten times higher. The average annual per capita income in Kenya is only \$706 (UNDP, n.d.). Life expectancy is just 62 years. Kenya's Human Development Index score is .54, ranking the country low in development (UNDP, n.d.). Thus poverty was a frequent topic of conversation among participants during the research.

Environmental strains. Kenya is an environmentally fragile country, much of which was degraded during colonialism. During British colonial rule, European settlers took the best lands, which were in Kikuyu and Maasai territories (Hornsby, 2013; Ndege, 2009). Agriculture shifted from subsistence, family-based production to commodity production for export. This led to widespread environmental degradation through massive deforestation and created an export-focused economic system that remains in place today (Ndege, 2009). Many of these lands are still owned by the British government, outside investors, or elite Kenyans; thus the average Kenyan does not have access to productive, healthy environments. In addition, to maintain control of the 40 different ethnic groups, the colonial regime rounded up all native Kenyans and confined them to "reserves" (Hornsby, 2013). Due to massive overpopulation, the land in the reserves deteriorated quickly. The environment has yet to recover from any of these changes

during colonialism.

In addition to the colonial-created degradation, the environment continues to be damaged in other ways. Deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion due to shifting climate patterns, logging, and slash-and-burn agriculture are increasingly impactful (Maathai, 2009; Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, n.d.). Water pollution is high due to the overuse of pesticides (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, n.d.). Urban areas like Nairobi and Mombasa have other environmental problems. Public spaces are under threat from developers (Makworo & Mireri, 2011). There are high levels of water pollution from industries (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, n.d.). Nearly half of the population does not have access to clean water (WaterAid, n.d.). Three quarters of Kenyan citizens do not have access to functioning solid waste management systems, which leads to widespread and deadly disease outbreaks (Shankardass & Hassan, 2007; WaterAid, n.d.). Air pollution in the form of high particulate matter levels from unregulated vehicle emissions is dangerous (Kinney et al, 2011). Thus, environmental degradation was something that study participants could readily discuss because they lived with it everyday.

Population growth. Kenya has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. Between 1999 and 2008, the number of Kenyans grew from 28.8 million people to 38 million people, an increase of 33 percent (NCAPD, 2010). This rapid population growth has occurred because of two reasons: Kenyans are living longer, which is a benefit of the spread of medicine, and Kenya's total fertility rate is high, which family planning programs have targeted to lower (Fengler, 2010; NCAPD, 2010). Women report that they want to plan their families but do not have the resources to be able to do so (NCAPD, 2010). Thus, the total fertility rate has only slowly dropped from 6.7 children per woman in 1989 to 4.6 children per woman in 2008, which

is much higher than ideal rates (NCAPD, 2010). The population explosion will likely not slow in the immediate future. Because of the high fertility rate, nearly half of all Kenyans are under the age of 15 (NCAPD, 2010). Thus, even if the total fertility rate in Kenya drops dramatically, the population will continue to grow rapidly as these young Kenyans have their own children (Fengler, 2010; NCAPD, 2010).

The rapid population growth in Kenya is linked with current and future social and environmental problems. As the population expanded, Kenya has urbanized into unplanned and unsupported slums (PAI, 2012). The economy in Kenya also does not include enough jobs for the present population and unemployment is expected to grow along with the population (NCAPD, 2010). Therefore, urban poverty is projected to continue to increase. In addition, the limited resources of the Kenyan government must be allocated to an increasingly amount of people. Population growth is expected to outpace health and education expenditures (NCAPD, 2010), which will likely the poor who rely on state services.

As the population has grown, scarce resources have been degraded and overused (PAI, 2012). Relatedly, the agricultural system is predicted to not be able to produce enough food as the population grows, even if the fertility rate drops dramatically (NCAPD, 2010). Kenya's rapid population growth is important to the context of exploring environmental problems and poverty because of the difficulty of fostering needed development in a country with an exploding population.

Weak state services. Kenya has several small safety net programs. These include cash transfer programs for orphans, the hungry, the elderly, urban dwellers, and the disabled (Watsa & Warutere, 2013). The national government is currently working with the World Bank to link these programs into one comprehensive system and better coordinate these services (Watsa &

Warutere, 2013). However, other than these small programs, the Kenyan government is not able to provide sufficient services. Consider the state of health, education, and trash services.

Kenyans suffer from a myriad of health problems. Infectious diseases are common and include malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis (CSIS, n.d.). Chronic diseases like cardiovascular disease, cancers, and diabetes, are increasing (CSIS, n.d.). The Kenyan government spent about \$858 million on health in the budgetary year spanning 2013-2014, which equated to 10 percent of the budget (Daily Nation, 2014). However, the budgetary allotment for health is below international standards. In 2006, Kenya's total health expenditure at \$29 per capita, well below the WHO recommended minimum of \$34 per capita (WHO, 2009). In addition, medicine and medical treatment is not free, thus many poor people go without treatment (WHO, 2009).

In 2002, President Kibaki eliminated school fees for primary schools, reduced fees for secondary schools, and set a goal of universal education by 2015 (Burnett, 2012). In the 2013-2014 budgetary year, education received the highest percentage of funding at \$2.5 billion dollars (Daily Nation, 2014). The government allotted \$120 per student per year for their education (Burnett, 2012). President Uhuru Kenyatta ran on a pledge of one laptop per child to digitize education, which was a very popular promise (Nguni, 2015). UNESCO (2012) has commended Kenya's strong commitment to education. However, the education system in Kenya is not planned appropriately. Schools are overcrowded; there are 50 students per teacher on average (Nguni, 2015). The basic requirements of schools like books and toilets are lacking for many (Burnett, 2012). The quality of education is poor (UNESCO, 2012), and there is also little accountability in the public education system. Teacher absences are high and pay is low (Nguni, 2015). The \$120 allotted for each student often does not arrive at local schools due to corruption (Burnett, 2012). Free public schools often charge high fees like exam fees and enrollment fees,

and require other costly payments for things like uniforms, all which keep poor students out of school (UNESCO, 2012). The one laptop per child promise has not materialized due to soaring prices of the laptops associated with corruption and ethnic favoritism (Mungai, 2015).

Local authorities are mandated to clean up the local trash (NEMA, 2014). Rapid population growth in the urban areas makes this a pressing need (NEMA, 2014). However, most local authorities do not have the capacity, technical know-how, or equipment to collect waste, educate the public, and manage the large dumping sites. In addition, funding is a challenge as other local needs take precedence over garbage collection and corruption diminishes available funds (NEMA, 2014). These examples are important to keep in mind when participants discuss resources available to them. While there may be various public programs that exist on paper, often the services are not available.

Global forces. In 2012, Kenya spent \$569 million servicing its external debts, an amount that is equal to about one third of the foreign development assistance it received in the same year (ONE, n.d.). This debt, loaned by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, was explicitly intended to support economic and social development (Smith, 2006). However, in Kenya, like in many other African countries, much of the loan money was embezzled or stolen by corrupt and authoritarian governmental officials in the latter days of colonialism and during independence (Maathai, 2009; Wa Kinyatti, 2010). The Kenyan government was so corrupt regarding this money that it was temporarily cut-off from receiving new loans from the World Bank, the only country ever to be blacklisted in this manner (Finer, 2003). Due to the corruption, there was little left for the development that was supposed to occur and spur the economy, which would have enabled the repayment of the loans (Maathai, 2009).

The initiation of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) followed. These programs were a one size fits all macroeconomic policy imposed by lending institutions for highly indebted poor countries as a condition of their loans (Desai & Solas, 2012; Smith, 2006). Countries that could not repay their loans were forced to adhere to “conditionalities” set by the IMF and World Bank through SAPs in order to receive new loans, many of which are used simply to repay the former loans, compounding the debt. Conditionalities focused on the reformation of domestic markets through deregulation, currency devaluation, trade liberalization, and privatization of natural resources, regardless of the unique situation of the country (Smith, 2006). In addition, countries forced to accept these conditions were required to maintain a balanced budget, which typically resulted in drastic cuts to social spending (Desai & Solas, 2012). This meant less (or no) money for social services.

The goals of these programs were to promote development and ensure debt repayment through the elimination of government interference in the domestic market in order to attract foreign investment and better integrate the country into the global market (Desai & Solas, 2012). However, rather than economic development, SAPs typically resulted in greater hardship for the poor, promoted conflict, foreign disinvestment, and led to greater repression of human rights (Abouhard & Cingranelli, 2007; Dominelli, 2012). As such, the IMF and World Bank have been criticized as agents of economic colonization for implementing an agenda that benefited their largest shareholders (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan) rather than the developing countries that are the supposed foci of their missions (Turner, 1994). Even though the IMF and World Bank loan conditions have softened in recent years, many countries have yet to recover from these programs (Smith, 2006).

The impact of SAPs in Kenya has been similarly negative. The Kenyan economy began

with the Golden Years, the first 10 years of Independence in which gross domestic product (GDP), school enrollment, and life expectancy all rose rapidly (Rono, 2002). The Golden Years were followed by the Lost Decade from 1980-1990, which was characterized by an economic downturn and increasing external debt. SAP implementation followed the Lost Decade. Like other affected countries, Kenyan SAPs led to reduced revenues for social spending and lower expenditures on basic needs and social services. Thus, revenues needed to support community recovery during droughts and services for the environmentally displaced were not available. Without state subsidies, local products failed to compete effectively with imports, which in turn resulted in lost livelihoods (Rono, 2002). This process over time compounded high rates of poverty and led to a widespread inability to purchase emergency goods by the poor. The rights to extract natural resources were also sold to private companies, which often led to further destruction of the environment and loss of local control over the economy. Even with these disastrous effects, Kenya has been touted as a beacon of successful development by the global financial institutions that supported SAPs.

Kenyan social work. Social work remains a developing profession within Kenya. There has been a national social work association since 1960, before Kenya was an independent nation (Kenya National Association of Social Workers, 2015). Kenya is also well-represented in international social work associations by the renowned Kenyan social worker and scholar Gidraph Wairire (2014). Kenyans interested in social work can study at the national university or several certificate programs around the country, the first of which was founded in 1962 (Mungai, Wairire, & Rush, 2014). However, despite the need for social workers across Kenya, there are not enough fully-fledged social work departments in the country nor are there sufficient trained social workers on the ground (Mungai, Wairire, & Rush, 2014; Wairire, 2014).

Kenyan social workers have not been successful in lobbying for professional protections, which has led to negative consequences (Wairire, 2014). Many who are employed as social workers or social work educators do not have a background in the profession (Wairire, 2014). Practice typically remains generic with little specialization options (Wairire, 2014). Social work schools tend to have their own set of ethics and values (Mungai, Wairire, & Rush, 2014). Social workers also struggle to work effectively with groups that they fear or do not like, such as Somalis or people with ethnicities different from their own (Wairire, 2014).

The lack of unity and organization of social work was reflected in study participants' opinions about social workers. Many were unsure about social work, although they had judgments about the profession, which suggests they had met social workers before. Some thought that social workers work with "troubled families." Others feared social workers would take away their children. The most common view of social workers voiced by participants is that they are the corrupt arm of the government on the ground. This view was so prevalent among study participants that the Advisory Board suggested I stop introducing myself as a social worker because I was scaring people. Throughout the study, I only met one person who identified herself as a social worker and she was a prison guard.

Rather than social work, community development programs are more common in Kenya. There are several technical schools that support this area of study and two Advisory Board members were community development students. Through this work, educating local community members to be "community practitioners" by community development experts is common. For example, a community development expert might go to a community to train community members on how to teach residents about avoiding HIV or train them on how to recognize malaria and dispense medication. It did not seem like these trained community members were

paid; the goal of the community development programs seemed to be to fill gaps in professional services in socially excluded communities with volunteers.

Overall, neither social workers nor community development experts were engaging in community activism or community organization within the communities in this study. These issues are said by the participants to be within the purview of “activists.” One such activist, Wangari Maathai, the late environmentalist, politician, and professor, founded the Green Belt Movement (Maathai, 2007). The foundation of this organization was a natural progression for Maathai following activism in support of the environment, women, and the poor. The organization centers on empowering women to protect their environments by planting trees (Maathai, 2007). The Kenyan power structure responded to her work by jailing Maathai and her colleagues several times under charges of spreading malicious rumors, sedition, and treason for actions during the Moi regime (1972-2002) (Maathai, 2007). Despite the danger, the Green Belt Movement endured and the international community recognized the importance of this work and awarded Maathai the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, the first African woman to receive this honor.

Activism in Kenya has had periods of great success, like the Green Belt Movement and also when protesting against the Moi regime. There have also been periods during which there is very little activism, like now. Kenyan communities are currently described as “politically muted,” conservative, and prizing obedience (Obonyo, 2013; Stockman, 2013). This is important to keep in mind because although Kenya’s environmental movement is internationally known, this does not mean that a majority of citizens are involved in environmental or social activism.

The Kenyan context is complex but provides an analytically productive case to examine the intersecting forces that combine to form slow violence. All of these factors—slow violence, the colonial legacy, poor national leadership, ethnic tensions, poverty, global forces, and lack of

assistance—impact many Kenyan communities. But nonetheless, Kenyans survive and even thrive.

Organization of the Dissertation

This chapter introduced the research study through a theoretical framework of slow violence and contextual grounding of recent Kenyan history. Chapter Two provides a description of research methods and research sites. Chapter Three details the first finding: Micro Disasters. Due to the emergent finding of small and localized disasters, this chapter argues for an inclusion of the coined term “micro disaster” within the social work disaster literature. To explicate this argument, I review the scholarship on disasters. Chapter Four covers what happened to study participants after they experienced micro disasters. Formal responses to micro disasters were not available or they were problematic. Instead, participants described how they typically relied on their social networks for survival. Based on my findings, I argue that the reliance on social networks is problematic because these networks typically lacked sufficient resources to help in a substantive manner. To ground this finding, I review the scholarship on international aid and on social networks. To privilege the voices of study participants and give a continuous example, one case will be split between Chapters Three and Four. While no single experience can be representative of the diversity of the impacts of slow violence, this story aims to illustrate the issues that many poor Kenyans share with regards to environmental degradation. Chapter Five, the conclusion, details the study implications for social work practice and scholarship, and additions this research makes to scholarship on slow violence.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Rationale for the Research Design

The fundamental challenge in addressing slow violence is making it visible. In fact, Nixon (2011) explicitly made a call for the stories from the invisible people affected by the invisible problems to concretize the effects of slow violence. As it is a relatively new concept, few studies have incorporated slow violence to date (Cock, 2014; Holterman, 2014; Martinez-Alier, 2014). The intention of this study is to make the stories from communities affected by the slow violence in Kenya visible through an inductive qualitative study.

Using a phenomenological approach, this study explores how communities are affected by slow violence and how these communities adapt and recover. A phenomenological approach focuses on the shared meanings that underlie the phenomena of study, the experiences and stories that people speak of, as well as the structural and contextual conditions (Padgett, 2008). I chose a phenomenological approach to explore how poor Kenyans articulate and share insights into their experiences of environmental degradation in the slum neighborhoods of Nairobi and rural communities that are connected to these neighborhoods through family members who have migrated to the city. The manifestation of slow violence in developing countries has received little research attention thus far. Phenomenology allows for this exploration as well as the linking of shared experiences into narratives. In addition, both phenomenology and the concept of slow violence aim to understand phenomena that are grounded in the context, which is ideal for exploring environmental degradation within the complex Kenyan setting.

Formulating the Study

Pre-Dissertation Research

In 2002, I studied Kiswahili language and culture in Tanzania as part of a study abroad. At the time, I was completing a bachelor's degree in International Relations with a focus in Economic and Social Development and my period in Tanzania allowed for the examination of the local impacts of global forces; I was particularly interested in the impacts of the World Bank on people's daily lives. This time abroad was a key influence in my turn to social work as I wanted to work towards changing the global forces like neoliberalism that create and entrench inequalities. Throughout my career in social work, I wanted to go back to East Africa and explore these issues; my dissertation was an opportunity to do so.

To assess the feasibility of a study on the impacts of the environment on poor communities, I conducted pre-dissertation research during the summer of 2011. I began as a volunteer researcher at Eco-Ethics Kenya (E-EK) in Mombasa, Kenya to explore the local context through E-EK's connections. I chose to go to Mombasa, Kenya, rather than Tanzania because Kenya had more established NGO networks than Tanzania, which I thought would be beneficial to conducting the study. Although Mombasa is in Kenya, not Tanzania, Mombasa is part of Swahililand, like the coastal areas of Tanzania, thus I assumed that my cultural and linguistic experience would be transferable. I aimed to assess if local community members could speak about the impacts of the environment on their lives, which are often amorphous and hidden, and if they would speak with me. I found that they were able and willing to do so. In addition, through this pre-dissertation research, I was able to form an Advisory Board of local community members to guide the study.

Advisory Board Formulation

At E-EK, we assessed why their anti-tire burning campaign did not work. I designed an evaluation plan, which began with speaking to the people who were burning the tires. E-EK

warned against this because they felt the tire burners were dangerous. I decided that they must be spoken to and the best cautious course of action would be to find someone who could introduce me to the tire burners and vouch for me. Near the tire-burning site, I met a group of young men who were making shoes out of the outer ring of tires and then selling the inner ring to the tire burners. The shoemakers invited me to accompany them to various activities like visiting a local chicken farm, touring the slum in which they lived, and eating meals with them. After I gained their trust, they introduced me to the tire burners in order to complete my evaluation.

By spending so much time with the shoemakers, I learned about their lives. During this time period, Kenya experienced the worst drought in 60 years (Slim, 2011). All of the shoemakers were rural to urban migrants who moved due to the drought, which caused a severe food shortage around the country, particularly in rural areas (Slim, 2012). They were severely impoverished, well below the Kenyan urban poverty line of \$1.46 per day (Poverties.org, 2011). As part of the Kamba group in the Swahili area of Mombasa, they were often targets of violence. They were barely surviving in this context. Due to their life experiences and their contacts within local communities, I asked them to advise this study. In 2013 when data collection started, many of the shoemakers had moved to Nairobi, which was one of the reasons the study moved to Nairobi. This will be discussed in depth below.

By collaborating with a local Advisory Board, this study encourages a local viewpoint, insures the inclusion of topics important to the affected populations, and promotes the trustworthiness of the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Padgett, 2008). In addition, by using an Advisory Board this study supports the human right of participation in the research project itself (Sepulveda Carmona, 2013). The Advisory Board members were invaluable to the success of

this study through their introductions to the local communities and their explicit support for the study, which made participants more comfortable speaking with me.

The Advisory Board was not a fixed group. Rather, people helped as they could. I kept in touch primarily with two shoemakers, Benjamin and Richard, after my pre-dissertation research in 2011. By the time of the data collection in 2013, Benjamin had accepted a job as a mechanic and could only advise the study on the weekends. Richard had since accepted work as full-time as a newspaper salesman and he could only advise the study on Sundays. Benjamin and Richard introduced me to two other rural to urban migrants who could assist the study full-time. Boscoe (an unemployed graphic artist) and Brian (a student who was on a semester break) formed the core of the Advisory Board with Benjamin, Richard, and several others helping when they could. All of the Advisory Board members were available for discussions around planning and analysis. Participation in research activities ranged from two members to 20, depending on the context.

All of the Advisory Board members were men. Their ages ranged from about 18-30. All of the Advisory Board members completed secondary education, a rarity in Kenya. Many were students at the local universities or in certificate programs; one had a college degree. All were poor. Most were making a living by hustling for daily work. Like most of the participants, all Advisory Board members were part of the Kamba ethnic group, the fifth largest ethnic group in Kenya (Hornsby, 2013). Although the Kamba often have political power in the role of a swing vote in presidential elections (Prunier, 2008a), the Kamba endure social exclusion during non-election times as other ethnic groups form the ruling party and the dissent. Social exclusion is especially true for the rural Kamba, who are very isolated due to their locale and positionality within the sociopolitical context.

I trained Boscoe and Brian on CITI ethics. I intended for them take the formal CITI course, but the course is only available for people enrolled in participating academic institutions. Therefore, I trained them myself, as I am very familiar with research ethics through teaching research methods courses. They received certificates of completion that they could take with them when applying for other jobs. I trained other Advisory Board members in ethical recruiting strategies when they asked if they could work on the project.

I asked the Advisory Board members to either discuss ethical recruiting strategies with outside contacts, which was what typically happened, or to let me talk with them before data collection. This was necessary because often Boscoe, Brian, and I met and they then introduced me to a participant to interview. That participant often had also arranged a tour of his or her community and set up other interviews for me for that day. Boscoe and Brian were very good at discussing ethics with community contacts, and many of the contacts assured me that they did not discuss the study with others by bribing or threatening people. When I read the information sheet to participants, they said they already knew that the study was voluntary.

In return for their assistance, I paid the Advisory Board members. Boscoe and Brian asked to be paid \$75 per month. The other Advisory Board members were paid what they asked for days that they worked, which was usually about \$5 per day. As we often worked long days, I paid for food breaks as well. During times that we were out in the field away from Nairobi for an extended period, like in Kitui, I paid the Advisory Board members' travel and living expenses. I generally adhered to their requests for payment, which were modest. I also wrote letters of recommendation for all of the Advisory Board members. One member reported being hired for a job due to his participation in the study.

Initial Plan for Study and Changes

While conducting pre-dissertation research and working at E-EK, it became apparent that many communities were not receiving any formal assistance from aid groups or government workers. However, they were still surviving on their own. Thus, this study is framed to look at environmental impacts and how people used their social networks for survival. This frame did not change throughout the study.

Many of my other plans changed. Members of the Advisory Board were rural to urban migrants who escaped drought. As the Kenya was experiencing the worst drought in 60 years, which caused food shortages in the rural areas (Slim, 2012), migration to the cities was a common phenomenon. Through other people that I met, they also discussed attempting to help their relatives settle in Mombasa as they were also escaping the drought. Thus, I planned to study the phenomenon of environmental displacement in Mombasa.

By 2013, much had changed. During the time between pre-dissertation research and dissertation research, the drought ended and environmental displacement was not occurring at the level it had been two years before. Participants were willing to discuss their displacement and major environmental problems that I identified, but they also wanted to discuss environmental problems that they identified, which were often different. Although most participants were environmentally displaced persons, I chose to refocus on topics they wanted to discuss to enhance the community-based framing of the study. These topics will be discussed in the findings chapters.

During the two years between pre-dissertation research and dissertation research, tensions in Mombasa increased dramatically. Many Muslim clerics were killed, but responsibility for the killings was not clear (Samson, 2014). Poor Muslim youth in the area rioted and took out their anger on people and things they could reach— like churches and poor migrants in Mombasa

(BBC News, 2014a). The Advisory Board members were often targeted and thus many moved to Nairobi. Because of this and potential safety concerns, I decided to move my study to Nairobi as well.

This decision presented unexpected challenges. As my plane landed, Nairobi was under siege by al-Shabaab in the worst terrorist attack in the country's history. As it became known that the police and military extended the "siege" to five days (security cameras showed the violence occurred in only six hours) to loot the mall (Howden, 2013), the police retreated from public view. At the same time, President Kenyatta used the terrorist attack to call for an end to both his and Vice President Ruto's war crimes indictments from the ICC. In the absence of strong leadership, gangs and other criminal leaders filled the power vacuum, which led to widespread instability, insecurity, and violence. This made data collection very challenging.

Researcher's Role: Positionality and Reflexivity

Within this study, I tried to constantly access the impact of my social position through reflexive processes in order to control my biases (Padgett, 2008). As a white middle-class American woman, I was concerned about my positionality due to the historical legacy of oppression through colonization. Thus, one of the reasons I formed an Advisory Board for this study was to lower the power differentials between myself and participants. I aimed to do research with participants, rather than on them. This impacted who I recruited for the study, what I asked the participants, and how I acted around them.

Community leaders and experts were not recruited for this study. Scholarship on Kenyan history links many current community leaders with the former colonial structure (Hornsby, 2013). The Advisory Board members also believed that their experiences were outside of the realm of experience of the community leaders, stakeholders, and experts. In addition, scholarship

suggests that the voices of “everyday” Africans are muted, when compared to people speaking about them (Maathai, 2009). Thus, I recruited participants who were “normal” community members, rather than leaders or experts, who could speak about their personal experiences. The Advisory Board members agreed with this recruitment strategy. In fact, they were very concerned that they would not have access to people with whom I would like to speak. They often told me, “We only know disenfranchised people.” I told them I wanted to talk to people that no one thinks to talk to, who are forgotten, or who are ignored. Agreeing on the recruitment was one of the first steps we did in the research process.

The Advisory Board members also approved the interview questions and made suggestions. For example, they suggested not asking participants their age because participants might not know their exact age. They also suggested not asking participants their ethnicity; because of the ethnic-related post-election violence of 2007/8, openly discussing ethnicity could be thought of as aggressive or provocative. Likewise the Advisory Board members suggested areas for study. For example, they recommended the examination of small environmental events, which ended up a major emergent finding of this study and the topic of focus in Chapter 3. These actions with an advisory board are documented processes of supporting reflexivity within cross-cultural fieldwork (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

Kenyan culture adheres to strict gender roles. I was unsure if participants would approve of a woman conducting a study, thus inhibiting their participation. However, I found that my social position was often beneficial to the study. In the communities, I was often a curiosity and people would come up to me to see what I was doing. They would then take me by the hand and lead me to several people with whom I should talk. In other cases, I would wave at groups of

people and they would invite me over because I was a white woman in their community. This was how I met the Advisory Board. Recruitment was never a problem.

In addition to being a white, middle-class, American woman, all of which I thought in advance about, I am also a social worker and an environmentalist, which I did not assess in advance. Because of the values I hold, I often felt that the research was both morally and ethically challenging. Some ethical examples included: I interviewed many people who were in extreme poverty and could use more than the \$2 incentive for food and money; I met charcoal makers who were literally destroying the environment; and several Advisory Board members threw trash on the ground constantly. It was challenging to respond appropriately as a researcher in these instances, rather than as a social worker or an environmentalist. Many of these situations will be discussed.

By virtue of living in Kenya, I experienced the Kenyan environment. Some of these accounts are woven into the findings. This is an accepted practice in fieldwork-based methodologies as the inclusion of the researcher's experience is considered an integral component of reflexivity during fieldwork (Padgett, 2008). For example, I had not intended to live in the wealthiest area of the Nairobi when I designed the study. However, due to my social location and the instability of Nairobi at the time of data collection, I was often a target for criminal activity and needed a safe living space. I reluctantly settled in Lavington, a wealthy but secure area with fences and guards. This afforded me another opportunity though. When participants discussed their experiences with the environment, I was able to compare them to the wealthy areas to see if the problem was widespread or in the poor areas only. This resulted in additional findings of unequal experiences with the environment. My experiences are told as my own, rather than integrating them into the thematic findings of the participants.

Data Collection

Data collection was through a combination of taking field notes, exploring ethnographic interactions, and conducting formal interviews with 32 participants. The flexibility of the data collection adheres to phenomenological standards (Padgett, 2008). Most interactions and formal interviews were conducted in English or Swahili, both of which I speak. In a few cases participants spoke Kikamba, which was translated by an Advisory Board member.

The focus of data collection was on the identified phenomena: the shared experiences of environmental problems and community coping strategies. I led the collection of data and the Advisory Board assisted but did not collect data on their own. Data was recorded using a Smartpen. No participants refused recording. Many ethnographic interactions were unplanned and not recorded but these interactions were written down as soon as possible. During the evenings, I either wrote up extensive field notes for that day or I recorded field notes onto the Smartpen when I was in rural areas and a computer was not available. All data was taken off the Smartpen as soon as possible and transferred onto my password-protected personal laptop, which remained at my Nairobi residence other than traveling to and from Kenya. All data was also uploaded onto a password-protected cloud-based server as a backup. Interviews and field notes were transcribed as soon as possible and all paper versions of notes were destroyed following transcription.

Fieldwork scenarios with the Advisory Board were variable. Often it was just Boscoe, Scott (to be discussed below in Accompaniment section), and me in the field. (Like many 19 year olds, Brian often found it difficult to keep to a schedule, particularly when appointments were early in the mornings.). Other days, it was a large group of young men and me in the field. In one memorable instance, I had been begging the Advisory Board to set up a day in Eastleigh,

the infamous Somali neighborhood of Nairobi, because they had friends in the area. I knew I could not go into Eastleigh alone without an experienced escort. They set up a day and brought all of their friends– 20 young men– and we all walked around Eastleigh together, which was not particularly conducive to collecting data. Other days, it was just me alone in the field.

Interviews

Formal interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide that was revised throughout the study based on Advisory Board and Dissertation Committee suggestions. Revisions supported my process of reflexivity and made the study stronger. For example, the Advisory Board suggested I stop asking participants for their income, age, and ethnic group because of cultural discomfort with these questions. My Dissertation Committee suggested I ground my participants more, because they struggled through the interviews, by asking them to describe their communities before asking them about their communities. The semi-structured questions were:

1. As you know, I am doing research about how people are affected by the environment.
Could you tell me about a time you were affected by the environment?
2. How did you recover from [stated environmental problem]?
3. Please describe your community.
4. How does the environment affect you and your community?
5. When people are affected by the environment in your community, who helps them?
6. How do people in this community support each other?
7. What do you think is the main environmental problem in this community?
8. How do you cope with this environmental problem?
9. What, ideally, would fix the problem?

10. Who, ideally, should address environmental problems?

11. Where are you from? (a proxy for ethnicity)

Many follow up questions were asked and were specific to each interview.

All participants gave verbal consent for participation after I read them an Information Sheet in Swahili or English that was available for their keeping. In the rare cases that the interviews were in Kikamba, they understood Swahili well and understood the Information Sheet in Swahili; they just preferred to communicate in their native language when giving detailed responses.

Interview sites were variable and included homes, churches, outdoor meeting spaces, the side of the road, places of work, and cafes. Interview dynamics were also variable. It was rare that I conducted a one-on-one interview with a participant. Most felt more comfortable interviewing in pairs or a small group. I usually ran them like a group interview, rather than a focus group because I wanted to hear their individual stories. They would often sit in a half moon and have each participant go through all of the questions before moving on to the next participant. I tried to follow their expectations to make them feel more comfortable with me, rather than demand that they follow a prescribed process.

Cultural norms often shaped the context of the interviews. In many cases, I interviewed one participant with multiple other community members in the room who were not interviewed. When I interviewed a young woman, her parents were in the room. When I interviewed a young man, another observer was in the room as it would have been inappropriate otherwise because I am a woman. Often the participants wanted the Advisory Board in the room to begin the interview but would frequently dismiss the Advisory Board after a few questions once they

became more comfortable. I tried to follow their expectations in order to show respect. This interview strategy was reported to the IRB.

All participants in formal interviews were paid \$2 for their time. I wanted to pay them more, but the Advisory Board insisted that I not do so. If I did, participants could be economically coerced to interview, and they cited the ethical training that I gave them that banned coercion in research recruitment. I did give two different participants more money because I was upset with their situations that involved very ill children.

The formal interviews were challenging. Participants seemed nervous and unsure. Their answers were often not stories but were very concise answers, indicating a discomfort with the formal interviews. Thus, I often found that ethnographic field notes provided an important vehicle to record insights about environmental concerns and community processes.

Field Notes

When I asked participants to show me around their community or show me the environmental problem, their stories came alive. They seemed to enjoy showing me around. Thus, in most cases, the interview was a starting point to the data collection but the community tours were when I collected rich data. These community tours lasted between a few hours to over the course of several days.

Often during these tours, community members were aware of what I was doing, other community members suggested I see something of interest or they wanted to discuss their interest in the project. For example, I was observing an abandoned water pump in a drought-ridden area when a woman approached with her four donkeys to say that because the pump was not working, she had to collect water for many hours every day. I recorded these interactions as field notes, often immediately, to ensure I captured as much detail as possible. I took pictures,

with permission, as a tool for field note write-up. These pictures often did not have people in them. When they did, I asked for permission from all people in the picture, not just the participants. However, often the participants asked me to take a picture of them. I sent these pictures to them through the Advisory Board.

Accompaniment

Accompanied fieldwork is commonplace (Lunn & Moscuza, 2014) and my partner, Scott, was often with me during data collection. I believe his presence resulted in gathering stronger data. When I was doing pre-dissertation research in Mombasa, I was often asked why my husband “allowed” me to be in Kenya, which highlighted my social position as a woman in their society. Often people did not want to talk to me alone, for fear of my husband’s reactions. Scott’s presence seemed to normalize the situation for many participants. This shift in understanding with spousal accompaniment is supported in the literature on positionality of women scholars in developing countries (Lunn & Moscuza, 2014).

While I interviewed participants, other people often showed Scott around the community or spoke with him about my work, his work, the United States, and soccer. When taking tours of the communities, participants often spoke to him, as he was the man, but I listened and followed up. I found this dynamic interesting. As Scott’s presence normalized the confusion around a woman doing this work, his presence also reinforced gender roles as male participants often spoke directly to him not me. I tried to be flexible in these situations by completing my work, but doing so in a culturally accepted manner by not taking over the conversation from Scott. Because of his engineering expertise, Scott was also able to point out and explain things that I would not have seen, like International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certified chemical drums

used as housing structures (see Jua Kali community description below), which I then asked participants about.

In addition, despite wanting to do field work in Kenya, it was very challenging. Scott's accompaniment supported the completion of the study. His presence made me physically safer. His presence also provided emotional support to finish the data collection within a violent and unstable context, which was often very demoralizing.

Sample

The sample was a combined snowball and purposive sample, guided by the Advisory Board. Inclusion criteria for participation in the formal interviews was self-defined poverty and first-hand experience with an environmental problem. In total, 32 participants were interviewed, which is a comparatively large sample size for the phenomenological approach, which normally requires six to 10 participants (Padgett, 2008). Due to the complexity of contexts involved in this study, the sample size was increased. This larger phenomenological sample size also allowed for data that is both deep and broad (Baker & Edward, 2012).

Most of the participants were recruited through the Advisory Board, as they were their friends and family members. Many of the Advisory Board members were also interviewed and included within the sample. This built trust with the Advisory Board, helped them understand the study, and helped them explain the study to potential participants. I also recruited participants through convenience as I met them throughout daily life in Nairobi. Overall, recruitment was not a challenge.

Demographics. Participants in the sample had many commonalities. The participants were poor. Initially, I asked participants their income to determine if they were under the Kenyan urban poverty line of \$1.46 per day or rural poverty line of \$.68 per day, depending on their

context (Poverties.org, 2011). Participants were so far under the poverty line, at about \$.50 per day, that the Advisory Board felt that I was embarrassing the participants by asking them their income. They assured that they would let me know if a participant was not poor. They did this with one participant. A taxi driver in Kitui was deemed middle class. However, he was included in the study because he discussed a drought that occurred when he was a poor child.

The participants were ethnically homogenous. Twenty-six of 32 participants were of the Kamba ethnicity, the same ethnicity as the Advisory Board. The other participants included one Luhya, one Kikuyu, and four unknown ethnicities. The Advisory Board did not know many people outside of their ethnicity due to continuing ethnic tensions and their social exclusion. This was expected.

Rather than interview local community leaders or experts, the participants in the study had relatively limited power. I did this purposefully to interview the people few talk to in order to find the invisible people of slow violence (Nixon, 2011). I did interview one chief. Chiefs in Kenya are informal community leaders that are not elected like the local government leaders but are usually revered in their community. He was poor but had higher social status than the other participants.

I sampled for diversity in two areas: gender and age. As the Advisory Board members were all young adult men, most of the first participants were also young adult men. I asked the Advisory Board to assist in locating more women and older people. The gender variance of my participants was 33% female and 67% male. The age categories were 56% young adult and 44% middle-aged. Again, like the income question, the Advisory Board felt that I was embarrassing participants by asking them their age because many people did not know their exact age. Instead,

we compromised and they would tell me which age category their participants fell into: young adult, middle-aged, or retired. I did not interview any retired people.

The “sample” for ethnographic interactions was much more variable. I talked to and/or observed wealthy Kenyans, chiefs, children, disabled people, NGO workers, the elderly/retired, and people from all ethnic groups. I did not interview them for a variety of reasons. Many did not fit the inclusion criteria. Many did not experience environmental problems themselves but could talk about environmental problems in their community. Many did not want to be formally interviewed but would informally talk with me. In addition, the Advisory Board did not want me interviewing some of these people for reasons they would not say. I chose to give them this control to maintain their trust.

Saturation

Three to six months of data collection was planned to reach saturation. However, due to the difficulties around safety, I made the decision to attempt to finish data collection over a three-month period. Aside from a few volunteer ventures and one weekend off, I collected, transcribed, wrote up, or analyzed my data every day. By the end of this period, I was hearing the same stories and I had a feel for the direction of my findings, both of which indicated saturation. I returned home after three months, with an option of collecting more data at a later date if necessary.

Data Analysis

Coding

The transcriptions of interviews and field notes were inductively analyzed with NVivo for Mac. The data was explored through three waves of analysis using a phenomenological approach. In this approach, the essence of the shared experience around the identified

phenomenon of slow violence was the focus of analysis (Padgett, 2008), rather than a number of other shared experiences (culture of the Kamba, young adult life in Nairobi, poverty, etc.).

In the first wave of analysis, I inductively open coded all of the data. I read through the data, determined a theme and coded it with that theme. I did this by chunking the data through breaking each narrative apart and defining concepts with codes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), rather than line coding the data because I was interested in experiences and stories, which are usually longer than one line and need context. Through this method, I defined 173 codes. I then explored how these codes related to each other in their definitions in order to prepare for the second wave of analysis. Many codes were transformed into sub-codes and others were merged. For example “loss of crops” and “loss of farm animals” were merged into “loss of assets,” which was designated a sub-code of “secondary effects.” My final codebook includes seven main codes (communities, disasters, formal assistance, informal assistance, primary environmental problems, recovery, and secondary effects) with sub-codes (130 total).

In the second wave of analysis, I used the seven main codes and sub-codes to deductively re-code all of my data. The recoding was done to both check my interpretation as well as ensure all of the data was coded in the same way.

In the third wave of analysis, I used the coded data to explore linkages across the data through a horizontal analysis. For example, I looked at disasters (a main code) and determined what caused the disaster and what happened to the participants after the disaster. I also conducted comparative analyses (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) where similarities and differences across themes and communities were explored. I wrote many memos as a process of exploring my thoughts around these connections; these memos also support an audit trail and a reflexive process. I drew several concept maps, which were peer reviewed by my committee.

Validity and Trustworthiness

Audit trail. To be open about my process of research, I documented each step taken in the data collection and analysis (Padgett, 2008). Much of this process is detailed in this chapter. Auditing allows for defending research decisions with actual documentation as well as supporting the other strategies used to enhance rigor in this study (prolonged exposure, member-checking, and triangulation) through the documentation of these procedures (Padgett, 2008).

Prolonged exposure. Trustworthiness of the data is supported through collecting data over time. This allowed for multiple contacts with participants in the formal interviews as well as the ethnographic observations (Padgett, 2008). Community members also trusted me due to the time spent within the communities, allowing them to bring up information and ideas they felt important (Padgett, 2008). This occurred many times. For example, I often went to a community to discuss a particular environmental catastrophe like a long-lasting drought. After some time, they would admit that they would rather discuss their daily trash problems, so we were able to talk about both environmental problems.

Because white Americans did not often visit many of these communities, this could have impacted the ways that the community members acted in my presence. I tried to counter this by being in the communities as often as I could, being involved in community activities, and adhering to community norms. I spoke Swahili, ate the local food in a local manner (with my hands), attended local events like a harambee (a social networking process that will be discussed in Chapter 4), and was flexible about my research processes. I would do things like sit on the ground with people to talk to them. While they laughed about sitting on the ground with a white person, it seemed to make them comfortable. I also dressed in a very conservative manner, and

participants often pointed out that they noticed I was trying to be sensitive. Such seemingly small actions of respect went far.

Member-checking. I often checked my thoughts and assumptions with the Advisory Board members and participants both in the moment and during analysis in the United States. This process of member-checking supports reflexivity, guards against research bias, and promotes the validity of the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Padgett, 2008).

Member-checking often confirmed what I was interpreting. For example, I suggested that some groups of people are offered assistance while other groups are entirely excluded and the Advisory Board members agreed. Other times, Advisory Board members disagreed with me. For example, in Jam City, the participants said “we” a lot. I thought this identified a unified community but the Advisory Board thought that was too much conjecture. In most cases of disagreement between the Advisory Board and me or a participant and me, I member-checked with other participants. In other cases, member-checking was not useful. For example, I suggested Shauri Moyo (a Kamba neighborhood) was cleaner than Majengo (a Swahili neighborhood) because of strong local leadership in Shauri Moyo. The Advisory Board disagreed because of an ethnic stereotype of Swahilis. In cases of statements like these, I did not take into account the member-checking, but rather used the conversations as evidence that ethnic tensions remain, which is a part of the local context.

Triangulation of data. The trustworthiness of the data was supported through triangulation of field notes and interviews. Observing within the communities, in addition to conducting the interviews, allowed for verification that participants do what they say they do, which enhances rigor (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Padgett, 2008). For example, in a rural area, a participant said she must collect water over a 24-hour period during drought. She leaves in the

morning, sleeps on the road, and returns the next morning with water. I wondered if she was exaggerating but I saw her leave the community with her donkeys and not return until the next day.

Ethnographic observations also allowed for the consideration of interactions of which the participants were not consciously aware and did not speak about (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Including these observations contributes to a more holistic understanding of participant experience (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). For example, during times when I was meeting with groups of community members, usually during tours, I could see how the men interacted with the women, how the older adults interacted with the young adults, and how different ethnic groups interacted with each other. This was useful in thinking about the communities in terms of cooperation or competitiveness among community members. If I could, I member-checked what I was seeing with the community member. For example, in South B I was speaking with a Luhya community member from Western Kenya. I saw him greet his Swahili neighbor in coastal Swahili, a dialect that is used in Swahili areas like Mombasa, rather than Sheng, a dialect common in Nairobi. This indicated to me respect across ethnicities in the community, a rarity. The Luhya participant had to think about my suggestion, but he later agreed.

I also planned to support the trustworthiness of the data through triangulation of secondary sources whenever possible. I assumed that in any cases of news reports or NGO reports, the participants' experiences would be validated and confirmed (Padgett, 2008). However, in the few cases where there were other sources, the reports conflicted with the participants' experiences. In these instances, I chose to privilege the participants' stories over the conflicting reports. I did this for multiple reasons. First, within a constructivist perspective, the participants' stories are their valid realities, whether these can be "proven true" or not (Padgett,

2008). Second, my observations triangulated and backed their stories, not the reports. Third, because I have known many of the Advisory Board members and their family members for several years, they took time off of work to assist me, and they kept me safe even at personal risk to themselves, I trust them. The cases of divergence during data triangulation were not ignored. Rather, these reports supported an additional finding, which is a suggested action when there are conflicting sources (Padgett, 2008).

Limitations

Lack of diversity. As is clear in the descriptions of my methods, I relied heavily on the Advisory Board for their local viewpoint and their access to community members. However, this led to lack of diversity in the study. Nearly all of the participants were Kamba. Most participants were male. All participants were young adults or middle-aged. Thus, many questions are left unanswered about the impact of the environment on other people. Future research can be more inclusive of different populations, in order to begin comparisons, such as exploring the differing impacts of slow violence for men and women.

With regard to other communities in Kenya, I made other contacts with other ethnic groups throughout my daily activities. I would often visit the other communities on my days off from the Advisory Board; the Advisory Board members flatly refused to assist in the research in these areas. I did not conduct research in these areas to the same extent as the other communities because I did not have other Advisory Boards formed for these areas. Future in-depth research can be conducted in these other communities with other Advisory Boards.

Reactivity. This study was also limited because I could not be deeply embedded in all of the communities, which would have protected against reactivity (Padgett, 2008). Due to safety concerns, I was not living in any of the identified communities. In Nairobi, I was not able to

attend community functions at night. I was also only in the communities for three months, rather than several years, thus limiting what I observed to those months. Although I believe community members and participants were comfortable with me, largely due to the support from the Advisory Board, I never reached the “fly on the wall” ideal of ethnographic research.

Research Sites

Pre-dissertation data was collected in Mombasa, Kenya. Dissertation data was collected in and around Nairobi, Kenya. Data was collected in 19 communities. (In this case, communities are organized by locale. Often participants discussed their communities using other definitions.) The communities include 10 urban slums in Nairobi, six communities that were rural but have been subsumed into Nairobi’s sprawl, two rural villages, and one rural town. The communities are generally described in this section, although several communities are described in more detail in the findings chapters. Many of the communities have very little information published about them. Therefore much of the descriptions were developed from the data for this study, supplemented by outside sources when available.

Nairobi

Nairobi is the economic and political capital of East Africa with more than 100 major international companies and organizations in the city, including United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) (APHRC, 2014). However, much of Nairobi remains poorly developed. Indeed, although the percentage of the country’s wealthy is increasingly concentrated in the city, income inequality in Nairobi is quickly rising (Oxfam GB Kenya Programme, 2009).

Nairobi has exemplified Africa’s urban population explosion (APHRC, 2014). The population has increased tenfold after independence from about 350,000 residents in 1962 to an

estimated 3.36 million residents in 2009 (APHRC, 2014; Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.). One result of this population growth is that poverty is now heavily concentrated in Nairobi, when it was previously a rural problem (APHRC, 2014). The urbanization of poverty in Kenya continues as economic conditions in Nairobi have been deteriorating much faster than the rest of the country (UN Habitat, 2006).

Because of widespread corruption (which will be discussed at length in Chapter 4), grinding urban poverty, and the culture of impunity, Nairobi is one of Africa's most dangerous cities (LeBas, 2013; Werlin, 2006). Many gangs count the police as members or leaders (Werlin, 2006). During the data collection time period, my neighbor was held hostage by a gang of off-duty police officers for four hours until an elite military unit charged the house, killing the officers. Nairobians are often arrested not for committing crimes but for the sole purpose of soliciting bribes, which poor Kenyans cannot often give, thus they are held in detention for days (Werlin, 2006). Indeed, members of the Advisory Board would frequently go missing, only to be found in a jail waiting for a friend to "bail" them out with a bribe. It is estimated that Kenyans pay \$40 annually as bribes to the police, a huge sum for poor Nairobians (World Bank, 2003).

Ten urban slums in Nairobi. Data was collected in 10 urban slums in Nairobi. It is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of residents live in poverty in one of Nairobi's 100 slums and the number increases every year (APHRC, 2014; Oxfam GB Kenya Programme, 2009; UN Habitat, 2006). Inequalities in the slums are evident. Residents must contend with many difficulties that are not as prevalent in the wealthier areas like inadequate shelter, crime, poor public transportation, higher HIV rates, higher child mortality rates, poor support networks, higher crime rates, and higher relative costs related to poor governance (bribing officials) (APHRC, 2014; Oxfam GB Kenya Programme, 2009; Shankardass & Hassan, 2007). Only 19.5 percent of

slum dwellers have electricity, much lower than the whole of Nairobi at 88.6 percent and Kenya at 23 percent (APHRC, 2014). Life expectancy at birth in these neighborhoods is just 35 years (APHRC, 2014).

Environmental degradation is evident in the Nairobi slums with problems like traffic congestion, poor waste management, and water shortages (UN Habitat, 2006). There is little strategic environmental planning and few environmental partnerships that could allow private companies to take over tasks like waste management (UN Habitat, 2006). Sanitary conditions are particularly poor as most residents use either a shared pit latrine (UN Habitat, 2006) or a “flying toilet,” where waste is bagged, tied, and thrown outside; this is compared to 82 percent of the rest of Nairobi who use flush toilets (APHRC, 2014). Both methods, pit toilets and flying toilets, pollute the water supply; the only river through the city, which many people drink out of, is considered highly polluted (UN Habitat, 2006).

Most of the slums were ethnically segregated (APHRC, 2014), either by neighborhood or by sections within larger neighborhoods. The slums were very crowded. Much of the housing was either made of metal sheets buried perpendicular to the ground, forming four walls, with another metal sheet on the top as the roof or rudimentary single room apartments built with concrete blocks. Each apartment typically houses multiple people; amongst respondents the range in each single room was one resident up to seven residents. These rooms cost about \$30 per month. The 10 urban slums are:

Eastleigh. Eastleigh, nicknamed Little Mogadishu, is a Somali ethnic enclave within the Blue Estate. The area is economically diverse because it was a safe area for Somalis to immigrate and restart their lives. Despite a generally calm and safe atmosphere, Eastleigh is infamous for its al-Shabaab militant activity, which greatly frightened residents in other Blue

Estate communities, re-enforcing ethnic divisions. There is great tension between Somalis and the Kenyan government. All undocumented Somalis are required to live in refugee camps, not in Somali enclaves like Eastleigh. However in November 2013, the Kenyan government ordered the closure of all Somali refugee camps, an order with which the UN refused to comply (VOA News, 2013). In March 2014, the Kenyan government ordered all Somalis back to these camps (BBC News, 2014b). In April 2014, the Kenyan government rounded up and arrested thousands of Somalis who were outside of refugee camps, many of whom lived in Eastleigh, held them in the local soccer stadium under inhumane conditions, extorted those who could pay, and deported others back to Somalia (Odula, 2014). The area of Eastleigh and the communities of Somalis in Kenya are on edge over what the Kenyan government will do to them next.

Githurai and Progressive. Githurai and Progressive are mixed income communities on the outskirts of Nairobi near several universities. Many students live in these areas. A highway is under construction through the neighborhoods, which residents are concerned will raise their rents and push them out. The ethnicity breakdowns of Githurai and Progressive are not known but are likely mixed.

Jua Kali. *Jua Kali* (*Hot Sun* in reference to day laborers) is a small poor neighborhood within the Blue Estate. This area is filled with “informal industry,” which is outside the bounds of formal factories. Old chemical drums that were labeled as ISO certified were seen being hammered for other uses including for homes. These barrels are highly toxic. Scott was able to point much of this out, due to his experience as an environmental and chemical engineer. The ethnic breakdown of Jua Kali is not known.

Kibera. Kibera is the most infamous slum of Africa. It is estimated to be the largest urban slum in Africa with about one million residents, although the Kenya government claims only

100,000 residents live in the community (Karjana, 2010). Kibera is so large that it is ethnically diverse, although the 12 villages within Kibera are highly segregated. The community was one of the main Nairobi sites for the post-election violence of 2007/8 with hundreds of people killed and tens of thousands displaced (LeBas, 2013).

Many NGOs and foreign aid projects are in this neighborhood, although not enough for the neighborhood's needs but enough to create animosity between other communities in need. Participants discussed their jealousy of Kibera often. Kibera is also one of the most studied slums in Africa (Becchetti, Conzo, & Romeo, 2013; Deacon, 2012; Ellis et al, 2008; Gallaher et al, 2013; Hershey, 2014; Loewenberg, 2012), although none of these studies explored slow violence. However, this attention has not been all positive. Kibera is a bizarre "must visit" community for do-gooder types including celebrities, internationally known aid workers, and government officials (Deacon, 2012), as well as a new brand of tourism. During the research period, there was a news segment that mocked a bus of tourists driving through Kibera on a "slum tour" that retreated from the area due to community members throwing rocks at them. NGOs, academics, and foreign aid officials have been also accused of creating narratives of Kibera that are problematic including dubbing the area as "a place considered among those in the world where cooperation and trust/trustworthiness are scarcest" without any evidence (Becchetti, Conzo, & Romeo, 2013, p. 284), exaggerating the population size (articles always tout the one million population size, not the population size controversy), and treating the area as a unified entity, despite the fact there are 12 villages in the area, including middle-class communities.

Korogosho. *Korogosho (crowded, shoulder-to-shoulder)* is a large, crowded, ethnically diverse, and poor neighborhood that is a famous area due to historical social activism in the area. In addition to many political actions, a local community group has been fighting for a "slum

upgrade,” which has resulted in a paved main road, the installation of streetlights and a water tank for a school. However, with the upgrade, came a rise in rents, pushing many of the poorest community members out of the area, a fact that the community leaders highlighted as a positive because they linked crime to these poor community members.

Majengo. Majengo is a small poor Swahili neighborhood within the Blue Estate next to Jua Kali and Shauri Moyo. Many Tanzania migrants also live in the community. Majengo is rumored to be one of Nairobi’s red light districts.

Mathare. Mathare is the Kenya’s oldest slum and second largest with about 500,000 residents. Due to the large area, Mathare is economically diverse. The neighborhood is ethnically diverse but the ethnic groups tend to cluster together into smaller villages. Kikuyus and Luos are the primary residents but there are also Luhya, Kamba, and Kisii areas.

The Mau Mau often hid in the neighborhood during the Emergency (Hornsby, 2013). Currently the Mungiki, Kenya’s most notorious criminal gang who often link themselves to the Mau Mau, operates primarily from the neighborhood. The Mungiki formed as a Kikuyu ethnic organization that pushed back against Westernization in rural areas but evolved into an ethnic militia that often enforces political decisions and runs an organized crime ring in Nairobi (LeBas, 2013). The Mungiki’s banning, along with all other ethnic militias, in 2002 increased the distrust between state institutions and local residents in Mathare (LeBas, 2013).

Pipeline. Pipeline is a large Kamba neighborhood near the former colonial pipeline. The community is economically diverse but rapidly developing due to its prime location at a train stop, pushing the slum dwellers out of the area. The neighborhood is often a first stop for many Kamba rural to urban migrants. Many participants stated that alcohol is a problem in the community, the only community to discuss substance use.

Shauri Moyo. Shauri Moyo is a small poor Kamba neighborhood in the Blue Estate. The area was a historical hotbed of activism in the early 1990's that kicked off protests for governmental reform (Obonyo, 2013). Current residents of Shauri Moyo are young rural to urban migrants. Many of the Advisory Board members lived in Shauri Moyo.

South B. South B is a large, poor, and ethnically mixed poor neighborhood. Different ethnicities were seen living together, rather than segregated in the community, a rarity across the research sites. The community members were also noticeably older than in other neighborhoods. A strong local leadership that partners with community members and government officials to solve problems in South B was highlighted often in discussions.

Six formerly rural areas subsumed into Nairobi's sprawl. The formerly rural areas subsumed into Nairobi's sprawl were undergoing change that was out of their control. They often struggled to adjust to their incorporation into Nairobi following generations of village life on the land but their adjustment was necessary as Nairobi will continue to spread. The six formerly rural communities are:

Athi River. Athi River is a large Kamba community that is home to several cement and steel factories. Many of the community members do not work in these factories but must live with the environmental fallouts like air pollution, dust that settles in the community, and water pollution due to industrial discharge into the waterways.

Jam City. Jam City is a Kamba community across the highway from Athi River but is much poorer. The physical community itself is very organized and small; it is just two rows of small iron-sheet structures that house people and businesses. However, the amount of people living in the community is very large, about 600 adults and 1,400 children, as reported by the village chief. Jam City was the most visibly poor community that was near an urban area.

Kiserian. Kiserian is a former Maasai area. The Maasai started selling their land around Nairobi (also a former Massai area) around 2001 so that they could move further away from Nairobi. Kiserian includes a small urban center with a rural ring.

Kitengela. Kitengela is a Kikuyu and Kamba area. The area is also former Maasai land. The area is booming with construction. The land is very dry and not suitable for farming according to participants, although many farms were seen.

Ongata Rongai. Ongata Rongai is another former Maasai area. The area has many large houses for wealthy Kenyans who live outside of Nairobi. Their house workers migrated to Ongata Rongai with them for their work.

Mlolongo. Mlolongo is a Kamba area that is now booming with development due to the Nairobi sprawl. Mlolongo is known as the site where semi-trucks gather to form a caravan up to the northern areas so to be protected from bandits through safety in numbers. Many wait for days for a critical mass; it is an interesting sight.

Two Rural Villages and One Rural Town

Two rural villages and one rural town in Machakos and Kitui Counties were research sites. These areas are rural Kamba areas and are undergoing rapid development but remain highly impoverished (60-64 percent of the population is poor, as compared to 45 percent of Kenya) (Kenya Open Data, 2014). The three rural communities are:

Mutito. Mutito is the poorest, most isolated, and scattered community of the three. Along the highway and some of the sandy paths, police from Nairobi set up roadblocks, as these roads lead to Somalia. However, local residents said these roadblocks are primarily a corruption scheme that is challenging to afford.

Wamunyu. Wamunyu is a rural village about three hours from Nairobi. Much of the

village center caters to travelers with cheap guesthouses, gas, and food for their journeys. Other than a village market that meets in the town center where people congregate weekly, many in Wamunyu live on their farms, which are nearby and accessible by walking and biking paths. Wamunyu is the hometown of many of the Advisory Board members.

Kitui Town. Kitui Town is a small rural town. The town hosts many rural migrants from local villages like Mutito. The town is very isolated but an alternative route to Mombasa will be built through the town, which will likely change the area greatly.

Ethical Considerations

I completed the University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board Form for Ethnographic and Naturalistic Research, including a request for a waiver of signed consent. I protected human subjects by utilizing numerous measures. All participants were informed of the voluntary nature of this study and their choice to discontinue participation at any point during the study. I gave all participants my contact information as well as the contact information of the Principle Investigator and the IRB for any questions related to the study. Participants called me frequently to discuss the study, both during data collection and analysis. All participants have been identified by pseudonyms in all written documentation and oral presentations and all other identifying information has been changed to protect participant confidentiality. In the rare cases that participants became upset while discussing their stories, we took a break.

Summary

Using a phenomenological approach, this study explores how communities are affected by slow violence and how these communities adapt and recover. This study was guided by an Advisory Board of Kenyans in the population who provided suggestions on interview questions, access to communities, and opinions on the interpretation of the data. Data was collected through

interviews, field notes, and ethnographic observations. Data was analyzed through a phenomenological approach, which focused on the shared experiences of slow violence. The qualitative method of data collection and analysis was ideal for this study as it allowed for exploratory research on understudied topics. This yielded insights that likely would not have been gained from quantitative approaches because the participants and Advisory Board members were encouraged to shift the study in directions that were important to them, rather than answering a structured survey.

CHAPTER 3: MICRO DISASTERS

The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case Part 1

On the night of April 8, 2013, the Nairobi River burst its banks flooding Shauri Moyo, a poor community in the Blue Estate area of Nairobi. For Corlucka, a resident of the neighborhood, the night had begun with a celebration. Corlucka had returned from upcountry for his mother's "pre-wedding ceremony" around nine at night. He brought back the traditional alcoholic brew of Machakos for his four roommates known as The Brotherhood (Richard, Boscoe, Amos, and Moses) and greetings from home. They celebrated late into the evening. In other rooms, Victor and his wife were asleep along with Roberto and his wife. Dan was asleep, alone, after a long day hustling for work as an electrician. It was raining hard but not in an unusual manner for the rainy season.

In the middle of the night, Bosco felt trembling but convinced himself it was just an intoxicated dream of an earthquake. He went back to sleep. Dan was awakened by the water in his room. "The water was so high, it was like an island. I was just in the middle of the water. And then I heard the sound, the crack." He panicked and ran to the main road without saving any of his belongings. Roberto woke and found that the water was several feet high in his room and that his bed was floating. He quickly ran outside and knocked on all his neighbors' doors. They credit him with their lives. Corlucka awoke from Roberto's alerts, and in a confused state he pulled his roommates out of the house. "The water was up to my shoulders." He then heard the cracking. "It started at the far end, at Roberto's house, and it was coming our way... We started getting out and even it didn't take a second that a wall on the side of the river, it fell over, it fell into the river." Boscoe remembers his friends screaming and pulling at him. "The house is

going! The house is going!” He was the last person of the complex out of the door. “Suddenly when I got out, it collapsed. We lost everything.”

In seconds, these five houses collapsed into the Nairobi River. Over one year later, the survivors continue to struggle with the trauma of the flood, displacement, and continuing problems. Many in the group cried and had to take breaks while discussing events, which they referred to as “the tragedy.” In other communities in the Blue Estate, several people were killed in the flood.

The people who lived directly next to the destroyed houses, enduring the same living situation and proximity to the river, continue to live there. The toilets remain damaged from the flood; there is obvious leaking sewage on the pathway to the houses where children were seen playing. In addition, there is a large crack in the foundation on the walkway, just above the river. Corlucka explained, “The river is still over there and you can see there is more and more erosion. So, let’s say, every rainfall, we wait for ghosts. More walls will fall down.”

The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood exemplifies a different kind of environmental disaster than ordinarily recognized by social work scholarship on disaster. This literature centers on “mega-disasters,” or disasters that are extremely large events. Recent examples of disasters have included the Haitian earthquake where over 200,000 people died, the Pakistani floods when the number of people affected reached 17.2 million, tsunamis, and Hurricane Katrina (Gillespie, 2008; Mathbour & Baroousa, 2012; Pyles, 2011). But rather than describing mega-disasters when discussing environmental problems, participants in this study described smaller, localized disasters, a phenomenon that I term “micro disasters.” The micro disasters described in this chapter include urban flashfloods, rural flashfloods, gradual increases of water levels, rural drought, pollution, and accumulating waste (both human waste and garbage). This chapter offers

an overview of the disaster scholarship within social work and argues for the inclusion of micro disasters within the scholarship through the examination of the different dimensions of the experience.

Literature Review: Disasters

Disasters of all causes have become more frequent over the past 20 years (Gillespie and Danso, 2010). Disasters also seem to be more intense, cause more long-term disruption, and claim more victims (Rogge, 2003; Zakour, 2010). Disasters can strike anywhere but tend to highlight the longstanding injustices in society (Dominelli, 2007). In fact, scholarship on disasters is clear: poor and socially marginalized communities suffer the most from these events (Dominelli, 2012a; Gillespie, 2008; Gillespie & Danso, 2010; Mathbor, 2007). Specific problems for these communities include that they are often not able to afford to live safely within the local environment, not able to take disaster prevention measures, and not able to afford recovery (Dominelli, 2012a). Poor communities in developing countries, like Kenya, are typically hit with multiple disasters, which does not allow adequate time for recovery (Rogge, 2003).

Poor and marginalized communities are served by fewer disaster relief organizations and those that do serve them have low service capacities (Zakour & Harrell, 2003). Indeed, disasters often mirror local political dimensions as governments funnel disaster aid into more affluent communities, leaving poor and marginalized communities even more vulnerable (Mathbor & Bourassa, 2012). The latter communities are at disproportionate risk for emotional, physical, and economic suffering post-disaster (Rogge, 2003). These communities are also protected by fewer mitigation projects (Zakour & Harrell, 2003). Thus, they often lack development that supports safe living within the local physical environment (Zakour, 2010). This, combined with their vulnerability to the disaster, means that disasters cause greater damage in poor and marginalized

communities (Dominelli, 2012a). The social position of disaster survivors is highly predictable of post-disaster outcomes, including survival (Dominelli, 2012a). Ninety six percent of deaths from natural disasters occur in developing countries among the global poor (Dominelli, 2012a). The disproportionate casualties among the poor illustrates that the roots of suffering from disasters are structural issues of poverty and marginalization, rather than the disaster itself. The event simply brings these issues to the forefront.

Defining Disasters

There are many definitions of disaster. Most social work literature uses Barton's (1969) definition of collective stress situations to define disasters (Gillespie, 2008; Soliman & Rogge, 2002; Zakour, 2010). Due to the collective stress in the community following a hazardous event, community functioning is impaired (Soliman & Rogge, 2002). Thus, disasters are not simply an environmental event; an earthquake in the desert is not a problem (Gillespie, 2010). Rather, it is the interaction of the event within the sociopolitical and economic context that creates collective stress and impairs community functioning. Therefore, disasters can be seen as an extension of everyday events as the level of development interacts with political, social, economic, and environmental forces to cause community-wide stress (Streeter, 1991).

Vulnerability theory. Because predisposition to disasters is not simply assessed by one's closeness to an environmental hazard, disaster scholarship often uses vulnerability theory as a frame to assess the ratio of risk to susceptibility (Gillespie, 2010). Due to this calculation, vulnerability is not equally distributed. Social, political, and economic forces impact communities differently and unfairly (Oliver-Smith, 2004), which influences their risk to a number of problems, including disasters. Highly vulnerable groups include the socially marginalized, the young, the old, the poor, and the disabled (Zakour, 2008). These groups tend to

have poor living standards, low development, and little protection from the elements, all of which result in dangerous living conditions (Zakour, 2010), similar to the invisible people that are affected by slow violence. Due to their social exclusion, vulnerable populations also tend to have little access to formal services that support disaster preparedness and recovery, amplifying their susceptibility and risk to disaster and limiting their ability to recover. Compounding these issues are structural trends that influence vulnerability like community politics, population growth, urbanization, and social and demographic changes that weaken social bonds (Gillespie, 2010).

Complicating vulnerability theory is that the calculation of risk to susceptibility is not a sum of causal factors (poverty, closeness to an environmental hazard), but is rather an interaction of forces (Zakour, 2010). In other words, the same perceived level of vulnerability will have different impacts during a disaster depending on other factors like community resiliency, mobilization of social capital, availability of responsive client-centered services, and presence of sufficient disaster relief services (Zakour, 2008). This in turn impacts the processes of recovery including reconstruction, repair of the natural environment, collection of material goods for survival, and emotional support that is premised on community bonds. Thus, some argue that the use of vulnerability theory, as opposed to focusing on environmental hazards, offers a greater understanding of the holistic person-in-environment frame that contributes to the occurrences and processes recovery of disasters (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004).

Alternatives to vulnerability theory. Although vulnerability theory includes issues of power and justice, these are considerations within a complex calculation of many other factors, not a priori conditions of disasters. Indeed, most disaster research has been conducted in the United States and on middle-class populations (Soliman & Silver, 2004), which is a different

context than most disasters. The generalizability of the findings of disasters in a U.S. context to cross-cultural or international settings is just beginning to be explored. Due to this, there is a concern that the disproportionate risks faced by developing countries and poor communities have been ignored (Gillespie, 2010; Streeter, 1991). This is despite the widely accepted argument that the poor and marginalized will suffer the most due to disasters (Dominelli, 2012a; Gillespie, 2008; Gillespie & Danso, 2010; Mathbor, 2007).

Beyond the generalizability concerns of this research to poor communities who experience disasters worldwide, Dominelli (2012a) has argued that scholars in this area hinder themselves by failing to assess both local and global issues. Indeed, even mainstream vulnerability theorists are concerned that there is no known social work literature that tackles social justice along with disaster mitigation and response (Gillespie, 2010). Further, recommendations for disaster mitigation and response from vulnerability theorists do not address the imbalances of power as a response to disasters.

Outside of social work, disaster scholars have long argued that there are no natural disasters; because vulnerable people suffer the most in disasters, all disasters are man-made (O'Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 1976; Walker, 1999). Alternatives to vulnerability theory within social work have been offered, although none have been applied as fully as vulnerability theory within the field. A sustainability approach to disaster recovery offers a critical frame to remedy inequalities in communities affected by disaster (Pyles, 2009; Pyles & Harding 2012). Rather than poor communities facing a downward spiral post-disaster, the sustainability approach uses the disaster as a catalyst for dismantling oppressive systems through engagement with the community, support of the cultural diversity of affected communities, and a focus on the needs of community members as defined by the community members. Empowerment of the

community via social mobilization and action related to the disaster are theorized to be transformative for the affected communities under the sustainability approach.

The sustainability approach centers oppressive forces as a key to understanding disaster impacts and as an argument for rebuilding after disasters in a just manner. However, it does not argue for preventing disasters through proactively addressing injustices. While many disasters highlight existing injustices, the oppressive forces in many communities are already known and can be proactively addressed before disasters disproportionately impact marginalized groups. Relatedly, the underlying assumption of vulnerability theory is that not much can be done to affect natural hazards (Gillespie, 2008). Critically overlooked in this assumption is that many hazards that seem natural are not natural at all; they are caused by human actions. In contrast, “slow violence” offers a unifying frame through the critical examination of both unjust, slow, and invisible environmental degradation, along with local and global systems of power (Nixon, 2011).

Research in disasters is also limited worldwide, particularly within social work. Most disaster scholarship is quantitatively oriented (see Zakour & Gillespie, 2010 for a summary) and not community-based (Mathbor & Bourassa, 2012). This over-saturation of top-down research does not capture the holistic experience of disasters. This project, using a local Advisory Board of community residents to conduct a qualitative study, begins to fill these gaps. The inclusion of qualitative studies when exploring disasters can yield holistic, contextualized, and deep understandings (Padgett, 2008), which is important due to the multiple forces affecting people in disaster situations. By using an Advisory Board, micro disasters are explored in this study through an insider perspective by people who are disproportionately susceptible to disasters.

Findings: Micro Disasters

In contrast to the social work literature on disasters that focuses on large-scale mega disasters, participants in this study discussed small disasters, which I termed “micro disasters.” Micro disasters were localized events. These disasters were exacerbated by injustice. They also entrenched inequalities as the poor become poorer.

Localized Events

Micro disasters affect small areas of a larger urban community or are localized in rural areas. In addition to the Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case, consider the Case of Drainage in Githurai to illustrate micro disasters in urban areas. Githurai is an area in eastern Nairobi with about 800,000 people. It is considered one of the “slumburbias,” which is a mixture with both slum areas and more developed areas on the outskirts of the city. A large local market is in the area, which many of the study participants worked at selling used clothes. Participants in Githurai frequently discussed the high crime in the area, which was a rare description in this study. Despite the fact that a majority of participants across the study lived in high crime areas, they often said they felt safe in their communities. Githurai is rapidly changing as Nairobi expands. A busy road is expanding through the area to increase transportation capacities. Many areas of the community have been demolished to make way for the road and upscale apartments.

The main environmental problem in Githurai, as defined by participants, is the widespread lack of drainage systems. This opinion is supported in the literature, as drainage is a newly identified need within surveys on slum dwellers in Nairobi (APHRC, 2014). During rains, even small weather events, streets are turned into muddy traps. Travel becomes difficult, making daily activities like going to school often impossible. The stagnant water spreads diseases like malaria by creating mosquito breeding grounds. The water also often mixes with sewage and spreads throughout the community. Tom explains:

The drainage is the worst! It's the worst! You will see when this place experiences heavy rains, the drainage is full. Some of the sewage is blocked and flows inside this plot! And then you have to step on that water to walk outside. Now the water is contaminated and has diseases.

People who are affected by lack of drainage must survive without access to services. Spencer explains, "Some diseases come up and in case of those diseases, there are no hospitals around. The ones that are here, they just do first aid. They will send you away in distress."

The identification of lack of drainage as the participants' primary environmental problem was surprising because many participants survived extreme environmental disasters, like severe drought in the rural areas that caused mass deaths. However, the impacts of lack of drainage caused daily difficulties, whereas mega disasters were rare. The problem of lack of drainage also highlighted the lack of infrastructure that most citizens expected and received; most wealthy areas in Nairobi had paved streets with drainage ditches, while other poor communities either had ditches or were on land that drained well naturally. Thus, participants could see disparities between Githurai and other communities on a daily basis.

Micro disasters that affect small areas of a larger urban community, like the Githurai and Shauro Moyo, cases were common but also highly variable by the particular situation. Participants in some areas discussed heavy rains that led to death and property destruction; the same rains were not identified as problematic in other areas. In areas closest to industrial sites, participants discussed pollution as a major problem; in areas without industry, the participants never mentioned pollution. In areas without garbage collection, participants pointed to garbage as a major cause of discomfort, disease, and death; in areas with garbage management systems,

the garbage was simply hauled away and participants did not discuss it as a problem. Because these micro disasters were so localized, they were not seen outside of the affected communities.

Like the micro disasters that affect small areas of a larger urban community, in the rural areas, micro disasters were localized problems. Consider the Case of Localized Droughts in Wamunyu and Mutito.

Wamunyu and Mutito are two poor rural communities inhabited primarily by the Kamba ethnic group about one day's journey from Nairobi. Wamunyu is bisected by a major highway through the village. Much of the village center caters to travelers with cheap guesthouses, gas, and food for their journeys. Other than a village market that meets in the town center where people congregate weekly, many in Wamunyu live on their farms, which are nearby and accessible by walking and biking paths.

Mutito is more isolated, poor, and scattered than Wamunyu. One must travel by public transportation to Kitui Town, which is about four hours away from Nairobi using a direct bus, longer for cheaper and indirect transportation routes. From Kitui Town, one must hire a taxi to drive about four hours into the bush on an unpaved highway and then on sandy paths that do not look suitable for cars. Along the highway and some of the sandy paths, police from Nairobi set up roadblocks, as these roads lead to Somalia, a country with which Kenya is currently at war.

Mutito developed around a large river but this river has been dry for over four years and was being used as a road. Both areas are strikingly sandy, dry, and incredibly hot. The annual average rainfall in these areas is between only 400 and 1,200 millimeters, which categorizes the areas as semi-arid (WRI et al., 2007). Boscoe, a college-educated but unemployed poor young man who moved to Nairobi from these areas, explained that historically their Kamba ancestors were traders and artisans, not farmers, but "at some point" they turned to farming despite the

poor conditions of the land. Now, the predominant livelihood strategies in the area are food crops, cash crops, and livestock. Thus, the local economy is entirely dependent on a consistent and adequate November rainy season; but with decreasing rains, livelihoods in these areas are increasingly challenged.

All of the older residents that were a part of this study spoke of increasing drought since they were children, indicating a pattern that supports climate change, an exemplar of slow violence. Many in Wamunyu explained that they used to have two rainy seasons (November/December and March/April), which equated to two farming seasons each year. This allowed for a margin of error if one farming season failed and an abundance of produce to sell if both harvests were strong. However, now the March/April rains have stopped and residents must adapt to a sole November rainy season, which is sometimes too short to ensure even one good harvest. Although residents in Mutito continue to plant crops yearly, many expect the November rains to fail and thus in most recent years they did not get anything from their attempts to farm. The environment has slowly degraded to the point that it often does not support living.

The main activity for participants during waking hours was traveling to a water source, gathering water, and traveling home. As climate change leads to longer droughts and the environment becomes more degraded, community members in these areas must travel farther to find water sources. During the data collection period, many participants in Mutito were spending four to five hours each day traveling to and from the nearest water source because all of the local boreholes had dried; they reported that there are periods when they spend the entire day, 24 hours, traveling to get water and sleep on the side road when they are tired. Droughts, which are connected to climate change, a form of slow violence, are causing the land to become increasingly uninhabitable but these droughts are highly localized to the area.

The most challenging problem in these communities during drought periods is a widespread lack of food. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) assessment on the status and effects of climate change corroborates this experience. The IPCC warns that the decreasing food supplies in areas affected by climate change are reversing the gains made against global hunger, a mega disaster among the worldwide poor in developing countries. In Wamunyu and Mutito during drought periods, all participants in these areas said there is widespread famine and that many have died in the past. There is always some way to get food but during times of scarcity and increased prices, the poor cannot afford it, creating an injustice. Ester described the area as, “There’s a lot of firewood but nothing for us to cook.”

These effects of the recent climate changes on farming are exacerbated by activities that the farmers undertake themselves. Many residents who left the areas reported that it was impossible to earn a living farming because of overpopulation and the decreasing size of farms as family sizes expanded. Due to this overpopulation and lack of other income generating opportunities, all land is deforested and used. The “good” lands, which are flat and the closest to potential water sources, are owned and farmed. The “bad” lands, which are on the side of hills and far from water, are farmed by squatters. Maathai (2007) documented this issue in Kenya and described deforestation as both a cause of poverty (farming on lands not suited to farming, which leads to poor yields) and an effect of poverty (deforesting all lands).

This over-deforestation also leads to slow violence through the gradual degradation of land locally and the environment globally. When trees are on the land, they provide a structure for holding fertile soil in place, absorb heavy rains, and slow the flow of water, which prevents localized flashfloods (Szalay, 2013). Deforestation also causes the soil to become drier because there is no tree cover to protect the soil from the harsh rays of the sun, causing evaporation in the

soil. A drier soil is more prone to flash flooding than healthy soils under a forest canopy.

Without replacing the tree cover, this problem compounds over time. The result is increasingly arid land and desertification. Deforestation also reinforces the cycles of climate change. As trees are cut, they can no longer absorb carbon dioxide emissions, elevating the level of this greenhouse gas in the atmosphere (Dominelli, 2011).

Although residents did not verbalize the connection to deforestation, they often talked about flashfloods slowly degrading their land. Ben's father, a middle-aged poor farmer and artisan wood carver, said: "And the other thing, when it floods, it sweeps away the fertile soil so when I plant, I can't expect to get a harvest, not unless you have cash to buy the fertilizer, to make that soil fertile." Eventually, due to the deforestation and increasing droughts from climate change, desertification will likely take over the lands and the area will be inhabitable.

Despite the fact that these droughts sound catastrophic for the affected communities, they were highly localized processes. Many areas in Kenya were not experiencing these conditions, unlike the widespread drought mega disaster of 2011. In fact, if one had a vehicle, an area with adequate rains was only a few hours away. There was no mention of these localized droughts in the media or in accessible aid reports. The main consequence of localized micro disasters is that they are typically invisible to everyone but people who are affected, mirroring the conclusions of the invisibility of slow violence (Nixon, 2011). Thus, micro disasters are part of the holistic understanding of the impact of environmental degradation but are generally hidden from wider discussions about the environment.

Exacerbated by Injustice

Micro disasters are exacerbated by injustice related to slow violence. These injustices include unjust environmental degradation, lack of power in influencing decisions made about

their communities, marginalization, disenfranchisement, and lack of community and personal resources for response. For example, consider the Case of Development-Induced Flashfloods in Jam City.

Jam City is a formerly rural area in Machakos County, about 19 miles outside of Nairobi, situated at a bend in the Athi River. It is an ideal location: just off the highway, near Nairobi and the airport, but outside of the immediate bounds of the city. Jam City is located across the highway from Athi River, a community named after the river that hosts the cement and steel factories of the area. The communities are very close, both socially and physically. The residents are all of the Kamba ethnicity, the children of the communities go to school together, and often residents share churches and transportation vehicles.

Jam City is significantly poorer than Athi River and was the most visibly poor community in this study, although data does not exist to determine such rankings formally. The houses were constructed primarily of corrugated iron sheeting panels, like in the urban slums. The elite in the community, like the village chief, owned rudimentary concrete-block houses. The residents in this community have lived on this land for many generations and farmed the nearby vacant land. The residents refer to Jam City as their village, a term that is used for rural communities. And indeed, the community felt like a small tight-knit village. The residents knew each other by name and role (i.e., that's Mary; she escorts the children to the school in Athi River.), where in other communities, they did not know most of their neighbors.

The research visit was guided by the village chief, an informal and traditional position of authority that many other communities no longer had. Participants preferred a group interview and when describing the environmental situation in their community, they used the pronoun "we," the only community to do so frequently. The atmosphere was comfortable; when

participants differed in their opinions, the chief encouraged them to speak up, especially the women. Even though Nairobi is near, the big city seems like an enigma as few worked in or travel to Nairobi. Jam City and the surrounding area of Athi River is their preferred location for work, school, and home life.

However, as Nairobi continues to expand rapidly, its boundaries have reached Jam City and started to engulf the community. In 2011, a Chinese development company began building a luxurious gated apartment complex just three inches from the edge of Jam City. It was a shocking site of inequality. On the inside of the gate, there were several high-end apartment towers with manicured gardens, guard stations, and a children's playground; around Nairobi, there were several billboards advertising this development and its luxury. On the outside of the gate, was Jam City with no electricity, running water, or consistent source of employment. The disempowerment of Jam City residents in the development decisions that impacted their community was evident, and the environmental injustice that resulted from this development was the main topic of the research conducted in Jam City. The residents explained their situation:

The main problem are these buildings (the apartments). Because last year, before they built these houses, when the water comes, those floods were not affecting us so much because the water was draining everywhere. For now, they have blocked the area. There's the buildings and the wall. At times in our area, it doesn't rain but the water comes maybe from Nairobi and all the other parts. It just comes here. It floods in the whole area. At times, it usually comes during the night. So when it comes, the water has to drain into the houses direct. There's no way to divert. There's the houses in the area and there's the wall all around. So if it drains, it just comes to our area into the houses.

The participants explained that the new development was built on a natural flood plain at a bend in the Athi River. Before the development, this area flooded during the rainy season and the water subsided naturally. Jam City was located just outside of this flood plain purposefully. Because of the decision to build apartments in the flood plain, the developers built a floodwall around the complex. A likely unintentional effect of this wall was that all floodwaters were then directed into Jam City. As the development directed the waters into the highest point of Jam City, the floodwaters flowed downhill through the entire village until again meeting with the river.

Jam City residents were not sure if the wall was to keep the water out of the development or Jam City residents out of the development.

The wall is to protect themselves, their property... And you know, they think we are thieves. They cannot live with people such as us. They usually check with the local people. They even, if you ask them, they even say because of the population of the area, we will steal in the area so they have to build a wall to protect themselves. You see, they think we are just a dirty village.

Participants were acutely aware of their low position within society. However, Jam City residents did not feel powerless at the start of the development project. In fact, Jam City was one of the few communities to unite community members and directly pressure their local authorities to intervene on their behalf. Even before the floodwall was constructed with negative impacts for their community, Jam City residents hoped for a greater voice in shaping the development project and sought the possibility of employment at the construction site. Local authorities responded by demanding the community relocate to Athi River. Thus, the causes of the micro

disaster are both the environmental injustice of the flood wall diverting water into their village as well as community members lack of power within society.

As this case exemplifies, there were multiple causes of micro disasters, all of which are rooted in injustice. Jam City residents explained they lived in the community for generations in a harmonious relationship with the environment as they purposefully lived outside of the floodplain. The new luxury buildings were built without community input, even after the community asked for simple inclusive measures in the development like construction employment. This, in itself, is an injustice. However, the building of the floodwall, which channeled floodwaters directly into the neighborhood, intentionally or not, created a further injustice. For this situation to be remedied the community would need to be included in decisions that affect their community and the floodwall would have to be redesigned so to not channel water into the community.

Injustice exacerbated many of the micro environmental disasters. The Case of Localized Droughts in Wamunyu and Mutito illustrates a global force of injustice, climate change. The slow spread of drought and encroaching desertification has been linked to climate change, which is also an exemplified form of slow violence (Nixon, 2011). Climate change is a global injustice (Beck, 2010) because the poor in developing countries suffer the most even though they bear little responsibility for this environmental crisis (Basher, 2008; Beck, 2010; Huegler et al., 2012; IPCC WGII, 2014; Morton et al., 2008).

Injustices that exacerbated micro disasters were seen throughout Nairobi. The poor communities are closest to the rivers. In the poorest of the poor communities, the rivers flow freely without any protective structures. In these communities, the poorest people live closest to the river. They lived in housing structures that did not protect against the elements (houses made

of iron sheeting that are prone to destruction versus more expensive concrete brick houses). The poorest communities also lacked functioning waste management systems, while in the wealthy areas, there were both functioning garbage collection and sewage systems, which protected these communities from disease. The poorest communities in Nairobi also lacked drainage systems. While some poor communities were not affected by lack of drainage, in all of the wealthy areas, the streets were paved with drainage ditches.

The poorest communities observed in this study also lacked clean water. At least one participant in every community discussed the problems with dirty water; this was the only environmental commonality across communities. This finding is backed in the literature. Global access to clean water is inequitable (UN Habitat, 2006). Only 22 percent of Nairobians in slums have water connections, compared to the majority of Nairobians who lived outside of the slums (UN Habitat, 2006). Participants in this study either drank dirty water from contaminated rivers or spent an exorbitant percentage of their income on bottled water. Water prices in slums and rural areas were more expensive than water prices in the wealthy areas of Nairobi where it was piped into the houses. Lack of clean water has increased since 2000 in Nairobi's slums and is now considered one of the greatest needs of local residents (APHRC, 2014).

Micro Disasters Entrench Inequalities

Because micro disasters were exacerbated by injustice, the poor were the most affected group. They were also often affected by micro disasters that they did not cause. Further, these groups do not have the resources to cope with these events, thus entrenching their poverty, as they spent all of their assets to survive, lost their assets to the micro disaster, and lost their opportunities because of attempting to survive micro disasters rather than go to school. Consider the Case of Garbage in the Urban Slums.

No poor urban communities in this study had adequate state-run garbage management, despite being a declared public service (NEMA, 2014). (The rural communities burned their garbage, which tended to solve major garbage problems, although it created air pollution problems in the long-term.) While garbage is not an obvious exemplar of a disaster, micro or otherwise, many participants discussed the problem of garbage as their primary concern with the environment, despite the fact that many participants had survived mega disasters. Faith, a poor housewife in Kitengela, explained the lack of garbage collection and human waste containment.

It is disposal of waste materials is the biggest problem. You see everywhere you go... Everywhere you go you just leave it. The drainage system blocks, it overflows and drains to the river. There is no sewer in Kitengela. The problem is the way people dispose the water. The children can go to the contaminated river and start playing in it and they can die. It is so much unhygienic because there is no sewer. I think in the whole Kitengela, there is no disposal of waste, the drainage system. You can see it is here... Now, it is a hazard, a health hazard because the children play in the water. Sometimes you can even see big people in and out and using the river water for living. Instead of buying water, they use that water for their house.

Faith felt that the waste was affecting her more than catastrophic events like the large-scale drought she survived in 2011, likely because waste disposal is a daily problem with no end in sight.

In many of these communities, garbage was everywhere. Garbage blew in the streets and into open doors of houses. In neighborhoods that had flood ditches, the ditches were almost always clogged with garbage, defeating their protective purposes. Garbage was often piled into large heaps, with residents reporting that sometimes they would wake up to find dead bodies on

top of the heap. The smell was noxious. Children were often seen playing in the garbage. These garbage piles were supposed to be cleared at regular intervals by the city but participants said that was rare.

The garbage was so abundant in some neighborhoods that it seemed the community was built on a garbage dump; to get around the community everyone just walked on paths of garbage. In many communities, the paths around the communities were on top of garbage, which led up to a stream of human sewage, as there were no sewer systems either. To cross the stream of human sewage, required crossing a precarious bridge made of twigs. A noticeable amount of the garbage was plastic—plastic bags and plastic bottles—assuring the garbage would not decompose. This situation is normal for cities in developing countries, as lack of solid waste regulations and proper disposal facilities leads to dumping waste in uncontrolled manners (Kimani, 2007)

The social norms around garbage in many communities were inconsistent. Despite the fact that nearly every participant complained about the garbage, when taking tours of the community, it seemed that the norm was to throw garbage on the street or out the windows, rather than the designated areas for garbage in each community. During observations, people brought containers of garbage to the street and threw the contents onto the street. Dead rats were left next to the garbage to rot; participants enjoyed the joke of pointing to the rats and calling them “our politicians.” One participant, Ben, as we walked around his neighborhood eating slices of watermelon laughed at me as I gathered the rinds and the plastic bags that slices came in. “This isn’t America. It’s different here. We don’t have to do that,” he said as he threw his plastic bag into the street outside of his house.

Nairobians have a documented lack of environmental awareness about the consequences of their actions (UN Habitat, 2006). Many participants identified this and suggested that a

solution to their garbage problems is that an organization could educate their neighbors on the consequences of inadequately disposed of trash. They were able to identify this indifference because other similar communities did not have trash problems. South B and Shauri Moyo developed methods of trash disposal through changing community norms to make trash on the ground unacceptable, and in the case of South B, throwing trash on the ground was subject to a fine. This will be discussed in Chapter 4.

There is one main garbage dump in Nairobi: Dandora. Rumors that the dump was controlled by “dangerous gangs with hundreds of guns” existed in every community. Thus, many participants were afraid to bring their garbage to the dump. While not discounting their fear, the same rumors swirled around the dump in Mombasa, but the people in the dump appeared to be people with mental illness trying to live off the garbage, not gang members. Regardless, the rumors were strong enough to deter participants from using the dump at Dandora. However, even if all residents dumped their waste in Dandora, the dump is unregulated, unrestricted, and not managed in a manner that prevents seepage into the environment (Kimani, 2007). The soil and water near Dandora contains high levels of heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants, which cause nearby residents to suffer from various health disorders that affect the skin, the respiratory system, the gastric system, their hearing, the central nervous system, their eyes, and their blood (Kimani, 2007).

The abundant garbage had severe consequences beyond aesthetics. The spread of disease was a constant worry. Julius explained:

The disease outbreaks come for the slum areas. You can find even a diarrhea outbreak, it comes from the slums because the place is not very well kept. There’s an outbreak in the places where the garbages are right close. It affects people that way.

Indeed, related research has described trash in the streets as a “bomb waiting to explode. It is a breeding ground for so many diseases” (Sachs, 2014, p. 1). Diseases spread through mosquitos, rodents, and trash seepage into the drinking water (Sachs, 2014). Participants reported the families of the sick had to use whatever little savings they had for medical treatment. This entrenched their poverty and they had to resave, hoping to save enough resources before the next disease outbreak occurred.

Trash and sewage collection is served by the overwhelmed and inefficient city services (UN Habitat, 2006). This service is reserved for a few areas only, namely the Central Business District and wealthy neighborhoods (UN Habitat, 2006). It was also observed that the wealthier areas could supplement the city services by utilizing contractors and children who were paid to pick up garbage in the neighborhood. These services were often very cheap—about the equivalent to 50 cents per month—as the real value for the service providers was picking through the trash for whatever the wealthy threw away.

Entrenching injustice was common among all the cases presented and in all the communities that were explored. Themes among all communities are explored in depth here to exemplify this last piece of micro disasters.

Loss of assets. Almost everyone affected by micro disasters lost some assets. Many in floods lost their houses, as they were either swept away or irreparably damaged. As their houses were lost, so were their assets inside of the houses, which typically took years to accumulate. Antoine explained, “If you have your personal property in the house, you just leave to go with the water. And then you rescue your family.”

For example, items lost in the Shaury Moyo Midnight Flood Case included: 2,500 shillings (\$25— a large sum for a poor Kenyan), beds and mattresses, ID cards, certificates of

education, cooking utensils, clothing, a TV, a subwoofer, “all of my savings”, a sofa, food that had been contaminated by dirty water, and driving licenses. Dan explained surviving a flood micro disaster, “Since that day, I don’t even have a house. I don’t know how I can survive so I’m just here. To start again a life, is very difficult with nothing.” Corlucka agreed, “It’s like we were beginning again from nothing.”

The loss of documents (a driver’s license, high school degree, secondary degree, identity card) was particularly painful. At a cost of \$5 to \$15 each, replacing such documents is a great expense without permanent and good paying employment. Replacement also takes several months to complete. But without these documents, the participants reported they could not compete for employment and were at risk of arrest without a proper ID. For instance, Boscoe was a seasonal driver at an international printing company, a job he could no longer do because he lost his license, resulting in the loss of his economic activity. And he could not apply for jobs in his desired career area either, graphic arts, because he could not prove he graduated college. In fact he and other participants struggled to provide evidence they even graduated high school to prospective employers. This is essential before any interviews can occur, as it is a defining accomplishment within the population.

In drought-based micro disasters, assets were also lost. Planting crops was often used as a form of savings by urbanites; often all extra money was sent home to plant on their family’s land. After a failed harvest, all savings were lost. In addition, like poor farmers the world over, many took out loans for fertilizer and pesticides. Thus with a failed harvest, participants lost their savings and found themselves in crippling debt. Also in drought-based micro disasters, many lost their assets in the form of the death or quick sale of their livestock, as water and food for the animals became too expensive.

Difficulty traveling. As micro disasters destroyed the infrastructure, either by damaging paved roads or making mud roads impassable, it became difficult to travel out of the affected areas. Even when roads were not damaged, it was difficult to travel out of an area due to the ensuing chaos. As micro disasters hit a community, many reported that security broke down as outsiders traveled to the area to take advantage through theft of unattended items, thus residents could not leave the area. The insecure environment often became violent. Spencer explained fearfully, “Some come up to the people, they go into the buildings. Sometimes they also kill people.” This fear of losing what few belongings they had kept residents in their communities during and after micro disasters. This resulted in children not going to school and adults not going to their jobs.

Disease and death. Death was directly due to the micro disaster, such as through drowning in flashfloods. Death was also due to the secondary effects of micro disasters, for example, through death from hunger in a drought, and death from disease in a flood and in areas with a lack of waste management.

Diseases were spread frequently during flood-based micro disasters. Stagnant water was particularly dangerous in malaria zones and many communities said they feared a malaria outbreak post-micro disaster. In addition, much of the flooded water was contaminated due to a lack of functioning water treatment plants in the country and thus communities reported the spread of cholera, pneumonia, typhoid, and skin rashes post-flooding micro disaster. Participants also stated a constant fear for the children and the elderly in their communities during and after micro disasters. In floods, parents often reported feeling their children would drown on the way to or from school. Illnesses like malaria and typhoid were particularly worrisome as they are much more deadly for children and the elderly.

Due to these secondary effects, many of the young adult participants in the study migrated away from their rural home communities in search of work in urban areas. This phenomenon will be explored in the next chapter. Here, it is connected to the effects of micro disasters; when the young adults were away in the urban areas, their family members back home in the rural communities struggled to adapt without them. The young people who left would have traditionally completed the labor-intensive rebuilding tasks post-disaster, like repairing a damaged house. These are tasks many of the elders and the children in the community simply could not do. Thus, many of these recovery-oriented tasks were not done, further increasing the local residents' vulnerabilities to the danger of micro disasters.

Loss of economic activities and potential. Many of the micro disasters had the effect of destroying economic activities. During drought, harvests that were supposed to support a family for an entire year are often lost. A middle-aged poor farmer named Ester who made mats and bowls out of grass during drought periods explained that in Mutito, "There is not even the idea of growing to sell anymore because we can't even get enough for food. We mostly don't get anything." Participants that engaged in animal husbandry reported the loss of their economic activity as well. Without enough water, the animals died or were sold at steep losses. On the other end of the spectrum, flashfloods have the ability to kill animals and often did. Although in one instance of humor, a farmer told the story of watching his cow swim in its pen in six feet of water from a flashflood for several hours.

This loss of economic activities was linked to the social position of community members. While the poor struggled to live through droughts, the more wealthy farmers readily adapted by buying water management technologies to support their income generating activities. Ben's

father explained that not all people in his community were equally affected by the drought-based mini-disaster:

They are being affected but you cannot compare them to us, to the others, because they have money. They have got some dams, terraces, irrigation. They have cash to do everything to be ok. Even if they have drought, they will buy food for the *shamba*-men (*gardeners*).

Because of their general lack of resources to adapt, drought was a micro disaster for the poor, while the more wealthy farmers invested in technologies to mitigate disasters and protect their harvests.

The poor urban areas also saw a loss of economic activities due to micro disasters. In the Blue Estate during the Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case, artisans had their kiosks washed away in the flood. Much of the land for the market was lost as well to the river, leading to more competition for spots in the market. This was in contrast to the wealthy areas where the heavy rains were just an annoyance because the areas had adequate drainage and the communities were not in the proximity of potential hazards like the Nairobi River.

Future economic potential was also lost due to micro disasters. Schools in poor communities were often flooded as many were built particularly close to the rivers and thus were shut down for many months waiting for repairs. In drought-based micro disasters, children were often pulled out of school to fetch water from progressively farther sources as local sources dried up. A taxi driver from Kitui told his story of running away and surviving on his own in a new city at age 13:

The reason why I came to the urban center is because I'm a standard 4 dropout [8th grade] and a partial orphan [father is dead]. When I was in standard 4, it didn't rain and my

mother made me go to the farm to cultivate the land when the other students were learning so I just fled to the urban center.

He was unsure though if heading out on his own at 13 supported his potential but he remained bitter over his childhood experience of not getting an education.

A poor farmer (Ben's cousin) living through drought explained the intersecting issues with micro disasters and children:

The problem is due to short rains... And I can say that that is the greatest problem because when money lacks, these kids and my young brothers and sisters, they won't get their rights as in education.

Deepening poverty. Often these effects were compounded, synergistically amplifying the problems of local communities. For example, floods destroyed fragile pit toilets, spilling sewage into people's homes and their water sources. This spread diseases like cholera, which was expensive to cure, and lead to deaths. All of these secondary effects lead to deepening poverty for already severely impoverished people. And at any moment, another micro disaster could strike. In fact, many communities detailed multiple mini disasters happening over the course of one year with each mini disaster making them more vulnerable to the next.

Summary

The social work research on disasters focuses on mega disasters, like earthquakes and tsunamis. This focus does not capture the experiences of participants in this study. They faced micro disasters. Participants in this study who survived micro disasters reported them no less dangerous, destructive, or deadly than mega disasters. These environmental problems were not widespread but were small and localized. Micro disasters were also exacerbated by injustices because the ability to adapt was linked to the participants' social position. Micro disasters also

entrenched inequalities as often the poor became poorer because of the environmental event. Responses to micro disasters, which will be covered in the next chapter, were insufficient at best and often non-existent. Participants were able to rely on each other but with varying success.

Chapter 4: Avenues of Assistance

The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case Part 2

In response to the flooding during the 2013 rainy season in Shauri Moyo and in other communities in the area, the Kenyan Red Cross Society (KRC) conducted rapid assessments in affected communities. People in Shauri Moyo had copies of the initial report. It lists at least one death and at least 60 houses swept away in the floods in the Blue Estate. (The Blue Estate is a larger area in Nairobi in which the Shauri Moyo neighborhood is situated.) The Shauri Moyo participants wrote on the report, “Our place. Shauri Moyo. Nothing has been done for the affected!,” and “Up to date, no help in the Blue Estate.” They felt abandoned.

The final report and donor appeal to Western nations by the KRC, which the participants did not have at the time, listed 33 people dead, four people missing, and 640 houses destroyed. However, the report did not list the effects in the Blue Estate at all. Instead, the report stated all affected people lived in rural areas and described the collapsed houses as built with traditional materials that were susceptible to destruction by heavy rains, not concrete apartments like those that collapsed in Shauri Moyo. It said, “About half of the population who lost their houses is nomadic pastoralist with traditional light housing constructions made of grass, while the other half is made up of farmers and traders with semi-permanent housing constructions made of mud” (Kenya Red Cross Society, 2013, p. 1). The survivors in Shauri Moyo received no assistance from the KRC.

The Kenyan government allotted funds to support victims of the 2013 rainy season. Most of the participants in Shauri Moyo followed the process of applying for this support through application at the local Chief’s Office. (One participant did not do so because he believed it to be a waste of his time due to his fears over corruption.) They filed their lists of items lost along with an estimation of the value of these items. After the money was released, the local Chief

reportedly absconded with the money. The survivors of the flood had no recourse and received no assistance.

Instead, they relied on their social networks for survival. Many moved into friends' houses or friends' dorm rooms, which were over-crowded. Some temporarily moved in with their family members in the rural areas, giving up their jobs in Nairobi. Many in the Shauri Moyo community and their home communities supported the survivors in ways they could with material goods like cash, clothes, and food. However, one year later the survivors of the flood had yet to recover all lost assets.

According to interviews with participants, the only hint of a formal response given to survivors in Shauri Moyo was rumors of demolition of all houses within 30-50 meters of the river by order of the local government. Affected people would likely not be relocated. Participants were fearful of displacement and homelessness.

The aftermath of the Shauri Moyo flood exemplifies the exclusion from international aid and local government response that many of the communities within the study faced. Instead of relying on these helping sources as a safety net during micro disasters, the communities survived by using the only resource they had— each other.

Literature Review: Avenues of Assistance

When in need, people and communities have multiple possible avenues for assistance. One avenue is institutionalized assistance. The social work profession developed as an effort to professionalize helping mechanisms through state programs and charities (Glicker, 2011). This formal assistance has become more common over time as it has become an identifiable segment of capitalist societies (Livingstone, 2013). This formal assistance, which includes government programs, non-governmental organizations, charities, and foreign support, is referred in this chapter in shorthand as “aid.”

Another avenue for assistance is informal support through mutual aid among community members. Cooperation has allowed for the survival of communities throughout the evolutionary process and is defined as a central human trait (Bowles & Gintis, 2013). Mutual aid remains a common survival strategy for people in need despite the proliferation of formal aid for many reasons ranging from exclusion from the formal relief (Warren, Thompson, & Saegart, 2001) to preference of receiving help from people they know.

The Kenyan state is limited and provides few services for its citizens. Scholars have suggested that there is no national disaster management body in Kenya (Africa Research Bulletin, 2013) and that there are also no formal poverty alleviation measures that are coordinated by the Kenyan government (UN Habitat, 2006), despite the fact that both exist (the Kenya National Disaster Operation Centre and the National Poverty Eradication Plan). This contradiction, along with participants' lack of knowledge about the existence of these programs, suggests limited programmatic abilities and effectiveness. However, Kenya receives an immense amount of international aid through various programs. In 2012, Kenya received the 11th highest amount of humanitarian and development aid globally (Global Humanitarian Assistance, n.d.). Funded sectors of aid by ranking of percentage of aid are health (27.6 percent), humanitarian relief (16.9 percent), infrastructure (12.8 percent), general budget support (11.7 percent), agriculture and food security (6.9 percent), water and sanitation (5.7 percent), and other (18.4 percent) which includes governance and security, education, environment, debt relief, banking and business, and industry and trade (Global Humanitarian Assistance, n.d.). Despite the amount of aid in Kenya, NGOs and foreign aid projects tend to operate on an ad hoc basis with little coordination between them and little support from the local or national government (UN Habitat, 2006). In addition to aid, Kenyan communities also have a history of cooperating to support their

community members who are in need (Bisung et al, 2014). This chapter explores the mechanisms of support for Kenyan communities after micro disasters.

International Aid

Charity and aid have been functioning since the earliest documentation of human societies (Kopinak, 2013). International aid, or charity given by the wealthier countries to the poor countries of the world, was first established in the 1800s (Phillips, 2013) and has continually evolved since. Aid formalized during colonialism to build infrastructure that supported the extraction of resources by the colonial regimes (Kopinak, 2013; Phillips, 2013; Wrong, 2009). Aid from the colonizing countries continued after independence to support the economic development of the colonized countries (Phillips, 2013). During the Cold War period, aid progressed in multiple directions. Both sides of the Cold War used aid to encourage political allegiances (Hornsby, 2013). As a trend, aid then shifted to deliverance from multilateral organizations rather than from individual countries (Phillips, 2013). Aid also shifted from supporting economic growth, which was not reducing poverty, to focusing on meeting people's basic needs (Phillips, 2013). Currently, aid continues to evolve, which will be discussed throughout this chapter.

Aid purposes. Scholars have debated the purposes of international aid since its development. Many believe that aid should be used to facilitate economic growth and others argue that aid should be humanitarian in nature (Phillips, 2013). Modern aid serves both of these purposes through emergency relief and development assistance. Emergency humanitarian relief provides aid to reduce casualties in emergencies (Branczik, 2004). This type of aid is designed to meet basic needs of survival quickly through providing water, sanitation, food, shelter, health care, and security (Branczik, 2004; Kopinak, 2013). Emergency relief is ideally time-limited with fast-paced interventions to support survival of the emergency (Kopinak, 2013).

In contrast, development assistance supports rehabilitation from emergencies and development of local community capacities (Branczik, 2004; Kopinak, 2013). This type of aid includes construction of property, infrastructure, and institutions; the establishment of a functioning judiciary; the democratization of governance; and the funding of economic development (Branczik, 2004). Building the local capacity is the goal of development assistance so programs sustain after the aid ends (Kopinak, 2013).

In many cases, emergency relief and development assistance are not distinct but overlap in their work (Branczik, 2004; Kopinak, 2013). For example, humanitarian relief may respond to a drought with water and food. Development assistance may be later employed in the same area to dig boreholes. In addition, due to a variety of global factors around funding and local contexts of emergencies, emergency aid is increasingly not short term (Dominelli, 2012a). Emergency relief aid that lasts longer than three years now consumes over 50 percent of the emergency aid globally. Two-thirds of this 50 percent is being used to support people for more than eight years (Dominelli, 2012a). Thus, the aid types are often blurred.

Aid donors and actors. Funding for aid comes primarily from governments through two main monetary flows: loans and grants (Branczik, 2004; Brech & Potrafke, 2013; Goldin, 2009). Since the 1970s, grants have increased, while large-scale loans to governments have decreased (Brech & Potrafke, 2013). However, the European Union has tended to still favor loans to increase recipient incentives to use the aid resourcefully, while the United States has pushed for more grants (Brech & Potrafke, 2013).

There are three main aid channels: multilateral, bilateral, and through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Multilateral aid occurs through intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Branczik, 2004). These are the largest aid institutions, which provide 80 percent of aid (Goldin, 2009). These

organizations rely on governmental funding from participating states. The aid from these institutions includes emergency relief and developmental assistance, as well as both grants and loans. Bilateral aid occurs as assistance from one country to another (Branczik, 2004). This aid is often given as a part of foreign policy. This can result in conditions set by the donor country, which the recipient country may or may not adhere to. For example in Kenya, many grants by foreign governments support human rights organizations and free press organizations. The Kenyan government has attempted to end this sort of aid (Kiai, 2013). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly providing a higher percentage of aid (Branczik, 2004). NGOs can be independent charities or receive funding from NGOs and foreign governments. These cogs in the aid system are interconnected with many NGOs funded through governments and intergovernmental organizations. This system is very large; \$2.3 trillion in aid has been given over the past 50 years globally (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).

Current trends in international aid. In the last decade, NGOs have proliferated as they are seen as more effective in delivering services and less corrupt than recipient governments. New aid relationships have also developed. These are largely based on mutual self-interest (Phillips, 2013), in contrast to the donor-centric aid policies of the past. As China has risen from an aid recipient country to a donor country, the China-Africa relationship developed. China provides extensive infrastructure development and, to a lesser extent, monetary funds for development programs for African countries (Phillips, 2013). In return, China is awarded rights to raw materials (Phillips, 2013). In Kenya, this relationship has been formalized as the “Looking East” policy (Kwayera, 2013). The “horizontal” relationship between Kenya and China is prominently reported on in the media, compared to Western countries that are portrayed as infantilizing Kenya with their demands. “We are not children” is a common refrain when discussing aid dynamics. However, aid specialists have compared these new aid relationships as

similar to the old, as the aid goes to supporting economic development, which has been shown to not alleviate poverty (Phillips, 2013).

There has also been a recent wave of intergovernmental projects that aim to end poverty in the developing world (Easterly, 2007). Through this work, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were launched as a global framework to guide aid to developing countries through eight specific goals (UN Millennium Project, 2005). These goals include:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Create a global partnership for development

These goals are broadly supported by nearly every world leader as well as the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and aid agencies (Easterly, 2009). The MDGs are quantifiable, specific, and supporters claim they are achievable (UN Millennium Project, 2005).

The formulation of the MDGs was followed with the 2002 Monterrey Conference (Goldin, 2009). This conference aimed to develop a true partnership between rich and poor countries. The rich countries pledged to increase the quality and volume of aid, and the poor countries promised to institute reforms that would enhance aid effectiveness (Goldin, 2009). These agreements were within the ideal that aid works best with cooperating partners.

Aid barriers and critiques. There is widespread acknowledgement, even among aid proponents, that the aid system is deeply flawed (Easterly, 2007). The primary concern is that aid

does not support development or poverty alleviation in a meaningful way (Bayat, 2012; Kopinak, 2013). The various reasons cited for a lack of aid success are varied and include insufficient funding, lack of data to determine efficacy and best practices, and top-down aid. Corruption also affects aid and societal functioning, thus it will also be discussed.

Insufficient funding. Many proponents of aid argue that there is enough knowledge about how to support development and end poverty but the aid funding is not sufficient to achieve lofty goals (Branczik, 2004; Kopinak, 2013; Pogge, 2010; Sachs, 2010; UN Millennium Project, 2005). Many backers of the MDGs support this argument. Pogge (2010) argued that the severe poverty can be ended worldwide with just \$262 billion annually, which is well under half of the US military budget. The UN Millennium Project (2005) suggested that for the first time in history, ending poverty is affordable; all that is needed, along with the planned MDGs, is for developed countries to keep their promises for aid funding (Sachs, 2010; Sachs, 2012).

Without sufficient monetary backing, aid agencies adjust accordingly. Obviously, many planned and needed aid projects are simply not implemented without sufficient funding (Sachs, 2010). Because the amount given for programs is too low, many aid agencies must also utilize funding that is meant to provide aid to people in need for local salaries and administrative costs, which lowers the impact of the programs (Kopinak, 2013). Aid agencies may also chase funding outside of their expertise or mission to keep their institutions functioning (Easterly & Williamson, 2011). Furthermore, it becomes difficult for aid agencies to plan for programmatic sustainability and to develop future programs when their funding is uncertain (Kopinak, 2013).

While international funders of aid, particularly Western governments, have not fulfilled their promises of monetary assistance (Goldin, 2009; Sachs, 2012), there is pushback over blaming the failures of aid on lack of funding. Maathai (2009) argued that development is not about money, as Africa and Kenya are both very rich in resources but are poorly developed.

Instead, she claims, development failures are due to a multitude of complicated problems entrenched in the aid system and the global power structure like trade inequities (Maathai, 2009). These arguments have been taken up by others (Goldin, 2009). In addition, as per the Monterrey Conference agreements, recipient countries have largely not kept their promises to institute policy reforms that would make aid more effective (Goldin, 2009). Thus, solely blaming donors relieves poorly performing national governments of responsibility of aid failures (Goldin, 2009).

Top-down aid. Governments, communities, and individuals on the receiving end of aid are often not active partners in the aid processes (Fehling, Nelson, & Venkatapuram, 2013; Goldin, 2009; Maathai, 2009). Rather, poverty reduction models are planned and implemented by external experts in a top-down manner (Sachs, 2012). The concern is that much of the need in these communities is completely outside of the realm of the lived experiences of the aid workers, planners, and donors (Maathai, 2009). Without community input, the aid may not target what the community needs (Maathai, 2009).

In this top-down paradigm of aid, community buy-in is not a necessity as donors bring their money, materials, inputs, and ideas to “save” people (Easterly, 2009; Fengler, 2011). For example, the United States’ President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), provided funding for AIDS prevention programs and treatment. However, PEPFAR included policies that shifted AIDS prevention programs from condom-based to abstinence-based, except for the riskiest populations, due to evangelical pressure within the United States (Goldberg, 2007). The abstinence emphasis of the aid continued for years despite denunciations from community members in recipient countries (Goldberg, 2007).

The MDGs have been criticized as designed and implemented in manners that are too top-down. In these projects, the goals are the same across countries and communities, regardless of local needs and capabilities (Fehling et al, 2013). These goals are also operationalized through

quantifiable measures, which rely on country-level averages rather than unique contextual goals (Fehling et al, 2013). For example, the MGDs aim to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by halving the proportion of people living on \$1 per day. This goal is not challenging for many countries whose poverty line is much higher like many Asian countries but is unrealistic for others that are facing severe poverty with no institutional capacities like Sudan (Oya, 2011). In addition, by focusing on average improvements, it may obscure the conditions of the worst-off. To achieve many of the goals, countries and programs may be tempted to aim for the lowest hanging fruit, like people living just under \$1 per day, rather than the more difficult cases (Fehling et al, 2013).

Top-down aid also has the effect of corroding local responsibility. Rather than governments solving problems in the communities to which they are accountable, aid has often allowed governments to shift the burden of their problems to aid agencies (Maathai, 2009). This limits the capacity of countries to engineer their own solutions to their problems, engendering dependency rather than empowerment and sustainability and stifling local solutions to problems (Fengler, 2011; Kopinak, 2013). Regularly, there is also no funding from the local government for to sustain the project because the aid was implemented without such agreements. In Kenya, this played out cyclically. As aid rose, the state weakened (Hornsby, 2013). In turn, it was unable to attract and pay top talent, limiting it more and entrenching the reliance on the aid system (Hornsby, 2013).

Lack of efficacy determinations. As it became clear that aid was not achieving its intended results of poverty alleviation and development, evaluation of aid and monitoring for best practices was emphasized. However, aid is difficult to assess because it often does not have starting and ending points, and includes components that are constantly influx (Kopinak, 2013), which complicates evaluations.

Ideally, aid should be done in the spirit of the 4 Cs: cooperation, coordination, collaboration and communication with intended aid recipients, local communities, local authorities, and other aid organizations (Kopinak, 2013). This framework was proposed by Kopinak (2013) but is inline with other suggestions of ideal aid processes. In the model, aid agencies should specialize in programmatic areas and countries in order to develop expertise (Easterly & Williamson, 2011). Aid agencies can then *cooperate* and *coordinate* with each other so that all needs are supported efficiently (Kopinak, 2013). This is in contrast to agencies competing with each other, providing aid outside the expertise of the agency, and having too many agencies working in one area and not enough in others. Aid agencies also need to be deeply immersed in the local culture so the aid is culturally competent and responsive to recipient needs (Kopinak, 2013). This can support *collaboration* with the host government and other stakeholders to encourage sustainability, local respect, and needed aid. Aid tends to yield more positive results with collaborating governments because the local institutions can change policies to support the aid programs (Goldin, 2009). Collaboration with local community members is also inline with the right to participation as delineated by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (Sepulveda Carmona, 2013). Aid agencies need to clearly *communicate* their plans and goals, which will satisfy both the mandates of the donors as well as the expectation from aid recipients and partners (Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Goldin, 2009; Kopinak, 2013).

Best practices—successful projects on the ground, not just ideals like the 4 Cs—are challenging to identify and define (Easterly & Pfütze, 2008; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Kang, Anderson, & Finnegan, 2012; Riddell, 2014). An operational definition of best practices is not agreed upon. Many funders promote accountability as a best practice. This often means that programs should be implemented with fidelity to the processes prescribed by the donors.

However, this type of assessment of best practices disregards outcomes in the lives of the beneficiaries (Kang, Anderson, & Finnegan, 2012; Murtaza, 2012). Thus, it is unclear if these programs promote development and alleviate poverty, even if they adhere to donor models. Other funders emphasize outcomes but they are expecting fast, positive, and measurable results, which the donor defines and are tied to future funding for the aid organizations (Kopinak, 2013). This pressure can result in aid agencies focusing on the easiest victories, rather than targeting the most needy populations, which leads to superficially positive outcomes (Kopinak, 2013). This also disregards whether or not the beneficiaries agree with the intended outcomes.

Experts have hypothesized various principles of best practices of aid like transparency of use of funds, low overhead costs, specialization of expertise, inclusion of local stakeholders in aid decisions, and use of effective channels (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Goldin, 2009). Aid can then be assessed but these criteria have not been empirically tested as actually supporting best practices; thus aid is assessed on hypotheses and assumptions, which is problematic. Other scholars argue that there are no best practices; aid should be so localized that it cannot be replicated (Feek, 2007). In addition, the final goals of aid are still debated. They could be anything including fewer people in poverty, economic growth, self-reliance, inclusion in the world market, peace, good governance, a robust civil society, the codification of human rights, fewer terrorist organizations, and for recipient countries to become donor countries.

Depending on the metrics of what is considered a best practice, rankings of aid vary. For example, aid from the United States gets a poor ranking from Easterly & Williamson (2011) due to below average efficacy; aid from the United States also gets a poor ranking from Midling (2009) but because the United States often assists dictatorships. Aid from the United Nations is named the worst in administering aid programs (Easterly & Williamson, 2011); aid from the

United Nations is also identified as the most ideal (Goldin, 2009). While the call for evaluation of aid is common, the metrics for assessment remain undefined.

Corruption. A major topic within the development and aid literature is corruption. Corruption is described as an obstacle to development (Sen, 1999), a “cancer” that is spreading (Maathai, 1995, p.1), and “public enemy number one” (World Bank, 2013 p. 1). It is argued that many of the problems of developing countries can be traced to corruption (Blackburn & Sarmah, 2007) and that aid only works in a non-corrupted environment (Branczik, 2004).

Corruption in this context is abuse of public office for private gain (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015; Harrison, 2007). It is considered a characteristic of bad governance and often occurs as a public official demands money for public services (Batabyal, & Chowdhury, 2015; Hope, 2014). Examples of types of corruption include when public funds go missing, purchases of goods and services by the state are based on who offers the best kickbacks rather than the highest quality of goods, and public programs are developed because of their capacity to generate illegal sources rather than their efficacy in supporting society (Blackburn & Sarman, 2007). Corruption can also be on a much smaller scale like offering a bribe to get a replacement license quicker.

Corruption has severe consequences. Economic development is impeded by corruption (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015) and reduces investment in the country through high costs of bribes and fears of corrupted resources (Hope, 2014). Corruption leads to lack of public accountability, good governance, and rule of law, all of which are values that underpin strong democratic societies (Hope, 2014). Citizens’ support for these values weakens over time (Hope, 2014). Citizens also begin to believe, perhaps rightly so, that they cannot move up in their social and economic status honestly, which creates a corrupted culture through the economic and social strata of society.

The poor are disproportionately impacted by corruption. When comparing countries with high corruption to countries with low corruption, high levels of corruption are associated with low development, low life expectancies, high levels of poverty, low rates of economic growth, high-income inequality, and low levels of social capital (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015; Blackburn & Sarman, 2007; Hope, 2014). Corruption decreases state revenue from taxes, leading to social services that are underfunded, which are more likely to be used by the poor (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015). When using these services, the poor must give bribes to use the services, which represents a higher portion of their income than that of wealthier individuals (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015). Corruption also reduces the funds available for development-related programs that would be targeted to alleviate poverty (Hope, 2014). As the wealthy become wealthier due to development, they can buy greater influence in a corrupted system, further ensuring a disproportionate share of resources to them (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015; Hope, 2014; Maathai, 1995). Corruption also undermines the rationale for aid (Bauhr et al, 2013). Aid givers want to help people in need, rather than line the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats, thus they are reluctant to give to corrupt countries. However, foreign aid is often needed most in corrupt countries, leading to a paradox over where to give aid (Bauhr et al, 2013).

Kenya has routinely been ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world; in 2014, it was ranked 145th out of 175 countries (Transparency International, 2014). Officials have plundered the country's resources for their own enrichment so often that Kenyans have normalized the behavior and nicknamed it "eating" (Hope, 2014). Corruption in Kenya exists because people in power benefit from the corruption and there are no existing governmental institutions that have the capacity to stop it (Hope, 2014). Regulatory institutions like the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission have been deliberately weakened by the beneficiaries of corruption, undermining the rule of law (Hope, 2014). For example, nationally respected political

reformer John Githongo was appointed as the anti-corruption czar by President Kibaki, his long-time mentor, an appointment that was popular throughout the country (Wrong, 2009). However, when Githongo exposed the corruption the Kibaki government, he had to flee the country due to threats on his life by the administration (Wrong, 2009).

The corruption in Kenya goes beyond the most elite and has been entrenched in all levels of life due to a culture of impunity, low rule of law, and lack of transparency. Everyday activities require *kitu kidogo* (*a little something, i.e. a bribe*) to do things like get proper approvals for things like businesses, get one's house hooked up to the city water system, and get a job (Hope, 2014). The police are frequently cited as the most corrupt institution in Kenya, accounting for about one third of the total burden of bribery (Hope, 2014; Werlin, 2006). Relatedly, the judiciary is often bribed to hand down a favorable outcome (Hope, 2014), further undermining the rule of law.

Corruption in Kenya is listed as one of the “bottlenecks to development” in much of Maathai's work (2007, 2009). In Kenya, it is estimated that 30 percent of public monies are spent on projects while 70 percent is stolen (Hope, 2014). Being part of a certain ethnic group or being able to provide kickbacks are acceptable reasons for being awarded a contract, rather than qualifications or quality of work (Hope, 2014). Corruption has affected aid within the country. For example, the Ministry of Education received substantial financial support from the United States and Great Britain to fund public schools and feed children during the school day. During an audit, it was found that one million dollars disappeared from this fund in just one month (BBC News, 2010). Total money diverted from schools to the pockets of corrupt officials is unknown (BBC News, 2010). Following reports of the stolen money, the United States withdrew \$7 million and the British withdrew \$16 million from future funding of the program (Hope, 2014). Cynicism in Kenya is understandably high (Hope, 2014).

Cooperation, Mutual Aid, and Social Networks

Many communities worldwide must solve their problems without formal assistance because of lack of state protection and international aid available for the communities (Bayat, 2012). Indeed, the literature on cooperation and disasters theorizes that poor communities use each other to survive disasters (Dominelli, 2012a), rather than formal aid programs. Mutual aid provides communities with economic assistance, social interchange, and protection in the absence of formal social services that meet their needs (Hernandez, 2008). The concept of mutual aid is supported by social networking theory, which delineates the patterns of relationships that make up a social structure (Chandler & Munday, 2011). Rather than the individual (termed actor), it is the actors' connections to others that are the focus of study (Specht, 1986). These connections, termed social ties, are operationalized as relationships like friendships, kinships, and community connections (Last, 2007). The sum of an actor's social ties forms a social network (Chandler & Munday, 2011), a strength-based community resource that develops as actors work together (Kedebe & Butterfield, 2009). The most beneficial social networks are not static but constantly evolve as needs change (Specht, 1986).

The study of social networks within social work has largely been through quantitative network analyses that focused on the structure and attributes of the networks like anchorage (the focal actor of the network), range (the number of actors in the network), and reciprocity norms, rather than on the support garnered from the network (Auslander & Litwin, 1987; Hawkins & Maurer, 2012; Tracy, 1990). In addition, social networking theory has not been applied widely in culturally diverse contexts, like in sub-Saharan Africa (Kedebe & Butterfield, 2009; Schilling, 1987). Even so, it has been found that social networks can mitigate many of the consequences of social exclusion by providing economic, social, and cultural support (Auslander & Litwin, 1987; Daly & Silver, 2008; Weiss, 1973). However, small and homogenous social networks can be too

insular, which may enforce the marginalization of these groups through a lack of access to opportunities that exist outside their social networks (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). For example, in a community of farmers, when farms fail due to lack of rain, the farmers may want to change careers to work in a factory. But, if they do not know anyone at the factory, it is very challenging to access that opportunity. On the other hand, social networks that are too loosely knit may not be able to recognize needs within the network, and social networks that have too few collective resources may not be able to support others.

Social capital theory builds on social networking theory and is conceptualized as the resources produced by social networks, although a lack of consensus around a social capital definition exists. Social capital was first defined by Bourdieu (1986) as one of many collective properties within social networks that could be converted into economic capital, with others being cultural capital and symbolic capital. Following Bourdieu, social capital began to be valued on its own by theorists, rather than as a resource that solely builds economic capital. Coleman (1988) proposed a definition of social capital that focused upon the collective resources in social networks from which individuals are able to draw resources. De Souza Briggs (1998) disaggregated social capital into two types: social leverage, the social ties one can utilize to get ahead, and social supports, the social ties that one can utilize to survive. Putnam (2000) popularized social capital as the collective value in communities that builds from trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Lin (2001) proposed that social capital is built through the rational choices by actors of investing in social networks in hopes of garnering tangible returns.

Social capital attributes include integration, cohesion, solidarity, networking, interaction, collaboration, friendship, social inclusion, trust, reciprocity, and social support (Aghabakhskhi & Gregor, 2007; Kiptot & Franzel, 2014; Mathbour, 2007; Skovdal & Ogutu, 2012). These attributes can be themed into four central aspects of social capital: relations of trust; reciprocity

and exchanges; community rules, norms, and sanctions; and connectedness, networks, and groups (Pretty & Ward, 2001). Social capital can be built through engaging in a number of activities including recreation, religion, politics, culture, and economic ventures (Mathbour, 2007). Social capital can lead to various positive outcomes like social and material support for people in need and collective action to address structural forces (Aghabakhskhi & Gregor, 2007; Bisung et al, 2014; Mathbour, 2007; Mwangi & Oma, 2012).

Social capital is divided into three strata, each of which focuses on different levels of social connections (Mathbour, 2007). Accessing all of the strata of social capital is considered ideal due to the diversity of connections, particularly for poor communities (Mathbour, 2007). *Bonding* social capital is the social capital within communities, tightly knit groups, and homogenous groups (Mathbour, 2007; Putnam, 2000), which is often recognized as shared norms, values, and cooperation (Putnam, 2000). These connections often support basic social needs through forming an unofficial safety net for community members by banding together (Aghabakhskhi & Gregor, 2007; Fukuyama, 2001), which can be useful for communities that are outside the bounds of formal aid systems. However, bonding social capital can have negative consequences. Bonding social capital can entrench traditional roles and systems of authority, which can be harmful for historically oppressed groups in communities like women (Fukuyama, 2001). In addition, bonding social capital can lead to the exclusion due to intolerance and fear (Fukuyama, 2001), which can be seen in Kenya through continuing ethnic tensions and spurts of violence.

Bridging social capital exists among communities or groups that are different than one another (Mathbour, 2007; Putnam, 2000). This level of social capital can provide information when official communication channels are weak, develop avenues to share ideas, and build consensus among groups that are diverse (Aghabakhskhi & Gregor, 2007; Putnam, 2000).

Bridging social capital can lead to a more inclusive society through increased tolerance and understanding (Fukuyama, 2001). It also allows individuals to have a greater range of resources available to them in times of need (Putnam, 2000), which is particularly necessary when formal aid is not obtainable.

Linking social capital represents ties with outside interests, people in power, and institutions (Mathbour, 2007). This level of social capital is often the most difficult to establish; this is particularly true for socially excluded and poor communities that are often not participating in the decision-making processes of society (Sepulveda Carmona, 2013). Linking capital is often overlooked by aid institutions, which tend to work through their own direction (Aghabakhskhi & Gregor, 2007). This goes against the spirit of the 4 Cs, through lack of concern for cooperation, coordination, collaboration and communication, all of which inhibit the ideal delivery mechanisms of aid, and the building of trust between aid institutions and beneficiaries and recipient governments. Because of the lack of linking social capital, aid cannot reach many people who are in need.

There is no consensus on the best way to measure social capital (Gallaher et al, 2013). Many studies use World Bank measures but others argue for the importance of cultural relevancy (Gallaher et al, 2013). There is also no consensus on how to build social capital (Nyangena, 2008). A majority of scholarship on social capital has been conducted in the global North (Skovdal & Ogutu, 2012). However, scholars have recently examined social capital in Kenya. In addition, as social capital has been found to positively impact environmental outcomes (Pretty & Ward, 2001), much of the social capital research in Kenya includes environmental concerns. In Kibera, the infamous Nairobi slum, urban gardening improved social capital and food security among participants in the program (Gallaher et al, 2013). In rural Western and Central provinces, volunteer farmers who trained other farmers on successful techniques built new networks,

established reciprocity channels, gained confidence, and enhanced their social status through fame and recognition (Kiptot & Franzel, 2014). In Machakos, where much of the rural data collection for this study occurred, high social capital was found to prevent soil erosion through establishing new norms of farming like building terraces (Nyangena, 2008). In southern Kenya, Maasai were given individual rights to land. This was found to adversely change local social networks, decision-making processes, cooperation between them, and increase conflict over scarce resources as formally communal people individualized their practices (Sundstrom, Tynon, & Western, 2012).

Social capital not been widely employed in social work research despite its potential value in understanding community processes (Hawkins & Maurer, 2012). However, social workers within the community development and international social work subfields argue for using a social capital framework to support community development and community building (Delgado, 2007; Fabricant & Fisher, 2008), to empower marginalized groups (Dominguez, 2008; Yan & Lam, 2009), and to eliminate poverty (Jordan, 2008; Kebede & Butterfield, 2009; Saracostti, 2007). Social capital has rapidly expanded into the international poverty alleviation agenda, and was even identified as ‘the missing link’ in development programs by the World Bank. Indeed, the concept is useful in its support of informal economies and the positive aspects of social ties and social networks, both of which are highly valued in many developing countries (Fine, 2002).

The concept of social capital has been critiqued for a lack of analysis of systemic forces, like the policies of the World Bank, which impact poor communities worldwide (Fine, 2002). For example, consider the two following studies in Kenya. In a Western Kenya slumburb near Kisumu, social capital was found to be a necessary but not solely sufficient component to improving access to water and sanitation in poor communities (Bisung et al, 2014). A discussion

point in the study made clear that structural inequalities must be addressed in addition to strengthening social capital to improve local health outcomes (Bisung et al, 2014). In contrast, a study in Kibera found that social capital in the form of childhood friendships can support children in poor households affected by HIV through resource sharing, such as sharing food, and practical support, like sharing domestic duties (Skovdal & Ogutu, 2012). This study recommends that development programs focus on building the social capital of children to respond to family crises (Skovdal & Ogutu, 2012). It did not discuss addressing the structural issues that cause poverty, the exclusion of these children and their families from the formal aid processes, or the ethics of assuming that the solution to community-wide parental sickness and death from AIDS is to make the children reliant on each other. The lack of analysis of structural issues and the assumption that people can survive their circumstances by collectively pulling themselves up by their bootstraps is common in the social capital literature.

A lack of clarity around social capital and continuing criticism of the concept has led to alternative understandings of the uses of social networks. Simone (2008) proposed an alternative concept, People As Infrastructure (PAI) to explain social networking processes specifically in African cities where resources are greatly limited and services are erratic. Because there is little formal infrastructure in these cities, he suggested that African city dwellers must collaborate to support an informal infrastructure made of their skills and knowledge in order to allow for the most efficient use of scant resources for a maximal outcome of all involved. Activities in these cities are not restricted by regulations, rules, and norms, creating opportunities for residents who are able to delicately navigate across social, economic, and geographic boundaries. Thus, according to a PAI framework, most residents exhibit a willingness to interact across these boundaries through reciprocal efforts. But rather than developing long-term social ties built on continued investment (as in social capital theory), Simone suggests social ties are constantly

negotiated to fit the particular context through flexible, provisional, open-ended, and unpredictable efforts. Residents in these cities, in other words, support each other but do so in a manner that is mutually beneficial in the particular situation of the current context, which may arise from an unpredictable range of scenarios.

Migrants to African cities, like EDPs, are particularly inclined to engage in the processes delineated in PAI (Simone, 2008). Migrant groups are commonly thought to survive through intense cooperation between members of the group. However, often the skills and connections within the group are too homogenous (Simone, 2008). For example, former farmers may only know other former farmers, which would not help them find employment in the urban area. Thus, it is more beneficial to generate new social ties with unknown individuals or groups, even if it is risky. Migrants who are able to do this are rewarded more than those that solely stay within the group (Simone, 2008). Further, because most migrants in African cities are not in their preferred locale, either wanting to move back to their home communities or elsewhere, they do not value investing in long-term social tie development that builds lasting social networks and creates social capital (Simone, 2008). Provisional reciprocal efforts may yield more rapid and effective support.

Findings

Because of the amount of aid going into Kenya and the social work framework of this study, an underlying assumption was that many participants would be engaged with aid institutions in some capacity. This assumption was not supported by the data, except for one negative case; instead, failure of formal aid mechanisms in all forms was a common theme across the 19 communities. Many communities sought assistance during micro disasters from their social networks because of the failure of formal aid, their social exclusion from the formal helping networks, or because it was their preferential helping mechanism. In some cases across

the 19 communities, social networks were able to support people to recover to their previous state after a micro disaster. Some were even able to improve their lives. However, in most cases, the social networks did not have enough resources to support recovery; they were only able to support survival. Thus, micro disasters for these people tended to result in poorer lives.

Aid Failures

Governmental aid: inaction and corruption. Participants often discussed their views that disaster relief should be under the purview of the Kenyan government. However, the Kenyan government-based disaster relief was non-existent or corrupted, a finding that was suggested by literature and other publicized examples in this area (BBC News, 2010; Hope, 2014). A Jam City resident explains non-reaction by the government:

If there's the flood, we usually call them, the governors, counselors, they live nearby. They receive the phone calls and they don't come. They just say, we're coming, we're coming, but they usually come after the floods are over. Yeah, because the vehicles, they cannot visit themselves and so the area becomes so dirty and muddy, they cannot get in. They will not risk themselves.

In Shauri Moyo monetary aid was allotted for recovery after the floods by the Kenyan government. However, the local chief absconded with the money. Corlucka explained:

We were told by the chief to write a report of all things lost in the flood. We wrote everything and the chief told us there was a certain amount of money, which was to be released by the government for the people affected by these floods. Four months we waited for the cash. We stayed. We were struggling. We stayed. We stayed. I went back to the chief. [He] was not there. I asked the assistant chief, where is our chief? Oh, [he] had been transferred. The government got some funds for the flood but we didn't get anything. Corruption! Something of that nature so I just said we tried. It was so

painful...They only really help if there is a huge disaster. This isn't a huge disaster. It's just a local place.

Community problems with the government became even worse after the flood. The local government is now proposing that all housing dwellings within 30-50 meters of the river must be demolished. When this law goes into effect, Richard said, "Then we will be homeless." Evicting slum dwellers is common in Kenya and alternative land and housing are usually not provided (UN Habitat, 2006).

Governmental problems were common elsewhere, primarily through means-testing to find the poorest people in the communities. This was problematic because many of the participants felt they were the poorest people in the communities but they were not identified as in need of aid. Ruth, a poor farmer in Mutito explains:

It was the case that the government sometimes comes in with relief food but then they just leave. They just go to the worst cases, like the poorest, and give them. But it's a case of giving 1-2 kgs so it doesn't really make a big difference. It's like they say I am not disadvantaged like the ones who are most pressed so I have never received any relief. It's been three years since the last time they gave relief food so you just have to do something for yourself.

Government corruption also impacted NGO aid. Ruth explains further:

And even corruption. Someone who is releasing the food, let's say World Food Programme, they give like 100 sacks to be transported from Machakos to Kitui or from Kitui to the divisional areas and 100 sacks are being given but the number of sacks that reach the place is like 50. The other 50, you don't know where that goes. Either they are sold on the way or I don't know. It really happens here in Kenya.

While the Kenyan government lacks capacity to respond to all of the participants' concerns, the lack of meaningful assistance from the government was noticeable because participants saw government responses to other problems. As the Westgate Mall terrorist attack occurred at the beginning of the research period, participants often made comparisons of governmental responses to micro disasters that affected them to the massive governmental response to the terrorist attack. The Westgate Mall was located in the wealthiest neighborhood of Nairobi, Westlands, and was frequented by the Kenyan elite and expatriates. Corlucka, a survivor of The Midnight Flood in Shauri Moyo Case, compared his disaster with the terrorist attack:

If it (a flood) would have happened in Westlands, they could have taken it seriously.

They don't care about poor people. They're less concerned about us than about the people in Westlands. The rich people don't need help but the government helps them so much! They are like buddies.

The disaster of the terrorist attack highlighted the preferential treatment of people in power. After many years of assumptions that the government could not help him with anything including raising his sister as a young boy himself, Corlucka questioned why the government chose to assist certain groups and other groups to ignore.

Despite participants overwhelmingly identifying the government as responsible for emergency relief, development aid was not discussed as the government's responsibility. Even in cases that seemed to be clearly under the responsibility of the government, like building drainage ditches, participants identified others as responsible, like landlords. This contradiction needs to be explored further but it may give credence to the argument that aid corrodes local responsibilities (Kopinak, 2013; Maathai, 2009).

Foreign aid and NGOs: top-down aid. Aid was not common within the communities included in the study, which was expected as poor and marginalized communities are served by fewer aid organizations (Zakour & Harrell, 2003). But even in the few communities with aid organizations, participants focused on failed aid projects from foreign aid ventures and NGO projects. The primary complaint was the top-down implementation of this aid. Participants discussed this in terms of both relief and development aid.

The Kenyan Red Cross (KRC) would sometimes bring small amounts of aid, like blankets and food, in response to micro disasters. However, this aid was not enough for all of the survivors. Thus, the KRC picked who would receive aid (children and the elderly), without input from the community, angering many people in the communities. The Chief's wife in Jam City explained:

At times, the Red Cross people come to the areas. They bring some food, beddings, but they cannot cover for the whole village. They just give several, not to everybody.

Because you find that almost everybody is affected so they just look for the elderly, the young people, they just help some, not all.

Red Cross aid is typically given in this manner. However, without coordinating with recipient communities, this would seem confusing. This is particularly so because participants view the Red Cross as a wealthy Western organization that has enough aid for everyone. Thus, participants spoke of this angrily.

In an example with development aid, in Korogoshi, an urban slum in Nairobi, the French government installed a building with toilets and water treatment capabilities. Clean water and toilets were available for a small charge. However, this project had long been abandoned. A community leader explained that they did not want this project and asked to use the money to feed people in the community instead. The project was built, shoddily. (During our time in

Kenya, Scott volunteered with the local Rotary Club. As he is a chemical engineer with waste management experience, the Rotary Club asked him to assess the project to see if it could be repaired and used. It could not due to poor construction.) Due to the poor construction, the digester that treated the waste failed after about three months. The community members rejected the project after its failure and were still angry over their lack of input in the project.

In Wamunyu, a rural community suffering through drought, it was shocking to see an abandoned water pump in the center of the village. The Chinese government built the pump as a development project and assigned local community members, without the input of the community, to collect fees to pay the electricity bill and maintain the pump. After several months, the electricity to the pump was turned off. The appointed leaders of the pump had stolen the money instead of paying the bill. The community had not attempted to unite against this appointed group.

Also in the rural communities of Wamunyu and Mutito, there was a widespread German aid program during droughts and flashfloods. This aid was tied to work through development projects to benefit the community like building flood barriers and repairing roads. However, the people who I interviewed did not understand the purpose of the projects or the aid-for-work philosophy. Some community members reported they worked but did not receive aid. Many reported they worked but compensation was not fair. Although having recipients contribute labor towards aid is considered a new best practice (Bisung et al, 2014), the contribution must be established in collaboration with the community, not demanded as in this instance. The view of this program was extremely negative, many reported it was exploitative, and thus community members opted out of the program despite real need, a powerful statement against the program. Ester in Mutito complained of a lack of payment:

There was a relief group that came to give us aid but it was tied to work. We get aid after doing a certain job. Like, we have to do work, we are given a certain distance, like here to there, to repair the roads, potholes. Up to date, we did the job and we have never been paid. The relief people went away.

Ben's father said the aid is not enough for the assigned work:

You could even get some assistance from European countries. Germany. Not giving you food. You have to work for that food! You have to repair the roads then they pay you, like a sack of maize and a half sack of beans and salad. That's little.

Many participants conveyed a sense of indignation that a rich country would force upon them the choice to work on their projects or continue to suffer hunger and risk death. They felt that Germany had enough money to give aid without attached conditions.

Aid from foreign governments and NGOs failed due to top-down implementation and a mismatch of expectations from the donors and the communities. More input from the communities may have resolved many of these issues, assuming that the aid workers and funders were responsive to this input. For example, perhaps the German aid workers could have asked the community to identify projects to work on. In addition, more communication from the aid donors would have also supported the aid projects. Had the communities known that the Red Cross did not have sufficient resources, they may have been more likely to accept the scant aid provided. Likewise, had the German aid program about the goals of the work for aid program, perhaps the community would have been more engaged.

It is difficult to discern if aid in Kenya does not work or if need in Kenya is so great that aid does not reach all intended recipients in its present form. It was clear, though, that most people in this study received no meaningful assistance. One participant who must survive urban flashfloods year after year excitedly ran after me following the interview to tell me she

remembered when she last received any assistance—it was in 1997. Thus most communities were not struggling with corruption or aid that they did not understand; they were not receiving assistance at all. But in the face of great odds, they were surviving the micro disasters and they did so by relying on each other.

Aid Success

One community, Jam City, of the Case of Development-Induced Flashfloods in Jam City, saw formal aid success. Prior to the building of the luxury apartments and the ensuing floods, aid workers on behalf of the “Korean Government” contacted the local chief (a community elder that is not elected nor holds a formal paid position but is revered as a traditional authority figure) to see what the community needed. The chief discussed this with the community and they all jointly decided on the need for a toilet (in comparison to their fragile pit toilets) with waste treatment capabilities. This decision followed the best practices for aid. The project was accompanied by community support of the intervention, which developed through conversations with the community (Bisung et al, 2014).

During the research period, Korean construction workers along with Jam City workers were in the process of building the toilets, which provided jobs for the community. When finished, toilet use cost was projected to be around five cents, which would fund jobs to people running and maintaining the toilets. The community was very proud of this project and excited about the development for the community, indicating success of the project.

Coping, Recovery, and Survival Through Social Networks

In the aftermath of micro disasters, the participants showed different degrees of resiliency. Some participants *coped* with micro disasters, meaning they solved the problems related to the micro disasters to emerge more secure against future disasters. Others *recovered* from micro disasters, meaning they rebuilt to the pre-micro disaster state. But many people

merely *survived* micro disasters, meaning they lived but became worse off after the micro disaster.

Coping with garbage through community leadership. Two urban communities, Shauri Moyo and South B, successfully managed their garbage despite no formal systems. All communities had designated areas for disposing garbage. It would either be burned or taken to a dumping site on designated days. Although garbage was still blowing in the wind and standing next to a designated trash heap was very unpleasant, these two communities were markedly cleaner than other areas. It was difficult to encourage community residents to think about why this situation existed. Because neighborhoods were divided ethnically, local residents often stated the reasons for their clean neighborhoods through ethnic stereotypes of others. For example, several participants suggested Majengo's trash problem (a Swahili neighborhood) was because Swahilis are inherently lazy, a common stereotype of Swahilis; Eastleigh's trash problem (a Somali neighborhood) was because Somalis like to live in their waste, suggesting they are dirty and primitive. This was expected, as ethnic tensions remain high. However, I was able to observe certain traits of the two clean communities.

South B and Shauri Moyo were noteworthy due to the social norms in the community. Dumping sites were organized. Children were paid to clean up litter. Instead of streams of human waste flowing throughout the community, people were seen hand scrubbing the streets, which were made of compacted mud. Both communities had leadership in this area. South B had strong local representatives that worked with a group of community members that met around trash and waste. South B even had established fines for litterers, who were usually new to the community and not socialized into the non-littering norms. Shauri Moyo's local government representative reportedly organized with a local business to pay children and young adults to keep the

neighborhood clean, although community members were not sure exactly how this happened. These features were not seen in other communities.

Residents in both communities were invested in improving their living conditions. South B was noticeably older than many other urban neighborhoods. Residents reported living there for several decades and having children in the neighborhood. Shauri Moyo stands in contrast. Shauri Moyo was observantly young; young adults are the elders of the community. Shauri Moyo is also a more transient neighborhood than South B. Residents are constantly moving in and out of the area, and most are not local but are rural to urban migrants. The residents are very friendly with each other, which was observed and described as a benefit of the area by study participants. In both communities, residents reported they *liked* their communities, something not often said in other areas. Their investment in making their communities a nice place to live was clear.

Coping with human waste through adaptive ventures. The lack of containment and disposal of human waste was a commonality across almost all of the communities in the study. The constant smell of human waste was concerning due to disease, which the residents were very aware of. In most of the communities, there were either fragile pit toilets where the waste dropped into the ground, or flying toilets where the waste was bagged in the house and thrown outside. Both of these were problematic because the waste was not entirely contained and would flow in streams throughout the community. During floods, the waste would flow into people's houses.

South B got their waste out of their community. As South B is located on the Nairobi River and on a tributary, a local entrepreneur supported by the local government built toilets in the form of bridges over these rivers. Thus, the waste drops into the rivers and flows away, solving the local waste problem. The social norms in South B shifted due to the success of the bridge toilets and now pit toilets are not in the area and flying toilets are not tolerated. Obviously

this is problematic for communities down river, which I thought of often when visiting those communities, like Jam City and Athi River. However, lacking governmental management of waste that is supposed to be covered by tax dollars, the community adapted the best they could.

Coping with droughts through migration. Although most rural residents hunkered down on their land and hoped for rain during drought-based micro disasters, some young men adapted by migrating to the cities together. Boscoe pointed to a dried water hole in Wamunyu and said, “This is why people move to the urban areas. You can’t survive here.” These forced migrants are environmentally displaced persons (EDPs), a population that is projected to continue to grow worldwide. It is estimated that a majority of slum dwellers in Kenya are migrants from the rural areas (Archambault, De Laat, & Zulu, 2012). Currently, it is estimated that there are at least several million EDPs worldwide (Morton et al., 2008). This figure is predicted to rise to 10 million in ten years and to over 100 million within 20 years, with most of EDPs coming from poor rural areas of developing countries. However, as EDPs tend to move to urban slums in their home country with few translatable skills, they are often subject to a life of poverty in these communities (Morrisey, 2008).

Indeed, all but one EDP that was interviewed was living in a slum. Unable to secure good and consistent employment due to a lack of skills and the notoriously corrupt and exclusionary nature of the formal Kenyan economy, these EDPs were largely unable to send home money as hoped. In fact, they were often monetary drains on their families in the rural areas. Perhaps because of their lack of ability to succeed in Nairobi, rural to urban migrants in Nairobi typically do not move to the city and set up roots. Rather they move back and forth from their rural areas on average every two years, creating unstable and highly migratory populations (APHRC, 2014). Indeed, many of the participants in the study moved back and forth from Nairobi to the rural areas, and they moved around Nairobi as well.

Recovery through kibarua. Although many participants did not have the resources to recover from micro disasters immediately, some were able to rebuild their lives by using their social networks to engage in the concept of *kibarua* (*casual work*). Kibarua was suggested as an accepted form of charity in many of the communities, including by participants in both rural and urban areas. The work is not always needed but is agreed to in order to give money. For example, I agreed to allow two young men to clean the rug in my apartment, which I did myself all other times, in order to assist them monetarily in an emergency.

In Wamunyu, kibarua money was used to repair damaged houses due to drought-related flashfloods and to buy “starter” animals. The community had one wealthy elite member who owned a farm in Wamunyu but lived in Nairobi as a lawyer. (Incidentally, the lawyer was very famous as he had a role in documenting the post-election violence of 2007/8). When in community-wide crisis, the lawyer or the farmhand (it was not clear who made the decisions) allowed community members to work on the farm for as long as they needed through kibarua. Ben’s mom slowly recovered after a micro disaster drought in 2005 due to kibarua. She explained, “I lost everything. And then I got some cash from that kibarua and I just bought one goat, which gave birth to the others that I have now.” Ben’s father explained that the only way to recover from micro disasters is, “We just go for kibarua, raise cash, and start again.”

Kibarua was important in urban areas as well. Many times after a micro disaster, people who were not affected allowed people who were affected to work for them. For example, a common self-employment venture is to buy a motorcycle or dirt bike among a group of friends and work together providing taxi services in shifts. A similar venture is to buy a van among a group of friends and work together providing bus services in shifts. Many participants reported that friends that worked in these ventures allowed their friends who were in need to take shifts and they were paid through kibarua. In contrast to the rural elites who provided kibarua, the

people who owned the motorcycles and vans were very poor but they had a resource they could exploit.

Recovery through merry-go-rounds. Some participants in drought-ridden areas were able to recover through the use of a type of microfinance scheme called “merry-go-rounds.” Each member of the merry-go-round group donated \$5 per month and the collected money went to one individual. Many used their merry-go-round money to begin a poultry farming business.

Poultry farming has proven to be very successful in drought-ridden areas. Poultry can live on much less water than cattle and can supplement their water intake with vegetables like cabbage. Poultry farmers that were interviewed, like Joseph, a poor farmer who turned to poultry farming after several failed harvests in Mutito, were having so much success that they advocated that I spread the word about the chicken farmers while in remote parts of the area collecting data.

Merry-go-rounds exist in contrast with other common microfinance ventures. Microfinance loans have become popular globally as a form of development aid that encourages recipients to lift themselves out of poverty (Dominelli, 2010). The programs provide start-up microcredit to people who are not otherwise served by traditional banking mechanisms for income generating activities (Yunus, 1999). Along with the loan, recipients usually receive financial training. However, typically these schemes come with strict conditions. The Grameen Bank, which popularized microfinance in Bangladesh, was founded as poor people pooled their money to provide loans (Yunus, 1999). Microfinance evolved out of this idea and typically keeps borrowers in groups. The groups are responsible to ensure every borrower in the group pays back their loans for others in the group to receive more credit (Yunus, 1999). This makes the groups responsible for member failure, which is often high (Dominelli, 2010). However, the banks are not assuming high risk in these ventures, as the interest rates of borrowers are often very high; 35 percent on average but as high as 80 percent (Kneiding & Rosenberg, 2008).

Microfinance loans are exemplary of top-down aid projects as outsiders bringing money as loans. Instead of this model, community members in Kitui developed a community-based model of loaning or donating money in ways that worked for them through merry-go-rounds. The money is a donation, rather than a loan with high interest. And while the money for the donation does come from group members like in microfinance, group members are not responsible for one another's success. The only condition in merry-go-rounds is if you miss a donation, you move to the end of the recipient list.

Recovery due to social capital linkages. Most affected people by micro disasters were socially excluded and did not have many social capital linkages, which are relationships with people in power or institutions. However, one instance was seen. A local pastor ran ministries as a school in Kibera and an orphanage for abused or orphaned children just outside of Kiserian, a formerly rural area that was being subsumed into Nairobi. The land of the orphanage was large. There was a main house where the children lived, several bunkhouses to hold church campers, both children from Kibera as well as volunteers from the United States. To save money, the orphanage began farming a large portion of the land. They reported they were nearly self-sufficient. To do this in a drought prone area, they installed a water source with funding from their American church partner, an example of linking social capital.

Surprisingly, a Maasai herder came onto the land with his livestock to eat the vegetation and to drink from the water source. This was a shocking sight—the Maasai are typically distrustful of outsiders and the orphanage was new in town. The Maasai also do not tend to be Christian and the pastor said many times he spends his time helping Christians. The pastor explained that he actually encourages the Maasai to come onto the land, “It’s a loss for us but it’s good for community relations.”

Reasons for successful recovery. These mutual aid strategies allowed for recovery from micro disasters for several reasons. In every instance, there were people who were not catastrophically affected by the micro disaster. The wealthy and elite that provided kibarua either were not affected by the environmental problem or had enough resources to be able to adapt. In the social capital linking example, the pastor of the orphanage was sponsored by a church in the United States, thus ensuring sufficient resources to build a borehole.

In contrast, the concept of *harambee (come together)* was often discussed when exploring community support. Harambee occurs when a member of the community needs assistance. A friend will hold a harambee, typically at a church or other community gathering space, and community members could come and donate to the people in need. Exemplar harambees, as told by the participants, were when a high school student on a motorbike collided with a semi-truck and was hospitalized for several months; when an elderly community member needed hospitalization; and for an outstanding student to attend an elite secondary school. While harambee promoted community helping, harambee was never described as an option to recover from micro disasters. This is likely because instead of one community member in need, as illustrated by the examples, most community members in the social network were affected by micro disasters. Nonetheless, many participants spoke with pride about the helping function of harambees.

In addition, these strategies worked for recovery because there was enough time to recover. For example, while undertaking kibarua during a drought, had an additional problem occurred such as sickness due to lack of clean water, the kibarua savings would have been wiped out, undermining a slow rebuild of assets. For most participants, this was the case. Affected communities were hit with micro disaster and personal catastrophes, one after another, forcing them into a downward spiral of poverty and despair. While micro disasters are not described

within current disaster scholarship, this idea of lack of recovery because of *continual* disasters is theorized in the literature about disasters in developing countries (Rogge, 2003).

Finally, these social networks had resources. The people in the merry-go-round had enough to spare to give \$5 every month. They were all very poor and outside of the bounds of traditional money lending services, but they were not struggling to survive in the most literal sense. This was in contrast to many people who were starving in the drought-ridden areas. Likewise, kibarua worked because there were people in the community who could give during times of crisis; often the elite gave kibarua, but also friends who did not have extra money but could open up pathways to an income source. Linking capital by definition are linkages to people with resources or power, thus allowing the pastor to infuse resources into the community and support his new community.

Survival. Participants suggested that full recovery from micro disasters was rare. Many reported that their friends and family helped in whatever ways they could during a micro disaster, but the help was often minimal because their friends and family were too poor to assist in a substantive manner. Scholars (Gitterman & Germain, 2008; Simone, 2008) suggest that this dilemma is common and proposed the expansion of one's social networks as one solution. However, most study participants simply did not seem to know a lot of diverse people to increase the resources available within the social networks. Despite this, they were able to support each other for survival through living communally, rescuing each other, and working together.

Living communally and splitting costs. Much of the support of survival from social networks came from living communally and splitting costs. After a micro disaster that destroyed all of Peter's assets, he explained he survived because, "I was received by a friend and I stayed with him for some time, almost a month and a half. Then I sorted myself. I could not come back right away because what I saw, I did not want to see it again." He explained why people are able

to rely on their social networks when in crisis, “You just receive them. Now they have been washed away. Nothing is left. Then I welcome you. I stay with you for some time. When it gets dry, you go back to your place. And I offer you whatever I have.”

Likewise, participants from Wamunyu who moved to Nairobi, relied on living communally while they established themselves. One participant, Boscoe, took on the role of point person for these EDPs. He explains, “When they move here, they now come to me because they know I can help them with housing. If they are schooling and they are in class or at the library all day, they just sleep at my place.” His assistance greatly eases their transitions, despite the low amount of monetary aid he can provide. Their presence helps him as well, as the EDPs contribute towards rent and other costs when they can.

Others explained that their community evolved into a large communal living situation over time. In South B, Kevin’s uncle reported a rarity: unity and non-competition across ethnic groups. He explained, “Luhya here, Kikuyu across, Coast behind. We live together. Everything is everyone’s. I don’t know what is what anymore.” This norm of cooperation developed after many years of living together and supporting each other through crises.

Rescue. Communities were able to literally rescue people from micro disasters, even when everyone was affected. Jam City residents explain, “You find a flood, you go around and knock on the houses. If there are small children or the elderly people, we have to carry them and support them.” While there were not many resources in their social networks, these community members did have manpower, and used this resource to help others survive.

Work together. Due to poor harvests, many were coping in areas where drought-based micro disasters are common by changing their income generating activities. Charcoal making was common. In this process, a group worked together to cut down trees and slowly burn them in a homemade kiln, which produced charcoal. The charcoal is then sold to middlemen who

transport it to the urban areas. The making and transporting of charcoal is illegal, but because the majority of Kenyans cook with charcoal, an action that is not illegal, there is a high demand for the product. Because the charcoal makers have no other means of income, they took on the risk of making the charcoal, despite its illegality. Increasing the risk, because many of the trees on their lands have been cut and burned into charcoal (and left the land arid), residents have resorted to sneaking into the national forest. This forest is now under guard by soldiers assumed to be affiliated with the Kenya Forest Service and the charcoal makers had been chased out many times. They feared an escalation of violence.

People as infrastructure. The concept of people as infrastructure (Simone, 2008) was not often seen in the communities affected by micro disasters. Primarily, people were helping others and asking for help from people they knew intimately. This was due to their social exclusion—they did not know that many people—as well as the instability of the area. The people they had long-term relationships with were more trustworthy than people they did not know. Nonetheless, one instance of people as infrastructure was seen.

In Mutito, a taxi driver ran away from his abusive family at the age of 14. He told his story of the man, a stranger, who helped him start his life in Kiuti:

When I first came to the town, I met a stranger. He is the owner of the driving school. I asked to work for him and lucky enough, the person who was cooking for the students had moved so I got the job. He said to work for the students and everything I will give to you: clothes, food, shelter. I had no place to sleep so I stayed in the school... That's how I started my life in town. I didn't know anybody but I met that guy.

The stranger and the taxi driver did develop a relationship over time. However, the relationship began as the taxi driver sought people whom he did not know to help him. The stranger responded to his need. This was rare. People generally trusted and helped the people they knew

intimately. One participant explained his fear of people he does not have strong relationships with: “The other thing is witchcraft, meaning, let’s say for example, you’re my neighbor and my son goes to university. When he comes home, I think, why has my son not done that? So I bewitch you. So that’s why when you are a graduate, you can’t even get a job. You have been bewitched because of jealousy.” This person was so terrified of the effects of jealous people, he only worked with and helped his closest friends.

Summary

Aid and government assistance were not readily available to support communities in this study through micro disasters. The few examples of government aid illustrated corruption through instances or rumors of stolen aid. Aid from foreign governments and NGOs was more common but still problematic. This aid was delivered in a top-down manner, which alienated recipients. Participants deemed only one instance of aid successful; in this case, the donor government worked closely with the community to support community-defined needs.

Despite aid failures, participants lived through micro disasters successfully. In a few cases, social networks were able to support coping with the micro disaster (participants were able to solve the problems related to the micro disaster) and recovery from the micro disaster (participants were able to rebuild after the micro disaster). These instances had defining characteristics. The participants in the social networks that supported coping and recovery suggested that in these circumstances, not all people in the social networks were affected by the micro disaster, which freed up resources. There was also enough time in-between micro disasters to recovery, which allowed for a slow rebuild instead of continuously responding to crises. Additionally, there were individuals within the social networks that had resources to share, which allowed for the support of other people.

Many participants were only able to literally survive micro disasters, rather than cope or recover. Their survival was also due to their social networks, however, their connections did not have enough resources for adequate support. Without resources for recovery, communities often spiraled deeper into poverty because of secondary effects like lost assets or lost income sources. Lawrence concludes, “Here in Kenya, we learn to weather the disasters. But we Kenyans, we cannot gain back what we have lost.”

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Because ecosystems have been treated as disposable with endless resources since the Industrial Revolution, slow violence has gradually degraded the environment (Nixon, 2011). While this occurs on a global scale and affects the majority of people, slow violence disproportionately impacts poor people in developing countries. Poor communities in Kenya in this study that endured slow violence were found to have experienced environmental disasters. These disasters were small and localized, a typology that is not included within the scholarship on disasters. While billions of dollars of aid are funneled into Kenya annually, the communities in this study did not receive aid to recover from the micro disasters that affected them. These communities survived micro disasters by relying on their social networks. However, in most cases their social networks did not have enough resources to support recovery, which was defined in this study as rebuilding to the state before the micro disaster; or coping, which was identified when participants solved their problems related to the micro disaster. Most participants spiraled deeper into poverty with the effects of micro disasters. These findings have several theoretical, policy, practice, education, and research implications, all of which will be discussed.

Theoretical Additions

Because slow violence is hidden, unremarkable, and unfolds over time, it has been difficult to capture attention about gradual environmental degradation. Thus, Nixon (2011) called for stories about the impacts of slow violence; few studies to date have used this conceptual framework for research. This study begins to fill that gap.

The concept of slow violence addresses marginalization due to poverty, ethnicity, gender, race, and locale in the developing world (Nixon, 2011). Much of Nixon's analysis around marginalization and environmental degradation addresses *why* certain communities are the focal points of environmental degradation (their marginalization). This theme was confirmed in this study. In addition, this study explored contexts where much of the population was affected by environmental degradation like droughts and desertification, a situation that was not delineated in Nixon's arguments. This study also applied the slow violence framework to explore specific environmental degradation scenarios in the form of disasters. Further, this study looked at the results of slow violence and how, if at all, communities were able to cope with these environmental changes. All of these themes will be discussed.

Impacts of Poverty

Like Nixon proposed, poor areas suffered from environmental degradation disproportionately in this study. The floods in Nairobi hit the slums only; in the wealthy areas heavy rains were drained away. The poor areas in Nairobi lacked functioning waste management systems; the state provided these services in the wealthy areas. The poor areas were also closest to factories and their industrial pollution but typically did not benefit financially as outsiders held the best jobs.

This study complicates the linked concepts of slow violence and poverty. In many cases, entire communities were affected by environmental degradation, but these communities were

unequal in terms of wealth and income. This is a common scenario but one that is not explored within the current slow violence scholarship. This is an important distinction because the wealthiest community members in these situations were able to cope and adapt.

For example, entire rural communities were impacted by drought. The poor responded by attempting to gather needed water in all ways possible; as the drought persisted, these attempts eventually failed. Their crops died and the poor became poorer through lack of income and increased debt. The wealthy, on the other hand, readily adapted to the drought. They built irrigation systems, dug boreholes, and purchased farming inputs that made their land better able to produce during droughts.

Thus, many of these environmental scenarios that impacted poor communities were because of lack of development and poverty, rather than the environmental degradation itself. This complicates Nixon's (2011) description of communities that are affected by environmental degradation, which are often presented as homogeneous entities. Because slow violence specifically targets hidden environmental degradation impacting "invisible" people, slow violence would be well served to acknowledge that even within "invisible" communities, some groups of people are more excluded and affected by the environment than others due to their social and economic standing.

Impacts of Rurality

Slow violence includes the idea of marginalization due to locale, which is used to frame the context of environmental degradation in the poor communities in developing countries (Nixon, 2011). Participants in this study often discussed an additional level of marginalization due to locale: their rural location. Like poor participants who lacked the ability to recover, rural

participants discussed their lack of recovery. Participants often discussed this in terms of lack of foreign aid.

They suggested that because of corruption and the remoteness of the rural areas, foreign aid meant for them did not reach them. For example, many participants in Mutito discussed food aid that was meant for drought victims in the area. The aid was imported into the country and then had to go through Nairobi and Kitui before reaching Mutito. These community members heard rumors that at every stage of this process corrupt officials skimmed aid, which left little for people in need. They also often suggested that the farther away a community is from an urban area, the less aid it received due to their marginalization from official government processes. Participants felt that their representatives forgot about them and the national government did not know about them due to their remoteness, thus enforcing their exclusion.

Many of the participants' ideas about foreign aid stemmed from rumors. Implied in these rumors was the idea that the urban areas received aid and assistance, and living standards were higher. This idea partially explains the optimism that many participants in this study had when migrating. However, these rumors were not supported by data or other sources of information: many of the migrants moved into the urban slums without sufficient translatable skills for success in the city, and conditions in the urban slums were very poor. However, the rumors and feelings of exclusion due to rurality complicate the inclusion of locale in slow violence literature in a way that likely reflects the feelings of many rural communities.

Impacts of Ethnicity

Slow violence includes ideas around societal exclusion due to ethnicity, or “micro-minorities” (Nixon, 2011, p. 106). Nixon describes the plight of the Ogoni in Nigeria who live on land with oil reserves. The Nigerian government gave companies like Shell and Chevron

permission to mine the oil, which polluted the Ogoni lands. The companies gave large payments to the government in exchange for the rights to the oil but little in payment back to the Ogoni; their land was also not repaired. As the Ogoni comprise less than one percent of the Nigerian population, they lack political power to change this situation. In fact, the government has gone so far as to execute Ogoni protest leaders like Ken Saro-Wiwa under false charges. The Ogoni situation connects to the concept of environmental injustice, as communities without power bear disproportionate environmental burdens without rewards.

Rather than ethnicity linking to why some communities have degraded environments, ethnicity played out in other ways in this study. As Kenya continued to heal from the post-election violence of 2007/8, the participants and Advisory Board members frowned upon openly discussing ethnicity; thus it was not a targeted domain of questioning. However, issues around ethnicity still emerged from the data. The Kikuyu ethnic group was often perceived as unfairly dominant, wealthy, and powerful. In a sense, this perception is correct, as most presidents have been Kikuyu, which has benefited many in this ethnic group through nepotism (Hornsby, 2013).

Study participants suggested that they experienced environmental degradation and they were not receiving assistance because they were not Kikuyu. Many implied that all Kikuyus were wealthy, thus no Kikuyus were struggling with environmental problems. Kikuyus *are* relatively wealthy in aggregate; 35 percent live in poverty, compared to 47 percent of the nation (Childress, 2008; World Bank, 2011). However, based on observations within Kikuyu areas, poor Kikuyu slums looked similar to poor Kamba slums. The one Kikuyu participant in this study was also very poor. In addition, participants often suggested that all the aid was going to the Kikuyu slum of Kibera. This was an interesting rumor that came up frequently. Kibera does have a documented outside presence in the neighborhood through foreign aid groups, NGOs, and

academic projects (Becchetti, Conzo, & Romeo, 2013; Deacon, 2012; Ellis et al, 2008; Gallaher et al, 2013; Hershey, 2014; Loewenberg, 2012) that was not seen in other areas. However, based on observations, living conditions in the villages I toured in Kibera were among the worst. Thus, even though Kibera was receiving aid, it was not sufficient to change living conditions. Further, when exploring secondary data sources, it became clear that Kibera is not a Kikuyu neighborhood; the ethnic breakdown is Luhya: 38.3 percent, Luo: 27.5 percent, Kamba: 13.4 percent, Kikuyu: 6.4 percent, and other: 13.7 percent (APHRC, 2014).

These (and other) rumors and assumptions about ethnicity resulted in division. Many neighborhoods were a stone's throw away from each other and thus suffered through the same environmental degradation. For example, in The Shauri Moyo Midnight Flood Case, there were also victims of the same flood in neighboring Majengo (a Swahili neighborhood) and Eastleigh (a Somali neighborhood). The communities never united and demanded assistance from the government or aid groups because of their ethnic divisions. This distrust of others that seem different but are in the same situations began during colonialism in order to control the large numbers of colonized people in comparison to the small numbers of colonizers. Ethnic divisions continue to be stoked by the Kenyan elite to maintain their control in a similar manner (Hornsby, 2013), which marginalizes and excludes many people. Thus this research suggests that the slow violence literature should address the ways that ethnicity can divide people so that environmentalism of the poor, a concept that will also be discussed in this chapter, is inhibited.

Vulnerability Theory or Slow Violence to Frame Disaster Scholarship

Rather than slow violence, vulnerability theory is often used as a frame for disaster scholarship (Gillespie, 2010; Oliver-Smith, 2004; Zakour, 2008; Zakour, 2010). Vulnerability theory explores disasters through the ratio of risk to susceptibility to determine vulnerability to a

disaster. The vulnerability theory frame did not fit the Kenyan context in this study for several reasons.

A main variable within vulnerability theory is the proximity of an environmental hazard (Gillespie, 2010). However, this assumes that all environmental hazards are readily identifiable as potentially dangerous. This assumption is not inclusive of many slow violence scenarios, which are not easily perceived. For example, in this study environmental problems included hidden degradation like the slow spread of desertification, hidden contaminants in garbage and industrial pollution, and the gradual erosion of riverbanks. Without acknowledging these unseen forces, many environmental hazards are ignored and reparative measures are not taken.

Relatedly, vulnerability theory assumes that environmental hazards are static and not changeable (Gillespie, 2008). Overlooked in this assumption is that many environmental hazards are not natural occurrences at all. For example, the river flooded Jam City because of a built floodwall around an apartment complex. Waste made people sick all throughout the Nairobi slums because of a lack of functioning waste management systems. Drought and desertification were spreading in the rural areas because of climate change. None of these environmental hazards are unchangeable. Thus exploring preventative responses to environmental hazards like reparation of degraded lands, just development, and clean up of trash must be included in assessments of environmental hazards.

In addition, lack of power and injustice are but two of several variables in the ratio of risk to susceptibility in vulnerability theory (Gillespie, 2010). In this study, lack of power and injustice were the primary commonalities among micro disaster scenarios. For example, the droughts were only deadly among the poor; lack of waste management and drainage were only problems in poor areas; polluting industries were located in the slums, not wealthier areas. Thus,

evaluations of power and injustice should be *at the center* of assessments of environmental problems, rather than exist as a peripheral concern. Slow violence offers an alternative frame for exploring disasters that can critically examine unjust environmental degradation along with systems of power.

Mega or Micro Disasters

Social work research on disasters focuses on large-scale mega disasters (Gillespie, 2008; Gillespie, 2010; Mathbour & Baroousa, 2012; Pyles, 2011; Zakour, 2008; Zakour, 2010). However, participants in this research study discussed small and localized disasters as their primary source of suffering from the environment. This was despite the fact that a majority of the participants survived mega disasters. In fact, participants reported these micro disasters were no less dangerous, destructive, or deadly than mega disasters. These micro disasters were highly unjust and typically only impacted poor communities. In addition, because of the lack of response by the state and private actors, many communities spiraled deeper into poverty after the micro disaster and the ensuing secondary effects.

Micro disasters are hidden, similar to slow violence. Because micro disasters only affect the poor and vulnerable, only those affected by these problems knew about the micro disasters. Micro disasters in Kenya were not publicized in the media, and were rarely responded to. However, due to the invisibility of micro disasters and the lack of inclusion of smaller disasters within the literature, it is impossible to demand holistic engagement with micro disaster survivors. The first step to remedying this limitation is by broadening the disaster conceptualization to include micro disasters. With micro disaster inclusion in the literature, further research can be done to explore community needs and social workers can begin to seek out ways to support micro disaster mitigation and response in Kenya and elsewhere.

Challenging Assumptions About Social Networks

The literature on social networks assumes that social networks have or can produce resources. The debate within the literature emphasizes the intensity of the ties that determine the best uses of these resources by examining trust, reciprocity, norms, and connectedness (Pretty & Ward, 2001). The communities in this study were often able to survive due to the assistance of their social networks, a conclusion that is supported within the literature (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Dominelli, 2012a; Hernandez, 2008; Kedebe & Butterfield, 2009; Lin, 2001). However, many of the participants in this study belonged to social networks with few resources due to their poverty. Thus, the social networks were usually only able to support the most minimal of survival, rather than full recovery. This is in contrast to the literature, which suggests that social networks can be used to eliminate poverty and help people and communities readily recover from disasters (Dominelli, 2012a; Jordan, 2008; Kebede & Butterfield, 2009; Saracostti, 2007). This study provides an addition to the social networking literature through an examination of the resources within social networks, instead of holding the availability of resources as an assumed positive attribute. If there are not enough resources for people to share, they cannot support each other through a crisis in a manner that leads to recovery.

Further, the scholarship on social networks predicts that social networks are flexible and evolve as network needs evolve (Specht, 1986). The assumption in this argument is that social networks have multiple avenues for evolution due to multiple uses of the collective resources. Again, if the social networks do not have enough resources to share, they cannot evolve for differing uses. There was no evidence of evolution of social networks within this study. However, observations only occurred during three months of fieldwork in 19 communities in one

country. Further research is needed to assess whether these trends regarding social networks and community resiliency hold over time and in other settings.

This study found that communities were able help each other through challenging circumstances when the social networks had adequate resources to share. Thus, a future line of inquiry is to explore if infusing resources into social networks supports people in need in a meaningful, community-based way. Perhaps avenues of kibarua can be established with an NGO. Relief aid (like food and water) can also be distributed so community members may free up monetary resources to participate in merry-go-rounds. The communities in this study were surviving without any assistance in dire circumstances. With a slight increase in resources, they may be able to work towards recovery or even the betterment of their circumstances.

Implications for Social Work

Social workers, including social workers in Kenya and those abroad, are well suited to support the excluded communities that are affected by environmental degradation, including those in this study. Environmental degradation is important to other communities as well, including in the United States, and thus the principles suggested in this section readily apply outside of Kenya. Social workers can advocate for policy changes that support environmental protection and repair in all affected communities, encourage the development of the social work capacity in Kenya, and support environmental education within social work education globally.

Policy Responses

Due to the temporal aspect of slow violence that causes slow degradation of the environment over time, the environmental impacts get disconnected from the core causes of environmental degradation and power imbalances (Nixon, 2011). In these cases, instead of climate change as the center of localized drought and flashfloods, and lack of waste management

as the center of disease outbreak, localized lack of development is the perceived problem by community residents. Installing a water pump in one rural area, ensuring people do not live on the banks of rivers, and situating a garbage bin in one neighborhood will not address the core issues of micro disasters. Micro disasters will continue as desertification spreads, flashfloods become more common, and waste is not wholly managed.

In their respective communities, social workers can advocate for stronger environmental protective policies and social justice through many actions. Social workers worldwide must encourage their governments to respect and fund strong governmental environmental agencies to limit pollution through various regulatory measures. Social workers must advocate for policies that support renewable energy development like local solar and wind farms and oppose dirty energy developments. Social workers must also back reforestation efforts in order to have more trees to absorb greenhouse gases and guard against deforestation. Social workers can advocate for adequate waste management systems.

Regarding the promotion of international social justice, due to the predatory loan structures of the IMF and World Bank, these international agencies have been criticized as agents of economic colonization for implementing an agenda that benefits their largest shareholders (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan) rather than the developing countries that are the supposed foci of their missions (Turner, 1994). Many of the borrowing countries, including Kenya, have yet to recover from these programs and have exponentially accumulated more crushing debt (Smith, 2006). The government of Kenya cannot jointly repay its debt while also responding to environmental degradation. Without the support of the Kenyan government, the impacts of philanthropists, donors, and social workers are diluted. Thus, social workers worldwide can hold the IMF and the World Bank accountable and join

Kenyan scholars in demanding the cancelation of these unjust debts through advocacy (Maathai, 2009). Without this burden of external debt, the Kenyan government can re-channel the debt payments into community development that promotes resiliency to climate change. The government can be held accountable for these funds by activities that will be described below.

Capacity Building in Kenya

The majority of participants in this study suffered greatly due to environmental degradation with little to no meaningful assistance. However, some of the communities in this study had access to aid ventures. The aid came from foreign governments and NGOs; the government did not give aid directly to participants in ways the communities found meaningful. Study participants focused on programs and other concretized projects when they described aid; likely grants and loans were given to the government of Kenya as aid but this was outside of the experience of the participants. However, there were many problems with the aid.

The aid was for both development and relief purposes. This was an important finding because of the critique that foreign aid tends to be crisis oriented (Maathai, 2009). This critique was not seen in the communities in this study. Much of the aid was not crisis oriented at all: toilet buildings, boreholes, and work for aid on development projects. Aid that was crisis oriented, like from the Red Cross, was so poorly implemented that it is difficult to believe the aid was driven by a need to impress donors through successful short-term relief.

Both foreign governments and NGOs gave aid to Kenya. However, it is difficult to conclude that this aid corroded local responsibility, as feared in the critical scholarship in this area (Branczik, 2004; Kopinak, 2013; Maathai, 2009). Participants in this study were asked about what they would like to see done to solve their problems and whom they thought should do it. Most participants said the Kenyan government should fix their problems, suggesting that local

responsibility was not corroded. However, the government did not give aid directly to any participants successfully, suggesting that these local responsibilities are not being carried out. More research is needed in this area.

As suggested in the critical aid scholarship, the aid that was given was implemented in a top-down manner (Easterly, 2009; Fehling, Nelson, & Venkatapuram, 2013; Fengler, 2011; Goldin, 2009; Maathai, 2009). The toilet building in Korogosho was not wanted by local residents, but was built anyway. The German work for aid program in the rural areas angered community members with demands that local residents work for food aid. The Chinese government picked untrustworthy community members to run the water pump project without consulting the community. The only successful aid program identified was a toilet building built in Jam City by the Korean government after discussing the project with the community. Top-down aid was a major problem of the projects seen in these communities. This is something that local social workers can address through intermediary positions that support aid programs with community-based work, and assist local communities in voicing their opinions about what they need.

While funding documents were not available, the actions of the Red Cross suggested that their funding levels did not allow for appropriate aid in communities. In Jam City, the Red Cross gave relief to only the elderly and children, a move that the community did not understand; but it suggested that the organization did not have enough relief aid for all residents. In the least, the Red Cross should have communicated with Jam City to explain their actions, rather than to leave local residents to assume that “the Red Cross does not care about [them]”

However, other actions of the Red Cross suggested the aid workers were not at all tied to the local communities (Kopinak, 2013). In Shauri Moyo, the Red Cross conducted an assessment

in response to flooding that displaced and killed people. They used this data that was collected on the floods in a bizarre funding appeal to Western countries where the number of victims identified was correct but the context of the flood changed to rural areas. Actions like these highlight why the private aid sector is so severely critiqued by study participants.

Many participants described the government as corrupt, which supports other studies on this topic (Hope, 2014; Transparency International, 2014). In two instances, participants in this study tied this corruption to aid: the local authorities stole both World Food Programme food and national government funds for flood victims. In addition, corruption certainly affected the daily lives of the participants through constant bribing of officials and the police. It was difficult to hear stories of forced payments to officials while also discussing how many days participants went without eating. Thus, as expected, corruption within the government highly impacted participants, both in their daily interactions as well as through the aid processes. The result was that corruption made the participants poorer, as they struggled to afford bribes or went without needed aid. Corruption must be an area that is addressed when working with these communities.

Many of these problems can be addressed by social workers. In Kenyan communities, the social work profession is not widely established, despite the efforts of internationally renowned social work scholars in the country (Mungai, Wairire, & Rush, 2014). The further development of a strong Kenyan social work profession can be supported through international social work education organizations like the IASSW, and social work educators and scholars in this area.

Social work education in Kenya can go beyond a formalized curriculum. Community leadership is needed in socially excluded communities affected by slow violence, particularly because none of the communities in this study are currently united to change their circumstances. Slow violence (along with Marxist concepts, empowerment theory, and community organization

models) includes an argument that people will eventually organize to change local conditions that adversely affect them. Specifically within literature on slow violence, poor people are expected to unite to support an environmentalism that is beneficial for them, which will also include fighting many of the forces that are linked to their oppression and poverty (Nixon, 2011). This is categorized as an environmentalism of the poor.

One of Nixon's examples of environmentalism of the poor is in Kenya. Wangari Maathai, along with seven other women, started the Greenbelt Movement to unite Kenyans against deforestation and soil erosion as well as sexism (Nixon, 2011). The main activity for the movement began as tree planting by women, which was considered an act of civil disobedience by the Moi regime (Nixon, 2011). The linking of gender issues and environmental degradation was natural in the context. As colonialism shifted the land use from subsistence farming to intensive farming for exports, the land degraded rapidly, affecting the poor the most because they could no longer rely on the land for survival (Nixon, 2011). In addition, as the Kenyan economy commoditized, men held the bank accounts and men made the monetary decisions. The Greenbelt Movement gave back power to women as they protected their farmlands through tree planting and were often paid to plant the trees. The Greenbelt Movement also expanded over time to include interrelated issues like demanding the release of political prisoners and relief from international debt (Maathai, 2009; Nixon, 2011). Nixon failed to fully address the formation of the Greenbelt Movement. While it targeted poor women affected by environmental degradation, these women did not form the Greenbelt Movement. Instead local community leaders, like Mathaai, created it.

It was my assumption that some community members would be involved in community actions to address environmental degradation, slow violence, and their socioeconomic

conditions. This was due to my training as a community social worker and my belief in community organizing models. However, environmentalism of the poor or any other uniting activism to better their circumstances was not seen in any of the communities studied. Participants were asked if they had ever united or thought about pressuring authorities to respond to their needs. Their responses were always no. Many seemed confused at the question and they could not answer why they had never done so. Kenya is in a period of political muteness with little widespread activism (Obonyo, 2013; Stockman, 2013). Thus, perhaps the gap between environmentalism of the poor and the contexts of the study is lack of local leadership and lack of critical education. Social workers can impact this area.

The future leaders of environmentalism of the poor movements do not need to be internationally known scholars like Mathaai. They can be local community members interested in these issues. Social workers, both Kenyan social workers and social workers involved in the international associations due to the lack of trained Kenyan social workers, can support such a movement by training community members in topics like community organization and community development. With people power, local communities can pressure local authorities, NGOs, their national government, and the global power structure to respond to their needs. They can also advocate for an open government that uses additional funds for communities, not corrupt activities.

Social workers can also support solving the immediate slow violence problems in many of the communities, while structural and educational issues are concurrently addressed. Several neighborhoods were able to solve their problems. South B and Shauri Moyo solved their trash problems through community cleanups and strict rules around garbage. Community members in Kitui solved their drought-related economic challenges by forming merry-go-round groups to

support economic changes. Jam City successfully worked with a foreign aid group to build toilets in the community. Social workers can amplify these successes through orchestrating tours of successful ventures. Participants in the merry-go-round even suggested this as a way to collectively survive the increasing droughts. Careful attention should be given though to ethnic tensions that remain in order to support learning and collaboration, rather than competition and jealousy.

While developing connections like these is a typical local social work function, there are not enough social workers on the ground in Kenya. In addition, because of the immense aid in the country, there are many international social workers and development workers in the country. Thus, these tours can be organized by both local social workers and people in the international development field depending on who has connections in the communities. Further, involvement in the tours by people who work in the international aid agencies might begin to build relationships with communities to mitigate the established top-down processes that were observed widely in the communities in this study.

Micro Social Work Practice

Within the clinical concentration of the social work profession, needs related to the experiences of the participants in this study are increasingly recognized. In the most recent edition of the Life Model the importance of the physical environment was highlighted through the infusion of content on ecofeminism and deep ecology (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). Special attention was given to hidden environmental degradation, such as contamination of the physical environment from toxins (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). Thus, there is movement within the person-in-environment framework to include an assessment of the physical environment when working with clients.

The incorporation of the concept of slow violence can support this shift further by including other dimensions of environmental degradation. Slow violence highlights the hidden environmental degradation that slowly occurs over time to the most marginalized groups. Within this study, these environmental problems were everyday issues like lack of drainage, lack of waste management, and lack of adequate seasonal rains. Individual occurrences of these problems were not always devastating; participants withstood many environmental problems successfully. The concept of slow violence came into play as these problems accumulated over time and were compounded by other issues like poverty. For example, participants discussed weathering individual seasonal droughts. Their harvests failed for one season but they engaged in other economic activities to make it to the next season. However, they could not weather the slow change in the climate that led to multiple failed harvests as they deepened into poverty with each drought. Assessments of the physical environment can be cognizant of these everyday environmental problems that clients may appear to be coping with in the moment but are detrimental over time.

In addition, disaster mental health developed as a subfield of crisis services following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (Roberts, 2008). Disaster mental health aims to support survivors through the impacts of disasters, including likely trauma and grief (Roberts, 2008). Participants from this study described feeling traumatized and many needed breaks while sharing their experiences. These findings support the importance of this line of clinical work. As previously discussed, participants identified micro disasters as their primary source of suffering from the environment, despite having survived mega-disasters. Thus, as the disaster mental health subfield continues to expand, micro disasters should be incorporated into disaster assessments when working with clients that are vulnerable to these events.

Social Work Education Outside of Kenya

Environmental social work scholars have argued for the development of practice techniques and curriculum changes to deal with issues raised by environmental degradation in local communities (Coates, 2003; Dominelli, 2011; IFSW, IASSW, & ICSW, 2012; Kauffman, 1994; Lovell & Johnson, 1994; Rogge, 1993; Shubert, 1994). However, students report a lack of inclusion of these topics within their curriculum, despite their passion for the subject (Miller & Hayward, 2014).

All social workers can bring environmental degradation into their work as it impacts both micro and macro level social work. Social workers must learn about the physical environment. Social work has long used scholarship outside of the discipline to advance the field. Incorporating environmental scholarship into social work curriculum will increase environmental understanding (Coates, 2003). With a foundational understanding, the curriculum can progress into including the physical environment in community assessments and within the eco-maps of client systems (Miller & Hayward, 2014). These assessments also must include slow violence and the secondary effects of environmental degradation, both of which are not always overt but can be documented by speaking with community members.

Social work curriculum includes training on power imbalances, and with inclusion of environmental issues students will recognize dynamics related to the environment. For example, poor Kenyans in this study had little to no say in decisions that affected them in regards to the environment. In many instances, participants did not know why an environmental burden was located in their area nor were they included in key decisions about the environment. These issues are transferable to other communities that must overcome their lack of power. All social workers can encourage inclusive decision-making mechanisms in the communities in which they work.

This includes both learning to organize a community so local residents can speak for themselves and modeling participation in services for the community, for example by utilizing an advisory board of consumers.

Further, as social work education includes the examination of students' values and privileges, social work education must also include learning about the interconnectedness of inequalities, the current economic system, and environmental degradation. Individuals are constantly encouraged by environmental experts to lessen their individual impact on the environment. This can be done in various ways including: divesting from dirty energy, using energy efficient products, recycling, insulating their home, purchasing green energy, using paper and water resourcefully, flying and driving less, and eating less meat (EPA, 2014; Stehfest, 2009). All social workers can engage in these individual actions as well as educate others. By exploring all of these issues within social work curriculum, social work students will be prepared to take on an active role in the environmental movement.

Future Research

This study was exploratory so there are several possible avenues for future research in these areas. One major implication of this study is the development of the concept "micro disaster." To further the development of this concept, quantitative survey research can be used to follow vulnerable communities over time, particularly through exploring the impacts of micro disasters. This study found that survivors often became poorer after micro disasters. This can be explored in-depth over time. Other impacts may also be examined that were anecdotally seen like trauma due to the micro disasters, substance use in communities repeatedly affected by micro disasters, and migration choices. Factors that lead to successful community responses may also be explicated. The concept of micro disasters can also be applied to other communities.

Thus, a qualitative design can be used to explore the impacts of micro disasters in other poor communities outside of Kenya. This will allow for comparisons between contexts.

Slow violence can be explored in other communities as well. Of specific interest are two different types of communities. Kenya does not have a robust social work profession. In the next exploration of slow violence, a country similar to Kenya but with a robust social work profession, like South Africa or Ethiopia, would be an interesting comparison. This will allow for exploration of the impact of social workers on these critical issues in affected communities. In addition, because environmental degradation is important in developed countries as well, issues of slow violence are prevalent in poor communities in the United States. Exploring slow violence in a variety of contexts will support the expansion and refinements of the concepts.

Because slow violence and micro disasters tend to impact the most marginalized communities, future research should continue to be community-based and would benefit from the guidance offered by different Advisory Boards. To study micro disasters across different communities in Kenya, Advisory Boards for different communities and ethnicities would likely need to be formed due to the lingering ethnic tensions of the areas. An Advisory Board of women would be helpful in exploring the differing impacts for women in any country. In addition, an Advisory Board that includes a social worker or other development professional would likely open-up opportunities to explore formal responses to these issues in-depth.

Conclusion

The participants in this study struggled to live through slow violence. The environmental degradation in their communities was not conducive to their well-being. The social and economic conditions in which they lived were not just. The participants did not cause any of these conditions; but they had to find ways to live within them, often without outside assistance.

Their situations are also not unique. Slow violence and injustice are just as impactful to other poor communities across the globe.

Yet, these conditions do not have to be permanent. There are alternative community models where humans live within the environment sustainably with respect for all people, no matter their age, race, gender, locale, or social or economic status. Social workers have much to give this movement. Indeed, addressing unjust effects that are a result of unsustainable environments and inequalities is now considered a core issue within international social work by the International Federation of Social Workers, International Association of Schools of Social Work, and the International Council on Social Welfare through the *Global Agenda for Social Work and Social Development* (2012). Contemporary times of widespread environmental degradation, which primarily affect the world's poor and vulnerable, call for social work's involvement. By doing so, the profession will remain true to the values of social justice and human rights in order to create a world that is equitably shared by all.

References

- Abdullahi, S. (2010). Why the number of Somalis in Kenya exploded. *Wardheer News*.
Retrieved
http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_10/Sept/01_somali_kenyan_sadik.html
- Abouharb, R., & Cingranelli, D. (2007). *Human rights and structural adjustment*. London, Cambridge University Press.
- Africa Research Bulletin. (2013). Floods highlight Kenya's disaster management challenges. *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial, and Technical Series*, 50(4), 19945A-19945B.
- African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC). (2014). *Population and health dynamics in Nairobi's informal settlements: Report of the Nairobi cross-sectional slums survey (NCSS)*. Nairobi: APHRC.
- Aghabakhshi, H. & Gregor, C. (2007). Learning the lessons of Bam: The role of social capital. *International Social Work* 50(3), 347-356.
- Archambault, C., De Latt, J., & Zulu, E. (2012). Urban services and child migration to the slums of Nairobi. *World Development* 40(9), 1854-1869.
- Auslander, G. & Litwin, H. (1987). The parameters of network intervention: A social work application. *Social Service Review*, 61 (2), 305-318.

- Baker, S., & Edwards, R. (2012). How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research. *National Centre for Research Methods*. Retrieved from http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_interviews.pdf
- Bales, K. (2004). *Disposable people: New slavery in the global economy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Barton, A. (1969). *Communities in disaster*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Basher, R. (2008). Disasters and what to do about them. *Forced Migration Review: Climate Change and Displacement*, 31, 35-36.
- Batabyal, S., & Chowdhury, A. (2015). Curbing corruption, financial development and income inequality. *Progress in Development Studies*, 15(1), 49-72.
- Bauhr, M., Charron, N., & Nasiritousi, N. (2013). Does corruption cause aid fatigue? Public opinion and the aid-corruption paradox. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, 568-579.
- Bayat, A. (2012). Politics in the city-inside-out. *City & Society*, 24(2), 110-128.
- BBC News. (2010, February 21). Kenya scandal splits political elite. *BBC News Africa*. Retrieved <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8526824.stm>
- BBC News. (2014a, March 24). Kenya church attack: Two more die in Mombasa. *BBC News Africa*. Retrieved <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26712771>
- BBC News. (2014b, March 26). Kenya restricts Somali refugees to camps. *BBC News Africa*. Retrieved <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26748570>
- Becchetti, L., Conzo, P., & Romero, A. (2014). Violence, trust, and trustworthiness: Evidence from a Nairobi Slum. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 283-305.
- Beck, U. (2010). Climate for change, or how to create green modernity? *Theory, Culture, and*

- Society*, 27(2-3) 254- 266.
- Besthorn, F. (2012). Deep ecology's contributions to social work: a ten-year retrospective. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 21(3), 248-259.
- Bisung, E., Elliott, S., Schuster-Wallace, C., Karanja, D., & Bernard, A. (2014). Social capital, collective action and access to water in rural Kenya. *Social Science & Medicine*, 119, 147-154.
- Blackburn, K. & Sarmah, R. (2008). Corruption, development and demography. *Economics of Governance*, 9, 341-362.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociological Education* (pp. 241-258). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (2013). *A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Branczik, A. (2004). Humanitarian aid and development assistance. *Beyond Intractability*. Retrieved <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/humanitarian-aid>
- Brech, V. & Potrafke, N. (2013). Donor ideology and types of foreign aid. *Social science Research Network, Working Paper Series*. Retrieved http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291881
- Burnett, J. (2012, July 16). Kenya's free schools bring a torrent of students. *NPR*. Retrieved <http://www.npr.org/2012/07/16/156840541/kenyas-free-schools-bring-a-torrent-of-students>
- Carson, R. (1962). *Silent spring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company
- Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). Kenya. *The World Factbook*. Retrieved <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>

- Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). Somalia. *The World Factbook*. Retrieved <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (n.d.). Kenya: The big picture on health. Retrieved <http://www.smartglobalhealth.org/pages/kenya-mission/kenya-health>
- Chandler, D. & Munday, R. (2011). Social networks. In *a dictionary of media and communication*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780199568758.001.0001/acref-9780199568758-e-2541>
- Childress, S. (2008, January 30). Violence in Kenya exposes tribes' widening wealth gap. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120159394599625011>
- Coates, J. (2003). *Ecology and social work: toward a new paradigm*. Halifax: Fernwood Press.
- Coates, J., & McKay, M. (1995). Toward a new pedagogy for social transformation. *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, 6(1), 27-44.
- Cock, J. (2014). Sociology and the 'slow violence' of toxic pollution. An invitation to debate. *South African Review of Sociology*, 45(3), 112-117
- Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, S95- S120.
- Council on Social Work Education (CSWE). (2014). *Draft 3 of the 2015 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards (EPAS)*. Retrieved <http://www.cswe.org/File.aspx?id=76675>
- Corbin, J. & Strauss, A. (2008). *Basics of qualitative research, 3e*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Daily Nation. (2014, June 11). A breakdown of Kenya's 2013-2014 budget. *Daily Nation*.

Retrieved <http://www.nation.co.ke/business/budget-treasury/-/996/2344526/-/birrr1z/-/index.html>

Daily Post. (2013, November 5). SHOCKER: UHURU to show how MAINA KIAI and other civil society scavengers sent money to ICC WITNESSES to incriminate him. *Daily Post*.

Retrieved <http://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/11/shocker-uhuru-to-show-how-maina-kiai.html>

Daly, M., & Silver, H. (2008). Social exclusion and social capital: A comparison and critique. *Theoretical Sociology*, 37, 537-566.

De Souza Briggs, X. (1998). Brown kids in white suburbs: housing mobility and the many faces of social capital, *Housing Policy Debate*, 9(1), 177-121.

Deacon, G. (2012). Pentecostalism and development in Kibera informal settlement, Nairobi. *Development in Practice*, 22(5-6), 663-674.

Delgado, M. (2007). *Social work practice with Latinos: A cultural assets paradigm*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Desai, M. & Solas, J. (2012). Poverty, development and social justice. In K. Lyons, T. Hokenstad, M. Pawar, N. Huegler, & N. Hall (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of International Social Work* (pp. 85-99). Los Angeles: SAGE Publishing

Dominelli, L. (2007). Editorial. *International Social Work*, 50(3), 291-294.

Dominelli, L. (2011). Climate change: social workers' roles and contributions to policy debates and interventions. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 20, 430-438.

Dominelli, L. (2012a). *Green social work: From environmental crises to environmental justice*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Dominguez, S. (2008). Social capital. In T. Misrahi & L. Davis (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social*

- Work, 20th Edition*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195306613.001.0001/acref-9780195306613-e-361?rskey=o4uWWv&result=1&q=social%20network>
- Elkins, C. (2006). *Imperial reckoning: The untold story of Britain's gulag in Kenya*. Henry Holt and Company: New York.
- Easterly, W. (2007). Are aid agencies improving?. *Economic Policy*, 22(52), 633-678.
- Easterly, W. (2009). How the millennium development goals are unfair to Africa. *World Development*, 37(1), 26-25.
- Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where does the money go? Best and worst practices in foreign aid. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), 29-52.
- Easterly, W., & Williamson, C. R. (2011). Rhetoric versus reality: The best and worst of aid agency practices. *World Development*, 39(11), 1930-1949.
- Ellis, A., Gogel, R., Roman, B., Watson, J., Indyk, D., & Rosenberg, G. (2008). The STARK study. *Social Work in Health Care*, 42(3-4), 237-250.
- Elkins, C. (2005). *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya*. Jonathan Cape: London.
- EPA. (2014). Climate change: what you can do. *EPA Website*. Retrieved
<http://epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/>
- Fabricant, M., & Fisher, R. (2008). Settlements and Neighborhood Centers. In T. Misrahi & L. Davis (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social Work, 20th Edition*. Oxford University Press.
 Retrieved from
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195306613.001.0001/acref-9780195306613-e-356>.

- Feek, W. (2007). Best of practices? *Development in Practice*, 17(4/5), 653-655.
- Fehling, M., Nelson, B., & Venkatapuram, S. (2013). Limitations of the millennium development goals: A literature review. *Global Public Health*, 8(10), 1109-1122.
- Fengler, W. (2010, April 28). *Demographic transition and growth in Kenya*. The World Bank. Retrieved <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2010/04/28/demographic-transition-growth-kenya>
- Fengler, W. (2011, November 14). Three myths about aid to Kenya. *The World Bank*. Retrieved <http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/print/three-myths-about-aid-to-kenya>
- Fine, B. (2002). It ain't social, it ain't capital, and it ain't Africa. *Studia Africana*, 13, 18-33.
- Finer, J. (2003, July 4). World Bank focused on fighting corruption: Graft and bribery, once tolerated, punished by blacklisting. *Washington Post*. Retrieved <https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/30085.html>
- Ford, R. (2013, March 5). 'Pwani si Kenya': The coast is not Kenya. *The World Outline*. Retrieved <http://theworldoutline.com/2013/03/kenya-elections/>
- Fukuyama, F. (2001). Social capital, civil society, and development. *Third World Quarterly*, 22(1), 7-20.
- Gallaher, C., Kerr, J., Njenga, M., Karanja, N., & WinklerPrins, A. (2013). Urban agriculture, social capital, and food security in the Kibera slums of Nairobi, Kenya. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 30, 389-404.
- Gathigah, M. (2013, October 8). Somalis caught between terrorism and a border dispute. Inter Press Service News Agency. Retrieved <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/10/somalis-caught-between-terrorism-and-a-border-dispute/>
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3),

167-191.

- Gillespie, D. (2008). Disasters. In T. Mizrahi & L. Davis (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of social work, 20th Edition*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195306613.001.0001/acref-9780195306613-e-107?rskey=hsRZb1&result=107>
- Gillespie, D. (2010). Vulnerability: The central concept of disaster curriculum. In D. Gillespie & K. Danso (Eds.), *Disaster concepts and issues (p. 3-14)*. CSWE Press: Alexandria, Virginia.
- Gillespie, D. & Danso, K. (2010). Introduction to major themes of disaster and social work. In D. Gillespie & K. Danso (Eds.), *Disaster concepts and issues (p. xi-xxii)*. CSWE Press: Alexandria, Virginia.
- Gillespie, D. & Zakour, M. (2010). Recent trends in disaster vulnerability and resiliency research: Theory, design, and methodology. In D. Gillespie & K. Danso (Eds.), *Disaster Concepts and Issues (p 35-60)*. CSWE Press: Alexandria, Virginia.
- Gitterman, A. & Germain, C. (2008). *The Life Model of social work practice: Advances in theory and practice, 3rd edition*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Glicken, M. (2011). *Social work in the 21st century: An introduction to social welfare, social issues, and the profession*. SAGE: Phoenix, AZ.
- Global Humanitarian Assistance (n.d.). Kenya. *Global Humanitarian Assistance*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/kenya>
- Goldberg, M. (2007). How Bush's AIDS program is failing Africans. *The American Prospect*. Retrieved <http://prospect.org/article/how-bushs-aids-program-failing-africans>
- Goldin, I. (2009). *Aid, international*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from

<http://ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/189250809?accountid=14518>

- Gottlieb, R. (1993). *Forcing the spring*. Island Press: Washington, D.C.
- Harrison, E. (2007). Corruption. *Development in Practice*, 17(4/5), 672-678.
- Hawkins, R., & Maurer, K. (2012). Unraveling social capital: Disentangling a concept for social work. *British Journal of Social Work*, 42, 353- 370.
- Hernandez, S. (2008). Mutual aid societies. In T. Misrahi & L. Davis (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, 20th Edition. Oxford University Press Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195306613.001.0001/acref-9780195306613-e-257?rskey=YeenZO&result=1&q=mutual%20aid>
- Hershey, M. (2014). Measuring the success of HIV/AIDS NGOs among Nairobi's youth. *Development in Practice*, 24(1), 51-62.
- Hoff, M. (1994). Environmental foundations of social welfare: Theoretical resources. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The Global Environmental Crisis: Implications for Social Welfare and Social Work* (pp. 12-35). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Holterman, D. (2014). Slow violence, extraction and human rights defense in Tanzania: Notes from the field. *Resources Policy*, 40, 59-65.
- Hope, K. (2014). Kenya's corruption problem: Causes and consequences. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 52(4), 493-512.
- Hornsby, C. (2013). *Kenya: A history since independence*. I.B. Tauris: New York.
- Howden, D. (2013, October 4). Terror in Westgate mall: The full story of the attacks that

- devastated Kenya. *The Guardian*. Retrieved <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-terror#undefined>
- Howden, D. (2014, January 21). Kenyan writer Binyavanga Wainaina declares: 'I am homosexual'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/21/kenyan-writer-binyavanga-wainaina-declares-homosexuality>
- Huegler, N., Lyons, K., & Pawar, M. (2012). Setting the scene. In K. Lyons, T. Hokenstad, M. Pawar, N. Huegler, & N. Hall (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of International Social Work* (pp. 1-34). Los Angeles: SAGE Publishing.
- IFSW, IASSW, & ICSW. (2012). *The Global Agenda For Social Work and Social Development: Commitment to Action*. Retrieved <http://www.cswe.org/File.aspx?id=60880>
- IPCC WGII. (2014). Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Retrieved http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf
- Jordan, B. (2008). Social work and world poverty. *International Social Work*, 51 (4), 440-452.
- Kang, J., Anderson, S., & Finnegan, D. (2012). The evaluation practices of US international NGOs. *Development in Practice*, 22(3), 317-333.
- Karimi, F. (2014, December 5). ICC withdraws charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. *CNN*. Retrieved <http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/05/world/africa/kenya-president-charges-dropped/>
- Karjana, M. (2010, September 3). Myth shattered: Kibera numbers fail to add up. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved <http://allafrica.com/stories/201009060391.html>
- Kauffman, S. (1994). Citizen participation in environmental decisions: Policy, reality, and

- considerations for community organizing. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 219-239). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Kedebe, W. & Butterfield, A. (2009). Social networks among poor women in Ethiopia. *International Social Work*, 52(3), 357-373.
- Kenya National Association of Social Workers. (2015). *About*. Retrieved <http://kenasw.org/>
- Kenya Open Data. (2014). Poverty Rate by District. Kenya Open Data Survey 2014). Retrieved from <https://kenya.socrata.com/Poverty/Poverty-Rate-by-District/i5bp-z9aq/>
- Kenya Red Cross Society. (2013). Emergency appeal. *International federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies*. Retrieved <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/13/MDRKE025EA.pdf>
- Kiai, M. (2013, December 18). In Kenya, averting a move to strangle civil society with the financial noose. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved <http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/maina-kiai/in-kenya-averting-move-to-strangle-civil-society-with-financial-noose>
- Kimani, N. (2007). Environmental pollution and impact to public health; Impaction of the Dandora municipal dumping site in Nairobi, Kenya. *UNEP*. Retrieved http://www.kutokanet.com/Storage/UNEP_Dandora_Environmental_Pollution_and_Impact_To_Public_Health_2007.pdf
- Kinney, P., Gishuru, M., Volavka-Close, N., Ngo, N., Ndiba, P., Law, A., Gachanja, A., Gaita, S., Chillrud, S., & Sclar, E. (2011). Traffic impacts on PM2.5 air quality in Nairobi, Kenya. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 14, 369-378.
- Kiptot, E. & Franzel, S. (2014). Voluntarism as an investment in human, social and financial

- capital: Evidence from a farmer-to-farmer extension program in Kenya. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31, 231-243.
- Kneiding, C. & Rosenberg, R. (2008). Variations in microcredit interest rates. *CGAP: Advancing Financial Inclusion to Improve the Lives of the Poor*. Retrieved <http://www.cgap.org/publications/variations-microcredit-interest-rates>
- Kopinak, J. (2013). Humanitarian aid: Are effectiveness and sustainability impossible dreams? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. Retrieved <https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1935>
- Kwayera, J. (2013, December 11). Kenya looks East as changing needs call for policy shift. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/?articleID=2000099846&story_title=kenya-looks-east-as-changing-needs-call-for-policy-shift&pageNo=1
- LeBas, A. (2013). Violence and urban order in Nairobi Kenya and Lagos, Nigera. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 48, 240-262.
- Lin, N. (2001). *Social capital. A theory of social structure and action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Livingstone, N. (2013). POLEMIC 'Capital's charity'. *Capital & Class*, 37(3), 347-353.
- Loewenberg, S. (2012, January 14). Grassroots project shines hope on Nairobi slum life. *The Lancet*. Retrieved <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2812%2960047-6/abstract>
- Lovell, M., & Johnson, D. (1994). The environmental crisis and direct social work practice. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 199-218). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

- Lunn, J. & Moscuza, A. (2014). Doing it together: Ethical dimensions of accompanied fieldwork. In J. Lunn (Ed.), *Fieldwork in the Global South: Ethical challenges and dilemmas*. Routledge: US.
- Maathai, W. (1995). Bottlenecks to development in Africa. *4th UN World Women's Conference, Beijing, China*. Retrieved. <http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/wangari-maathai/key-speeches-and-articles/bottleknecks-to-development-in-africa>
- Maathai, W. (2007). *Unbowed*. First Anchor Books Edition: New York.
- Maathai, W. (2009). *The challenge for Africa*. First Anchor Books Edition: New York.
- Makworo, M. & Mireri, C. (2011). Public open spaces in Nairobi, Kenya, under threat. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 54(8), 1107-1123.
- Martinez-Alier, J. (2014). The environmentalism of the poor. *Geoforum*, 54, 239-241.
- Mathbor, G. (2007). Enhancement of community preparedness for natural disasters: The role of social work in building social capital for sustainable disaster relief and management. *International Social Work*, 50(3), 357-369.
- Mathbor, G. & Bourassa, J. (2012). Disaster management and humanitarian action. In K. Lyons, T. Hokenstad, M. Pawar, N. Huegler, & N. Hall (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of International Social Work* (pp. 294-310). Los Angeles: SAGE Publishing.
- McKinnon, J. (2008). Exploring the nexus between social work and the environment. *Australian Social Work*, 61(3), 256-268.
- McKinnon, J. (2012). Social work and changing environments. In K. Lyons, T. Hokenstad, M. Pawar, N. Huegler, & N. Hall (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of International Social Work* (pp. 265-278). Los Angeles: SAGE Publishing.
- Midling, A. (2009, May 15). Norwegian aid has no effect. *ScienceNordic*. Retrieved

- <http://sciencenordic.com/norwegian-aid-has-no-effect>
- Miller, S., & Hayward, A. (2014). Social work education's role in addressing people and a planet at risk. *Social Work Education: The International Journal*, 33(3), 280-295.
- Miller, S.; Hayward R.; & Shaw, T. (2012). Environmental shifts for social work: a principles approach. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 21(3), 270-277.
- Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources. (n.d.). Ministry of environment, water, and natural resources. Retrieved from <http://www.environment.go.ke/>
- Morrisey, J. (2008). Rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. *Forced Migration Review: Climate Change and Displacement*, 31, 28-29.
- Morton, A., Boncour, P., & Laczko, F. (2008). Human security policy changes. *Forced Migration Review: Climate Change and Displacement*, 31, 5-7.
- Mungai, C. (2015, January 5). Laptops in Africa's classrooms; savior or a waste of good money? *Mail & Guardian Africa*. Retrieved <http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-01-04-the-future-of-education-controversies-over-laptops-in-schools-but-theres-more-to-the-story>
- Mungai, N., Wairire, G., & Rush, E. (2014). The challenges of maintaining social work ethics in Kenya. *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 8(2), 170-186.
- Murtaza, N. (2012). Putting the lasts first: The case for community-focused and peer-managed NGO accountability mechanisms. *International Society for Third-Sector Research*, 23, 109-125.
- Muthiri, F. (2014, May 26). Obama has not helped Kenya, Raila now claims. *The Star*. Retrieved <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-168497/obama-has-not-helped-kenya-raila-now-claims>
- Mwangi, I. & Ouma, S. (2012). Social capital and access to credit in Kenya. *American Journal of*

Social and Management Sciences, 3(1), 8-16.

National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD). (2010). *Rapid*

Population and Development. Retrieved

http://www.healthpolicyinitiative.com/Publications/Documents/1095_1_Kenya_booklet_3_31_10_sglepgh_LOW_RES_PDF_for_INTERNET_acc.pdf

National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA). (2014). *The National Waste*

Management Strategy. Retrieved

<file:///Users/JenWillett/Downloads/the%20national%20solid%20waste%20management%20strategy%202014%20-%20revised%20-%2031st%20oct%202014.pdf>

Ndege, P. (2009). *Colonialism and its legacies in Kenya*. Lecture delivered during Fulbright-

Hayes Group Project Abroad Program: July 5th to August 6th 2009 at the Moi University

Main Campus. Retrieved <http://international.iupui.edu/kenya/resources/Colonialism-and-Its-Legacies.pdf>

Nguni, B. (2015, January 21). Teachers' strike highlights Kenya's education challenges. *Equal*

Times. Retrieved [http://www.equaltimes.org/teachers-strike-highlights-kenya-](http://www.equaltimes.org/teachers-strike-highlights-kenya-s#.VRLGG5N4pww)

[s#.VRLGG5N4pww](http://www.equaltimes.org/teachers-strike-highlights-kenya-s#.VRLGG5N4pww)

Nixon, R. (2011). *Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor*. Harvard University

Press: The United States.

Nyangena, W. (2008). Social determinants of soil and water conservation in rural Kenya.

Environment, Development, and Sustainability, 10, 745-767.

O'Keefe, P., Westgate, K., & Wisner, B. (1986). Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters.

Nature, 260(5552), 566-567.

Obonyo, O. (2013, July 7). Kamunkunji loses political buzz as green beauty takes historic park.

- The Standard*. Retrieved
<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/story.php?id=2000087747&pageNo=1>
- Odula, T. (2014, April 28). Somalia says Kenya is detaining innocent Somalis. *ABC News*. Retrieved <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/somalia-kenya-detaining-innocent-somalis-23495365>
- Odour, K. (2008). Kenya/Somalia: Somalia community doing booming business in country. *Norwegian Council for Africa*. Retrieved <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/16696.html>
- Oliver-Smith, A. (2004). Theorizing vulnerability in a globalized world: A political ecological perspective, in *Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development & people (10-24)*, G. Bankoff, G. Frerks, and D. Hilhorst, (eds.). London: Earthscan.
- ONE. (n.d.). Debt cancellation. Retrieved <http://www.one.org/international/issues/debt-cancellation/>
- Owino, K. & Jairo, S. (2013). Unpackaging the failed states index: Kenya's policy options. Institute of Economic Affairs. Retrieved http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/publications/doc_download/308-unpackaging-the-failed-states-index-kenya-s-policy-options
- Oxfam GB Kenya Programme. (2009). Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya: Background analysis for preparation of an Oxfam GB urban programme focused on Nairobi. *Oxfam*. Retrieved http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/urban_poverty_and_vulnerability_in_kenya.pdf
- Oya, C. (2011). Africa and the millennium development goals (MDGs): What's right, what's wrong and what's missing. *Revista De Economia Mundial*, 27,19–33. Retrieved from <http://www.semwes.or>
- Padgett, D. (2008). *Qualitative methods in social work research, second edition*. California:

Sage Publications.

Peeters, J. (2012). The place of social work in sustainable development: Towards ecosocial practice. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 21(3), 287-298.

Phillips, K. (2013, December 17). The history of foreign aid. *Rear Vision*. Retrieved <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-history-of-foreign-aid/5162100>

Pogge, T. W. (2010). *Politics as usual: What lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity.

Population Action International (PAI). (2012). *Population, climate change, and sustainable development in Kenya*. Retrieved http://pai.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Kenya_PIB_Final.pdf

Poverties.org. (2011). Poverty in Kenya: The impact of unemployment, child labor, & HIV. *Poverties.org, Research for Social and Economic Development*. Retrieved <http://www.poverties.org/poverty-in-kenya.html>

Pretty, J. & Ward, H. (2001). Social capital and the environment. *World Development*, 29(2), 209-227.

Prunier, G. (2008a, January 7). Kenya: Roots of crisis. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/kenya_roots_crisis

Prunier, G. (2008b, February 29). Kenya: Histories of hidden war. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy/kenya_behind_the_crisis

Prunier, G. (2009, February 3). The Kenya we want. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-kenya-we-want>

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New

- York: Simon and Schuster.
- Pyles, L. (2009). Neoliberalism, INHO practices and sustainable disaster recovery: a post-Katrina case study. *Community Development Journal*, 46(2), 168-180.
- Pyles, L. & Harding, S. (2012). Discourses of post-Katrina reconstruction: a frame analysis. *Community Development Journal*, 47(3), 335-352.
- Rice, X., Burkeman, O., & Carroll, R. (2006). Fall of Mogadishu leaves US policy in ruins. *The Guardian*. Retrieved <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/10/rorycarroll.oliverburkeman>
- Riddell, R. (2014). Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment. *Development Policy Centre*. Retrieved from <http://devpolicy.org/2014-Australasian-Aid-and-International-Development-Policy-Workshop/Roger-Riddell-Background-Paper.pdf>
- Roberts, A. (2008). Crisis Interventions. In T. Mizrahi & L. Davis (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social Work, 20th Edition*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195306613.001.0001/acref-9780195306613-e-93?rkey=fluqyf&result=4>
- Rogge, M. (1993). Social work, disenfranchised communities, and the natural environment: field education opportunities. *Social Work Education*, 29(1), 111-120.
- Rogge, M. (1994). Environmental injustice: Social welfare and toxic waste. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 53-74). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Rogge, M.E. (2003). The future is now: Social work, disaster management, and traumatic stress in the 21st century. *Journal of Social Service Research*, 30(2), 1-6.
- Rono, J. (2002). The impact of the structural adjustment programmes on Kenyan society.

- Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 17(1), 81-98.
- Sachs, J. (2010). The art of medicine: The MDG decade: looking back and conditional optimism for 2015. *The Lancet*, 376, 950- 951.
- Sachs, J. (2012). From Millennium Development Goals to sustainable development goals. *The Lancet*, 379, 2206-2211.
- Sachs, N. (2014, June 20). Garbage everywhere: What refuse in India's streets reveals about America's hidden trash problem. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/06/confessions-of-a-trash-tourist-india/373118/>
- Samson. (2014, April 2). Radical cleric, Makaburi gunned down in Mombasa. *Speechlog*. Retrieved <http://speechlog.com/radical-cleric-makaburi-gunned-down-in-mombasa/>
- Saracostti, M. (2007). Social capital as a strategy to overcome poverty in Latin America: An overview. *International Social Work*, 50 (4), 515-527.
- Schilling, R. (1987). Limitations of social support. *Social Service Review*, 61, 19-31.
- Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Sepulveda Carmona, M. (2013). *Report on the special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona*. United Nations: Human Rights Council.
- Shankardass, S., & Hassan, Z. (2007). History of urbanization and proliferation of slums in Kenya. *U.N.-Habitat: Twenty First Session of the Governing Council*. Retrieved from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1710_462872173GC202120History20of20Urbnizatio n20in20Kenya.pdf
- Shubert, J. (1994). Case studies in community organizing around environmental threats. In M.

- Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 240-279). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Silver, P. (1994). Occupational disease and the disadvantaged worker: A mandate for social work. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 170-198). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Skoval, M. & Ogutu, V. (2012). Coping with hardship through friendship: The importance of peer social capital among children affected by HIV in Kenya. *African Journal of AIDS Research, 11*(3), 241-250.
- Slim, H. (2012). IASC real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the horn of Africa drought crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Retrieved from http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/RTE_HoA_SynthesisReport_FINAL.pdf
- Simone, A. (2008). People as infrastructure. In S. Nuttal & A. Mbembe (Eds.), *Johannesburg: The elusive metropolis* (pp. 68-90). United States of America: Duke University Press.
- Smith, M. (2006). Discourses on development: Beyond the 'African tragedy'. In M. Smith (Ed.), *Beyond the 'African tragedy': Discourses on development and the global economy* (pp. 2-24). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Soine, L. (1987). Expanding environment in social work: the case for including environmental hazards content. *Social Work Education, 23*(2), 40-46.
- Soliman, H. & Rogge, M. (2002). Ethical considerations in disaster services: A social work perspective. *Electronic Journal of Social Work 1* (1), 1-23.
- Soliman, H. & Silver, P. (2004). Social work intervention in disasters and traumatic stress

- events: An emerging practice arena. *Journal of Social Service Research*, 30(2), xiii-xv.
- Specht, H. (1986). Social networks, social exchange, and social work practice. *Social Service Review*, 60 (2), 218-240.
- Stehfest, E., Bouwman, L., van Vuuren, D., den Elzen, M., Eickhout, B., & Kabat, P. (2009). Climate benefits of changing diet. *Climate Change*, 95, 83-102.
- Stockman, F. (2013, May 28). In Kenya, it's not about the pigs. *The Boston Globe*. Retrieved. <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/05/27/can-pig-protest-change-kenya/tGgRTrWMDfhrkKH9pUSazO/story.html>
- Streeter, C.L. (1991). Disasters and development: Disaster preparedness and mitigation as an essential component of development planning. *Social Development Issues*, 13(4), 100-110.
- Sundstrom, S., Tynon, J., & Western, D. (2012). Rangeland privatization and the Maasai experience: Social capital and the implications for traditional resource management in southern Kenya. *Society and Natural Resources*, 25, 483-498.
- Szalay, J. (2013). Deforestation: Facts, causes & effects. *Livescience*. Retrieved <http://www.livescience.com/27692-deforestation.html>
- Tester, F. (1994). In an age of ecology, Limits to voluntarism and traditional theory in social work practice. In M. Hoff & J. McNutt (Eds.), *The global environmental crisis: Implications for social welfare and social work* (pp. 75-99). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- The Constitution of Kenya. (2010). Laws of Kenya. Retrieved from http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution_of_Kenya__2010.pdf
- Tracy, E. (1990). Identifying social support resources of at risk families. *Social Work*, 35, 252-

258.

Transparency International. (2014). Corruption perceptions index 2014: Results. *Transparency International*. Retrieved <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>

Turner, R. (1994). Rastafari and the new society: Caribbean and East African feminist roots of a population movement to reclaim the earthly commons. In T. Turner (Ed.), *Arise Ye Mighty People! Gender, Class and Race in Popular Struggles* (pp. 9-55). Trenton, NY: Africa World Press, Inc.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (n.d.). About Kenya. *UNDP in Kenya*.

Retrieved from

<http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/countryinfo/>

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2012). Fact sheet: Education in Kenya. Retrieved

http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/EDUCATION_IN_KENYA_A_FACT_SHEET.pdf

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat). (2006). Nairobi urban sector profile. *United Nations Human Settlements Programme*. Retrieved

<http://unhabitat.org/?wpmact=process&did=NTYyLmhvdGxpbnms=>

United Nations Millennium Project (2005). *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Overview*. Retrieved

<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf>

Verini, J. (2013, March 2). The fall and rise of Raila Odinga. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/02/odinga_kenyatta_kenya_election

VOA News. (2013, November 25). UN refuses to close Somali refugee camps in Kenya. *Voice*

- of America. Retrieved <http://www.voanews.com/content/un-refuses-to-close-somali-refugee-camps-in-kenya/1797351.html>
- Wa Kinyatti, M. (2010). *History of resistance in Kenya: 1884-2002*. Maina wa Kinyatti: Lexington, Kentucky.
- Waiganjo, K. (2013, November 24). State must rethink move against civil society funding. *Standard*. Retrieved http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000098520&story_title=state-must-rethink-move-against-civil-society-funding/
- Wairire, G. (2014). The state of social work education and practice in Kenya, in *Professional Social Work in East Africa: Towards Social Development, Poverty Reduction, and Gender Equality (93-107)*, H. Spitzer, J. Twikirize, and G. Wairire, (eds). Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- Walker, P. (1999). Natural disasters are man-made. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 16(5).
- Warren, M., Thompson, J., & Saegart, S. (2001). *Social capital and poor communities*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- WaterAid (n.d.). *Kenya*. Retrieved <http://www.wateraid.org/us/where-we-work/page/kenya>
- Watsa, K. & Warutere, P. (2013, July 23). World Bank to help Kenya build a national safety net to reach 3.3 million poor people by 2017. Retrieved <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/07/23/world-bank-help-kenya-build-national-safety-net>
- Weiss, R. (1973). The nature of loneliness. In R. Weiss (Ed.), *Loneliness: The experience of emotional and social isolation*, (pp. 9-29). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Werlin, H. (2006). The slums of Nairobi: Explaining urban misery. *World Affairs Institute*,

169(1), 39-48.

WIN-Gallop International. (2012). Global index of religiosity and atheism. *Gallup International*.

Retrieved

<http://redcresearch.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/RED-C-press-release-Religion-and-Atheism-25-7-12.pdf>

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Connon, T., & Davis, I. (2004). *At risk: Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

[World Bank. \(2003\). Kenya: A policy agenda to restore growth. *The World Bank website*.](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2810165/kenya-policy-agenda-restore-growth)

[Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2810165/kenya-policy-agenda-restore-growth](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2810165/kenya-policy-agenda-restore-growth)

World Bank. (2011). Kenya at a glance. *The World Bank website*. Retrieved from

http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ken_aag.pdf

World Bank. (2013). Corruption is “public enemy number one” in developing countries, says

World Bank group president Kim. *The World Bank website*. Retrieved

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-countries-world-bank-group-president-kim.print>

World Health Organization (WHO). (2009). *World Health Statistics*. Retrieved

http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS09_Full.pdf

WRI; Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing, Kenya; Ministry of Environmental

and Natural Resources, Kenya; Central Bureau of Statistics; Ministry of Planning and

National Development, Kenya; & International Livestock Research Institute. (2007).

Nature's benefits in Kenya: An atlas of ecosystems and human well-being. *World*

Resources Institute. Retrieved from [http://www.wri.org/publication/natures-benefits-in-](http://www.wri.org/publication/natures-benefits-in)

[kenya](#).

Wrong, M. (2009). *It's our turn to eat: The story of a Kenyan whistle-blower*. Fourth Estate: Britain.

Yan, M. & Lam, C. (2009). Intersecting social capital and Chinese culture: Implications for services assisting unemployed youths. *International Social Work*, 52(2), 195-207.

Yunus, M. (1999). *Banker to the poor: Micro-lending and the battle against world poverty*. Public Affairs: The United States.

Zaimov, S. (2014, April 20). Kenya president signs polygamy bill into law despite Christian opposition. *The Christian Post*. Retrieved <http://www.christianpost.com/news/kenya-president-signs-polygamy-bill-into-law-despite-christian-opposition-118806/>

Zakour, M.J. (2008). Social capital and increased organization capacity for evacuation in natural disasters. *Social Development Issues*, 30(1), 13-28.

Zakour, M. (2010). Vulnerability and risk assessment: Building community resilience. In D. Gillespie & K. Danso (Eds.), *Disaster concepts and issues* (p. 15-34). CSWE Press: Alexandria, Virginia.

Zakour, M. & Harrell, E. (2003). Access to disaster services: social work interventions for vulnerable populations. *Journal of Social Service Research*, 30(2), 27-54.