A Transnational and Intergenerational Account of Value Preference Patterns: Revisiting Needs-gratification and Post-materialist Theories

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Revisiting Needs-gratification and Post-materialist Theories

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A Transnational and Intergenerational Account of Value Preference Patterns:
Revisiting Needs-gratification and Post-materialist Theories

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Abstract

The socio-political values predominant in a particular society will reflect the correspondent needs of that society, and these needs can include factors other than material acquisition. In contrast to needs-gratification theory (Maslow, 1970), and post-materialist theory (Inglehart, 1971), this paper discusses agency in terms of relational autonomy (Oshana, 2006), as it pertains to power. I argue that a) personal and national economic affluence or security may not be sufficient to describe social ecology nor fully describe the ways that power can influence values, b) individual and collective relational power is utilitarian and essential, c) fulfillment of material and social needs can be directed by relational as well as material values, d) relational values can be just as common in impoverished or subordinated nations as they are in affluent or empowered nations, and e) values such as justice or egalitarianism may be more commonly held, and more strongly so, among people living under worse social ecologies and economic conditions. A conceptual analysis, a new measure of cross-level relational power, and a survey study of adult convenience samples in 7 nations (N=685) provide preliminary evidence supporting these hypotheses. Implications for theories of socio-political values and hierarchy are discussed.
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Society is an organic whole and not an aggregation of a numerical or arithmetic order. It is the moral forces and not the material forces which form the cohesive social cement which binds and accommodates the various social segments, despite the fact that some of these moral relations are the reflection of these material forces in the moral domain.

Kamal Joumblatt in “Revolution in the World of Man”, p. 25

Social psychology focuses largely on proximal influences on the human agent. More distal macrolevel factors, such as global economic distributions, political regimes, electoral systems, state militancy, and various forms of inter-state, state, and factional power have largely been left to political scientists and sociologists to tackle (Oishi & Graham, 2010). Meanwhile, social scientists have been increasingly arguing that the macro and micro levels of analysis are not as independent today as they once were, nor as independent as most people assume (e.g., Guillaume, 2011, Minnegal, 1996), and that time spans matter both for material and psychological factors’ patterns of stability or change (e.g., Georgas & Berry, 1995, Inglehart, 2008).

But there has been some effort to integrate macrolevel factors within social psychological theory and empirical analyses (e.g., Moghaddam, 2009, Pilisuk & Zazzi, 2006, Pratto, Lee, Tan, & Pitpitan, 2011, Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2012, Rokeach, 1973, Tetlock, 1998). This approach, sometimes known as socioecological psychology (for a review, see Oishi & Graham, 2010), tries to explain how people’s social and physical environments help shape their cultures, minds, and behavior while recognizing that
intergenerational spans of time can predict changes between and within societies (e.g., Yamagishi, 1998).

In this paper, I will argue that both material and social needs are important to people in all situations, but to different degrees. To make this claim, I apply a socioecological approach to the conceptualization of the self and of power, characterizing them in terms of individual and collective needs, which can be both acquisitive (or materially affording agency) and relational (or socially affording agency) under a particular social ecology. From there, I will discuss the importance of needs and power in determining political values. I argue that political values endorsed by people in different social ecologies will reflect the needs, affordances, and constraints that characterize those ecologies. I will then discuss how and why the pattern of people’s political value preferences will differ between societies according to the social ecology and sociopolitical context, with a special focus on the value of counter-dominance. Finally, I will provide preliminary evidence for these points, and discuss their implications in terms of current political psychological theorizing and people’s political behavior.

The co-determined self

The human being can be characterized as an inherently social being as well as an individual, and the two as being inseparable. Social psychology, and particularly self-determination theory, has a venerable tradition of recognizing the fundamental and universal nature of the needs for both autonomy and relatedness and their pivotal role in explaining human psychology and behavior (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995, Ryan & Deci, 2000). Indeed, as Leary (2007) concludes in his review of human motivation and emotion, individual self-related motives function foremost to protect people’s social well-
being. Moreover, interactionist psychologists have aimed to define the self in relation to their material and social context, albeit in different ways (Mischel & Shoda, 1995, Reis, 2008, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). One of the reasons all these scholars may have adopted this approach is a dis-satisfaction with mainstream European and American social psychology’s focus on the individual self as completely independent. Miller (1999) has argued that the idea that self-interest strongly determines behavior is so normative in Western cultures that it is seen as a matter of course, leading people to think and behave reflexively as if this norm was objective truth and to present themselves as more self-interested than they really are. Similarly, a meta-analysis by Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2005) showed that Westerners self-enhanced on individualistic dimensions more than Easterners.

But people in all societies strive to meet basic human needs such as autonomy and relatedness at least to some extent (Keller, 2012, Killen & Wainryb, 2000). For example, interdependence is present and important even in highly individualistic cultures (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Group differences tend to be only in the prioritization of the expression of one, but not necessarily at the expense of the presence of the other (Keller, 2012). When humans are portrayed as having to struggle for a balance between individualistic agency and social communion, this ignores the fact that these can be mutually constitutive across different societal contexts (for a review, see Keller, 2012, Baumann, 2008, Christman, 2004, p. 148, Oshana, 2003, 2006).

Agency and autonomy are often seen as interchangeable terms describing the person as a volitional organism motivated to strive towards the fulfillment of needs and desires with a sense of efficacy and without a sense of coercion (Kagitcibasi, 2005). But
consider what is involved in autonomous agency – control and authority over one’s life choices (Baumann, 2008). While being in control does entail that people must be competent in and of themselves, they must also be in a social position from which they are able to control their social environment. The latter control necessitates the availability of options in the social context to manage other people’s or organizations’ attempts to wield coercive control over them and their efforts to meet their needs (Oshana, 2006, p. 84) and to appreciate and make use of beneficent relations for the same purpose.

Similarly, having agentic authority requires ‘owning’ the ‘government’ of one’s desires and values. In order to do so, a person must have the psychological and material resources and social position to be substantively and procedurally independent (Oshana, 2006, p. 78-87). Extending this thinking, Baumann (2008) has argued that autonomy cannot be described as a function of either external social environment or the person’s internal psychology alone; rather, autonomy needs to be conceptualized as intersubjective and socioecologically situated, temporally and dynamically. Only by doing so can one account for people’s capacity to adapt to changing environments, to engage in self-exploration and self-definition, to imagine alternative possibilities, to distinguish legitimate expectations from those that are not, and to emancipate themselves from inimical persons or environments. Thus, it is in some ways nonsensical and an ideological affront to human complexity and dynamism to discount or dichotomize autonomy and relatedness as separate needs or as distinct means by which distinct needs are met (Kagitcibasi, 2005, Oshana, 2003).

If we define agency not in terms of volitional autonomy, but of profitability to the self, it is easy to see how agency can be ultimately important to people’s self-
conceptualizations and motivations (Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002). But the same arguments discussed above regarding agency still apply. There are important limitations to individual self-interest. The importance of communion, characterized by attention to the interest of the other, is underestimated. For example, geographer Miller (1992) has argued that rational choice theory’s reliance on the essentialist *homo economicus* model of human nature often does not consider nonstrategic forms of rationality, collective identity formation, and the crucial effects of place-specific social relations on social behavior, particularly collective mobilization and action. He shows that the relative importance of communicative versus strategic forms of action coordination varies geographically and historically and cannot be understood apart from systemic processes.

Again, there seems to be a false conflation of agency and separateness that obligates a tension between autonomy and relatedness, between agency and communion. Empirical evidence distinguishing the autonomy dimension from that of separateness is abundant, and comes from many domains, including research on family dynamics, adolescence, and cross-cultural research on individualism and collectivism (for a review, see Kagitcibasi, 2005). Importantly, some of these studies show a positive relationship between autonomy and relatedness in many sociopolitical contexts (Kagitcibasi, 2005). The more dependent on others an agent is, the more important considering others’ agency is to that agent, and thus the more communally-oriented the agent needs to be (Abele & Wojciske, 2007).

In the following discussion of power and its influence on political value patterns in different social ecologies, I will adopt the conception of agency and relatedness as
fulfilling both material and social needs, and as co-determinate. I do not separate narrowly individualistic self-interest and narrowly communal other-interest. Instead, I distinguish between an acquisitive orientation and a relational orientation in terms of unmet needs, motivations, and consequently preferred political values. I define an acquisitive orientation as a focus on the material resources which agents need to afford their control and ownership over their choices within their social environments. The other side of the coin, the relational orientation, is a focus on the social resources agents need to negotiate these two elements of their agency with their social environment, given their material environment, a concept quite similar to that of ‘social capital’ (e.g., Narayan, 2002). I extend this understanding of the agent to the collective level, arguing that groups can have needs and affordances in much the same way as individuals, and these determine their collective agency. Following Abele and Wojciske’s (2007) research on the function of dependence in determining how relational an agent needs to be, I argue that while both acquisitive and relational orientations are present in many different sociopolitical environments, the relative importance of these orientations across social ecologies may differ according to the degree of asymmetry in interdependence in these ecologies.

Thus, one way to assess the relative importance of acquisitive and relational orientations to a given group is to recognize and assess affordances as the presence of and (a)symmetry of acquisitive and relational resource interdependence between agents.

*Power as acquisitive and relational*

There is a tradition in needs-gratification theory (e.g., Maslow, 1970), and post-materialist theory (Inglehart, 1971), to distinguish between material and ‘post-material’
or non-material needs and values, with a clear prioritization of the material over the non-material in terms of the sequence in which they are addressed. From the point of view I have just described in which the material and social are co-constructed, it makes little sense to categorize certain needs, such as security, as ‘material’ in nature or means of fulfillment, and others, such as self-definition and identity, as ‘non-material’ (see also Brewer & Gardner, 1996). For example, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994), human security is a basic need which can be broken down into economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Some of these can be seen as primarily ‘material’ (e.g., personal security, food security) and others as primarily non-material (e.g., community security, political security), but the two classes are intimately interlinked – the fulfillment of one is more or less dependent on the fulfillment of the others. Similarly, the need for self-definition through the moral mandates of justice (Clayton & Opotow, 2003), includes such ‘material’ elements as the ‘minimum acceptable standard of living’ (Deutsch, 1975, Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordóñez, 1993) and ‘non-material’ elements such as the scope of justice, moral community, or circle of moral regard (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, Deutsch, 1975, Reed & Aquino, 2003) and social inclusion (e.g., DeWall, Deckman, Pond, & Bonser, 2011).

Such a distinction between material and non-material may not apply to narrower concepts either. For example, wealth, a ‘material’ resource, is an important determinant of social and political status and influence (Gill & Law, 1993), supposedly ‘non-material’ concerns. The relationship is reciprocal - social and political status facilitates accumulation of wealth (Christakis & Fowler, 2009). If people in a particular group lack
political voice, achieving material outcomes may be much more difficult (e.g., Lucero, 2008). But they are also deprived of a social need (recognition as human beings and as a collective) and the power to fulfill it (legitimacy). As relative deprivation theory has shown (e.g., Folger & Martin, 1986), people can also feel both acquisitive and relational deprivation more acutely if there are unfavorable intergroup comparisons. For example, relative deprivation in terms of political voice can produce discontent and collective action on both acquisitive and relational grounds (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983, Sanchez-Mazas, 2008).

This argument applies to power inasmuch as it does to needs and resources. Maslow (1970, pp. 35-36) claims that certain ‘material’ or biological needs, because they are most obviously connected to survival, must be met before people become concerned with ‘non-material’ or social needs. But if, as I have argued, different forms of power can be both ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ in their utility in achieving agency over both material and social need-fulfillment, the idea that people have a hierarchical set of needs distinct from one another and that people always aim to find the power to fulfill them in sequence of priority, each separately from the other, seems inadequate. For example, the most ‘materially’ needy, such as the homeless, suffer both because of their deprivation in terms of shelter and food, but also because the sociopolitical culture and the policies of the collective institutions under whose jurisdiction they fall, fail to acknowledge and act on these needs (Eckersley, 1998). I argue then that it is not that the rich and powerful have ‘higher’ concerns and no ‘basic’ needs, or that the poor and powerless have more ‘basic’ needs and no ‘higher’ concerns. Needs that are met are not felt, but are nonetheless there (Heins, 2010), just as very high deprivation in some needs, while most
strongly felt, does not obviate the existence and importance of other needs. I frame power for need-fulfillment as a set of material affordances of agency with relational utility, and as social affordances with material utility. By taking this approach, discussions of power recognize the inter-linkage of the material and non-material uses of power and of their motivating underlying material and social needs.

Under the definition of power stipulated by power basis theory (PBT), the common function of all forms of individuals’ power is addressing their needs, either by meeting those needs or denying others their needs (Pratto, Lee, Tan, & Pitpitan, 2011). Given this definition, power can be thought of as the balance of affordances and constrains that permit or deny people’s need-fulfillment. In this sense, power can also have primarily acquisitive (e.g., wealth, physical strength), or relational (e.g., respect) forms. Defining social ecology as the long-term affordances and constraints on collectives allows one to deduce what needs are met or unmet, and to what extent, in a given context. The levels and proportions of various forms of power are then by definition related to people’s social ecology.

A full application of the conceptual frame discussed so far to individuals within a particular milieu is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus on the theoretical implications and predictions that such a frame may have across social collectives. But individuals’ power can be seen as at least partially derived from that of the collectives (parties, ethnicity, sect, nation, etc.) to which they belong, which in turn derive a significant portion of their power from the allegiance and contributions of their constituencies (e.g., Strange, 1996). Moreover, as I will argue shortly, individuals can experience asymmetric interdependency in fulfilling their needs not only vis-à-vis their
own groups, but in relation to others. Following from the latter two assertions, how people in particular groups respond to the degree of asymmetry of their group’s interdependence on another may be informed by what we know about how people negotiate their agency at the individual level. Since very few groups exist totally in isolation, people in almost all groups have to deal with the people and organizations of other groups. Thus, it is not sufficient to analyze individuals within a collective independently of their relationships with other collectives.

People within their collectives have to deal with others both laterally, with collectives of roughly equal scope and power, and vertically, with collectives of lesser or broader scope and power. This is particularly so in a historically and presently ‘globalizing’ or increasingly interdependent world (e.g., Strange, 1996, Wallerstein, 2005). People’s ability and chosen means to meet their needs or deny others their needs are thus a function of a reciprocally-influencing layered power structure (e.g., Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011). For example, Pratto, Sidanıus, Bou Zeineddine, Levin, and Kteily (under review) show that Lebanese and Syrian people’s support for various factions in their domestic political contexts can influence and be influenced by these factions’ regional and international political links. This multi-layered dynamic power structure can also be seen in the domain of economics. The estimate of the economic resources a nation has control and ownership over, often measured by group-level variables such as GDP (gross domestic product) or GNP (gross national product), is inherently connected to the market value of that nation’s goods, with the market being trans-national, as well as citizens’ employment rate and productivity, which in turn are related to the quality of life and employment opportunities made possible by sound governmental policy. Thus, the
economic power and affluence of ordinary citizens is simultaneously a function of their own employment, the nation’s economic condition, and the behavior of the international market. Therefore, individuals’ power can be seen as embedded in that of their group (in the case of this paper, their nation), and the group’s power as embedded in the power dynamics of the broader group of groups.

Extending PBT to the collective level, then, the groups that people belong to and identify with can also be seen as agents in their own right, with acquisitive and relational needs and affordances that are partially determined by social ecologies. These collectives not only have their own ecology, but also have a power position within the world’s social ecology. In this paper, I will examine collectives at the national level, as this grouping remains highly important to the way the world is organized socially, politically, and to some extent, economically, today.

Assessing power

This theoretical view requires that we measure power in a way that is sensitive to group agency and its embeddedness in relational interdependency networks. Extant measures of national power do not adequately capture my theorizing because they either do not recognize relational interdependency or they do not acknowledge ecological aspects of power itself. For example, social network analyses of nations’ alliances, trade flows, and conflicts, while producing group-level integrated relational and acquisitive outcome measures such as monadic dependence balance or network centrality or leverage (e.g., Kim, 2007, Levitsky & Way, 2009, Maoz, 2006), fail to assess how such elements of power impact the constituents of these groups, and whether relational power is transmitted vertically from the national institutions down to citizens in the first place.
Other measures of power are purely acquisitive, focusing on group material attributes that give states relational clout on the international level, such as the correlates of war composite index of national capabilities (CINC) (Kim, 2007). Other scholars use purely economic acquisitive measures such as the gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product per capita (GNP/capita) as measures of power (Inglehart, 2008). These measures of affluence are related to measures of other forms of power insofar as affluence is fungible with other forms of power, and thus can be indicative of a large portion of a nation’s power. However, these measures are not equally correspondent to the different forms of power. So, for example, GNP/capita can be a sufficient indicator of a state’s institutional economic and international political power, but may be insufficient to indicate it’s military power, when the economic resources on which military power depend are not all related to economic output or at least the portion of the output that is theoretically distributed over a population (e.g., large population deflates GNP/capita without reducing state power, as may be the case with China).

Although such measures of group forms of power are undoubtedly important, a more ecologically-descriptive relationally-aware means of assessing power may be to consider the share of multiple different types of power an individual or collective has, out of what is available (see also Emerson, 1962, Paulson, Gezon, & Watts, 2003). Aside from the considerations one must make given a conceptualization of human-based agents, individuals or collectives, as having interlinked acquisitive and relational needs, the other argument for examining such metrics lies in four fundamental properties of power.

First, as realistic group conflict theory assumes (e.g., Campbell, 1965), many forms of power are limited in reality or potentiality (in absolute terms and in terms of
ease of access). For example, there is only so much nutritional value produced globally that may be consumed by people (Blaydes & Kayser, 2011). This necessarily introduces tensions between people and forces them to deal with one another, and limiting factors must be considered if one is to accurately understand what deprivation looks like, both in absolute and relative terms.

Second, power is fungible - that is, its different forms are tradable (Pratto et al., 2011). For example, we know that the Arabian Gulf states have a sizeable share of the world’s oil production. We also know that these states’ control over and exploitation of this resource gives them the potential to influence the international market very strongly, which in turn can affect national economies and individuals’ ability to provide for themselves, as happened in 1973. Such pseudo-monopolies then can be dangerous to others. In order to get around this vulnerability, many countries’ leaders, with the support (or insufficiency of opposition) of their populations, have invested quite a lot of effort and expense, trading forms of power they do have, to achieve secure supplies of this resource (e.g., relationally through trying to achieve good relationships or legitimizing political regimes in these states, and/or acquisitively by buying guarantees of oil exports or maintaining military control and/or presence in the region). The fungibility of power does not prevent, and may even abet, pseudo-monopolies (and in some cases actual monopolies) of power. Individual nations’ power relative to others has been fairly stable, especially between the “Great Powers” and the “Periphery” after the Cold War (see Levitsky & Way, 2009). Thus, while almost every country has grown and developed significantly for decades, their relative strengths and position in the structural network of nations and leverage over each other have remained nearly intact or become more
disparate (e.g., Kim, 2007, Levitsky & Way, 2009), and this is true for disadvantaged groups within nations as well (e.g., Kochhar, Fry, & Taylor, 2011) and for the quality of life of the populations of these countries (UNDP Human Development Reports, 1970-2010). Within the international network, then, there are some nations that have chronically had multiple monopolies or pseudo-monopolies (e.g., the U.S. over political and military clout, interstate brokerage, see Ikenberry, 2011, Kim, 2007), and some that have had none, nor any means of gaining leverage over those who do, thus making them more dependent and vulnerable and at risk for conflict (e.g., Goldgeier & McFaul, 1992, Levitsky & Way, 2009, Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, & Talmud, 2007). Similarly, there are privileged groups and individuals within each country that have had access to and benefited most from the use of international disparities (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Assessing shares of various forms of power and how they are transmitted to populations allows us to examine how interdependence asymmetry affects collectives and not just their institutions.

This latter consequence of power fungibility underscores the third property of power. That is, that it is self-reinforcing or self-amplifying, agglomerating different forms of power primarily in the top of the hierarchy (Magee & Galinsky, 2008, Pratto et al., 2011, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, the law of increasing disproportionality predicts that the increasing exclusion of subordinates from positions of authority can be chronic and strong (Putnam, 1976).

Finally, some forms of power can be destructive or constructive, without a necessary correspondence in this property between the relational and acquisitive domains. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) show that military expenditure is, to an
extent, a 'regional public bad' in the way it precipitates arms races. But military expenditure and industry can also be related to economic and scientific growth (e.g., Frederikson & Looney, 1983). The boundary between power’s constructive and destructive uses - to fulfill needs and to constrain them - may thus be porous or ambiguous, especially when it is possible to distinguish between the user and the agent(s) affected by these uses (compare to Simon & Oakes, 2006). For example, people may constrain others’ needs by trying to meet their own needs (e.g., tragedy of the commons), as well as meet their needs by constraining others’ (e.g., mutually assured destruction).

Because of the properties of power just named; limited, fungible, self-aggregating, destructive and constructive, looking for agglomeration or centralization of many forms of power simultaneously may tell us where interdependence may be asymmetric, a condition in which domination on one hand and vulnerability on the other may arise.

I argue that the inter-relatedness and fungibility of forms of power and the stability of their hierarchical distribution make it so that absolute indicators of various forms of power can be good empirical predictors of where chronic asymmetric interdependence in the corresponding domains may be. For example, absolute economic indicators such as GDP or GNP/capita, typically used to categorize countries into economic or development ‘classes’ (e.g., UNDP, 2011), map quite closely onto measures of economic national power centralization (Kim, 2007). But economic affluence and centrality are merely components of the power context under which individuals and societies exist. The national social ecology, enabling popular need fulfillment or deprivation, within and outside the national context, may also be described in terms of the
state’s long-term relative share of global resources, including but not limited to economic, military, social, and strategic resources. Similarly, the national social ecology involves the transmissibility of these resources from the state to the population (e.g., state responsiveness to popular political participation, state efficacy in provision of popular needs). These factors can be assessed using group-level measures, such as competitiveness of political participation or average caloric intake or national economic affluence. But they and their variation within a social ecology can also be measured at the individual level, for example assessing individuals’ economic or physical insecurity or political self-efficacy. Accounting for these, and other acquisitive and relational components of national social ecology, may result in different classifications of nations, and suggest different ways that people and their group organizations, whether state or otherwise, can respond in the political domain to unfavorable social ecologies.

This is precisely why the psychology of peoples’ responses to (lack of) power in terms of their values and behaviors should be examined as a function of their broad social ecology and sociopolitical context, not just their immediate economic situations.

The role of needs and power in shaping values

There is a near-consensus among social psychologists and others over an understanding of values as manifestations of social entities’ needs and desires, shaping the goals these entities hold and the means by which they go about achieving them (Bengtson & Lovejoy, 1973, Inglehart, 1971, Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, Schwartz, 1994). According to these scholars, both personal psychological and social structural affordances and constraints are implicated in differences between people on the values they prefer.
But values have also been defined and discussed in many ways. While Bengston and Lovejoy (1973) emphasize experiences as the source of desire and values, Inglehart (1971) argues that it is needs that underlie desire, and that values are thus the motivators shaping the pursuit of need-fulfillment. In this paper, I follow the understanding that needs can specify values, and that values in turn are linked to the shape and goals of people's behaviors.

And while values researchers classify values according to different criteria, many of them share the conceptual distinction between material and social, humanistic, or post-bourgeois value sets (Bengtson & Lovejoy, 1973, Inglehart, 1971, Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Inglehart (1971) and Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) argue that values can be ranked in a hierarchical priority system. Values directing efforts to fulfill material, biologically-primal needs, as opposed to social needs, come first, until and unless the social entity becomes ‘saturated’ with the resources necessary for the fulfillment of material needs. For example, Inglehart’s (1971, 2008) theory of post-materialism provides substantial evidence that across generations, as economic security in developed, rich, nations became more a given, people in younger generations emphasized ‘post-bourgeois’ values such as belongingness and justice more so than people of elder generations. Inglehart (2008) also claims that the peoples of poor and conflict-ridden nations tend to be overwhelmingly more materialist than those of rich and secure nations. Similarly, Oishi, Diener, Lucas, and Suh (1999) showed that across cultures, there is a shift in predictors of life satisfaction from satisfaction with safety needs to satisfaction with love and esteem needs as the lower needs are gratified. In short,
the form and degree of needs a person or collective has, along with the resources
available to achieve those needs, are intimately linked to the values that social entity has.

Inglehart (1971), as well as other scholars (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, Rokeach, 1973), show that values can link needs to behaviors, and guide the form of need-
fulfillment behaviors, with social, economic, or political goals. Moreover, they argue that
values can not only determine behavior, but the importance of the failure or success of
this behavior. In a 23-day diary study, Oishi, Diener, Suh, and Lucas (1999) showed that
values defined qualitative differences between people in what predicted their subjective
well-being, and success in the valued domains predicted their degree of well-being.

However, by lumping sets of values together under ‘material’ and ‘post-material’
categories, or within the ranking schemes of prioritization outlined by needs-gratification
theory (Maslow, 1970), studies may miss important differences between the patterning of
value preferences within these classes and subsequently explanations for differences in
behavior.

One reason that this may be so is the unexamined assumption that material goals
are sufficient to attenuate material needs, and that social needs require only ‘post-
material’ resources. The interdependence of the two classes of needs and the values that
drive their fulfillment may be recognized by conceptualizing needs and values as
acquisitive and relational, as I have defined these terms (pp. 3-5). In doing so, one may be
able to look for intergenerational and cross-national differences in value preferences that
are not predicted by post-materialist or needs-gratification theories.

For example, Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) show that while most trends in
value preferences in American society over the period spanning 1968-1981 do conform to
the assertions made by Inglehart (1971), the ‘post-material’ preference for the value of equality actually decreased over the period of 1971-1981. Further underscoring the inadequacy of the ‘material’ and ‘post-material’ distinction and the hypothesized proportional popularity of these classes of values between rich and poor social entities, researchers have found that lower class individuals act in a more prosocial fashion because of a greater commitment to egalitarian values and feelings of compassion (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), whereas upper-class individuals support the ‘material’ value of greed more so than lower-class individuals (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012).

I argue that one can understand why relational concerns can matter more to the poor if one understands equality as a relational value characterizing the need for social resources that permit the achievement of material outcomes in a given material context. Increasing prosperity reduces the need for social resources to ameliorate material deprivation, such as support for institutional intervention targeting the minimum standard of living and thus the economic gap between socioeconomic classes, and the converse may be true. Of course, one must still contend with the influences of other values and sociopolitical structures and norms that may act in tension or concordantly (Schwartz, 1994) with egalitarianism, especially when trying to apply this reasoning cross-nationally. Different political systems (e.g., free market capitalism vs. socialism) and cultural value traditions (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) normalize egalitarian behavior and policies to different degrees, and make holding egalitarian values more or less difficult or likely. Nonetheless, insofar as people with no material leverage to improve their material circumstances are exposed to the concept of equality and examples of its enactment,
support of this value may be more common. This exposure may be more common today
than in the past, as the influence of international media and convergence of educational
content increases with globalization. Similarly, by viewing material values such as wealth
as acquisitive, characterizing the need for material resources that permit the achievement
of social outcomes in a given social environment, it may be possible to explain why
wealthier individuals and groups value greed for wealth more so than materially deprived
agents. Wealthy actors in wealthy environments can get caught on the ‘hedonic
treadmill’, especially as mutual dependence is less necessary, social capital is eroded, and
relational networks are more impoverished, leaving material gain as a primary pathway to
self-definition and self-worth, and as the primary means by which people can fulfill the
needs otherwise obtainable through strong social networks (for a review on the negative
effects of affluence, see Luthar, 2003).

Post-materialist and needs-gratification theory explanations of value differences
are not only problematic in regards to the value of equality. Contrary to post-material
implications, people in developing or least developed countries (LDC) attach as much, if
not more, significance to values of dignity, justice, respect, and morality, as to ‘material’
values in determining their political behavior and goals (Anderson, 1990, Brooks &
Manza, 1994, Davis & Speer, 1991). For example, Anderson (1990) showed in
interviews with 160 destitute and less poor villagers in Nicaragua and Costa Rica that
40% of respondents did not mention economic utilitarian motivations at all for their
political actions; rather, self-defense, reaction to repression, anger, and injustice were the
driving motivations for these people. Upon further analysis of interviews, Anderson
(1990) concluded that values of morality, self-respect, and dignity were vital for these
motivations. Work by Brooks and Manza (1994), on the other hand, showed that even in the most developed of countries, ‘material’ values remain an important component of people’s lives.

Clarifying these conflicting findings requires, at the least, understanding some ways in which the fulfillment of both social and material goals, motivated by acquisitive and relational values, can be important in attenuating material needs. The accordance or deprivation of ‘sociopolitical capital’ or relational power marks and partially constructs the (a)symmetry of influence, control, and need-fulfillment, both ‘material’ and ‘non-material’, between people(s). For example, dominant groups have disseminated and normalized ‘legitimizing myths,’ ideologies bequeathing dominants with control and influence and maintaining compliance with, normalization, and legitimization of hierarchies and inequality (Buchanan, 1993, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) extend this idea to the realm of international relations. They show through case studies of U.S. diplomacy after the first and second World Wars and of British colonization of Egypt and India that hegemonic nations exercise power not only through material incentives and threats, but through the socialization of norms and value orientations among elites in subordinate nations. They argue that the latter can occur due to hegemons’ efforts to disseminate alternative political norms and values, under conditions of structural constraints (e.g., post-war vulnerability) or via more direct forms of coercive intervention. Indeed, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) argue that capitalizing on structural vulnerability to legitimize ideological domination obviates the need for hegemons to continually exercise coercion materially, creating a relatively self-sustaining political environment favorable to continued compliance with hegemonic norms and
Another value linked to ‘sociopolitical capital,’ namely recognition, has been argued to capture the fundamental moral dimension of social struggles, without discounting utilitarian motives as irrelevant or non-existent (for a review of the theory of recognition and its extension to international affairs, see Heins, 2010). Similarly, moral exclusion, that is, the monopolization of the applicability of moral values to the individual or collective self, legitimizing harm or exploitation of the other can have severe social and material behavioral consequences, from genocide to discrimination (Opotow, 1990). Even in international relations, actors’ sense of importance and worth counts for more than just a motivator for the fulfillment of material interests and culturally-relevant norms (Wolf, 2011). Social respect, whether of the categorical or meritoriously contingent types, can be a significant goal, both for instrumental reasons, particularly pertaining to social conflict, and as an end in itself (for reviews of the importance of respect in social psychology and international relations, see Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008, Miller, 2001, Wolf, 2011). Moreover, emotions shared by members of collectives, such as anger, in response to moral breaches and a sense of illegitimacy of their plight, can provide an alternate impetus and pathway to collective social or political action, when success is not guaranteed (Drury & Reicher, 2005), or when members of the collective do not feel politically efficacious (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

Relational power may also help to define a group’s perceived sociopolitical obligations and drive its members’ efforts to better their situations. For example, the form and extent of political participation in a particular nation depends on the national prevalence of such relational values as reciprocity and social inclusiveness (e.g., Narayan, 2002). Pocklington (1970) argues that it is necessary to understand how people
feel political obligation through the lens of the moral legitimacy of obeying or disobeying the law, and not just whether the law applies to those people. In this sense, political disobedience may or may not be an abandonment of political obligations, and judgments of moral legitimacy provide a form of social power that can act as an arbiter of what values and behaviors people adopt vis-à-vis the institutions or groups that have influence over them. A similar point has been made by Gross (1977), in her analysis of resistance and non-compliance among American draft protestors during the Vietnam War. She argues that resistance and non-compliance may be considered from the point of view of the actor, to be political virtues, self-constructed and autonomously implemented on moral grounds, *often for the perceived good of the very group that condemns these actions*. But she also argues that people desiring an escalation of commitment to what they consider virtuous political values and behavior may also require another element of social capital - social corroboration and support.

The interdependence indicated by these studies between material and ‘non-material’ needs and values, given the relationship established previously between power and value preferences, again suggests the need to conceptualize and assess power as the balance between affordances and constraints experienced by people across multiple domains, as constructed by relationships with others (see also Paulson et al., 2003). The dominance of certain political values and ideological frameworks in a particular society is at least partially a function of the need for societal responsiveness to the political demands, constraints, and affordances of the social ecology and sociopolitical context. Emerson (1962), for one, asserts that since social relations are commonly ones of mutual dependence with varying degrees of asymmetry, and dyadic power-dependence relations
between actors are embedded in a larger social environment, analyzing complex power structures such as those tied to politics necessitates assessing power networks of interlinked power-dependence relations. Georgas, van de Vijver, and Berry (2004) show that political value orientations such as loyalty and approval of hierarchy relate systematically with cluster membership of countries on ecosocial indices such as religion and affluence. They argue that such indices can explain similarities and differences in values in different clusters of countries.

Adapting Georgas and Berry’s (1995) ecocultural model, I argue that long-term national power afforded by social ecologies can be expected to have reciprocal influences on short-term sociopolitical contexts, and both ecology and sociopolitical context to influence societal adaptation. Individuals’ acculturation to the same political system (whether through compliance, defiance, integration, or self-marginalization) and socialization over generations of the social ecology each country has, may translate into patterns of political value preferences among individuals of a particular nation. In turn, individuals’ values direct need motivations to form the spectrum of nationally-specific socio-politically relevant behavioral repertoires. In other words, differences between nations in terms of what political values or action goals (such as autonomy, escape, and resistance against oppressive dominants) are popular in their societies stem ultimately from differences between those countries’ social ecologies. These latter manifest as differences in societal needs and the options for fulfilling those needs, and subsequently as differences in the social adaptations these societies may employ (or be influenced or coerced into employing by more powerful others) in response to their specific social ecology (see Figure 1A).
My discussion of the properties and linkages of self, power, and values so far (Figure 1B) indicate the need for two conceptual changes to needs-gratification and post-materialist theories. First, as I have argued, one must acknowledge that ‘material’ and ‘post-material’ needs and values cannot be independent of one another, and both can serve material and social functions. Therefore, studying more specific value dimensions within the acquisitive and relational conceptual frames and these values’ relationships to needs-fulfilling behaviors, may be fruitful (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, Schwartz, 1994). Second, and related to the latter point, in conceptualizing values as frameworks through which need-fulfillment is approached, it is not sufficient to look at economic affluence, whether at the individual and collective level, as the sole avenue through which material needs can be fulfilled or as the sole pre-condition for attention to and importance of social needs and values among people or as the ultimate driver of intergenerational value changes. Power exists in many fungible ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ forms, and the common function of all forms of power is to address needs (Pratto et al., 2011). Thus, power must be assessed more broadly, with the understanding that all forms of power have influences on the importance and fulfillment of multiple domains or classes of needs and values.

This is not to say, of course, that the broad strokes of the work done so far under the frame of post-materialist or needs-gratification theory are invalid. Rather the argument is that it is necessary to incorporate further complexity and specificity in these theories (see also Bardi & Schwartz, 2003), so as to more accurately reflect the conditions of survival and life satisfaction in a social world.
Political values and behaviors in powerful and disempowered social groups

Under relatively stable national social ecology, a specific behavioral pattern may become present in a society, depending on the particular constraints and affordances of the ecology and the sociopolitical context that determine the priorities, if any, in fulfillment of different needs. At the collective level, each of these behavioral orientations, or scripts, or goals, may be shaped and supported ideologically by various value frameworks or orientations directing a motivating need or set of needs. Values such as self-determination, independence, and freedom or other collectively self-defining values may be related to political action with separatist or isolationist goals (e.g., Heins, 2010, Suso, 2010). Materialism, on the other hand, may characterize preferences for stability, security, wealth, system justification and other self-protective factors (Dirks, 1993, Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Values such as respect, dignity, equality, and counter-dominance, responding to insufficiencies or deprivations in intergroup social inclusion or affiliation, may be linked to revisionist and self-empowerment political behaviors and goals (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008, Opotow, 1990, Wolf, 2011).

One of the factors that makes a particular collective’s social ecology unfavorable is the presence of oppression, the asymmetric interdependence (power-dependence) constraints in the sociopolitical context (see also Emerson, 1962, Paulson et al., 2003). The nature of oppression is to deny people not just their bodily needs, but their legitimacy as people (and peoples), their agency, and their very humanity, relative to the oppressor (e.g., Opotow, 1990, Wolf, 2011). A politically vulnerable or oppressed society or group is likely to be economically insecure, and this insecurity will be reflected in both material and non-material value preferences (e.g., preference for both security and counter-
dominance), corresponding to deprivation in both material and social resources and the
effect of this deprivation on the group’s ability to meet its needs. Thus, ‘material’ and
‘non-material’ value preferences can co-exist and be just as prevalent among
disempowered agents as they are among the powerful.

There are several ways in which collectives can respond to a lack of power afforded by the social ecology. They may strive to be free of unwelcome external influence, that is, to achieve autonomy and self-determination for one’s collective. Such behavior and goals can be perceived, for example, in indigenous peoples’ efforts to control their own territory, economy, and culture (e.g., Buchanan, 1993, Joseph, 1879; Suso, 2010). Another response to such an unfavorable ecology is to attempt to escape. Whole nations may become more or less characterized by emigration (e.g., Lebanon, Mexico, Turkey, Ireland), with large numbers of people seeking physical escape by migrating to contexts with more manageable social ecologies (Dirks, 1993). Similarly, people in some groups may aim to escape psychologically. People may seek to justify and rationalize their circumstances to reduce dissonance and pressure for conformity or solidarity, or to internalize loyalism and seek to maintain the system (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, Jost & Hunyady, 2002, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). People may also attempt to escape by allowing themselves to become politically alienated and/or apathetic (Long, 1975, Stokols, 1975). People in subordinated groups may also focus on collective self-empowerment and defiance of oppression (Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002, Pratto et al., 2011, Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001, Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Social ecological constraints on both acquisitive and relational power can, but do not necessarily, cause tensions and ambivalence among people between acquisitive and
relational values and behaviors. That will depend primarily on the social ecology, the
degree of utility of the specific values and behaviors to the needs of the social ecology,
and on the inter-relatedness of the needs themselves. That is, there will be more tension
in a given social ecology and sociopolitical context the more any set of values are
functionally necessary and mutually exclusive. Thus, it is possible that in disadvantaged
social ecologies and sociopolitical contexts, people may have more complex or
ambiguous understandings of their position; a response perhaps to a more difficult
situation than privileged people or groups might face (Foels & Reid, 2010). Favorable
social ecologies are characterized by fewer unmet needs and less power-dependence
constraints exercised by others, potentially allowing more unambiguous preferences for
values.

For example, freedom (reflecting a need for self-determination) and security
(reflecting a need for physical safety) can both be considered important but do not have
to be mutually exclusive in politically stable nations, because both needs can be met, and
both values can be held simultaneously. On the other hand, where collective insecurity is
chronic in a nation people may be forced to make a choice between the two. In such
cases, the needs for collective self-determination and physical safety are themselves made
to be mutually exclusive by the ecology, resulting for example in increased prevalence of
support for authoritarianism (Osterreich, 2005).

Similarly, material values may not always be in tension with counter-dominance
values. But when the social ecology dictates that these values be mutually exclusive, a
situation faced by people in many disempowered nations, a choice is forced between

The case of counter-dominance

The preference for social dominance can be characterized as valuing and supporting hierarchy, inequality, oppressive power-dependence, and social exclusion (Pratto et al., under preparation, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The mirror image of this orientation, counter-dominance, can be characterized as valuing and supporting relational autonomy, collective freedom, equality, and social inclusion.

Various psychological theories, some of which I have already discussed, support the prediction that people may value counter-dominance and its associated values more in unfavorable power ecologies. Reactance theory (for a review, see Miron & Brehm, 2006), taken to the collective level, would argue that constraints on a group’s ability to achieve its desired goals is likely to elicit rejection, refusal, resistance, and other forms of reactant stances and behaviors. Such constraints, evident in sociopolitical ecological asymmetric interdependency as threats to freedom and relational autonomy, describe a type of power disparity that may represent barrier and social influence threats for the disempowered collectives involved. Seeman, Carroll, Woodard, and Mueller (2008) show that these types of threat elicit stronger reactant responses as opposed to classic confrontational threats.

Similarly, research on social dominance theory finds that oppressed peoples evidence more opposition the world over to group-based dominance and support for equality in general than dominant group members do (see Lee et al., 2011, for a meta-analysis of effects of group power differences on social dominance orientation).
Likewise, members of lower economic classes reject group dominance and support equality more than members of middle and upper economic classes (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Pratto & Stewart, 2012). Within the social identity tradition, the strengthening and increase in awareness and salience of a group’s identity as a disadvantaged or subordinated group (e.g., Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002; Pratto & Stewart, 2012), may also allow them to see how subordination can be flagrantly opposed to their interests while serving dominants, leading to further opposition of such dominance (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2011, Lee et al., 2011; Narayan, 2002; Pratto, 1999). The sense of entitlement in subordinated groups is related to their delegitimization of their political systems and system change-seeking, including the tendency to reject ‘just world’ views and self-blame, and to adopt self-improvement and empowerment goals (for a review on differences in entitlement antecedents between subordinated and dominant groups, see Major, 1994).

These findings are in direct contradiction to system justification theory, which argues that “people who suffer the most from a given state of affairs are paradoxically the least likely to question, challenge, reject, or change it” (Kay & Friesen, 2011). Kay and Friesen (2011) argue that when people’s political system is threatened, when they are dependent on or unable to leave it, and when they lack personal control within it, they are most likely to defend the status quo. System justification may be pragmatic for the individual in relation to the systems instituted by a powerful ingroup, helping to preserve social stability (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), in a state favorable to oneself or one’s ingroup. But I argue that contrary to system justification theory, in societies under unfavorable social ecologies, beliefs in the fairness and equality of political systems can be less
prevalent, and rejection of and resistance to the system more prevalent than in favorable national social ecologies. Jost and Hunyady (2002) argue that people engage in system justification in an attempt to cope with circumstances they cannot change and maintain social stability or avoid the potential chaos and conflict social change can bring. But the type of threat, the degree to which change is perceived as possible, the degree to which there is social support, cohesion, and identity-investment around rejecting a system, as well as other characteristics of the social ecology and sociopolitical context may all function to attenuate or reverse system justification in adverse circumstances and are not accounted for by Jost and Hunyady (2002). One example of a social ecological influence not accounted for is the level of political responsiveness and democratic norms in a system. If the system is responsive to democratic pressures, not justifying the system is in part a kind of self-blame, personally and as a citizen. Moreover, if a system is responsive, then in a procedural sense it is just (and allows for political engagement), even when mobilizing against aspects of the system that people desire to reform or change. This is not necessarily the case in autocratic and hybrid regimes.

In summation, I argue that both material and non-material, acquisitive and relational value ‘classes’ can be present regardless of the state of national development and power or of individual economic security. And relational values such as counter-dominance or egalitarianism may actually be more prevalent in disempowered nations, while acquisitive values such as wealth may be more prevalent in powerful nations.

In the present study, using a sample of 7 nations, I will define and describe a socioecological index of intergenerational, multilevel, multiform relative power, henceforth the Trans-level Intergenerational Relational Leverage Index (TIRLI). This
index combines measures of national shares of different forms of global power over a
time span extending at least 20 years within the 1988-2010 period, spanning a significant
portion of the lifespan of at least two generations. Also included are measures
operationalizing the likelihood that national populations received the benefits of such
powers over the same period. Because these measures assess both shares of state power
among nations and transmission of state (institutional) power to the population, the index
conceptually spans three levels – national power as embedded in the international system,
and population power as embedded in the state. Statistically speaking, however, these are
all obviously group-level measures.

Therefore, I will also describe related individual-level measures (see Table 2) in
the same nations: socioeconomic and demographic factors such as economic insecurity
and socioeconomic status, and measures of political self-efficacy, system justification,
preferences between material and non-material values, and the strength of support for
resistance against oppression. Finally, I will relate these measures to the TIRLI. The
index is not intended to be the definitive operationalization of the chosen cluster or type
of powers or of power as a component of social ecology generally, but one example of
such.

From the conceptual analysis and evidence surveyed above, I derive the following
expected patterns:

1. The relative power of the sampled nations, as assessed by the TIRLI, will be
   relatively stable over the 1988-2010 period.

2. Power, as assessed by TIRLI, will correspond well with the absence of various
   forms of external intervention.
3. The power rank of sampled nations will be different when assessed using a purely economic index (GNP/capita) versus using the TIRLI.

4. Both material and non-material values will be endorsed by people regardless of their level of personal economic insecurity.

5. Value preferences will be similar across participants’ ages for all national samples.

6. Personal economic insecurity will be related to the variation in people’s preference for a value over another.

7. Personal economic insecurity will be related to the preference for equality over wealth.

8. Personal economic insecurity will be related to endorsement of resistance against dominant groups’ oppression, and inversely related to perceiving political systems as fair.

9. Personal economic insecurity will be related to the variation in people’s endorsement of resistance against oppression, and in their perceptions of their domestic political systems as fair.

10. People will favor equality over wealth in all national samples, and especially so in disempowered nations.

11. At the same time, people will favor stability and security over democracy and freedom to the extent that their nation is disempowered.

12. A general affinity for resistance against dominant groups’ oppression will be present in all national samples, and more strongly evident in disempowered nations than in powerful ones.
13. Perceived fairness of national and international systems will be weak or rejected outright in all national samples, especially in disempowered nations.

Method

*The Trans-level Integrated Relational Leverage Index (TIRLI)*

The purpose of TIRLI is to assess national power ecologies experienced by citizens over more than a generation of time (i.e. more than 20 years). As I mentioned previously, there are many ways in which one may be able to describe national power ecologies, and TIRLI is one of many, not the definitive way to do so. I have discussed previously (pp. 10-11) other ways to measure power, and the advantages of looking at shares of various forms of power out of what is globally available, and of assessing the efficiency of transmission of state power to the population.

Thus, TIRLI is composed of the percent share of world services (e.g., communication, transportation, information technology, intellectual property) export values, the percent share of world military expenditure, a scale of the competitiveness of political participation and average per capita daily caloric consumption. The first two of these measures describe the extent and direction of asymmetric interdependency, in terms of how much military and services resources (which capture military, economic, and strategic resources) is controlled by each nation compared to the rest of the world. While military expenditure and export values are often used by economists and political scientists as measures of power (e.g., Kim, 2010, Maoz, 2006), the relative shares of these resources out of the global totals have not been used for this purpose, though some have argued conceptually for doing so (Paulson et al., 2003). The measure of
competitiveness of political participation has been used to capture variation in the degree and forms of political inclusiveness (Marshall & Jagger, 2003). In other words, this indexes how much citizens are able to have influence on their country’s political system. Average per capita daily caloric consumption, measured from a supply perspective, is an indicator of transmission and distribution of economic growth, which has been shown to be more useful than such indicators as the GINI and goods consumption avoiding the biasing effect of inequality on the other measures, since biological limits make it impossible for a small number of individuals to consume most of a nation’s calories (Blaydes & Kayser, 2011). Competitiveness of political participation and average daily per capita caloric consumption are conceived of as operationalizations of the extent to which each nation’s control of its political and economic resources reaches its population in individually meaningful ways.

Military expenditure data from 1988-2010 were obtained from the SIPRI FIRST database (SIPRI, 2012) and the annual expenditure averaged over that time period, and divided over the average global annual military expenditure. Annual services export value data from 1988-2010 were obtained from the World Trade Organization databank (WTO, 2012), averaged over time, and divided by the total value of service exports. Export values were used instead of import or balance of payment values since conceptually, I was looking for a measure of where the provision of strategic economic resources may be monopolized, that is, on which states do other states depend for their services resources. The competitiveness of political participation data were obtained from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jagger, 2003). Average daily per capita caloric consumption data from 1988-2007 were obtained from the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture
Organization’s (FAO) food balance sheets, which comprise the total quantity of all food commodities divided by the national population, accounting for domestic stock, imports, and exports, with statistical adjustments and imputation of missing data by the FAO (see FAO, 2001).

The scores for the four measures discussed were Z-scored for 9 nations – the 7 sampled nations and two reference nations, Japan and Swaziland, and averaged to compose the single TIRLI score. The latter two nations were chosen because over the time period involved, Japan had the second strongest economy as measured by GDP, and Swaziland among the weakest among developing nations (not including the small island states and the least developed countries as classified by the U.N.). One can appreciate the range of TIRLI scores in the 7 nations sampled by comparing them with Swaziland as a very weak developing nation and with Japan as being among the most powerful nations after the U.S.

Low scores on the TIRLI signify nations that chronically depend on powerful foreign benefactors or brokers for the power to meet some of their needs or constrain others’ and in which national control of some resources is not well transmitted to their people. On the other hand, high scores signify nations which chronically enjoy some structural autonomy to meet their needs and constrain others’, and nations in which this power is well transmitted to the nations’ populations.

The average Fund for Peace Failed States Index External Intervention component score, over the available data, from 2006 to 2011 (Fund for Peace, 2011) includes various forms of economic, military, and political interventions for each nation. That is, it indexes states’ weakness in terms of how much external states have intervened in them. If
TIRLI is externally valid, it should relate well to this score. On the other hand, GNP per capita (World Bank, 2012), a commonly used group-level measure of economic affluence averaged over the same period of time, should not have as close a correspondence to this score. TIRLI and GNP per capita measures were used as averages of data from the 1988-2010 period, with some data missing, as they are not available in the public domain. But scores from the earliest available year (TIRLI: 1988, GNP per capita: 1990) and from 2010 were compared for both these measures, as a way to examine their stability over time.

Samples

A survey was conducted on convenience samples in 7 nations between July 28, 2011 and October 28, 2011. The questionnaire was near-identical in each nation, but offered in an official or common language or languages of that nation. The questionnaire was written originally with English, Arabic, and Spanish phrasing in mind. Collaborators native to each country translated and back-translated the questionnaire until consensus was reached that the meaning implied for each measure in the local language was a) not conceptually different than that of the originals and b) that the local phrasing was meaningful for the potential sample. The nations surveyed were: Lebanon, Turkey, Ireland, China, Switzerland, Italy, and the United States. Although these samples are not nationally representative, such is not necessary for our purposes (see also Anderson, 1990) because the respondents are exemplars of their societies and they were recruited to encompass the range of socioeconomic situations within each nation. Similarly, although the nations selected are not representative of the globe, they do represent a broad
sampling of the national power ecologies among developing and developed countries (Figure 3), though unfortunately not among the least developed countries.

Lebanon

Ninety-five (52 male, 43 female) participants were interviewed in person (N=3) or answered self-administered questionnaires in Arabic, distributed through the snowball technique (N=92). The median age was 32 years. The sample was largely split between working and middle-class participants: 52.6% of participants rated their economic situation as good or better, and 43.2% rated themselves ‘so-so,’ compared to others in their society. The mean level of economic insecurity was 5.08 on a 10-point scale – that is, that participants on average neither agreed nor disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

Turkey

One hundred and twenty-four (60 male, 36 female, 28 unidentified) participants answered an online questionnaire in Turkish using Qualtrics online software. The median age was 36 years. The sample was largely middle class: 67.1% described their economic situation as good or better, whereas 20.2% described their situation as ‘so-so’. The mean level of economic insecurity was 4.28 on a 10-point scale – that is, participants on average very slightly disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

China
Ninety (47 male, 32 female, 11 unidentified) participants from Beijing answered an online questionnaire in Simplified Chinese. The median age was 26 years. Compared to others in their society, 27.8% of participants rated their economic situation as good or better 50.6% as so-so, and 21.5% as poor or worse. The mean level of economic insecurity was 4.99 on a 10-point scale – that is, that participants on average neither agreed nor disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

Ireland

Fifty-eight (24 male, 34 female) participants answered self-administered English questionnaires distributed by snowball technique. The median age was 42 years. The sample was split between working and middle class: 50% described their economic situation as good or better, and 45% described their economic situation as so-so. The mean level of economic insecurity was 4.63 on a 10-point scale – that is, participants on average very slightly disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

Switzerland

Fifty (23 male, 27 female) participants answered an online questionnaire. Seventeen participants responded to a French version of the questionnaire, 6 responded to an Italian version, and 27 responded to a German version. The median age was 32 years. The sample varied in economic need; compared to others in their society, 56% of the sample described their economic situation as good or better, 32% as so-so, and 12% as poor or destitute. The mean level of economic insecurity was 3.34 on a 10-point scale –
that is, participants on average disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

Italy

One hundred and fifteen (50 male, 63 female, 2 unidentified) participants answered a self-administered questionnaire in Italian. The median age was 38 years. Compared to others in their society, 78.6% of the sample described their economic situation as good or better, and 20% as so-so. The mean level of economic insecurity was 3.66 on a 10-point scale – that is, participants on average disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

The United States

One hundred and fifty-three (81 male, 68 female, 4 unidentified) participants answered an online questionnaire in English using Qualtrics online software. The median age was 33 years. Compared to others in their society, 46.7% of respondents described their economic situation as good or better, 28.8% as so-so, and 24.2% as poor or worse. The mean level of economic insecurity was 5.03 on a 10-point scale – that is, that participants on average neither agreed nor disagreed that they often have difficulty obtaining the things they and their families need.

Measures

Participants’ Economic Situations. I used a subjective 6-point comparative measure of socioeconomic status, assessing how participants compared their economic situations to those of other people in their society. I also used an absolute indicator of personal economic insecurity, assessing to what extent participants agreed or disagreed
that they often had difficulty obtaining the things they and their families needed on a 10-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). In the
analyses below concerning the relationship between individuals’ personal economic
situations and their preference for ‘material’ (acquisitive) or ‘post-material’ (relational)
values, I used the economic insecurity measure only because as an ipsative measure, it
corresponded more closely than the comparative SES measure with the conceptual
assertions made by Inglehart (2008) vis-à-vis preferences for material versus non-
material values.

Values. In order to avoid the chance that any one preference for a material or non-
material value over another might be specific to that pair, I included in the analyses 3 8-
point bipolar value preference scales - 2 pairs more closely linked to agent-focused
considerations pitting freedom (1) vs. security (8), and equality (1) vs. wealth (8), and
one pair more closely linked to relational considerations, pitting stability (1) vs.
democracy (8). In the analyses below the scale is reversed for the latter so as to make all
non-material relational-focused values low on the scale and material agent-focused values
high on the scale. I chose to use bipolar scales, rather than the typical value ranking
scheme (Inglehart, 1971, Rokeach, 1973, Schwarz, 1994) for two reasons. The first is that
such scales conceptually follow Rokeach’s (1973) argument that ipsative preferences
may be a more useful means of measuring value endorsement, due to the social
desirability effects and inferior predictive utility that affect ratings of separate values. The
second reason for using bipolar scales is that such scales allow participant to indicate
their preference for one value over another in a more stringent way, while making the
choice more concrete than a ranking of multiple values all at once. With ranks, one does
not know whether preference for 1 over 2 is the same degree of preference of 2 over 3, or for that matter, whether the preference for 1 over 3 is equal to the sum of the preference of 1 over 2 and 2 over 3. With the bipolar scales, we may be able to discern how much people prefer one value over another in comparable ways across several different value pairings. Moreover, by using bipolar scales, I was able to pit ‘material’ and ‘post-material’ values against one another in value trade-offs that occur in social reality, particularly in conflict situations. Giving the scale no midpoint further reinforced participants’ need to make a choice, if such a trade-off were actually presented to them. To account for possible primacy effects, I reverse ordered one of the three value preference scales (stability vs. democracy).

Operationalizing psychological escape in the form of system justification, two questions assess how fair participants think domestic and international political systems are, answered on 10-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). Finally, participants’ general affinity for resistance against oppression by dominant groups is examined through a pair of questions measuring the participants’ agreement or disagreement with the ultimate importance of resistance to oppression and the respect they have for oppressed groups that do so, on 10-point Likert scales from 1 (strong disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The correlation between these latter two scaled items was $r = .40, p < .001$ across samples, and the correlation ranged from $r = .29, p < .001$ in China, to $r = .56, p < .001$ in Lebanon. For a list of the individual level variables and the specific questions employed to measure them, see Table 4.
Results

Assessing power

I have argued that power in a social ecology, once measured as the state’s share of different forms of global power and its ability to transmit this institutional power to its people, recognizes that power is often limited in availability, that it is self-reinforcing, that its forms are inter-related and fungible, and that these include acquisitive and relational affordances. The hypotheses generated through this reasoning regarding TIRLI were largely supported. The findings show that there is an upper limit to certain kinds of power, namely caloric consumption and competitiveness of political participation, which are available only up to a certain degree and then level off, even in the most powerful of nations (Figure 2). The relative power of the sampled nations, as assessed by the TIRLI, was relatively stable, and often increasing in disparity between nations, over the 1988-2010 period, and less variable than GNI per capita (Figures 3 and 4). A notable exception is China. One possible explanation for this exception is that China over the period of time discussed, was increasingly monopolizing production and export of commercial merchandise, making others dependent to some degree on the nation for their needs in that domain, giving the nation resource leverage allowing rapid growth. The same argument applies to the growth in GNP, which, not actually distributed over China’s entire population (as the caloric consumption measure shows), artificially deflates the state’s institutional economic power. These two factors, as well as many possible others, were not included in TIRLI, but, as measures of forms of power, which is fungible and self-reinforcing, are closely linked to those measures I have included.
As hypothesized, TIRLI corresponded well with the absence of various forms of external intervention, and vice versa. Again, the one notable exception is that of China. The same arguments made above may apply as explanations why other nations were not more interventionist in China.

The relative position or rank of the sampled nations was quite different when assessed using a purely economic index (GNP/capita) versus using the TIRLI. When assessing power (as conceptualized as resources affording need-fulfillment and averting or eliminating constraints) with GNP/capita, Switzerland was the most affluent (powerful) nation, and Turkey about as powerful as Swaziland. When assessing power with TIRLI, a more realistic picture emerges. Developed nations of Europe and Japan were very close together, and Turkey not far behind. Developing nations are distinctly lower in power, but the difference between the developed nations aside from the U.S. and the developing nations was much smaller than the difference between the U.S. and any other nation – the U.S. as hegemon, or as Ikenberry (2009) calls it, a leviathan, naturally is an extreme outlier.

Economic insecurity, age effects, and value preferences

I have argued that a preference for material over ‘post-material’ values among the economically disadvantaged, or among generational cohorts who have been socialized in an economically deprived situation, is not a general rule - that the relationship between economic insecurity and value preferences depends more on the correspondence between a specific value and its utility under the conditions an individual experiences rather than on whether the value is material or non-material.
Thus, I predicted that both material and non-material values will be endorsed by people regardless of their level of personal economic insecurity. Results showed that contrary to post-materialist predictions, people in 7 different national samples on average preferred post-material values to material values (averaging the three value pair scales) (Figure 5), and separately valued freedom, democracy, and equality respectively over security, stability, and wealth, regardless of their level of personal economic insecurity, and in fact valued post-material values more at either extreme of their self-reported personal economic insecurity (Figures 6-8).

I have also argued, following the findings of other scholars (e.g., Piff et al., 2010), that people with higher economic insecurity will be more likely to prefer equality over wealth. Due to an insufficient number of nations to account for nestedness within country with multilevel modeling, the correlation across the whole sample may be subject to error. But the data show that there is little to no increase in preference for wealth over equality as people’s economic insecurity increases.

The bivariate correlations between personal economic insecurity and preference for material values (as averaged across the three value-pair bipolar scales) were not significant except in the Lebanese sample ($r = .24, p=.03$). The correlations between age and preference for material values were also non-significant except in the Turkish sample, where older participants tended to have more preference for material values ($r = .22, p=.05$), and marginally but in the opposite direction in the U.S. sample, where older participants tended to value ‘post-material’ values more than younger participants ($r = -.16, p=.06$).
I also assessed the relationship between these two hypothesized predictors of value preference (age and economic insecurity) with the participants’ indications of preference for each value pair. No consistent pattern of differences between developed and developing country samples, or by age groups for these samples, emerged.

Moreover, for samples where correlations were significant, each independent variable correlated with preferences on only one of the three value pairs, not on all three, as would be expected if the material and post-material classification were reliable. In the Chinese sample, older participants tended to prefer wealth over equality more so than their younger fellow citizens ($r = .23, p = .05$). One potential explanation for this may be the increased socialization among younger participants in capitalism and valuation of wealth.

In the Lebanese sample, the more economically insecure participants were, the more they preferred wealth over equality ($r = .28, p = .01$). This may be because the perceived outcomes of espousing egalitarianism may be perceived to be unclear or even unfavorable, especially to disadvantaged groups in a context that is highly politically and socio-economically divided and polarized. Needs-gratification theory would predict that such a preference exist for economically deprived people no matter what country they are in. Even if we allow that the relationship may exist only for impoverished people in impoverished nations, this is not the case in these data, for either China or Turkey.

In the Turkish sample, older participants tended to have a higher preference for security over freedom ($r = .22, p = .05$). As security became more available in Turkey, with increasing political stability in the past few decades, diverging from the era of
multiple military coups to a stable civilian government, people may have come to be less constrained in favoring freedom.

No significant correlations were found for either age or economic insecurity in either Italy or Switzerland, countries which, at least until the financial crisis of 2008, had not seen much change in various forms of power, obviating the socialization effect, nor had significant deprivation in one need over others necessitating primacy of particular motivating values to engage in need-fulfillment.

In Ireland, another developed nation, however, older participants were more likely to prefer security over freedom \((r = .29, p=.05)\), and more economically insecure participants were more likely to support democracy over stability \((r = .36, p=.01)\). Uniquely among my samples, there was also a relationship between the interaction of age and economic insecurity and preference for security over freedom \((r = .47, p=.001)\) and preference for material over non-material values generally \((r = .30, p=.04)\), such that the older and more economically insecure participants were, the more likely they were to prefer material values, and specifically security over freedom. Again, framing these results as involving the sociopolitical context and ecology, older, contemporarily poorer Irish citizens may be seen as maintaining a socialized value to attain a past need, brought on by the impact of the overspill of the strife of Northern Ireland’s Troubles and the worst of the disastrous economic situation in Ireland in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This, as opposed to the younger, wealthier generation, matured during the age of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, in a booming economy and political stability.

Finally, older Americans tended to favor democracy over stability more so than younger Americans \((r = .23, p=.01)\). Again, this makes sense contextually, considering
the climate of insecurity and political partisanship and polarization that has plagued the U.S. since at least 2001.

Age and economic insecurity were not correlated in any of the samples. The observed trends in terms of correlations between age, economic insecurity, and individual value pair preferences which have p-values less than 0.012 should not be considered statistically significant. The acceptable p-value is adjusted using the Bonferroni method to account for error in doing multiple correlations with the same independent variable and correlated dependent variables, \( p = \frac{.05}{4} = .012 \).

Supporting my argument that in disadvantaged social ecologies and sociopolitical contexts people may have to contend with complex or ambiguous positions, the amount of personal economic insecurity people reported related to higher variation in people’s preference for a value over another in each national sample. This was evidenced by the increasing confidence intervals around the means on the value preference scales, with higher levels of economic insecurity (Figures 5-8).

Furthermore, I have claimed that counter-dominant stances require holding relational values as important. Rather than assess the preference for all those values (i.e. relational autonomy, collective freedom, equality, and social inclusion), I asked participants about their attitudes regarding engagement with resistance against oppression. In doing so, I aimed to show additional validity to the equality-wealth value preference scale, as equality is conceived to be one of the core values involved in such an orientation. Moreover, by assessing an attitude, I aimed to measure more proximally counter-dominant policies and political behaviors people might support, and associate the likelihood of such support to individual and group-level measures of power. The results
show that, as for equality, personal economic insecurity was not related to endorsement of resistance against dominant groups’ oppression, but to the degree people varied between each other (at that level of economic insecurity) in how much they endorsed this attitude (Figure 9). In the same way, people varied more between one another in how much they perceived their domestic political system was fair, the higher their level of economic insecurity, though notably, at no level of economic insecurity were the means of this measure even close to the midpoint of the scale, showing near universal disapproval of domestic political systems among our participants (Figure 10).

Social ecology and political values

Following my argument that power must be assessed more broadly beyond measures of economic affluence, I examined the patterns in value preferences, perceptions of national and international political system fairness, and endorsement of resistance against oppression, across the spectrum of socioecological power of the sampled nations. To do so I looked at these patterns in relation to the TIRLI.

People in all nations on average favored post-material over material values, though people in the two most disempowered samples (by TIRLI), did prefer post-material values less people in than more empowered nations (Figure 11). Breaking the material and post-material categories down to individual value pair preferences, people in all nations on average favored equality over wealth (Figure 13) and supported resistance against dominance (Figure 15), regardless of their nations’ power in terms of TIRLI. However, consistent with previous findings that oppressed peoples evidence more opposition the world over to group-based dominance and support for equality in general than dominant group members do (Lee et al., 2011) and in contrast to the effect of
personal economic insecurity, people from samples taken from disempowered nations preferred equality over wealth, more so than people from empowered nations (Figure 14), and supported resistance against oppression more (Figure 15). On the other hand, consistent with needs-gratification and post-materialist theories (Maslow, 1970, Inglehart, 2008), the extent of a national sample’s preference for security over freedom was higher for samples from less powerful nations (Figure 12). There was no linear relationship between power as measured by TIRLI and the extent to which people favored stability over democracy (Figure 13).

I have argued that people in disempowered nations, like people disadvantaged by personal economic insecurity, have to deal with increased complexity and ambiguity of their situations and chances of expected survival and satisfaction, and thus may exhibit more tension between acquisitive and relational values that may be structurally induced to be functionally opposing. In line with this reasoning, I found that in disempowered nations more than in empowered nations, people tended on average to be more ambivalent or unwilling to indicate a clear preference (greater frequency of participants closer to the mathematical midpoint of the scale) between security and freedom and between democracy and stability than people (Figure 11).

System justification for members of a subordinated collective has been argued to be a mechanism of psychological coping with difficult circumstances they perceive to be beyond their control to change, motivated by preference for societal stability and/or dissonance reduction (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Partially, the psychological conflict or dissonance is between identifying with and needing belonging to a social group and identifying and condemning aspects of that group that are unjust. But, resistance and non-
compliance with dominant groups’ ideologies and institutions and the policies they enforce, as Gross (1977) points out, may be considered from the point of view of the actor, to be political virtues, enacted often for the perceived good of the very group that would condemn and punish them for these stances. Only the extent of the escalation of commitment to what they consider virtuous political values and behavior requires social corroboration and support.

People in disempowered nations share the reality of their disadvantage, a level of disadvantage beyond that experienced by the peoples of other nations. Thus, I expected that to a greater level, they would recognize injustice, endorse justice values such as equality, approve of resistance against injustice. Results indicated that people across quite different political and social long-term ecologies and short-term contexts disagreed that their domestic political systems were fair, except in Switzerland, where that perception of fairness was not particularly potent (Mean = 5.8 on the 10-point Likert scale) (Figure 15). The same pattern held for perceptions of the fairness of the international political system, except that rejection of this fairness was much stronger across the board, with no countries scoring higher than an average of 4 (slightly disagree) on the 10-point scale (Figure 15).

The degree to which people disagreed that their domestic political system was fair was higher the lower the country’s TIRLI score. In other words, the worse the social ecology (Figure 15). Across the whole sample, judgments of the fairness of domestic political systems ($r = .08, p=.04$) and the international political system ($r = .07, p=.08$) were not significantly correlated to the degree to which participants favored stability (with an adjusted criterion alpha of .025). Within nations, only in China was the
preference for stability related to perceiving the domestic political system is fair \((r = .35, p=0.001)\). In no country was the preference for stability related to the perceived fairness of the international system. This hints that the desire for social stability may not always be an important determinant of fairness judgments regarding political systems, as Jost and Hunyady (2002) and system-justification theory in general would argue.

**Discussion**

This study has some limitations. A greater number of national samples is needed to quantitatively ascertain, using nested models, the strength of the relationships between the different levels of analysis. And though the samples and nations I have used in this study are diverse in terms of age, socioeconomic status, language, culture, political structures and histories, and national economic, military, and political clout, and encompass much of the world’s range of power for developing or developed countries, more should be done to obtain data from the absolutely impoverished and among the least developed countries.

Additionally, a number of other power-share indicators may be necessary before the TIRLI measure can reach its full potential. The need for more institutional power indicators is made apparent by the differences between China and other low-power nations in this study. However, these must also be balanced by accounting for some way to measure how much, if at all, such institutional power benefits the populations of countries. For example, Chinese control over national currency value, is an indicator of institutional power (amplifying trade balance surpluses) as well as transmission of this
power to the populace (low inflation or cost-of-living). The various types of strategic employment of different forms of power should also be assessed.

Moreover, several components of my conceptual model of value preference formation have no analogues among the measures used. For example, more research is needed to describe acute sociopolitical contextual conditions such as the presence of political violence, short-term economic booms and busts, and arising confrontations, reconciliations, or integrations with the international political system (e.g., the U.N., World Trade Organization, etc.) and major powers. Similarly, I have not been able to describe in this paper, the processes of political acculturation and socialization (including accounting for dynamics of social identification), or link these to how the translation of values into political action occurs, though social psychological research already has a rich tradition in doing the latter.

However, the study also extends our understanding of societal and individual political value preferences and choices in several meaningful ways. In studies reporting that deprivation in the attainment of ‘growth’ values such as freedom usually leads to a decrease in their importance (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1983), designs do not examine intergenerational time frames, the groups are not highly self-identified, or the actual need for the deprived value is low. This study, in contrast, makes allowance for the collective beyond one’s national ingroup’s material resources as well as for intergenerational dynamics in power and deprivation in fulfilling, defending, or imposing these needs. By adopting a socioecological psychology approach, I provide a way to incorporate refinements and extensions in current identity research (Haslam & Reicher, 2011), in needs-gratification (Maslow, 1970) and post-materialist theory (Inglehart, 2008), and
justice (e.g., Deutsch, 1975) models of intra- and inter-societal politically-relevant value patterning. The study also provides specific predictions about the shape of such patterns, and preliminary data supporting these predictions.

As I have argued, and other research has showed, the dichotomization of values as material or post-material may be unhelpful (Anderson, 1990, Giacalone & Jurkiewicz, 2004). People, especially in oppressive situations, do suffer high deprivation in relational needs, and subsequently strive for the recognition and moral inclusion of their own groups as valid human entities by other groups, and reject hierarchy and oppression (Heins, 2010, Lee et al., 2011, Major, 1994, Wolf, 2011). Since people as individuals and collectives at different levels have social needs, the fulfillment of which can be a goal in itself and/or instrumental in other ways (e.g., Wolf, 2011), conceptualizations of power must address the relationships and complex causal interconnections that bind these human agents together. I claim that one useful approach, employed in this study, is to assess power interdependence asymmetries (see also Paulson et al., 2003).

My results indicated that measuring power over time in this way is more helpful in describing the capacity of peoples to receive and use their national resources to meet their needs than descriptors of cross-sectional economic affluence (e.g., GNP/capita, Inglehart, 2008). I showed that such a measure as the TIRLI better reflects various properties of power, such as the tendency for stability or increase over time of discrepancies between the powerful and the disempowered, the interrelationship between economic and other forms of power that are more proximal to different ways of fulfilling both material and non-material needs (e.g., need for security, need for political voice),
and a potentially more useful predictor of political influences such as external intervention.

I also found, contrary to post-materialist theory’s predictions (Inglehart, 1971, 2008), that neither age nor personal economic insecurity related consistently and systematically across nations or classes of nations (such as developed or developing world) in whether material or non-material values as a class were preferred with respondents’ level of personal economic insecurity or by the favorability of their broader intergenerational national social ecology. In fact, people in both disempowered and empowered nations, with low or high personal economic security, preferred equality over wealth. Moreover, this preference, and the associated attitude towards was stronger under unfavorable conditions, supporting findings across both groups (Lee et al., 2011), and socioeconomic classes (Piff et al., 2012). Also contrary to post-materialist predictions, in the U.S., it was older participants that valued democracy over stability more than younger participants. However, due to stormy economic or political waters in the last decade or so in the U.S., the recency and impact of this insecurity on Americans may have introduced a regression back to materialist concerns and values.

Nonetheless, the mixed results and the lack of consistency across developed or developing nations in preference patterns or in the specific values preferred, suggests, as others have (Anderson, 1990, Brooks & Manza, 1994, Luthar, 2003) that some relational ideals and the fulfillment of the their underlying needs may be instrumental to people in very different contexts, including the developing world, and that acquisitive values such as stability may still be a focus of concern and importance for different people in different contexts, including in the most wealthy of nations.
People exhibited more ambivalence, or reluctance to indicate a strong preference for one value over the other the more difficult the social ecology, and the higher their personal insecurity. An example of this was the choice between freedom and security. Freedom and security can both be considered important values but do not have to be mutually exclusive in politically stable nations, because both needs can be met and both values can be held simultaneously. And where one can be taken for granted (e.g., U.S.A., Italy, Switzerland), the other can be less ambivalently preferred. On the contrary, in unstable nations with chronic insecurity due to strife (e.g., Lebanon) people are forced to make a choice. In such cases, the need for relational autonomy and the need for physical safety are not mutually exclusive. Fulfillment of the needs for relational autonomy and physical safety is made to be mutually exclusive by the social ecology and sociopolitical context. In fact, responding to deprivation in the former may become a reason for deprivation in the latter. Thus, directing political behavior by a preference for one of these values is doubly (relationally and materially) impactful and risky. In the same way, poor people may have to be subject to others’ control in ways that privileged people are not, or else be in danger, a fairly common situation, for example, in prostitution and human trafficking. Results show this ambivalence in both Lebanon and China, as an unwillingness to deviate from the midpoint of the bipolar value preference scales. This effect was weaker or non-existent in more empowered nations.

On the other hand, there was more ambivalence about the general affinity for resistance against oppression the more favorable a sample’s national social ecology, reflecting the collective self-protective tendencies associated with structural advantage (Major, 1994). This complexity showed itself, albeit in a different form, in the
relationship between personal economic security and preference for different material or non-material values. Here, the more economically insecure individuals were, the more people differed in the extent of their preference for a certain value over another.

The latter findings indicate that economic security and a favorable social ecology generally can provide affordances that make it possible for people to solidify and strengthen preference for relational values in their societies by releasing them from purely acquisitive obligations, and reducing or eliminating trade-off or zero-sum calculations in the fulfillment of material and non-material needs.

But in addition to such an effect, an argument from the other side of the post-materialist coin is that the preference for material values in deprived circumstances may be partly due to the fulfillment and security of social needs. This is different than the need-gratification and post-materialist theories’ implication that relational factors themselves are less important or lower priority in disadvantaged societies and groups. As research has shown (e.g., Luthar, 2003), in at least an economically privileged situation versus an economically deprived one, people’s social bonds are weaker and less secure, whereas people facing collective constraints on the fulfillment of needs interact with and value connections with others to an especially high degree (Graupmann, Jonas, Meier, Hawelka, & Aicchorn, 2011), and can exhibit strengthening and increase in awareness and salience of relational power connected to their identity as an excluded, disadvantaged, or subordinated group (e.g., Opotow, 1990, Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002, Pratto & Stewart, 2012).

One way that such identification with groups disadvantaged by a particular political system can manifest itself is through an increase in resistance against this system
(Haslam & Reicher, 2011, Lee et al., 2011; Narayan, 2002; Pratto, 1999). Supporting this latter argument, my results show that the affinity for collective resistance against oppression was more strongly evident in disempowered nations than in empowered ones and system-justifying beliefs less evident. Thus, oppression, in the form of constraints on one group’s power, does seem to provoke collective reactance especially in disadvantaged, interdependence-oriented societies (see also Jonas et al., 2009). This reactance takes the form of hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, values, and attitudes (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Lee et al., 2011).

Whether the metric is personal economic insecurity or intergenerational relational national power, contrary to assertions made by system-justification theorists (Kay & Friesen, 2011), disempowered and insecure social agents do not seem more likely to acquiesce to their situation or revert to or remain in states of ‘lower’ psychological development or social engagement. This parallels social networks research at the national level that shows that the very presence of dominant political agents (and thus oppression) can increase the probability of instability, dissent, and conflict in a political system (Maoz et al., 2007).

Contrary to system justification theory (e.g., Jost et al., 2004), our results showed that an unfavorable social ecology was associated with lower system justification beliefs, and in these situations people did not prefer stability over democracy, as Jost and Hunyady (2002) might expect. The most disempowered national samples (China and Lebanon), on average did not choose to prefer either democracy or stability. Yet there is evidence that in simple outgroup-ingroup oppression, people may have reason and be motivated to seek instability. The Chinese and Lebanese contexts do not fall under this
category. The Chinese context is marked by a strong cultural and ideological emphasis on social harmony (Liu, Li, & Yue, 2010), and as the only non-democracy in our study, and for security reasons, people may have been unwilling to condemn their government. On the other hand, the Lebanese context is characterized by a strong fragmentation of society along sectarian and allegiance lines, and the Lebanese political system is built upon balancing the historical tradition of democracy and the need to maintain a stable balance of power in a civil-strife prone nation.

But, in many contexts, particularly in simple outgroup-ingroup oppression, people may have reason and be motivated to seek instability. Under unstable group hierarchy conditions, unfavorable comparisons to outgroups actually increase ingroup collective efficacy and efforts to improve group position, and through the social identity concern to prove the ingroup’s ability (refusal to be outdone), aggravate desires and justifications for insubordination against outgroups (Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002). Similarly, in situations where groups perceive extreme disadvantage or oppression, but where there are factors that can increase perceptions of collective efficacy, such as perceived possibility of change, subordinated people’s sense of identity may be especially strong (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2010) and politicized (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Conclusion

My results suggest that the simplification of value preferences and the relationships between needs, power, and values, by categorizing them as material and non-material, and by considering only economic power, and by neglecting social needs and resources and their utility for both material and social need-fulfillment functions and
behaviors, may be unhelpful. As Bardi and Schwarz (2003) have argued, studying preferences along more specific value dimensions (or preferences between particular values) within the acquisitive and relational conceptual frames and these values’ relationships to needs-fulfilling behaviors, may be more fruitful. And as power basis theory (Pratto et al., 2011) has argued, economic affluence, whether at the individual and collective level, is not the sole avenue through which material needs can be fulfilled. Nor is it the sole pre-condition for attention to and importance of social needs and values among people, or always the ultimate driver of intergenerational value changes.

Influential factors in the broader trans-generational social ecology, as well as in the immediate sociopolitical context, must be examined.

Given this understanding, social ecology, the sociopolitical context it frames, and people’s value preferences can be linked to the correspondence between specific values and their functional utility in providing agency, relational and acquisitive, over one’s ability to fulfill their needs, both social and material, under a set of structural affordances and constraints, and in tension or accordance with other value preferences. Network analysis may provide a way to do so while acknowledging the properties of power and of social ecology (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009). Research is needed that provides information at each point in this causal network, to allow one to predict value and social/political behavior commonalities and differences over time and between people in various contexts. The dictates of international law do not license a political entity to claim explicitly and legitimately the right to fight for self-interest beyond self-defense. Yet, as human rights interventionism, and in opposition, advocacy for sovereignty and non-interference, have increased, the meaning of the ‘self’ for a nation
has become more explicitly relational and relational value differences a major source of conflict. Future research would do well to address the social psychological and political ramifications of value-based political interventionism in a world of unequal needs and powers, of differing values and convictions.
### Table 1. TIRLI measures and scores for 7 sampled and 2 reference nations (Japan and Swaziland)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Database</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>CHI</th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th>SWI</th>
<th>TUR</th>
<th>LEB</th>
<th>IRE</th>
<th>JAP</th>
<th>SWA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average annual % share of global military expenditure</td>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>1988-2010</td>
<td>40.37</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual share of global commercial services exports</td>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>1988-2010</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness of political participation</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>1988-2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average daily per capita caloric consumption</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>1988-2007</td>
<td>3631</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>3606</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>3511</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>3606</td>
<td>2881</td>
<td>2300</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP per capita*</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1988-2010</td>
<td>33958</td>
<td>2841</td>
<td>24170</td>
<td>33357</td>
<td>8350</td>
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<td>TIRLI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In current international dollars

**Data available only from 2002-2010

Table 2. Individual-level variables and the measures operationalizing them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level Variables</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>Compared to other people in your society, what is your economic situation? 1 – wealthy, 2 - better than most, 3 – good, 4 - so-so, 5 – poor, 6 – destitute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic insecurity</td>
<td>10-point Likert scale (Strongly disagree-Strongly agree) “I often have difficulty getting the things my family and I need.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for material vs. non-material political values</td>
<td>8-point bipolar scales assessing preference for: Democracy (1) vs. stability (8) Freedom (1) vs. security (8) Equality (1) vs. wealth (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological escape: justifying the sociopolitical context.</td>
<td>10-point Likert scale (Strongly disagree-Strongly agree) “The international political system is very fair” “The political system in my country is very fair” “Other countries are unfairly advantaged compared to my country.” (R) “In my country, other groups are unfairly advantaged compared to people like me.” (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General affinity for resistance against oppression by dominant groups</td>
<td>10-point Likert scale (Strongly disagree-Strongly agree) “There’s nothing more important than confronting oppression by dominant groups.” “Oppressed groups that resist exploitation by dominant groups are worthy of total respect.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Figures

A)
Figure 1. a) A socioecological taxonomy of intersocietal differences in political values and behaviors (adapted from Georgas & Berry, 1995). b) A schematic of the conceptual interlinkages between needs, power, need deprivation, and preferences for acquisitive or relational values.
Figure 2. The relationship between TIRLI and its components, as well as with GNI per capita and levels of external intervention.
Figure 3. The relative position and change over time across the 7 sampled nations and 2 reference nations (Swaziland and Japan) in TIRLI scores.
Figure 4. The relative position and change over time across the 7 sampled nations and 2 reference nations (Swaziland and Japan) in GNP per capita Z-scores across these nations.
Figure 5. Mean levels of preference for material versus non-material values, by level of personal economic insecurity. Mean scores below 4.5 indicate average societal preference for non-material values (freedom, equality, democracy), whereas mean scores above 4.5 indicate preference for material values (security, wealth, stability).
Figure 6. Mean preference for security (8) over freedom (1) values, by level of personal economic insecurity.
Figure 7. Mean preference for stability (8) over democracy (1) values, by level of personal economic insecurity.
Figure 8. Mean preference for wealth (8) over equality (1) values, by level of personal economic insecurity.
Figure 9. Mean favorability of attitudes about resistance against oppression, by level of personal economic insecurity.
Figure 10. Mean perceptions of domestic political systems’ fairness, by level of personal economic insecurity.
Figure 11. Mean levels of preference for material over non-material values by TIRLI score. Mean scores below 4.5 indicate average preference for non-material values (freedom, equality, democracy), whereas mean scores above 4.5 indicate average preference for material values (security, wealth, stability).
Figure 12. Mean preference for security over freedom, by TIRLI. Mean scores below 4.5 indicate average preference for freedom, whereas mean scores above 4.5 indicate average preference for security.
Figure 13. Mean preference for stability over democracy, by TIRLI. Mean scores below 4.5 indicate average preference for democracy, whereas mean scores above 4.5 indicate average preference for stability.
Figure 14. Mean preference for wealth over equality, by TIRLI. Mean scores below 4.5 indicate average preference for equality, whereas mean scores above 4.5 indicate average preference for wealth.
Figure 15. Mean levels of support for resistance against oppression by dominant groups, by TIRLI scores. Mean scores below 5.5 indicate average rejection of resistance against oppression by subordinated groups, whereas mean scores above 5.5 indicate average affinity for resistance against oppression.
Figure 16. Mean levels of perceived fairness of domestic (blue) and international (green) political systems by TIRLI scores. Mean scores below 5.5 indicate average rejection of the system’s fairness, whereas mean scores above 5.5 indicate average belief in the system’s fairness.
References


