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The United States Military Realignment on Okinawa

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The United States Military Realignment on Okinawa

Kevin Michael Evringham

B.A., University of Connecticut, 2010

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Master of Arts Thesis

The United States Military Realignment on Okinawa

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2012
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<td>BRAC</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
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<td>USFJ</td>
<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The United States maintains a vast network of overseas military installations to project American foreign policy, defend national interests, and provide tangible support to our regional and global security partners. This network of installations spans six continents and provides the logistical and forward deployed presence required to support American military units stationed or engaged in overseas operations.

The latest report released by the Department of Defense lists over 423 sites in 26 countries outside the United States (Department of Defense, 2011). Though these bases are spread throughout six continents, large portions are concentrated in just two countries: Germany and Japan. The United States established these bases at the end of World War II, and military personnel and equipment are frequently rotated between them while serving to project American power, stabilize traditionally unstable regions and protect the interests of the United States (Dur, 2000, p. 471; Overseas Basing Commission, 2005).

Though seldom discussed domestically in the United States, these installations sometimes encounter fierce resistance or domestic debate in the host states questioning the role of foreign military forces in sovereign states far from their national lands (Johnson, 2004, p. 223-224; Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179). Germany, serving as the industrial heart of Europe, has been able to successfully integrate United States military bases into society (Cunningham and Klemmer, 1995; Smoke, 1996, p. 305-306). However, the basing relationship in Japan has consistently been more problematic (Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179). American military bases in Japan are not entirely
unwelcome (Foster, 2011), yet they have struggled, particularly in recent years, to become integrated into the country due to several unfortunate incidents of military personnel targeting local civilians. At the crux of the basing issue in Japan is the stationing of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of Japan (Johnson, 2007, p. 171-207; CNN, 2008). The bases and stationing of this unit on Okinawa is the subject of considerable domestic debate within Japan, and between the United States and Japan. These debates have resulted in several plans to relocate them within the prefecture of Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific.

Current relocation plans fail to take into account several geostrategic factors concerning the regional United States military posture and the overarching role of United States military forces in Japan (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005). This research seeks to address these oversights and present alternate basing options while also providing clear guidance on the mission and role of these forces. Alternate basing options are crucial for the United States in order to maintain positive relations with Japan and, therefore, our military presence within its sovereign borders.

The results of this thesis will offer alternate relocation strategies for American military units within Japan in support of the United States-Japan alliance and American foreign policy in the region. Specifically, this thesis will provide an analysis for identifying locations within Japan to which the 3rd MEF may relocate, rather than to locations outside of Japan. This research therefore seeks to identify locations within the main islands of Japan that could serve as a new home for the 3rd MEF whose presence on Okinawa has strained United States-Japanese relations for more than 20 years. Given the increasing importance of East Asia in the world economy as a whole, and the United
States in particular (International Monetary Fund, 2011b), the need to maintain these forward deployed military units and serve as an “honest broker” (Ishihara, 2011, p. 3) in the region is of critical importance to the security of the United States. Furthermore, the delicate balance of political-military relations in East Asia requires the presence of such an honest broker who can potentially balance the histories and dialogue between all states, regardless of past grievances.

This study begins with a background and literature review of the factors and history relating to the basing of United States military units in Japan from theoretical, historical and operational standpoints. First, the history of United States-Japanese relations and the development of the modern treaty agreement is examined to understand United States interest in Japan. Second, the domestic politics of Japan, post-World War II, and the role United States military forces have had on them are contextualized within the framework of East Asian security. Third, the strategic uses of United States military forces in Japan are analyzed to operationalize the mission potential for these units and how their basing location affects the mission. Finally, utilizing critical data from these sections, criteria were developed to examine the current base relocation plan for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit on Okinawa.

Chapter Three provides an overview of the data sets and methodologies utilized within this study. The Department of Defense Base Structure Report, an annually released account of United States military installations worldwide, is analyzed as the primary data set to understand the extent of overseas American military basing. This will include analysis of base sizes or footprints, the primary use of the bases, financial costs and mapping of their location. Next, locations and capabilities of Japanese military
installations within the main islands of Japan are examined and overlaid with United States military installations to provide possible locations for joint basing opportunities. Finally, capabilities of military equipment and transportation are mapped to determine the scope of response by American military units based upon proposed or alternate base relocations.

Chapter Four provides a critical analysis, utilizing criteria developed in Chapter Two, of the current relocation plan of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit proposed by the Department of Defense through a comprehensive mapping of transportation capabilities and potential contingency operations. Chapter Five presents an alternate relocation plan for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit that satisfies the criteria established in Chapter Two and falls within suitable geographic distance of potential contingency operations.

The Sixth Chapter summarizes the study results and presents recommendations for policy changes that address the noted deficiencies. The conclusion and recommendations for future research are put forth in Chapter Seven.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The role of American military forces in Japanese domestic affairs is not a development constrained to the post-World War II environment. Clear contextualization of our mutual histories is concomitant to understanding the challenges facing our alliance today. A concise account of United States-Japanese relations is covered, including American military interventions in Japan prior to World War II, along with the more recent history of strained relations due to incidents on Okinawa. This section also provides an overview of operations by American military forces in Japan to contextualize the role Japan plays in America’s forward deployed presence in East Asia.

2.2 History of United States Overseas Basing

Conceptually, the structure of United States overseas basing evolved from the analytical framework of naval warfare as put forth by Alfred Thayer Mahan in a series of books and publications at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century. Mahan, a United States naval officer who eventually attained the rank of rear admiral (post-retirement by an act of Congress), completed several in-depth studies of naval history and warfare and concluded that a strong national seapower was required in order for a state to become a major power on the world stage (Mahan, 1920, p. 284-290). Viewing the vast technological improvements in ship design during his career, Mahan recognized that the development of steam powered warships highlighted “the Nation’s inability to coal and supply its own fleets” (Hart, 1965, p. 300) while deployed and this was due to the lack of overseas bases or coaling stations. Additionally, he recognized that other major powers
had addressed these issues by creating “stations along the road, like the Cape of Good
Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defense and war; the
demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the
Gulf of St. Laurence, posts whose value was chiefly strategic” (Mahan, 1920, p. 20). The
obvious gap therefore was extraterritorial support for American naval deployments.

While Mahan’s theories spread throughout naval circles both within the United
States and abroad, Halford MacKinder, a British geographer, published a series of
works concerning what he termed the heartland or geographical pivot (MacKinder,
1943). In these works, MacKinder argued that control over the vast resources of the
Eurasian continent by one power would empower such a state so greatly that the entire
world could be threatened by its expansion. Identifying this Eurasian heartland as modern
day Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Mackinder believed that this region’s vast
resources, population and, most importantly, protection from seaborne invasion thereby
providing defense in depth, offered the nucleus or pivoting point for any expansion
towards global domination. The state that controlled these areas would be the pivot state
in global power politics (MacKinder, 1943, p. 596-598). Identifying the threat that the
Soviet Union or an alliance of Asian states could pose by solely controlling this area,
MacKinder argued for the continual balance of power and prevention of a land power
becoming so powerful that it controlled the entire Eurasian continent (MacKinder, 1943).

The combination of these two geo-strategists’ theories results in two very basic,
yet complex to manage, dictums for United States foreign policy. First, the United States
must balance its foreign relations and military engagement towards prevention of a
hegemonic Eurasian land power similar to the actions of the United Kingdom from 17th
century to the start of World War II (Kissinger, 1994, p. 70-77, 826). Doing so would prevent the capability of any one, or alliance, of states from dominating the heartland, expanding throughout the Eurasian continent, and utilizing the available resources to consolidate land power while developing sea power.

Second, in order to prevent a hegemonic land power from attaining Eurasian continental supremacy, the United States must maintain naval forces on par, or exceeding, other great powers in the state system. These naval forces must be available for deployment or combat action off or within, the Eurasian continent, thereby requiring considerable logistics and/or overseas bases from which to project American power. MacKinder himself recognized this and called Britain a “moated forward stronghold” (MacKinder, 1943, p. 301) from which the United States, itself a defense in depth for the Western Powers, could project air, land, and seapower onto the Eurasian continent’s western-most area.

It is not perhaps a stretch therefore to see Japan, a state in similar geographical position to the United Kingdom, as the British twin off the Eurasian continent in the East. Finally, MacKinder, perhaps referencing the works of Mahan, states “seapower must in the final resort be amphibious if it is to balance land power” (MacKinder, 1943, p. 301-302), viewed in the context of East Asia, the role of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force could not be clearer.

The establishment and maintenance of overseas American military bases is not a new phenomenon, and has been a fixture of United States foreign policy for over 150 years. The current purpose and theoretical approach that defines their continued
functioning is less clear. Advocates of isolationism see few benefits to far flung bases with long lines of communication and supply (Parent and MacDonald, 2011), yet a robust overseas basing structure endures within the United States military.

In the context of United States bases in Japan, understanding the history and nature of the bases there will assist in building recommendations for the current realignment plan to ensure the geostrategic dictums of Mahan and MacKinder are still supported.

2.3 United States – Japan relations before the 1951 Security Agreement

During the 19th century the United States had expanded throughout much of what are today the territorial borders of the 50 states. As the United States moved to develop commercial and military interests overseas, the need to support distant deployments of warships in support of these activities became apparent. With the introduction of steam powered warships the need for coaling stations overseas became a top priority for United States military planners. In the Pacific, with its immense distances between land masses necessitating the need for resupply ports, the United States had only recently begun to develop diplomatic relations (Hart, 1965, p. 18, 32-33, 54-55). These challenges had been brought to the forefront in 1851-1852 during the deployment of the USS Susquehanna to her stationing as the command ship of the East India Squadron in China. The Susquehanna was forced to rely on other state’s hospitality and expensive coal resources during her journey from Norfolk to Hong Kong (Symonds, 2001, p. 72), presenting tactical and strategic challenges to future deployments of steam powered ships (Hart, 1965, p. 54-55). Many believed that the lands of East Asia should be opened to the West to provide resupply, trade and diplomatic opportunities, whether those states
desired to be opened or not (Adams, 1842, p. 288-289). Japan, which had long been closed to western influence in a self-imposed closure called *Sakoku* (Samuels, 2008, p. 13), threatened death to trespassers or ship-wrecked sailors. The Tokugawa Shogunate, which ruled Japan since 1603, restricted western access to mainland Japan through Dejima, a small artificial island in the bay of Nagasaki, founded in 1641 and used primarily by the Dutch to trade with the Shogunate (McClain, 2002, p. 44-45).

American ships, flagged as Dutch, had been using the port to trade. However, attempts at true diplomatic or trading relations with the Shogunate failed, even after several attempts (1837, 1846 and 1849) to engage in discussions (Lawrence, 1953). The last expedition in 1849 by Commander James P. Glyn, which secured the release of shipwrecked American sailors, had demonstrated the potential for success. Upon his return to the United States, Commander Glyn recommended that future endeavors include more forceful demands for relations, particularly after seeing how horribly American prisoners were treated by the Japanese (McClain, 2002, p. 135).

In 1852 Commodore Perry was named the new commander of the East India Squadron and charged with opening Japan. The United States government ordered Perry to secure from the Tokugawa Shogunate “Japanese agreement to protect American seamen who were either ship-wrecked on Japan’s coast or driven into Japanese ports by bad weather; a similar agreement to allow the establishment of American coaling and supply stations at selected Japanese ports; and permission for U.S. vessels to enter one or more Japanese ports for trade” (Symonds, 2001, p. 74). After arriving on station in Shanghai in 1853, Perry, with the East India Squadron, set out for Japan with three stops: the Ryukyu Islands or present day Okinawa, which had not yet been annexed by Japan, to
secure aid for any future shipwrecked American sailors, Chichi-Jima (known in Japan as part of the Ogasawara island group) to assess the small islands feasibility as a future coaling station for American warships, and finally Tokyo Bay to negotiate with the Tokugawa Shogunate for United States diplomatic and commercial interests. Commodore Perry was successful not only at each of these stops but also in the overall charge of opening Japan to American interests, protecting American sailors and establishing ports of entry with coaling stations (Navy Department Library, 1953; Symonds, 2001, p. 74; McClain, 2002, p. 138). These concessions were signed on March 31st 1854 and came to be known as the Treaty of Kanagawa, effectively opening Japan up to American, and later European, trade, diplomatic and regional ambitions (McClain, 2002, p. 134-142).

Though the Treaty of Kanagawa was the first, many treaties were signed by Japan with the Western Powers in the coming years and the nature of these changed as access to Japan became more commonplace. These treaties became more unequal, in both the commercial and diplomatic sense, as the Western Powers demanded ever greater access and Japan found itself in a progressively weaker negotiating position. This period came to be known as the Bakumatsu, or End of the Curtain, as the Tokugawa Shogunate struggled to remain in power in the face of growing domestic opposition to western influence and a desire to restore the imperial family to power in place of the Shogunate. This movement became known as Sonnō-jōi or Revere the emperor, Expel the barbarians and was responsible for widespread outbreaks of violence against western citizens in the trading ports (McClain, 2002, p. 144, 146-148). The Western Powers engaged in several small scale battles throughout Japan from 1863-1864 with the final Battle of Shimonoseki.
in September 1864, representing the first failed opportunity for Japan to remove western forces from her shores. Before the decade ended, Japan would experience its own civil war, pitting pro-imperial forces against the declining power of the Shogunate.

Originally seeking to expel the barbarians, the pro-imperial party eventually shifted to one of modernization and negotiation with the West, including the United States. The imperial party developed a national policy of *Fukoku Kyôhei* or Rich country, strong army (Samuels, 2008, p. 15). The ultimate victors of the Civil War, the pro-imperial faction established the Meiji Emperor as the sole sovereign of the state in what came to be called the Meiji Restoration.

Considered by McClain (2002) as the beginning of the modern period of Japan, the Meiji Restoration in 1868 marked the shift of Japan from a feudal society to one driven to modernize with western technology through commercial and military enterprises (McClain, 2002, p. 155-171). Additionally, the re-established emperor worked to re-negotiate the unequal treaties imposed upon Japan by the Western Powers while simultaneously rapidly importing and developing a domestic military base on par with most of the great Western Powers.

For the remainder of the 19th century, American and Japanese interests would run parallel with the United States solidifying itself as a Pacific power through military victories in the Philippines, as well as the annexation of Hawaii (Mahan, 1900, p. 7-12). During the same period Japan rapidly modernized its military capabilities and tested them against other regional states such as China and Korea (McClain, 2002, p. 295-300). American military units forward deployed to East Asia were supported by coaling and
repair installations throughout the newly acquired territories following the Spanish-
American War in 1898 (Hart, 1965, p. 32-33) as the United States continued to establish
itself as an Asian power through the use of trade, diplomacy and shows of force such as
the Great White Fleet in 1907-1909 (Hart, 1965).

Relations continued amicably between the United States and Japan and in 1908
they signed the Root-Takahira Agreement which required that Japan recognize American
sovereignty in the Philippines and that the United States recognize Japanese interests on
the Korean Peninsula. Though tensions sometimes were ratcheted up as these two
powers jockeyed for position in East Asia (Hart, 1965, p. 204-236), relations between the
United States and Japan would remain relatively stable until the 1930s with the
aggressive expansion of Japanese military interests on the Asian mainland.

This expansion of Japanese imperial power in the 1930s would be the catalyst for
American involvement in the Second World War in the Pacific. The Pacific theater
pitted Japanese imperial forces against an American led allied coalition that, after four
years of island hopping, resulted in the unconditional surrender of imperial Japan in
1945.

At the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, the United States found
itself in control of vast expanses of territory in Europe and the Pacific that had recently
been under the dominion of the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy and Japan. The
demarcation of state borders in both theaters of conflict contained inherent problems that
provided challenges to clear, effective post-war occupation.
In Europe, Allied forces struggled, diplomatically, to re-draw borders and develop clear guidelines on occupation zones (Kissinger, 1994, p. 417). This was a particularly challenging task while Soviet forces continued to occupy large portions of Eastern Europe. In the Pacific, where the United States had shouldered a majority of the Allied war burden, distribution of the Japanese Empire fell to officials of the War and State departments.

Formosa, or Taiwan, was returned to China, the Philippines, which had largely been liberated by allied forces, were returned to the United States, and British territories throughout Asia returned to British control. The remaining territories of the Japanese Empire, principally those that were considered part of Japan rather than colonies of the Empire (Korea, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, the Ryukyu Islands, the main islands of Japan and the Kurils) were coveted by the Allied powers for both their strategic and economic potential.

Soviet demands for an occupation zone within the main islands of Japan met fierce resistance within the War and State departments and rather than provide the Soviet Union with a toehold on the main islands, the United States instead offered the northern half of the newly split Korea to the Soviet Union along with Japanese territory on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to which Stalin, more concerned with events in the European theater, acquiesced.

The result was a Japan vastly different, both geographically and politically, than one that had existed before the war. Gone were the vast continental territories with their resources and the infrastructure to extract them. The Empire of Japan, which at its height
encompassed almost 2.9 million square miles of territory along with vast expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, was reduced to controlling only the four main islands of Japan: Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku. Here, United States occupation forces established bases to ensure the peaceful transition of Japan from a martial imperial state to a democratic and capitalist one.

In a repeat of history, over 90 years after Commodore Matthew Perry’s initial opening, the United States once again forcefully entered Japan encouraging open government and free trade (McClain, 2002, p. 523-524). Unsurprisingly, Japan, again, learned and mastered the rules of the game swiftly by rebuilding and becoming a global economic power in less than 20 years. This recovery, dubbed an economic miracle (McClain, 2002, p. 562-563, 571-582), was supported by United States investment and trade, particularly following the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, and the continuing presence of United States military forces on the islands in support of the newly established security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951.

This treaty was essentially a part of the San Francisco Treaty, detailing the full closure of the Pacific theatre of World War II, and reflective of the dramatic shift that Japanese national policy had experienced following the end of the Second World War (McClain, 2002, p. 555-558). United States military forces would maintain bases within the main islands of Japan while the Ryukyu Islands or Okinawa was given to the United States as a military colony. Sacrificed once at the end of World War II to buy the main islands of Japan time, the relinquishment of the prefecture to the United States was a convenient way for Japan to ignore another troubled part of its past. Domestically, the imperial national policy of *Fukoku Kyōhei*, or Rich country, Strong army, was thrown out
with the signing of unconditional surrender onboard the USS Missouri on September 9th, 1945. In its stead, a policy had been developed that built upon the new Japanese constitution, which outlawed war, military forces, and incorporated the long term goals of one government official: Shigeru Yoshida.

2.4 The Cold War Treaty Era: 1950-1996

Elected as the last Prime Minister of the Empire of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida believed that Japan’s future lay in close concert with those of the West, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, and he worked to secure Japan’s economic future while essentially relinquishing Japan’s foreign and military policy to the United States (McClain, 2002, p. 555-558). The new constitution, created by American occupation authorities and accepted by the Japanese government, included a clause on the renunciation of war of which Yoshida took full advantage. This clause, Article 9 of the constitution, allowed only the maintenance of a self-defense force to act as a response force to domestic crisis or minor threats to Japanese territorial integrity. The true protection of Japan from external threats would come from the permanent stationing of United States military units throughout Japan in support of the newly signed security agreement.

By agreeing to these limits on Japanese military power, Yoshida met objectives not otherwise attainable in the post-war atmosphere of political debate (McClain, 2002, p. 555-558). Perhaps most important, Yoshida was able to solidify power and prevent a resurgence of militarism or revisionist political parties that wished to make Japan a “normal nation” again through rearmament (Samuels, 2008, p. 32). By doing so the
liberal internationalists, of whom Yoshida was one, were able to focus government spending on economic revival rather than rearmament and military procurement.

Though the country had been devastated by over 14 years of warfare, Yoshida understood the economic potential Japan maintained, if it could avoid entanglements in military affairs. To accomplish this, during his first of three terms in office as Prime Minister, Yoshida worked with occupation authorities to build an “unequal alliance with the United States and [to use] it as a shield behind which [Japan] could regenerate prosperity” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32). By doing so, Samuels states that “the only dangers to Japanese prosperity and security were abandonment by the United States or entanglement in U.S. Wars” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32) for which Yoshida, and subsequent prime ministers, pointed to the pacifist constitution and Article 9 which prevented Japan from becoming involved in such entanglements. This policy, of free riding under the American security umbrella, supporting American military bases within Japan, and preventing large defense expenditures, became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Domestically, the politics of the Yoshida Doctrine were not accepted by all and opponents of Yoshida, namely Kishi Nobusuke’s anti-mainstream conservatives, worked to remove United States military forces from Japan and develop domestic military capability. This challenge came to a head in 1960 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, a revision of the 1951 security treaty, when Nobuske’s opponents of the Yoshida Doctrine attempted to attain more autonomy for Japan with the eventual removal of United States military forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 42-43). Instead, this 1960 treaty expanded the integration of United States and Japanese forces, codified a status of forces agreement for the stationing of United States military forces in Japan, and
empowered the Japanese Self Defense Force to participate in collective security of the main islands of Japan. Frequently a point of contention between the United States and Japan, this policy has facilitated the establishment of a network of American military bases in Japan and the growth of the Japanese economy into one of the world’s largest (3rd as of 2012) (International Monetary Fund, 2011a).

Externally, the Yoshida Doctrine was tested first during the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. United States military units stationed on occupation duty in Japan were the closest allied forces available to come to the aid of the newly formed South Korea. On the main islands of Japan, the newly formed civil police force was transformed overnight into an unofficial military force, the precursor of the Japanese Self Defense Force. The major changes though developed on Okinawa, the new military colony of the United States in East Asia. In support of combat operations on the Korean Peninsula, military facilities on Okinawa were rapidly developed and used as staging points for troop rotations and bombing raids. The United States military mobilization on Okinawa was a direct result of the United States belief that the loss of Korea to the communists would further endanger Japan. The need therefore to contain the spread of communism and push back the North Korean advance required a sovereign, fully militarized location in the Pacific, unconstrained even by the welcoming nature of the Yoshida Doctrine. Many therefore recognize the United States involvement in Korea, and the subsequent military development of Okinawa, as the evolution of Kennan’s defense of “strong points” into the implementation of NSC-68, the policy of containment (Gaddis, 2005, p. 89). The new policy of containment, as first outlined by the Truman administration and evolved by subsequent presidential administrations, stated that: “any
substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled” and “the assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere (Gaddis, 2005, p. 89).” The implementation of George Kennan’s theory of containment, the belief that the spread of communism must be contained to prevent it from encroaching upon those areas the United States believed to be crucial to its own security, was the use of American military forces from Japan in the Korean War (Gaddis, 2005, p. ix). President Truman said as much during his address at the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula stating:

Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors (Truman, 1956, p. 335).

This view, that the loss of South Korea to North Korean forces would threaten free institutions, and particularly Japan, directly led to United States intervention on the Korean Peninsula and the military buildup on Okinawa. Furthermore it can be argued that:

The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan (Kim, 1973, p. 46).

Led by General Douglas MacArthur, appointed as commander of the United Nations Command in South Korea, United States military forces on occupation duty in
Japan acted as a quick response force swiftly deploying to areas in South Korea to stem the advance of North Korean troops until additional units could arrive from the continental United States through the bases on Okinawa. This role of an expeditionary quick response force has come to define some, if not a majority, of the stationing of United States military forces in Japan. In a recent book discussing the new American maritime strategy for the 21st century, Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian at Kings College London states:

...specific mention is made of the more post-modern benefits of forward deployed expeditionary capabilities, particularly their capacity to contribute to homeland defense in depth, their advantages in fostering and sustaining cooperative relationship with other nations and, most significantly, their ability to ‘prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system’ (Till, 2011, p. 338).

Though Till goes on to discuss how expeditionary operations against Iraq and Afghanistan fall into this category, this discussion can easily be prescribed to United States expeditionary forces currently stationed in Japan.

Not addressed by Till is the impact on the local populations in foreign countries that serve as host to these forces. On Okinawa, where the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force is stationed, deep emotions on the role of military forces in civilian communities, developed in World War II and exacerbated by the military development of Okinawa during the Korean War, create pacifist or anti-militaristic sentiment. During the post-World War II period of 1950-1972 Okinawa served as the keystone of the Pacific for United States military forces operating throughout East Asia including Korea and Vietnam. Okinawans, not wholly American citizens and never truly Japanese, struggled to identify with a national character from either state, particularly challenging as they
hosted a majority of United States military forces in Japan. The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972 altered the minutia of daily life, such as which side of the road vehicles drove on, yet the unequal usage of Okinawa as the host to a majority of United States forces in Japan continued as did Tokyo’s failure to address the complicated history of the imperial period. Throughout the balance of the Cold War Okinawa would continue to serve as the staging ground for United States military deployments in East Asia, particularly as the Pacific hedge against Soviet regional aggression. Figure 2.1 depicts the present, continued unequal structure of United States military forces in Japan.
Figure 2.1 Major bases of United States Forces Japan in terms of personnel and equipment. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
2.5 Challenges to the Alliance: 1996 - Present

Japanese domestic politics remained relatively stable throughout the Cold War with liberal internationalists supporting the Yoshida Doctrine through the limitation of the Japanese Self Defense Forces in favor of the United States security umbrella. As the Cold War came to a close these policies began to shift in the direction of a more focused domestic discussion on defense capabilities and normal nation status. In 1996, five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan met again to officially renew the security alliance. Japanese politicians, keen on improving the capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force and gaining closer equality in the alliance, agreed to new cooperative guidelines that expanded the role of Japanese forces. For the first time since World War II, Japanese forces would be permitted to engage in combat, officially defend the country, and engage in regional security operations. These changes, though minor, redefined the security relationship by supporting incremental re-militarization of Japanese international policy including the deployment of troops and ships to the Middle East during the Iraq War (Samuels, 2008, p. 92-97). This modernization of the relationship and capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force skirted the limitations imposed by the Japanese constitution and facilitated discussions on mission expansion and regional deterrence. The core tenants of the Yoshida Doctrine became more flexible as Japanese Self Defense Forces were given humanitarian and peace keeping missions around the world. Normal nationalists, those that wished for Japan to become a normal nation again by maintaining a true military, were testing the boundaries of acceptable roles for the Self Defense Forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 91-98).
In 2006 the Japanese Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense, a full cabinet level department of the Japanese government (Samuels, 2008, p. 75). The slow yet steady military modernization of the Japanese military continues. Perhaps most disconcerting is the historical troubled apologies of Japan. Japan’s imperial past contains some of the most vicious war crimes committed on the planet, all against its regional neighbors, and all mostly un-acknowledged by Japan. The visit by Japanese prime ministers to the famous Yasukuni war shrine is perhaps the most obvious example of Japan’s unwillingness to acknowledge its imperial past yet other, less publicized, issues remain. The textbooks of Japanese schools fail to give globally acceptable accounts of the imperial period and frequently skip crucial facts such as the Nanking Massacre, further alienating and inflaming the populations of regional neighbors that had experienced these horrible events (Samuels, 2008, pg. 113-115).

Perhaps the final complication to the United States-Japanese relationship is the lack of a post-Cold War mission statement for United States Forces Japan. The lack of a direct threat to Japanese territorial integrity, in the form of the Soviet Union, has put the mission of United States forces in Japan adrift. Okinawa, reverted to Japanese control in 1972 in exchange for a Japanese commitment to regional defense (Samuels, 2008, p. 43), continued to bear the brunt of the United States basing burden without a clear need for such forces to exist. Interestingly, other regional United States commands maintained clear guidelines on the mission and commanders intent. In Korea, the United States Forces Korea command maintained the mission of “deter, defend, and defeat external aggression” (United States Forces Korea, 2012) with its primary opponent, North Korea, which had maintained power. Fixated for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, USFK
had no need for a mission shift. United States Pacific Command, the parent command of both USFJ and USFK, maintained the same expected broad based mission of:

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), together with other U.S. Government agencies, protects and defends the United States, its territories, Allies, and interests; alongside Allies and partners, promotes regional security and deters aggression; and, if deterrence fails, is prepared to respond to the full spectrum of military contingencies to restore Asia-Pacific stability and security (United States Pacific Command, 2010)

Interestingly, the strategic guidance for USPACOM addresses specific concerns in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Korean Peninsula, the United States-China and United States-India relationship yet no mention is made of Japan or United States Forces Japan (United States Pacific Command, 2010). This oversight speaks directly to the lack of mission for United States military forces in Japan and complicates the relationship between the United States and Japan. As Japanese domestic politics moves towards a stance of acceptable re-militarization the United States must either work to co-opt these forces into joint ventures or work to prevent full scale militarization of Japan, particularly as other regional states become ever more concerned with Japan’s intentions. These factors, of the remilitarization of Japan, a lack of mission for United States Forces Japan, and unresolved imperial histories come to the forefront in discussions on United States military bases on Okinawa. Here, the protests against basing and remilitarization comingle with the troubled past of Okinawa’s sacrifice by Tokyo in World War II and then its sacrifice in the aftermath, as an American military colony. Understanding military realignments and their effect on Okinawa is crucial to contextualizing the complications of United States military forces in Japan and the purpose for their presence.
2.6 Base Realignments and Okinawa

The post-Cold War basing structure of United States military units underwent critical examinations and realignments following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The success of the containment strategy caught the Department of Defense by surprise and presented challenges to the existing base structure, the purpose of which had been to defend against Soviet aggression (Gaddis, 2005, p. 59). As the realities of the uni-polar global security environment became apparent, calls for base closures and realignments became a more frequent aspect of United States politics with commissions created five times, post-Soviet collapse, to analyze United States military posture and suggest changes (Department of Defense, 2005a).

These commissions, called Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), have done much to focus public discussions on the 21st century needs and geo-strategic requirements of United States military and foreign policies. Unfortunately, the remaining Cold War basing structure contains anomalies that cause friction with some United States overseas partners. These partners, which are commonly part of a larger security framework, provide land, financial support and in many cases, joint training with American military units based in their country. The friction caused by this Cold War era military basing structure provides ammunition for anti-American sentiment in these countries and deters the growth and development of closer ties between the United States and these security partners (Otis, 2009; Koo, 2011). One such example is the bilateral security agreement between the United States and Japan with the stationing of over thirty thousand American military personnel throughout the Japanese islands. Over 74% of
these personnel are based on the island of Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of Japan.

Okinawa, the smallest prefecture of Japan, has been host to a majority of the American ground combat troops, with their attached support and transportation units such as helicopters and transport planes, for a majority of the post-war period. This basing has developed friction both on the island, between United States military units, the Okinawans, and with the federal government in Tokyo. The friction is due, in large part, to several high profile crimes by United States military personnel that victimized local Okinawan civilians. This put strain on the United States-Japan security agreements and led some to question the presence of such a large foreign military contingent on the small island (Johnson, 2004). Compounding this is the growth of commercial and residential developments around the bases that has led to complaints of noise pollution from military aircraft (Bandow, 1998). These challenges ultimately stem from the political and civilian pressures of basing large units of foreign military personal on a small, relatively closed, island economy and environment such as Okinawa.

Recent dialogue between the United States and Japan has been to address some of the more salient issues such as noise pollution, base proximity to residential housing sectors, and concerns with the threat of crime. The result of this dialogue has been several plans to relocate some United States military units to a more remote part of Okinawa and other units to the United States territory of Guam (Fogarty, 2010; Kan, 2012). This dialogue, though positive in its attempt to finally address issues brought forth by the people of Okinawa for decades, fails to take into account the environmental and planning complications of moving these military units and also the effect they would
have not only on their new home locations but on American geostrategic interests in the region.

The Overseas Basing Commission, formed in 2002 to assess the potential closure and realignment of United States overseas bases, found significant faults with existing plans for realignments, including the realignment of forces on Okinawa. Their assessment of the existing methodology for base realignments overseas was very critical stating that:

The Commission must emphasize that considerations of rebasing cannot be seen as an aside from … major strategic deliberations. It cannot be merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs. Nor can it be the fallout of diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid pro quo for a bilateral arrangement there. The entire basing structure of the United States, both domestic and international, must be an integrated whole and must relate directly to the national security strategy of the United States (Emphasis added) (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 6).

Furthermore, the plans developed have not taken into consideration how “our presence in Okinawa is related to our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Taiwan Straits and other locations in East Asia” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 14) and that “Okinawa is the strategic linchpin to operational capabilities in East Asia. Diminishing our combat capability on the island would pose great risk to our national interests in the region” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. C&R2).

The Commission identified several deficiencies with the existing base restructure on Okinawa that were seemingly ignored and recommended that policy makers consider alternate options. One example was delaying any planned moves until the 2005 BRAC report had been finalized. This report, though it dealt specifically with domestic force posturing of United States military forces, could provide guidelines for realignments
outside the United States. Consequently, discussions on base realignments for Okinawa were delayed, in the hopes that clearer guidance could be obtained from the release of the 2005 BRAC report.

Base Realignments and Closure

The United States government has gone through five iterations of base closures and realignments since the closing days of the Cold War. Starting in 1988, the Department of Defense created a process to examine its current and future military basing requirements in light of budget cuts, a desire for increased efficiency and a general thawing of relations with the Soviet Union (BRAC Commission, 1988, p. 8-11). These BRACs made recommendations to Congress and the President to disband or move existing military bases and ensure the local base economy and environment would be supported following the removal of the base.

Though each round of BRACs caused considerable debate, primarily from legislators trying to keep bases in their state for local financial reasons (Spencer, 2005, p. 6), they all concluded with major shifts in US military basing, both domestic and overseas. The latest BRAC concluded in 2005 resulted in the closure of over 180 military facilities and the realignment of over 133,000 service members (Department of Defense, 2005b). Throughout these procedures, officials have worked to develop clear guidelines and recommendations for future BRACs or other Department of Defense installation movements. One key point made during the first round in 1988 was the role urban development has had on bases. The first commission stated:
The Commission found that many bases have experienced an erosion of their military value as a result of urban development. The resulting encroachment has forced the modification of missions at many installations. The acquisition of additional land, especially in less populated areas, may be needed to satisfy military requirements (BRAC Commission, 1988, p. 7).

Policy planners have since attempted to mitigate the effect bases have had on the surrounding population and limit the number of bases developed or maintained within urban areas. On Okinawa, this problem has yet to be resolved and speaks to the clear disjunction between prior BRACs and the ongoing controversy over United States military bases on Okinawa. The continued usage of military bases in densely populated and developed urban areas on Okinawa has facilitated the anti-American sentiment prevalent by native Okinawans due to both the negative effects on continued development, along with other quality of life factors such as noise pollution and increased crime. Current American military bases on Okinawa take up 20% of the land area and constitute large portions of the major cities and towns including 82.8% of Ginowan, the location of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. In this city the population density, due to American military ownership of a majority of the city land, is 4,853 /km$^2$ (Japanese Statistics Bureau, 2011).¹

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¹ The Japanese Statistics Bureau does not release population densities for units below the prefecture level. This population density was calculated based on the Japanese Statistics Bureau census for Ginowan and publicly available information on the size of the town of Ginowan.
Figure 2.2 Land use by United States Forces Japan by acreage. Okinawa, the smallest prefecture, contains the highest density of United States military forces of all prefectures. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
These population densities are higher than the city of Chicago yet have drastically different cityscapes due to building height restrictions imposed by the American military ownership of Okinawan airspace (Global Security, 2011). Compounding the challenge of high population densities is the result of urban development around the military base without adequate planning oversight. Due to the nature of military bases requiring high levels of security, no road, utility, sewer, or connection of any sort passes through these military bases, creating logistical and urban planning challenges for these cities. Additionally, the unplanned development of housing and businesses around the bases has created patchwork networks of partially paved roads and pathways throughout seemingly developed areas. These challenges have further hindered the Okinawans ability to improve their economy and create a stable environment for its citizens. The result is the prefecture with the lowest per capita income in Japan and the highest level of unemployment², due primarily to the seasonal nature of Okinawa's largest industry, tourism (Government of Japan, 2011).

² Okinawan per capita income has steadily maintained at about 70% of the equivalent of the main islands of Japan.
Figure 2.3 Population densities of Japanese prefectures. Though not as dense as other major metropolitan areas, Okinawa’s disproportionate share of military bases creates planning complications that do not exist in any other prefecture. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Population Data Source: Japanese Statistics Bureau (2011).
Perhaps the final issue that has pushed the Okinawan base issue to the forefront of the current discourse on the United States-Japan security agreement was the 1995 rape of a twelve year old school girl by three American service members. This incident, one of several high-profile crimes committed by Americans against Okinawan civilians, understandably inflamed the civilian population and led to questions about the role these bases have in the modern, post-Cold-War era. Following this incident, discussions between the governments of Japan and the United States were opened to find an alternative option for several of the American bases on Okinawa (McCurry, 2008). For the following decade these discussions continued with varying levels of support from the federal governments in Tokyo and Washington yet unwavering resolve continued on the part of the Okinawans.

In 2005, after a decade of discussions on a base transfer and the conclusion of the American BRAC, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed that the current restriction on development and the hardships placed on the Okinawans demanded the removal or realignment of several American military units on the island. The result was not an official United States Department of Defense-wide base realignment and closure plan but rather a specific set of moves that would alter the stationing and base structure of United States military units in Okinawa.

**The Okinawan BRAC**

The decision to move portions of the United States military stationed on Okinawa came in 2005 after ten years of negotiations and deliberation by the governments of the United States and Japan (Yoshikazu, 2006). The plan, set forth and agreed upon by both...
governments, is comprised of two primary sections. The first would see over 8,000 United States Marines, part of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, and their dependents moved from Okinawa to Guam, a United States dependency over 2,300 kilometers to the east. The second portion of the move would be a realignment of MCAS Futenma to a new base offshore of the Henoko Peninsula near Nago, Okinawa. It is this second move, and the proposition of land reclamation off the Henoko Peninsula, that has caused massive protests and increased anti-American sentiment on Okinawa over the past several years (Fogarty, 2010).

Citing the development failure of the current bases on Okinawa, the United States government believed that any new base constructed on the island itself would eventually become surrounded by urban development, similar to MCAS Futenma, and put the governments in a similar situation in the future. The decision to instead reclaim land offshore of the Henoko Peninsula, currently occupied by the United States Marine Corps base Camp Schwabb, was deemed the most appropriate to prevent future development and military operational challenges (Economist, 2005). Unfortunately, the chosen location of the water and reefs off the Henoko Peninsula, are domestically-protected sites and home to several species of threatened species including the dugoung (a relative of the manatee) and one protected species of sea turtles. The proposed base would reclaim land currently composed of coral reefs, a pristine ocean bay and the habitats of these protected animals.

The people of Okinawa, already unhappy with the military basing arrangement in the densely urban areas, have continued to protest, with the added feature of also demanding that the base be moved completely away, off the island of Okinawa. Since
the Japanese public became aware of this plan, protests and around-the-clock occupations by civilians in the proposed site have occurred (Yoshikazu, 2006). Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this plan is the failure on the part of the governments of Japan and the United States to consider alternate options, either on Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific. Members of the United States Congress have recommended combining the planned capabilities of the Henoko Base with Kadena Air Base in Chatan, one of the most highly populated cities, or on one of the main islands of Japan (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. C&R4; Dickie, 2011). Neither option has been seriously considered, nor, until 2011, have any alternate options been proposed to prevent the construction of a new base off the Henoko Peninsula.

Environmental ramifications

This failure to consider alternate locations that have less of an impact on the environment and civilian quality of life represents potentially poor consideration and long term planning on the part of both governments. Anti-American sentiment on Okinawa, and throughout Japan, has steadily increased since the 1995 rape incident and has only gained ground since the proposal for the Henoko Base land reclamation project. The concept of environmental consideration in the construction of new military bases is not new to the United States, and in fact previous BRACs have made environmental concerns an important factor in base construction. In the Base Redevelopment and Realignment Manual published in 2006, under Complying with Laws that Protect Natural and Cultural Resources, the Department of Defense states:

As part of the NEPA analysis, the Military Department will analyze the impacts on natural and cultural resources... Additionally and aside from...
the NEPA requirements, other laws such as the Endangered Species Act and National Historic Preservation Act require the Military Department to analyze the impacts on natural and cultural resources and to consult with Federal and State agencies before making final property disposal decisions (Emphasis added) (Grone, 2006).

Yet planners have failed to take the local (prefecture) considerations into effect and have failed to complete an adequate environmental impact report on the construction of the new base. Moreover, attempts by the United States Department of Defense to claim it is not responsible for actions committed by the Government of Japan on Okinawa have failed. In the *Dugong v. Gates* (2008) lawsuit which contested the United States Department of Defense claim of “no responsibility” in the construction of the Henoko base, the United States Federal District Court of Northern California found in favor of the plaintiffs and ruled that the United States Department of Defense had a responsibility and requirement to complete an independent Environmental Assessment Report of the planned base prior to any construction (Dugong v. Gates, 2008; Tanji, 2008).

Though the Department of Defense will complete the assessment, the impact it will have on the actual base construction is unknown as policy planners continue to speak in terms that make the base construction all but assured. At a recent presentation in Washington D.C., the Japanese politician Ishihara Nobuteru (the current Secretary-General of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, historically the most powerful party in Japan), whom many view as the next Prime Minister of Japan, stated that the question of the Henoko base transfer is of little importance to the larger vision that is the United States-Japan security agreement and that the base construction should continue regardless of any protest by the Okinawans (Ishihara, 2011, p. 4-5). This viewpoint, propagated by one of the most senior politicians in Japan, is directly against the civilian wishes of
Okinawa and fails to take a long-term view of the negative consequences this realignment could have on anti-American sentiment and the overall relationship between the United States and Japan.

### 2.7 American Protests of Overseas Basing

Discussions on overseas basing are not always positive and critics frequently cite the United States’ global structure of bases as an example of American imperialism resulting in calls for the partial or full withdrawal of United States forces overseas. Perhaps the most well-known is Chalmers Johnson, a retired professor from the University of California, San Diego and President of the Japan Policy Research Institute. Johnson, in several books entitled the *Blowback Series*, argues that American imperial overstretch has negatively affected not only the American economy, but also our relations with the states hosting our bases (Johnson, 2005, p. 310-312). Stating that “the only truly common elements in the totality of America’s foreign bases are imperialism and militarism – an impulse on the part of our elites to dominate other peoples largely because we have the power to do so” (Johnson, 2005, p. 152), Johnson puts forth an argument that since the end of the Cold War the United States has conjured up false enemies, including the potential resurgence of Japan itself, in order to maintain overseas bases and offensive operations in weak states (Johnson, 2005, p. 57-64).

Johnson unabashedly attacks the use of American military bases in Japan as an occupation force rather than one of peaceful cooperation (Johnson, 2004, p. 36-38). Glossing over the frequently tense security environment in East Asia, Johnson states that “the Japanese public does not … believe that their country is threatened by China” and
that “public opinion in Japan … remains deeply suspicious of American claims that North Korea is a threat” (Johnson, 2004, p. 58-59). His original work was published in 2004, before a rise in pro-base sentiment by Japanese due to the 2006 North Korean missile tests and the testing of a nuclear device. Johnson’s more recent book in 2007, *Nemesis*, merely modified his commentary on Japanese perceptions of American military forces by saying “they like being protected by the United States against possible threats from China and North Korea, but they do not like having foreign troops living anywhere near them” (Johnson, 2007, p. 205). This critique seems focused on Okinawa and fails to present data on public perceptions of bases on the main islands of Japan.

Discussing Okinawa, Johnson states that “the government in Tokyo likes [75% of US forces stationed on Okinawa] this arrangement because it knows that the public will tolerate American troops on Japanese soil only if they are kept out of sight” (Johnson, 2005, p. 200). Yet on the next page, he discusses the many United States bases throughout the main islands of Japan with no serious discussion of public opinion. Though correct in his assessment of the anti-basing sentiment prevalent on Okinawa, Johnson does not adequately assess the complete picture of perceptions by the Japanese public on American military bases in Japan. Nor does he offer arguments valid to remove the bases in their entirety. Furthermore, recent polling of the Japanese public shows increases in public support for the American military presence directly contradicting Johnson’s viewpoints (Foster, 2011). Though Johnson highlights much of the injustice perpetrated by the United States and the Government of Japan against the Okinawans he ultimately fails to present a clear, well thought-out plan that addresses the
needs of Japanese civilians, the security environment in East Asia or American foreign policy objectives.

In a more recent piece in *Foreign Affairs* against the forward defense of the United States, Parent and MacDonald (2011) argue that reducing the presence of overseas bases could serve as a booster to a struggling American economy, through cost savings, and not affect military capabilities or create regional instability. Parent and MacDonald state “forward defense is a holdover from the Cold War” and that should a conflict erupt, “U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 37-38).

Though laudable for their desire to reduce government spending, Parent and MacDonald ultimately fail to account for many intricacies in their broad statements concerning overseas bases. First among these is the *Omoiyari Yosan*, or sympathy budget, given by the Government of Japan to cover expenses for United States military forces in Japan. Parent and MacDonald fail to mention or examine the more than 4.4 billion USD that Japan spends yearly to support United States military forces in Japan. This amount covered 75-% of the costs of United States Forces Japan in 2003 (the most recent report) and represents the largest subsidy of any state with a United States overseas base (Department of Defense, 2004, p. B-21). Viewed another way, Japan’s sympathy budget in support of United States military forces in Japan equated to more than half of all cost-sharing programs by foreign countries in support of United States overseas bases (Department of Defense, 2004, p. E-4).
Another problem with Parent and MacDonald’s desire to realign or close United States overseas bases is their belief that “U.S. allies … will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 42). Yet this fails to account for the intricate relationships that exist in East Asia. For instance, challenging political questions such as the usage of Japanese ports as logistical hubs in the event of hostilities in the Taiwan Straits are neither addressed nor mentioned. Nor are contingencies relating to the Korean Peninsula, where it would be possible to envision North Korea threatening nuclear or conventional retaliation at Japan if it were to support American forces coming to the aide of South Korea, discussed in any context beyond the need for “rapid response forces” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43). These factors have been shown to stress the security relationship between the United States and Japan and they must be accounted for rather than assuming that our allies will always do what is expected (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 20).

Additionally, Parent and MacDonald do not address the logistical challenges posed for first responding units, in their plan stationed in Hawaii or on the continental United States, and responding to a crisis in East Asia. They only comment that “outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 38). Past studies conducted by agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office (Congressional Budget Office, 2005) show that the increased response time, due to the vast distances from the continental United States to any flash point, along with the increased threat to interdiction, of crossing 6216 kilometers (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to Yokosuka, Japan) of
open ocean in times of crisis would be more than just costly. Additional existing examinations, of the logistical challenges to mobilizing and deploying military units from the United States to potential trouble spots, includes the Overseas Basing Commission in a report prepared for Congress, also in 2005. Concerning logistical difficulties the chairman stated “the commission found significant faults – shortcomings in the domestic rail and port infrastructure needed for deployment, as well as serious limitations in sealift and airlift capacity to likely zones of conflict” (Cornella, 2010). Parent and MacDonald also call for the “shifting of commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 40) without identifying where these areas are. Few would argue that the East and South China Seas are not “in the most valuable geographic and functional areas,” and that maintaining the existing “commitments, resources and investments” is not in the interests of the United States, whether those interests are economic or geopolitical.

Ultimately, Parent and MacDonald provide an incomplete picture of the overseas basing structure, particularly as it relates to East Asia, and fail to present an adequate direction in which planners should start. They call on the United States to maintain only “rapid response forces” in “valuable geographic and functional areas” without identifying what that force structure would entail or where it could be stationed.

2.8 Summary

The United States-Japan security alliance is one of the most crucial aspects of American foreign policy and military deterrence in Asia. The maintenance of this
relationship is undoubtedly paramount to policy planners during any and all exchanges with the government and people of Japan. The goal of removing unsustainable, high risk military bases in the middle of urban centers is laudable and desired by military planners and civilian populations. Yet the decision of where to move those bases must be critically examined rather than hastily decided. Factors such as the purpose of these military forces being stationed in Japan must be clarified, the complicated histories of Japan with its regional neighbors must be understood and the burden of military forces stationed on Okinawa must be addressed. The past plan to move units to a new base created off the Henoko peninsula, the so called Futenma Replacement Facility, fails to do this and instead places political expediency ahead of well-considered strategic and environmental planning (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 6).

The literature presents several questions that must be answered concerning the current realignment plan of United States military forces on Okinawa. The controversy surrounding the stationing and potential relocation of United States military forces on Okinawa has caused complications to the otherwise stable United States-Japanese relationship. Addressing this controversy is crucial to the maintenance of positive relations between the two states and developing clear, appropriate solutions that can survive the test of time.

To accomplish this, criteria must be developed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the currently proposed relocation plans and alternate future proposals. The previous examination of the history and current status of United States military forces in Japan provide a clear basis for which to develop these criteria. This study will
therefore use the following criteria in the analysis of current and future basing proposals of United States military units in Japan:

1. The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive United States-Japanese relations;

2. Any restructure of United States military units and bases in Japan must consider their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula;

3. United States military forces in Japan act as an honest broker and stabilizing force while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past;

4. The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.

Effective and sustainable stationing of United States military units in Japan must address these criteria or risk deficiencies to military capabilities in the region, whether they be due to poor positioning of military units in relation to contingencies or from local base controversies that affect the Japanese national decision-making process.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Utilizing data provided from the annually published Base Structure Report, published by the Office of Installations and Environment within the Department of Defense, this research will examine and map the basing and unit allocation of United States military forces in Japan on a prefecture basis. Next, maps of these bases will be overlaid with population densities of Japan to understand better the bases’ potential effects on local populations. Combined with this, an overlay of Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) bases will be created for the consideration of joint basing between United States-JSDF forces. Finally, geographic distance between core units of the 3rd MEF will be examined and a map will be created to illustrate distance constraints. With these tools in place, a better understanding of the existing relocation plan, or any alternate relocation plans, can provide the geographic framework for recommendations to policy-makers.

3.2 Base Structure Report

Published in various forms since the 1990s, the Base Structure Report has maintained its modern format since 2002 and releases an updated version every September 30th. This report provides “a consolidated summary of annual real property inventory data that is reported by each of the Military Departments’ and Washington Headquarters Services’ based on their native real property databases” (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 2). Considered a summary of Department of Defense property worldwide, it nonetheless provides a detailed account of the majority of American military installations that are otherwise not easily, or publicly, attainable.
These installations are listed individually with several installations frequently making up one base yet listed as a separate line item due to differences in military service, mission type or actual physical distance. Each installation line item includes several variables pertinent to this study and includes:

Nearest City – Identifies the name of the city in which the real property assets are located or the name of the city nearest the assets.

Total Acres – Identifies the total number of acres at the listed site. It includes public land, land owned by other federal agencies and acreage of foreign land used by the Department of Defense.

Plant Replacement Value ($M) – Indicates the total Plant Replacement Value (PRV), in millions, for all facilities, per line item. This value represents the calculated cost to replace the current physical plant using today’s construction costs and standards. Larger values equate to installations generally better suited to large numbers of personnel.

Military Personnel – This is the number of military personnel working at the installation as listed in the report. This number is not an official count of base personnel and is listed in the report to reflect ‘relative magnitude’ of service related personnel. It is used as such in the context of this study.

The 2011 Base Structure Report identifies 85 installations within Japan spread throughout 13 of Japan’s 47 prefectures. Many of these installations actually form parts of a major base and represent individual tenant commands within the overarching United States military presence in that prefecture. This study, considering only the realignment of major units of United States military forces in Japan, narrowed the installation list down to only those installations that either currently, or have the potential to, support large numbers of additional air and ground units, such as those of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. Table 3.1 shows the installations included by these criteria.
Table 3.1 Major Installations of United States Forces Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Base Type</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Installation Name</th>
<th>Branch of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Kinser</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Medium Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>MCAS Futenma</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Foster</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Kadena AB</td>
<td>USAF Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Courtney</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Medium Site</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Hansen</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Gonsalves</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
<td>Navy Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>MCAS Iwakuni</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>Navy Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>Atsugi</td>
<td>Navy Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Medium Site</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>Camp Zama</td>
<td>Army Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Yokota AB</td>
<td>USAF Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>Misawa AB</td>
<td>USAF Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Department of Defense (2011)

There are two primary limitations with the usage of the Base Structure Report and it is important to note them, though generally, they are not prohibitive to this specific study. First, only overseas installations “larger than 10 acres OR have a Plant Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million will be shown” as line item entries on the installation list (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 4). Installations not meeting these criteria are totaled under a single line item entry entitled Other which is the final entry for each state.
Next, not all Department of Defense installations are listed on this report as evidenced by a complete exclusion of any and all reference to installations in Afghanistan, Iraq or certain other states hosting American military units during the Global War on Terror such as Kyrgyzstan (Schwirtz, 2011). Though this does not directly affect the purposes of this study, to the author’s knowledge, the fact that gaps exist in the report must be considered.

### 3.3 Japanese Self Defense Force Bases

Japan is not solely protected by military forces of the United States and maintains a capable military force charged with protecting Japanese interests and borders within Japanese sovereign territory. These forces, collectively called the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF), are stationed throughout the islands of Japan and frequently train, supply and coordinate operations with United States military forces in Japan. For the purposes of this study and the realignment of forces from Okinawa, JSDF major bases throughout the islands of Japan will be considered as possible locations for the realignment of the 3rd MEF.

Similar to United States military forces in Japan, the JSDF maintains many installations, large and small, throughout the islands of Japan. Utilizing the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s public listing of units and bases (Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2011; 2012a; 2012b), this study narrowed down the possible list of relocation sites to only JSDF forces on the Division (ground forces totaling 5,000 or more), Fleet (a squadron of destroyers or more), or Wing level (a squadron of fighter planes or more). This provides a listing of major JSDF bases throughout Japan that could possibly support
the relocation of the 3rd MEF. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of these major JSDF bases throughout Japan.
3.4 United States Military Transportation Capabilities

A factor not frequently discussed in the literature, yet extremely important in the viability of military units, is the transportation and range of military units. No discussion on the relocation of military units can ignore the transportation requirements imposed upon them by the geography of the region. In the case of East Asia and the Pacific, this is particularly a problem due to the vast expanses of open-ocean, which are only infrequently broken by small atolls or sparsely inhabited islands.

The relocation of United States military units from Okinawa to any planned or alternate location must consider this challenge as it relates to their mission. United States military units on Okinawa form just a portion of both United States forces in Japan, called United States Forces Japan (USFJ), and the unified combatant command, Pacific Command (USPACOM). USFJ, itself a subordinate command under USPACOM, oversees all American military forces in Japan regardless of service affiliation. This is especially important given the requirement for intra-service cooperation, as it relates to transportation and logistics, in the East Asian-Pacific region. Given the vast distances between non-hostile land territories in the region, only naval vessels or long-range aircraft can provide the necessary endurance capability to transport military units.

Naval

In order to meet these requirements, the Marine units on Okinawa, which are considered an Expeditionary Force, have specific naval ships assigned for transportation and logistics requirements in order to move them to any potential contingency location. These ships, designated Amphibious Squadron 11 (Phibron 11), are currently stationed in
Sasebo, Japan, on the island of Kyushu. Comprised of one amphibious assault ship (USS Essex), one amphibious transport dock (USS Denver), and two dock landing ships (USS Tortuga and USS Germantown), Phibron 11 is responsible for transportation and the amphibious operations of Marine units currently stationed on Okinawa. With a mission statement to “provide centralized planning embarkation, movement, control, coordination and integration of all aspects of Amphibious Warfare” (United States Navy, 2012) these ships provide a ‘you call, we haul’ capability required to meet the demands of expeditionary Marine units such as those currently on Okinawa. Current relocation plans for elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force do not include any planned move for ships of Phibron 11. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it is not expected that the homeport of any of these transport ships will be changed in the coming years and Sasebo will be utilized as the starting point for any required movements of these ships.

With the support of refueling vessels, the ships of Phibron 11 have the capability to transport an entire expeditionary unit around the world. Their limiting factor is speed and not distance. Though much has changed in technology for air and ground transportation in the past hundred years, maritime travel has remained relatively static in speed at around 20 knots or 37 kilometers per hour (Webb, 2007, p. 301-302). This equates to approximately 900 kilometers per day with Table 3.2 showing the estimated one-way travel times with a starting point of Sasebo, Japan. Adding to these times is the process of embarkation or loading of all required units, supplies and equipment. This process takes between one and a half to three days to complete, in good conditions, once the ships have docked at the embarkation point (Tabios, 2007; Kyhl, 2011).
Table 3.2 Distance and travel times for Amphibious Squadron 11 stationed in Sasebo, Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sasebo to:</th>
<th>Distance (km)</th>
<th>Travel Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>20 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subic Bay, Philippines</td>
<td>2523</td>
<td>68 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>74 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4617</td>
<td>124 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwin, Australia</td>
<td>5100</td>
<td>137 hrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once fully loaded, the squadron will travel to the contingency location and conduct operations in accordance with the mission. Though the process is relatively straightforward, the current separation of forces, Phibron 11 in Sasebo and the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, creates, in the minimum, a delay of three days, from activation to delivery, in the event of contingency operations in Korea or Japan.

Any relocation of these Marine units to locations further than Okinawa from Sasebo will create increased delay times. Therefore the role of geographic distance from Sasebo, Japan, the home port of Phibron 11, to any proposed relocation site for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force will be considered a criterion to determine relocation viability.

Air

Given the vast distances involved in transportation within the East Asian-Pacific theatre, air transportation would initially seem an ideal alternative to naval transportation. Though air travel is faster it suffers from several negative inherent factors that make it less preferable than maritime travel. First amongst these is lift capability and cost. The
United States maintains several long range aircraft capable of transporting Marine infantry units and portions of their equipment. Yet full deployment of artillery, rotary and potential armor units becomes prohibitive through air travel alone. When cost is factored in, the reality of too little being delivered for too high of a cost becomes apparent. For example, during the First Gulf War, “the United States [spent] $2.37 billion on airlift, which was more than half the total $4.57 billion spent on transport during the whole campaign” (Webb, 2007, p. 303) while only transporting 10% of the supplies and equipment through air transport. Additionally, it is not apparent that sufficient large air transports will be positioned in locations capable for re-positioning the 3rd MEF in case of contingency operations.

Another factor is the type of contingency operations to which the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force would be responding. In the case of a humanitarian crisis, such as the 2004 or 2011 tsunamis, air transports can expect friendly air corridors through which to travel and deliver military forces providing assistance. Unfortunately, this situation cannot be assumed in the case of contingency operations when the use of force is expected. Instead the likelihood that these Marine expeditionary forces will be entering a combat zone with hostile or contested skies is highly likely, thereby calling into question the feasibility of delivering these quick response units safely.

A final factor in the discussion on air transportation with the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force is the capabilities of attached helicopter transports. Currently the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force contains several squadrons of CH-46s which serve as medium lift, short range transports for elements of the 3rd MEF. The CH-46s, with a combat radius of 296 kilometers, have provided the Marine Corps with the required
battlefield transportation capability needed to maneuver and succeed in its expeditionary mission since the Vietnam War. Yet due to its age they suffer from slower speeds and shorter ranges than alternate options available.

In order to support the ongoing expeditionary role of the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense contracted with Boeing to purchase the newly developed MV-22 to replace existing CH-46 squadrons throughout the Marine Corps. Though troubled by early design flaws the MV-22 has nonetheless earned high praise from Marine Corps commanders since its first combat missions in Iraq in 2007 (Federal News Service, 2009). This has been primarily due to its increased range, combat radius of 1,111 kilometers, and speed of 443 kilometers an hour (Boeing, 2012b) versus the 248 kilometers an hour for the CH-46 (Boeing, 2012a).

3.5 Summary

The methods and procedures detailed above will assist in critically examining the current realignment plan of the 3rd MEF as presented by the Governments of Japan and the United States, along with developing any alternate realignment plan required.
4. Examination of the current relocation plan

4.1 Introduction

The relocation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from various facilities throughout Okinawa, though primarily MCAS Futenma, to an alternate location either within the prefecture of Okinawa or out of Japan, has been shown to have gone through several iterations. Discussed primarily since 1995, these relocation plans have failed to pass the planning stages as Japanese domestic politics vacillate between acquiescing to American demands for a new offshore base to arguing for the complete removal of all American military forces from Okinawa.

The most controversial plan thus far had been the Futenma Replacement Facility, which sought to reclaim land off the Henoko Peninsula and build runways over a nationally protected environmental site. Encountering stiff resistance at the local level, this plan had progressed forward until the fall of 2011 when the United States agreed to separate the discussion of the new runways off Henoko with the transfer of large portions of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force off of Okinawa (Takenaka, 2012). The transfer of these forces off of Okinawa seems to satisfy many of the complaints of the Japanese public. Yet an examination of how these new locations support United States policies in the region, through the application of the criteria established above, must be completed to ensure the relocation supports the strategic view rather than short term diplomatic goals.

4.2 The Current Realignment Plan

The current relocation plan calls for the transfer of thousands of Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force to locations throughout the Pacific including Hawaii, Guam,
Australia and the Philippines. Shifting from their current basing on Okinawa, these units will either re-engage long-time traditional allies that have not seen the large-scale permanent stationing of American military units in over twenty years or will return to the United States in an effort to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa. The current relocation plan calls for reducing the number of Marines on Okinawa to a cap of 10,000, thereby forcing the United States to relocate at least 8,000 Marines to alternate locations (Navy Times, 2012). Though these plans remain fluid, the outline below is the most recognized relocation plan of these Marines as described by various government officials of both states.

Guam

Hosting by far the largest shift in the relocation plan, Guam, an American territory, stands poised to receive 4,700 Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa in combination with several military improvement projects on the island (Kan, 2012). Originally slated to receive 8,000 Marines, Guam still offers several challenges to the Marine Corps as adequate training, and specifically live fire drills, are unavailable on the island requiring new facilities be developed and utilized on the relatively nearby island of Tinian (Kan, 2012, p. 9).

Australia

In a new security arrangement agreed upon during President Obama’s November visit to Australia, portions of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force will build up a presence in Darwin, Australia eventually totaling 2,500 by 2016. The first time American military forces have been stationed in Australia since the Vietnam War, these units are to support
the United States reengagement with states of South East Asia and balance the force posture of East Asia from being primarily focused in North East Asia to one that is visible throughout the entire region (Nicholas & Parsons, 2011; Kan, 2012, p. 4-9).

**Other locations**

Several other locations have been named to be recipients of Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa. Hawaii, with its large existing military presence, is expected to receive 1,000 (Navy Times, 2012) while Singapore and the Philippines, already home to small detachments of United States military forces, are in negotiations with the United States to host an unknown number of 3rd MEF Marines (Kan, 8, 2012; Tritten, 2012).

Remarking on the new deployment strategy, one *Stars and Stripes* reporter, based on comments from official sources, states “The new deployments and bases could combine with existing units in Japan, Hawaii and California to create a string of Marine Corps forces that stretches 7,700 miles and projects as far as the Indian Ocean” (Tritten, 2012). Not mentioned is how these forces will interact and serve the overarching missions and agendas of the 3rd MEF itself and United States regional foreign policy as a whole. Figure 4.1 shows the projected regional locations of the relocated Marines of the 3rd MEF.
Figure 4.1 Planned realignment locations of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011).
4.3 Critical Analysis through the Criteria

The planned diversification of United States military forces on Okinawa to locations throughout the Pacific at first seems to satisfy the needs of sustaining the United States-Japanese alliance and preserving our forward presence in East Asia. Yet broader concerns with United States military and foreign policy in the region do not seem to have been addressed.

Early discussions by the Overseas Basing Commission in 2005 on the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam faced criticism from the Commission itself stating “Nor are we sure that current discussions on relocating U.S. forces on Okinawa adequately addresses strategic concerns for U.S. security interests in East Asia” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. ii). How then does the planned relocation match the criteria established? The section below applies each of the four criteria individually to the existing relocation plans to determine if it matches the needs and purpose of American strategy in East Asia.

Criterion 1: The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive US-Japanese relations

Perhaps the most readily apparent of any of the criteria, the removal of thousands of Marines from Okinawa to any location out of the prefecture is conducive to improvements in US-Japanese relations. The planned cap of 10,000 Marines, along with the removal of 8,000, signals a final shift, however gradual, in policy amongst the prefectural Government of Okinawa, the federal government in Tokyo and the United States.
Considered a win to many Okinawans, these relocations though will leave many American military facilities open on the island with specific units and installations still undecided such as the Futenma Replacement Facility, the scope of units on Kadena Air Base and whether Marine Aircraft Group 36, the helicopter unit a part of the 3rd MEF, will remain on Okinawa or be transferred elsewhere. With these questions still unanswered, domestic politics in Japan, and therefore the United States-Japanese alliance, will continue to face opposition.

Criterion 2: Any restructure of American military units and bases in Japan must consider their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula

The most direct problem with the relocation of portions of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa to different locations across the Pacific is how these elements would come together or respond to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, or arguably anywhere, in force. With almost 8,000 miles of ocean separating elements of the 3rd MEF, little has been publicized on how these separate elements will travel, train or participate as a larger military unit such as they do now on Okinawa. Questions concerning which units will be transferred, infantry, armor, air, artillery, or a combination of all four, have not been answered beyond the rough estimates of personnel figures. No information, for instance on the disbursement of the Marine Aircraft Group 36, containing squadrons of helicopters detested by the Okinawans, has been released or even if they will leave Okinawa at all. Additionally the logistics complications of these units, spread throughout the Pacific, have not been addressed or seemingly accounted for. Discussing these types of concerns in 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission stated:

Our military forces must be able to meet the force projection demands placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Their training and
equipment must be adequate to the task, access to key locations assured, and units and bases protected to the degree commensurate with the risks we ask our service men and women to undertake. It is not clear that all of these concerns have been addressed.

A central objective of a rebasing strategy is to ensure availability of requisite combat power at the point of need. As we return forces from overseas, shift them within and between combatant commands, and transform them into more readily deployable units we seek an outcome of enhanced mobility. The Commission is concerned, however, that adequate strategic sealift, airlift, and prepositioned equipment and stocks do not exist and that current intra-theater airlift is over-stressed. Aside from the lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet potential contingencies. Moreover, the Commission notes that budgetary plans for mobility assets are inadequate to meet projected lift demand. (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. iv)

Therefore, the need for clear guidance on the mobility of American forces realigning in the Pacific is crucial to their combat readiness. Even without knowing the exact distribution of 3rd MEF units throughout the Pacific, two courses of actions can be posited that span the spectrum from the most logistically simple to the most complex.

Personnel only

A personnel-only plan is the most straightforward realignment of forces in the Pacific. They could be relocated to these alternate bases with none of their supporting equipment such as tanks, helicopters or artillery. Beyond creating an obvious challenge for training, the preservation of units with this equipment, such as the Marine Aircraft Group 36 on Okinawa, would fail to satisfy the demands of the Okinawans and the first criterion of this examination. Furthermore, as the Overseas Basing Commission highlighted above, the strategic airlift requirements for these widely dispersed units are either not in place or insufficient to transport the realigned units back to Okinawa or a
central location where they could be embarked by elements of Phibron 11, the Naval ships designated to transport them to locations of need. Unable to reunite with their host and command units on Okinawa, these 8,000 Marines would either be delayed from entering any contingency operation ordered for the 3rd MEF or hinder the ability of the 3rd MEF to respond to a contingency operation in the first place. As the simplest option for the realignment of forces from Okinawa throughout the Pacific, such outcomes call into question the expected purpose, in the eyes of force planners, of the 3rd MEF being forward deployed in the Pacific at all.

**Personnel and Heavy Equipment**

Realigning whole units of Marines with their equipment, tanks, helicopters and artillery is the more complex option for realigning forces in the Pacific. This would support their training missions and maintain high levels of readiness, desired by any military commander, and their response to a contingency operation ordered for the 3rd MEF.

Considering only the travel and embarkation times for Phibron 11 from Sasebo to Guam to Okinawa, in order to embark the largest number of Marines and equipment in the shortest amount of time, there is significant delay from the initial warning order to deployable readiness; see Figure 4.2 below for the estimated travel delay. In this scenario, traveling to and embarking Marines and equipment relocated to Australia, Singapore or the Philippines would present too large a delay. The resulting absence would weaken the capabilities of the 3rd MEF. Parent and MacDonald (2011), though calling for a decline in American military forces in Japan, recognize that response times
to contingency operations are crucial and state that “defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43). It is hard to see therefore how diffusing geographically the 3rd MEF will preserve its current rapid response capability in support of its forward-deployed mission.
Figure 4.2 Straight line travel distance and travel time for Amphibious Squadron 11 departing Sasebo, Japan for Guam then Okinawa. Embarkation times are not included. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Travel times based on Phibron 11’s speed of 37/km/hr.
In any scenario that separates elements of a military division, it must be understood that, though they are in many cases separate entities, artillery, armor, and infantry, these elements work and fight as a whole force. The separation and likelihood of only partial deployment of the whole presents operational planners with difficult decisions during contingency operations. Should partial units respond to the contingency while not at full operational capability? Or should the unit be fully reconstituted, creating a delay, before it is deployed and thereby increase the risk of the contingency becoming more difficult to address? Finally, should the unit not be allocated contingency operations due to the many unknowns revolving around its logistical dilemmas? Questions such as these, and the difficult answers they develop, seriously call into question the wide distribution of the 3rd MEF across the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean.

Criterion 3: American military forces in Japan act as an ‘honest broker’ and stabilizing force while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past

The removal of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to outside of Japan will signal a declining commitment of the United States to Japanese and South Korean security as rising regional competitors continue to flex their increased military and political clout. Japan’s Yoshida Doctrine of relying on the United States for security while capping domestic defense spending and capabilities may come under fire as revisionists seek to redefine Japan in the 21st century through a loosening of restrictions on weapons sales and development along with increased military deployments (Heginbotham, Ratner and Samuels, 2011, p. 140-148). The move of Japan to become a normal nation and maintain its own military (Samuels, 2008, p. 5-6) is likely to become stronger (Samuels, 2008, p. 181-183). In the context of a recent history of military aggression throughout the region,
this is likely to encourage states such as North and South Korea, Russia and China to develop military policies against any rise in Japanese militarism. Conversely, states such as Singapore and the Philippines will likely welcome an increased American military presence as China expands naval operations in the South China Sea, though there is no requirement that elements of the 3rd MEF fulfill this need. Rotations and stationing of American military personnel in these, and other states such as Australia, should come from units currently stationed outside of Japan. Only by doing so, and preserving the levels of American military forces in Japan at current levels, can the United States provide the security guarantee sought by the Yoshida Doctrine.

Criterion 4: The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States

The stationing of United States military forces in Japan provides the United States with a stable, regional presence, demonstrating our commitment to allies and security partners throughout the region. Japan, balanced off the coast of the Asian continent as the United Kingdom is off the coast of the European continent, offers much in the way of access for economic, political and military reasons. Therefore maintaining adequate levels of combat power in Japan supports the wide range of missions of the United States while presenting a visible deterrent to any land power seeking to expand in the region. The removal of significant portions of these combat forces signals a weakening of resolve on the part of the United States at a time when our leaders seek to deepen our regional commitment (Lothian and Jansen, 2011). Furthermore, as discussed above relating to Korea, the dispersion of the 3rd MEF throughout the Pacific, instead of maintaining unit coherency, questions the responsiveness and operational viability of the unit to regional contingency operations, and particularly ones involving combat operations. Rear
Admiral Dur, the former Director of the Strategy and Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has discussed the importance of force posture and stationing and had this to say on forward-deployed naval forces such as the 3rd MEF:

Presence forces are shaped for combat. Forward deployed naval forces provide the critical link between peacetime operations and the initial requirements for a developing crisis or major regional contingency. Their forcible entry capabilities provide the initial response and enabling capability for subsequent joint operations on a large scale in the event of conflict.

Our defense commitments and global interests require a robust forward naval presence. Forward presence has been a trademark of the Navy and the Marine Corps. And its importance is likely to grow in the uncertain future. If we can identify specific national interests and regional objectives that can be advanced or protected by naval power, we can then determine the levels of forces necessary to secure those interests. Defining the forces we need for presence need not be guesswork.

Naval forces – like all elements of a military arsenal – are built to fight and win wars. But their most important role by far is to be positioned to prevent them. Sized and configured to meet military objectives, naval forces serve the nation’s varied interests on a regular and continuous basis – in the littorals and on the open ocean, where U.S. economic security turns on free access in the world’s markets and resources.

In this regard, the past really is prologue. Naval forces deployed forward will remain the front line in our transoceanic strategy (Dur, 2000, p. 479).

The need therefore to maintain combat ready forces in Japan, which the current realignment plan does not consider, is crucial to United States security and foreign policy.

4.4 Summary

The United States’ current realignment plan for elements of the 3rd MEF to relocate to distant location throughout the Pacific does not take into consideration several factors relating to its military and foreign policy mission. Discussions on how logistics
will be managed between the new locations or how the 3rd MEF will respond to any contingency operation have neither been discussed nor seemingly planned for. Additionally the domestic politics of Japan, as it relates to military development and normalization, has not been considered. Finally, the re-posturing of United States military forces throughout East Asia, though important for our relations with states in South East Asia such as the Philippines and Singapore, ultimately fails to consider alternate military units such as the 2nd MEF stationed in San Diego. Doing so would maintain the unit coherency of the 3rd MEF and provide a combat-ready deterrent available for any regional contingency operation. The Overseas Basing Commission identified the lack of long-term planning on the part of the Department of Defense and its statements hold as true for the current realignment plan as in 2005:

Our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its own right. It must, therefore be fully integrated with every other facet of strategy before it can properly affixed. It is our opinion that the enormity of this point, and the discussion that it demands, has not been taken into account to the degree that it merits (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 6).
Chapter 5: Alternate Relocation Plans

5.1 Introduction

Realignment plans developed by the Governments of the United States and Japan have thus far been unable to provide options that satisfy the requirements of the United States’ regional objectives while addressing the domestic concerns of Japanese civilians on Okinawa. The need therefore to examine alternate plans that satisfy the criteria established is clear. Any alternate realignment plan must consider the criteria established and must satisfy them better than the existing plan as put forth by the United States.

A review of the criteria recognizes that the most limiting factor for the realignment of forces are the logistics and transportation factors. The dispersing of the 3rd MEF throughout the Pacific and then requiring adequate transportation back to either a centralized location or the actual contingency location has not been addressed and presents the most serious challenge to operational planners. The need therefore to realign the 3rd MEF within a reasonable travel distance from Sasebo, Japan, the homeport of Phibron 11, their assigned naval transportation, would be logical to minimize travel times and maximize operational capability. Additionally the maintenance of these forces, if possible within Japan but outside the prefecture of Okinawa, would support United States military and foreign policy objectives in the region. Therefore locations on the main islands of Japan (Kyushu, Honshu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido) should be considered with a preference for established military locations with low population densities in order to prevent a planning challenge such as happened on Okinawa from reoccurring. With clear
guidelines on the requirements for an alternate realignment plan the options can be mapped out and selected, based on their satisfaction of the criteria.

5.2 The Alternatives

First, the spatial and temporal distance or radius for acceptable realignment locations must be established. This alternate realignment plan sets the existing spatial and temporal distance of Sasebo, Japan to Naha, Japan as the acceptable standard by which alternate realignment locations can be measured. With a distance of 746 kilometers, ships of Phibron 11, traveling at an average speed of 20 knots (37 km/h) would take 20 hours of pure travel time to travel, one way, between the two locations. Therefore the spatial factor is 746 kilometers and the temporal factor is 20 hours. Portions of Japan that fall within this radius include the regions of Kyushu, Shikoku, Chūgoku, and Kansai, along with all or a portion of the prefectures of Aichi, Gifu, Shizuoka, Nagano, Ishikawa and Toyama in the Chūbu region. Figure 5.1 illustrates the extent of the spatial radius from Sasebo, Japan, including major bases of United States Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
As reflected in Figure 5.1, several locations of USFJ and JSDF forces on the islands of Kyushu, Honshu, and Shikoku are within the acceptable range of Phibron 11. Additionally, Figure 6.1 provides guidance on more acceptable prefectures, based on population density, than Okinawa, which has a higher population density of 612 residents/km². Utilizing this, the prefectures that would be suitable for the relocation of the 3rd MEF, taking into consideration those that currently host major USFJ or JSDF forces, and have a lower population density than Okinawa, can be tabulated for consideration. These prefectures are listed in Table 6.1.

Table 5.1 Prefectures within Phibron 11’s acceptable range that currently host USFJ or JSDF units and have a lower population density than Okinawa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Major USFJ Units Present</th>
<th>Major JSDF Units Present</th>
<th>Population Density / km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>Minor Depots</td>
<td>4th Escort Flotilla</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6th Air Wing</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1st Fleet Air Wing</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8th Division</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3rd Escort Flotilla</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5th Air Wing</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>Phibron 11</td>
<td>2nd Escort Flotilla, 22nd Fleet Air Wing</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>MCAS Iwakuni</td>
<td>31st Fleet Air Wing</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The eight prefectures listed in Table 6.1 provide guidance on possible alternate locations for the relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa. A final, if less likely, transportation factor to consider is the possibility of elements of the 3rd MEF responding to a contingency operation on the Korean Peninsula by means of their integrated air transport only. This integrated air transport, in the form of the MV-22 Osprey, can provide a mission radius of 1,111 kilometers to elements of the 3rd MEF, facilitating rapid
deployment to possible contingency operations within this range. Likely locations within South Korea that the 3rd MEF would respond to, if only to layover for supplies and refueling, include Kunsan Air Base, a part of United States Forces Korea (USFK), and Daegu Air Base, a base of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROK AFB). These bases are distant enough from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the most likely combat area with anti-aircraft capabilities, and maintain sufficient fuel and accommodations to serve either as a layover or temporary forward location in South Korea for elements of the 3rd MEF transported by MV-22s.

Figure 5.2 depicts the combat radius of the MV-22, centered on the Republic of Korea Air Force Base in Daegu\(^3\) to reflect areas within Japan that could serve as the permanent home of the 3rd MEF, with attached MV-22s, and reach this potential temporary location during a crisis on the Korea Peninsula. Due to the wide combat radius of the MV-22, most of Japan, excluding Hokkaido, is within this radius, including all the USFJ and JSDF bases selected from Figure 6.1.

The relocating of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa to any of the potential bases identified in Figure 6.1 satisfies the entire criteria established in Chapter 3. Locations such as MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi prefecture or any of the bases near Sasebo in Nagasaki prefecture could support the 3rd MEF and offer less potential for domestic disturbance than Okinawa. Additionally, the maintenance of the 3rd MEF within Japan

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\(^3\) Daegu Air Base was chosen over Kunsan due to its closer proximity to Japan and increased distance from the DMZ. Though Japan and South Korea maintain stiff relations and are engaged in several international disputes, it is assumed that United States military forces would be accepted at a Korean base, particularly during a crisis.
and their proximity to the Korean Peninsula would appear to support all United States military and foreign policy objectives.
Figure 5.2 MV-22 combat radius if responding to contingency operations on the Korean Peninsula. Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011). MV-22 Source: Boeing (2012b)
5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has identified several alternate locations within Japan for the relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa in lieu of existing plans that spread the 3rd MEF throughout the Pacific. Any of the major military facilities within the eight prefectures identified could adequately serve as the new home of the 3rd MEF, either in force or in sections separated by minimal land distances and thereby maintaining coherency. It is up to military planners and diplomatic officials to work with the Government of Japan to identify which one will be the most domestically acceptable option.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to analyze the current realignment plan of United States military forces on Okinawa and offer alternatives that focus on the strategic operations of the 3rd MEF, rather than the short-term political desires of both governments.

Through the establishment of criteria detailing the mission of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, the foreign policy objectives of the United States and strategic theory, this thesis was able to show that current realignment plans of United States military forces on Okinawa fail to account for several critical factors. The transportation and logistics element of supporting dispersed quick response units has not been considered nor planned for. Contingency operations on the Korean Peninsula, arguably the purpose for the United States Forces Japan’s stationing, has also not been adequately planned for.

The alternate relocation option presented would see elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force relocate to existing military facilities on Kyushu or Honshu in low[er] population density prefectures. Though challenges exist to alternate plans such as these (Burke and Sumida, 2012), the proposed option presented offers the most viable alternative to the existing plan and meets the military and foreign policy objectives of the United States.

Additionally the possibility of joint basing, or combined bases between United States Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Force, will support the alliance through increased integration and operability. The greater the linkage is, the deeper the
alliance becomes. Discussing alliance structure between the United States and its European allies, Walt states: “The greater the level of institutionalization within an alliance, the more likely it is to endure despite an extensive change in the array of external threats” (Walt, 2000, p. 327). The post-Cold War environment in East Asia has seen an evolution of the threats to regional stability and peace. Gone are the days of the threat of global nuclear war. They have been replaced by a modernizing, robust Chinese military flexing its military power in the so-called first island chain (Brookes, 2009). Not to be forgotten, North Korean missile and nuclear development continues unhindered by years of economic sanctions (United Nations News Centre, 2012). In the context of these East Asian 21st century power politics, particularly with a Japan that has yet to settle long-held emotional memories with its neighboring states, the need for deeper security linkages with the United States is paramount to a stable, non-confrontational region.

In the case of Okinawa, policy planners in both Japan and the United States should critically examine the political feasibility of moving existing military units to the main islands of Japan to support the United States’ defense commitment and alleviate the extraordinary burden placed on the people of Okinawa relative to their fellow citizens on Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku. This move would strengthen the United States-Japan security alliance, lower or remove anti-American sentiment prevalent throughout the country and improve the strategic and tactical requirements of the American military objectives in the region.

Additionally, the spatial and geographic importance of Mackinder and Mahan’s theories are shown to remain valid even after nearly a century of geopolitical upheaval. The need to maintain modern-day coaling stations for our forces overseas continues to
have significance in today’s ever more globalized world. Though the threat of a Eurasian hegemon dominating the heartland has diminished, the need to balance against its rise requires an American military presence at crucial locations. Japan, positioned off the Eurasian continent with direct sea lanes of communication and supply to the United States, serves as one of these. Future researchers should consider the continuing importance of these theories as, while states, governments, and policies rise and fall, geography will remain the same.

Looking forward, researchers could utilize the challenges and opportunities presented in the case of Okinawa to develop best practices with our partner states in East Asia and better posture the United States for what Secretary Clinton recently called “America's Pacific century” (Clinton, 2011). Through this framework of maximizing geo-strategic interests, the development needs of the local populations and addressing partner states’ concerns for the local environment, researchers should be able to analyze more clearly the future of American military and foreign policy both in the Pacific and, more broadly, throughout the global basing structure of American overseas forces.
## Appendix A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Base Type</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Installation Name</th>
<th>Branch of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Kinser</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Medium Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>MCAS Futenma</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Foster</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV Large Site</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Kadena AB</td>
<td>USAF Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
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<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Courtney</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>Marine Base</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Hansen</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Installation</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Camp Gonsalves</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sasebo</td>
<td>Navy Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>Air Base</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>MCAS Iwakuni</td>
<td>USMC Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>Navy Active</td>
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<td>Atsugi</td>
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<td>Camp Zama</td>
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<td>Misawa AB</td>
<td>USAF Active</td>
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</table>

## Appendix B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Name</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Branch</th>
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<td>2nd Fleet Air Wing</td>
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<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Air Wing</td>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>Misawa</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
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<td>21st Fleet Air Wing</td>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>Tateyama</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Air Wing</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>Tsuiki</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hokkaido</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ibaraki</td>
<td>Hyakuri</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Ishikawa</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<td>Kanoya</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Atsugi</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Nyutabaru</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>22nd Fleet Air Wing</td>
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<td>Omura</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>83rd Air Wing</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Naha</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing</td>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>Iruma</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>31st Fleet Air Wing</td>
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<td>Iwakuni</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Ground</td>
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<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>Asahikawa</td>
<td>Ground</td>
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<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>Higashi Chitose</td>
<td>Ground</td>
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<td>Senzo</td>
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<td>8th Division</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>Kita Kumanmoto</td>
<td>Ground</td>
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<td>1st Division</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Nerima</td>
<td>Ground</td>
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<td>6th Division</td>
<td>Yamagata</td>
<td>Jinmachi</td>
<td>Ground</td>
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<td>4th Escort Flotilla</td>
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<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>Naval</td>
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<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
<td>Naval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Bases of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Note the Naval Fleet Air Wings have been designated ‘Air’ units for the purposes of this study. This is to recognize their impact on the base communities rather than their specific service affiliation. Data Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b).


Economist (2005). No home where the dugong roam. Economist. 377 (8450), 44.


