Cooperative Tax Regulation

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This Article describes a new approach to tax regulation based on cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence. Currently, tax regulation in the United States relies too heavily on sticks and not enough on carrots. While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their advisors in a participatory process, and appreciating the elegant power of cognitive devices that portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than nonpayment of taxes as a penalty. Even with optimal penalties, tax officials cannot currently enforce the law effectively due to severe resource and information asymmetries. To overcome these debilitating shortcomings, the government must improve funding, recruiting, training, and retention. It must also partner with taxpayers and practitioners to strengthen detection, enforcement, and prosecution of abusive tax avoidance. Cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not only in taxpaying but also in tax advising and tax administration. Ultimately, it can produce a regulatory environment of collaboration rather than adversity, ex ante resolution rather than ex post controversy, and certainty rather than secrecy.
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Cooperative Tax Regulation

DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.∗

I. INTRODUCTION

In February 2006, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it failed to collect as much as $353 billion in taxes owed for tax year 2001.1 The “tax gap,” the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what they pay on a timely basis, reflected a compliance rate of 83.7%.2 Congress reacted strongly. Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) called the tax avoidance unpatriotic and responsible for the federal deficit. “When people and companies . . . don’t pay their taxes, the burden for paying this country’s expenses falls even more heavily on Americans who do their duty every April 15.”3 It was the government’s obligation “to go after scofflaws and tax cheats big and small, who are contributing to the deficit by not contributing their fair share.”4 Baucus and others urged the Bush administration to move aggressively,5 and to rework preliminary proposals which were forecast to net $3.5 billion over ten years, just one-tenth of one

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4 Baucus Press Release, supra note 3.

percent of the estimated $3.5 trillion tax gap.\footnote{6 The Tax Gap and How to Solve It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. (2006) (written testimony of Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner).}


Meanwhile, a minority warned against viewing the tax gap as a policymaking panacea. Charles Grassley (R-IA) noted that politicians had already begun to see the tax gap as “one of those magic elixirs” for all fiscal problems, so much so that he expressed feigned surprise that “folks don’t think the tax gap can cure baldness.”\footnote{16 Id.; see also Examining the Administration’s Plan for Reducing the Tax Gap: What Are the Goals, Benchmarks, and Timetables?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2007) (opening statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I’m worried that some members have their head in the clouds when it comes to the tax gap. Some members view the tax gap as money in the pocket to spend on favorite proposals. Nothing could be further from the truth.”).} The Treasury Department had estimated that 54% of the gap involved noncompliance where there was little or no third-party reporting of a taxpayer’s liability.\footnote{17 IRS, Tax Gap Figures, at 3 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf.} Noncompliance for rents and royalties, for instance, equaled 51%, for non-farm proprietor
income, 57%, and for farm income, an astounding 72%.Meanwhile, compliance rates for income subject to automatic withholding (wages and salaries) and information reporting (interest and dividend income) hovered around 99 and 95%, respectively. Proceeding on the assumption that people pay taxes only when they have to, and that increased enforcement by itself was not an effective alternative, the majority of tax gap proposals expanded information reporting. But this approach barely dented the $353 billion shortfall. In addition to yielding too little revenue, critics charged that the approach threatened taxpayer privacy, burdened taxpayers with excessive compliance costs, and tipped the regulatory balance decidedly away from taxpayer service.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the “low-hanging fruit” has already been picked by withholding and information reporting regimes. It is other forms of income—some perched on upper branches, some hidden from view at the subterranean level—that continue to elude tax officials. Capturing this income and reducing the massive avoidance of taxes in a meaningful way requires a multifaceted approach to a difficult problem that only seems to be getting worse. The government has three

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18 *Id.* at 2.


20 The Treasury Department has concluded that enforcement by itself cannot close the gap, because: (i) much of the tax gap is due to forms of unreported income that are difficult to detect (i.e., no third-party reporting); (ii) even if detected, tax liability might be uncollectible (due to difficulties in locating the taxpayer or taxpayer insolvency); and (iii) many detected liabilities are so small that it is not cost effective to pursue collection. JAMES M. BICKLEY, *TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT*, CRS REPORT, at 4 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33882_20070216.pdf.

21 See *Diane Freda, Information Reporting Proposals May Become Congressional Revenue Raisers, IRPAC Says*, 206 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-1 (Oct. 25, 2007) (describing efforts to increase reporting).

22 Nearly 98% of the estimated increase in compliance receipts from the administration’s tax gap recommendations relied on improved information reporting, which were estimated to generate only $29.5 billion over ten years, not quite 1% of the estimated gap. See Dep’t of the Treasury, *General Explanations*, supra note 7, at 120–21.


choices. It can continue picking away at the far fringes of the tax gap. It can impose draconian measures of coercive enforcement, for which there is no political will, nor any good argument even if there were.\textsuperscript{25} Or it can consider the virtues of cooperative tax regulation.

This Article describes these virtues and articulates an approach to tax regulation based on cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence. It argues that closing the tax gap requires a relational rather than a coercive tax compliance norm. Such a norm necessitates that tax regulators nurture compliance with both sweeter carrots and sharper sticks. A compliance equilibrium based on reciprocity rather than adversity provides positive incentives for taxpayers and tax regulators to trade secrecy for certainty. Under a cooperative model, taxpayers and their advisors enjoy certainty of outcome with respect to tax reporting positions and fewer post-filing challenges. At the same time, the government is in a better position to identify emerging taxpayer issues and compliance risks, and to shift limited resources from post-filing controversies to other areas of service and enforcement. Such an exchange relationship, characterized by dialogue and transparency, seeks to forge a shared understanding of what it means to comply with the tax law. By no means does the cooperative approach outlined in this Article reject penalties or enforcement as part of an overall compliance strategy. To the contrary, it recognizes explicitly that taxpayers will comply with the law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement.\textsuperscript{26} But it also recognizes that penalties alone and aggressive enforcement will not necessarily improve compliance, and may actually worsen it.\textsuperscript{27} The challenge for tax officials under the cooperative model “is to play a two-handed game: To deal with the wrongdoing today, while nurturing consent for tomorrow.”\textsuperscript{28}

A cooperative rather than an adversarial compliance norm may appear

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{25}See Joyce, supra note 5, at G-1 (quoting Commissioner Everson as saying, “[t]o reduce the tax gap dramatically would take some draconian steps, ones that would fundamentally change the relationship between taxpayers and the IRS, require unacceptably high commitment of enforcement resources, and risk imposing unacceptable burdens on compliant taxpayers”); \textit{Reducing the Federal Tax Gap, supra} note 8, at 18 (“[W]hile it may be possible to take action to reduce the tax gap, it is not possible to implement a policy that eliminates the tax gap without an unacceptable change in the fundamental nature of the current tax compliance system.”).
\item\textsuperscript{26}See Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, \textit{Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance}, in \textit{BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE} 3, 15–17 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (arguing that enforcement provides taxpayers with an extrinsic motivation to comply with tax laws); see also infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
\item\textsuperscript{27}See \textit{infra} note 53 and accompanying text.
\item\textsuperscript{28}Valerie Braithwaite, \textit{Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-compliant Actions}, in \textit{TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION} 15, 35 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter \textit{TAXING DEMOCRACY}].
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
inapposite in the tax context. After all, the goals of taxpayers and their advisors on the one hand and tax regulators on the other are largely adverse, with taxpayers trying to reduce and avoid taxes at the same time that tax regulators try to collect them. This Article argues that the interests of taxpayers and tax authorities are not all that dissimilar, particularly once we start thinking of taxpayers as interested partners in the regulatory effort and tax advisors as compliance counselors.29 From this perspective, paying one’s taxes yields tangible benefits beyond penalty avoidance, while advising taxpayer clients resembles the work performed by securities lawyers; the compliance norm is not “do you have a plausible explanation for your position,” but rather “does your position reinforce the public purposes of the law.” Tax officials also must adopt new perspectives under the cooperative model. If we make taxpayers, in the words of Justice Holmes, “turn square corners” when dealing with the government,30 it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a similar standard of “rectangular rectitude” when dealing with its taxpayer-citizens.31 Cooperative tax regulation requires tax authorities to assist taxpayers, share information with them, and respond to their concerns.

The regulatory model articulated in this Article adopts an approach reflected in the “new governance” and “responsive regulation” literatures. New governance involves “a shift in emphasis away from command-and-control in favour of ‘regulatory’ approaches which are less rigid, less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature.”32 Responsive regulation, for its part, emphasizes a dynamic, non-adversarial approach where regulators assist regulated actors in complying with the law, and where regulated actors, as reward for their cooperation, assist regulators in crafting the regulatory environment.33 Scholars have


begun to apply the responsive regulation model to tax.\textsuperscript{34} According to its most prolific proponent, Australian tax scholar Valerie Braithwaite, “[t]he traditional tax infrastructure of law, auditors, penalties, debt collectors, and court cases needs to be supplemented by measures that boost taxpayers’ commitment to paying tax with or without the tax authority watching over their shoulders.”\textsuperscript{35} This Article applies these regulatory approaches to U.S. tax regulation, particularly the corresponding virtues of an exchange relationship under which all parties—tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax practitioners—commit to transparency and information sharing, and where the government rewards compliance with leniency, flexible accommodation, and an opportunity to shape legal rules.

The Article proceeds in four sections. Part II applies the cooperative model to the existing tax penalty regime. While strict tax penalties typically embody the failed command-and-control approach to regulation, an effective compliance strategy requires regulatory sticks. Thus, Part II looks beyond the traditional economic deterrence model for tax penalties and explores non-economic motivations for complying with tax laws to help re-conceive the penalty regime. It recommends an interactive approach to tax regulation that rewards compliance with restraint, assistance, opportunities to participate in the rulemaking process, and even tax rebates. Part II also emphasizes that the government must act swiftly and effectively against intransigent noncompliance which, unchecked, undermines the cooperative model.

Part III challenges tax regulators to improve enforcement (which includes much more than penalties) as well as customer service. Like the rest of the Article, Part III argues that people will comply with the law if the law uses effective and fair mechanisms of deterrence, enforcement, prosecution, and punishment. On the enforcement side, Part III proposes increasing the number and thoroughness of audits, shrinking the “resource gap” and “information gap” that currently separates government lawyers from private sector lawyers, and facilitating private enforcement of tax laws. On the service side, it emphasizes a cultural shift in tax administration from command-and-control to collaboration, from ex post controversy to ex ante resolution, and from regulatory intimidation to procedural fairness.

Part IV examines the woefully deficient professional standards currently governing tax practitioners. It argues that weak regulation of tax practice by the professional associations—particularly the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants—

\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2007).
\textsuperscript{35} Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 1.
has enabled tax avoidance. Moreover, it commends recent efforts by Congress and the Treasury Department to elevate ethical guidelines for tax practitioners. Finally, it recommends a set of substantive legal rules and disclosure requirements designed to improve tax compliance by making tax planning and tax reporting more transparent.

As part of the effort to enhance compliance through increased transparency, tax officials need at their disposal a judicious mix of rules and standards. Part V discusses how rules provide certainty of outcome and lower compliance costs, as well as enhanced due process and fair treatment. It also shows how standards provide coherence to a set of otherwise independent rules by giving them overarching purpose. Part V roots this discussion in an examination of the Treasury Department’s regulations governing tax practice. It explores the extent to which the combination of disciplinary rules and aspirational standards contained in the regulations both reflect and conflict with cooperative tax regulation.

II. RE-CONCEIVING THE PENALTY REGIME

Taxpayers comply with the law when they think the law will be enforced. Indeed, taxpayer behavior depends largely “[o]n the government itself,” 36 both the fairness of its processes 37 and its willingness to enforce the law effectively and to prosecute wrongdoers. 38 Heavy-handed attempts at enforcement by regulators can backfire, however, resulting in less rather than more compliance. 39 The difficulty for tax authorities is crafting a regulatory regime that uses sticks as effectively as carrots.

Historically, the primary enforcement mechanism for U.S. tax officials has been a penalty regime based on an economic deterrence model of detection and punishment. The basic idea behind the economic model is that people respond rationally to maximize expected gain and to minimize expected loss. Thus, to deter non-compliance, regulators raise the magnitude of penalties or the probability of detection. The problem for tax officials is that for penalties to effectively deter non-compliance under the rational economic model, penalty rates would have to be raised to unrealistically high levels. If we assume an audit rate of 2%, twice the level of the current rate, 40 and we further assume that the IRS always (and

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36 McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 17.
37 See Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87 (2002) (arguing that a tax authority’s legitimacy depends on fair procedures of tax collection and enforcement).
38 See Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 77, 91 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998) (writing that “the willingness to pay taxes quasi-voluntarily or to give one’s contingent consent to conscription often rests on the existence of the state’s capacity and demonstrated readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise noncompliant”).
39 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
40 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
only) catches noncompliance on audit (another optimistic assumption), the penalty rate sufficient to deter underpayment would have to equal 4900% of tax due.41 Suffice it to say, the economic deterrence model is incapable of curbing noncompliance by itself.

While the motivations underlying tax compliance undoubtedly include economic considerations, rationality involves more than economic inputs. A tax penalty regime that appreciates these other incentives would recognize moral, ethical, and social considerations for paying taxes, and it would view tax penalties as more than punitive instruments. A regime that merely punishes wrongdoers creates an adversarial environment and compliance norm. By comparison, a cooperative tax penalty regime reflects collaborative norms, whereby taxpayers and tax regulators work together, and where taxpayer compliance is rewarded with leniency, technical assistance, and opportunities to participate in the development of legal rules. A cooperative regime must also be able to identify noncompliant behavior, and respond to intransigent noncompliance with escalating sanctions and intervention, which, if ignored, would undermine the cooperative model. To the extent positive incentives do not sufficiently facilitate compliance among recalcitrant tax avoiders, tax authorities should consider no-fault penalties. The imposition of a strict-liability penalty could drastically alter the taxpaying calculus, adding significant risk to overaggressive tax positions and transactions.

A. From Economic Deterrence to Cooperative Regulation: Sweeter Carrots, Sharper Sticks

Modern discussions of economic deterrence trace their roots to economist Gary Becker’s influential work in the 1960s and 1970s on the relationship between crime and penalties, both real and perceived.42 Becker’s economic theory of crime restated the goal of penalties as the internalization of the social costs of offenses, rather than the elimination of pain. In the early 1970s, economists Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo extended Becker’s general theory of deterrence to tax compliance, and argued that the degree of deterrence, calculated as the product of the probability of detection and the size of the penalty, determines the amount of income evaded for any particular taxpayer.43 For the next decade,
researchers employed increasingly sophisticated economic models, trading varying degrees of punishment and deterrence to locate the optimal tax compliance package.

Researchers found that maximizing economic gain or minimizing economic loss could not fully explain why people comply with the law; real-world penalty rates were simply too low to explain the relatively high rates of compliance.\textsuperscript{44} It became clear that compliance was not only about risk aversion, and that the economic analysis of deterrence over-simplified why people pay taxes by ignoring other explanatory variables.\textsuperscript{45} Researchers were forced to conclude that models associated with economic theories of tax compliance provided, at best, “tentative guidance . . . in well-specified circumstances.”\textsuperscript{46} It is worth examining briefly the findings to evaluate the role economic deterrence can still play in a re-imagined penalty regime.

Survey research predicts a positive impact of deterrence on avoidance and evasion with higher fines and higher rates of enforcement.\textsuperscript{47} Empirical research reveals more ambiguity, with some studies reporting a positive impact of penalties on compliance,\textsuperscript{48} and others reporting a positive impact of higher probability of detection.\textsuperscript{49} Researchers examining both fines and probability of detection report a positive but small impact on compliance,\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{44} See James Alm et al., \textit{Why Do People Pay Taxes?} 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 36 (1992) (finding that individuals “often pay more in taxes than a simple application of expected utility theory would suggest”).

\textsuperscript{45} See \textit{id}.; Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, \textit{The Economics of Tax Compliance: Facts and Fantasy}, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 357 (1985) (criticizing the application of the economics of crime methodology to tax evasion and avoidance).


\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, \textit{Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS} 1423 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); James Andreoni et al., \textit{Tax Compliance}, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 841 (1998) (“[H]igher penalties and audit probabilities discourage cheating.”).


\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., James Alm et al., \textit{Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES} 311, 322–25 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“[C]ompliance . . . rises when the audit rate
while other researchers have generated ambiguous results as to the effect of fines and detection. In fact, some studies report a “crowding out” of tax compliance when penalties are introduced with a corresponding increase in evasion.

If we believe that taxpayers, even perfectly rational, utility-maximizing taxpayers, care about considerations beyond narrowly defined economic self-interest, it should come as no surprise that penalties can lower rather than raise compliance. Thirty years of research has demonstrated that deterring noncompliant behavior is not entirely about economic self-interest or subjective probabilities of detection that merely augment the standard economic model. Rather, regulating tax compliance involves considerations extending beyond economics, and while some of these motivations can be reduced to monetary values, others cannot. A growing number of researchers have shown that moral, ethical, and social factors—more than threats of economic or legal punishment—determine whether and how taxpayers comply with the law. Similar considerations might even dissuade tax professionals from advising overaggressive planning strategies. At the very least, thirty-five years after Allingham and increases. However, the differences in compliance rates . . . are not large.”; Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in id. 291, 292 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).


The basic idea behind this finding is that taxpayers balance extrinsic motivations for paying taxes (i.e., penalties and enforcement) with intrinsic motivations (i.e., individual framing decisions such as feelings of civic virtue and desires to avoid shame and stigma), and that raising extrinsic motivations may fail to compensate for the corresponding incursion on intrinsic motivations. Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 34–35; Doreen McBarnet, When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 229; Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1044–46 (1997); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160, 173–75 (2001).


See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 97–98 (2001) (stressing the importance of appealing
Sandmo animated the discussion of why people pay (and don’t pay) taxes, there is a consensus that moral, ethical, and social strategies can and should complement traditional punishment and deterrence strategies.

A number of recent proposals for reforming the penalty regime account for multiple taxpaying motivations. None of them reject altogether the economic deterrence model, and some offer sophisticated refinements whereby rational taxpayers consider avoidance and evasion strategies based on expected rather than nominal sanctions. These proposals build on considerations that previous researchers may have noted but either assumed away or failed to explore fully, such as how non-economic and extra-economic motivations interact with the standard economic model. As importantly, they provide strategies for restructuring the tax penalty regime to reflect cooperative tax regulation.

Restructuring the penalty regime to recognize multiple taxpaying motivations requires acknowledging the power of social norms. These legally unenforceable rules of behavior operate beyond the reach of the current tax penalty system. Aggressive taxpayers and their advisors, moreover, have captured the power of social norms to the detriment of the tax system and other taxpayers by engaging in “norm-based tax planning,” the tacit, informal understandings that reduce tax liabilities and create tax-shifting distortions.

Though social norms can undermine the tax system, they can also reinforce it. In fact, tax compliance norms shared by tax decision-makers at large public corporations have had a positive impact on compliance in recent years. These norms have produced “general liability concerns within organizations” from the corporate taxpayer, outside legal counsel,
According to law professor Susan Morse, these tax compliance norms developed as a result of enforcement efforts “wholly unrelated to tax,” and were instead the product of statutory changes to disclosure and governance procedures for corporations. The tax compliance norm that Morse identifies, as well as the organizational and group dynamics that she describes, suggest that government efforts designed explicitly to facilitate tax compliance may have an even more powerful effect on tax decision-makers within corporations and on outside tax advisors. Given Morse’s findings, for instance, recent Treasury regulations establishing vicarious liability for tax practitioners responsible for overseeing a firm’s tax practice may have already altered risk and liability concerns within firms and among advisors.

Self-interest is never far from the surface, a reality that can help as much as hinder efforts to forge cooperative tax regulation. To level the playing field on which taxpayers and tax regulators play, for instance, tax scholar David Schizer recommends asking private lawyers “to help the government in a way that also helps their clients.” Schizer envisions a partnership between taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax authorities that would raise compliance by explicitly rewarding compliant behavior. Self-interested incentives for assisting reform could involve narrowing overbroad anti-abuse rules; rewarding lawyers and law firms that issue conservative opinions by granting them leeway in the examination process; expediting the revenue ruling and pre-filing processes for conservative lawyers; and further bolstering the reputation of conservative advisors by publishing a list of deviant practitioners. If just a few of the players privy to the “common knowledge of tax abuse” withdrew from the game, the stakes would go down (or up, as it were), as former participants partnered with the government—again, if only for self-


60 Id.

61 For fuller discussion of the changes, see infra notes 265–72 and accompanying text.

62 See Morse, supra note 59, at 984–94.

63 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.36 (2007) (subjecting to discipline practitioners with principal authority for overseeing a firm’s tax practice for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent behavior not in compliance with federal regulations).

64 Schizer, supra note 56, at 333.

65 Id. at 357–58. For discussion of anti-abuse rules, see infra notes 280–86 and accompanying text.

66 See Schizer, supra note 56, at 361–62 (“Lawyers will want conservative reputations, and clients will want to hire such lawyers, if the government treats opinions of conservative lawyers more favorably than opinions of aggressive ones.”).

67 Id. at 362.

68 See id. (“[T]he government . . . [could] keep a list of aggressive advisors.”). In 2008, the IRS began posting on its website final disciplinary decisions for violations of Treasury regulations governing standards of tax practice by tax practitioners. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.

interested reasons—armed with enough knowledge and market power to undermine Gresham’s Law. Moreover, if former participants blew the whistle on tax cheats, perhaps lured by the financial bounties offered under the redesigned IRS whistleblower program, government interests and tax practitioner interests would be further aligned.

A number of commentators extend the partnership model even more explicitly to cultivate cooperative behavior among taxpayers and tax advisors. These voices call for more responsive regulation in broadening the definition of deterrence to include “measures that nurture the social responsibility and ethics of taxpayers,” and that embrace “a dynamic framework” reflecting “the interplay of the taxpayer/tax-authority interaction.” An expanded conception of deterrence borrows from the “general prevention” approach in the literature on crime, and, according to legal scholar Sagit Leviner, is designed to improve compliance “not only by means of curbing illegal activity but also by encouraging legal behavior, such as by balancing authoritarian deterrence with positive encouragement and assistance.” Taxpayer cooperation could be further induced with a mix of cognitive tricks that exploit taxpayers’ preference for policies described as bonuses rather than their punitive opposites, such as offering tax rebates for filing taxes on time and without subsequent errors. Under the partnership model, tax regulators extend to taxpayers “cooperation, positive and helpful service, and open dialogue as a first response to conflicts.” If a taxpayer refuses the initial offer of cooperation, tax regulators would respond firmly but fairly, slowly ratcheting up enforcement to encourage compliance while continuing to offer

70 “Gresham’s Law” refers to bad money driving out good money. In the context of tax practice, Gresham’s Law refers to “bad” or “low-minded” tax advisors driving out “good” or “public-minded” tax advisors.


72 Leviner, supra note 72, at 255–56.


74 Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.
cooperation as a reward. By “genuinely rewarding taxpayers in an exchange relationship,” economists Lars Feld and Bruno Frey suggest, tax regulators can increase tax compliance by improving “tax morale.”76 More than a partnership, the taxpayer and tax regulator enter into a “psychological tax contract” that, like other contracts, involves reciprocal rights and duties.77 The psychological tax contract requires taxpayers and tax regulators to “treat each other like partners . . . with mutual respect and honesty” throughout the planning, auditing, and litigation stages of the relationship.78

Lest this partnership mentality conjure images of holding hands and singing “Kumbaya” around the campfire, it is imperative to place it in the context of give-and-take tax regulation. Substituting a shared governance equilibrium for an adversarial equilibrium necessarily requires that regulators and taxpayers work together in ways previously unimagined. A partnership mentality does not necessarily equate with lax enforcement or insufficient consequences for noncompliant behavior. Indeed, according to Dave Hartnett, Director General of the United Kingdom’s HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Custom, formerly, Inland Revenue), initiatives in Great Britain aimed at fostering a collaborative compliance norm have successfully avoided creating an environment where tax regulators are “pink and fluffy and only supportive.”79 British officials have been “very demanding of business and those who advise them,” requiring heightened, timely disclosures to help “make the system work.”80 The reciprocal exchange provides taxpayers more certainty, while the government receives valuable information about taxpaying behavior. In addition, the information gleaned from the partnership model of tax regulation can assist tax officials in better distinguishing between compliant and noncompliant taxpayers.81 Current evaders and aggressive avoiders may still engage in noncompliant behavior in the presence of the partnership model. But the

77 Feld & Frey, supra note 72, at 20.
78 Id. at 4; see also Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 17 (stating that while tax authorities may have legal legitimacy, that authority “does not guarantee them psychological legitimacy,” a pre-requisite for long-term compliance).
80 Id.
81 Increased information could also buttress other signaling techniques (such as which auditors or lawyers taxpayers use) that might be integrated into existing IRS programs that classify taxpayer behavior into different categories. See Stephen Joyce, LMSB Launches Issues Classification System to Promote Consistency, Cut Currency Time, 48 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-2 (Mar. 13, 2007) (discussing the IRS “industry issue focus” approach, a tiered classification system that categorizes compliance issues across industry lines).
feedback provided by a reciprocal approach can help tax authorities identify noncompliant taxpayers and respond with harsher penalties, aggressive enforcement, regular audits, and ongoing monitoring.  

A cooperative model for tax regulation might still appear vulnerable to “agency capture.” Under this theory, regulators fail to uphold the broader public interest by falling prey to the influence of powerful regulated entities which substitute their own self-serving agenda for the public policy agenda. Scholars have identified various federal agencies as victims of capture, including the Federal Aviation Administration (by the airline industry), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (by nuclear power companies), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food, Safety, and Inspection Service (by meat and processed foods industries), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (by the National Rifle Association).  

To date, no one has suggested that the IRS is particularly susceptible to agency capture. While it is true that inviting taxpayer input during rulemaking lacks the tension among competing public interests that exists in other regulatory contexts, it seems likely the IRS will remain immune to agency capture. Unlike other agencies, the Service does not interact as

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82 See Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements: The FASB, SEC and IRS Current Perspectives and Future, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 58 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, IRS) (noting that increased information would help tax officials “treat taxpayers commensurate with their behavior”).


88 Unlike environmental regulatory rulemaking, for instance, where interest groups align on both sides of issues, few taxpayers align on the side of the IRS.
intimately with the entities it regulates. Moreover, it does not oversee one particular industry with organized representation, but instead regulates hundreds of millions of taxpayers in hundreds of thousands of different taxable industries, thereby diffusing the potential influence of specific interest groups. In addition, the IRS does not engage in traditional “negotiated rulemaking,” where regulated entities “establish privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law.” Comparatively, the IRS, somewhat perfunctorily, meets the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, publishing notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, and inviting interested parties to comment. Far from producing undue influence, the process can result in taxpayers, practitioner groups, industry representatives, and trade associations feeling powerless in determining policy outcomes. Inviting taxpayer input early in the rulemaking process invests taxpayers and their advisors in the regulatory effort, and helps overcome feelings of helplessness and distrust.

Cooperative tax regulation operates within a framework of governance in which traditional criticisms of agency regulation are inappropriate. The cooperative model emphasizes flexible not rigid regulatory approaches, creative not static outcomes, fluidity rather than hierarchy. This dialectic approach achieves a balance of persuasion and punishment that “prevents the emergence of widespread taxpayer resistance and fosters goodwill and cooperation.” Moreover, this model is particularly well-suited to tax, where compliance is not always in the interest of taxpayers (especially in the short-term), and where the probability of detection is nearly an irrelevant consideration given current levels of enforcement.

B. Regulatory Sticks and No-Fault Penalties in an Uncertain World

Notwithstanding the significant potential of the cooperative model, tax regulation in the United States continues to emphasize punishment and deterrence. Recent changes to the penalty regime, moreover, have been

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89 For a similar argument that agencies working across industries are less likely to be captured, see generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003); Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN L. REV. 859 (1997).


92 To the extent capture theory infects tax regulation, it does so at the legislative rather than the administrative level. For a particularly colorful story of tax politics at the legislative level, see generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).

93 Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.

94 See infra Part III.A (discussing the debilitating resource and information gaps).
largely punitive rather than persuasive. In 2004, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act (Jobs Act), which heightened reporting and disclosure requirements for “reportable transactions,” tax code speak for “tax shelters.” As an incentive to disclose information with respect to tax-motivated transactions, Congress significantly raised existing penalties while also adding new ones, only a few of which rewarded disclosure with penalty avoidance or lower penalty rates. In addition, legislators set more stringent requirements for asserting a defense for engaging in reportable transactions, making it available only in the presence of adequate disclosure, substantial authority, and a reasonable belief that the position was “more likely than not” correct. Moreover, the Jobs Act authorized the Treasury Department to impose stringent monetary penalties on practitioners and firms for violating the new reporting obligations. In particular, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility may now levy

96 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111–12, 6662A, 6707, 6707A (Supp. 2005). Congress replaced the former registration and list maintenance rules with new rules requiring “material advisors” to disclose reportable transactions and maintain detailed lists of investors. See id. § 6111 (material advisor reporting requirement); id. § 6112 (material advisor list maintenance requirement).
97 A “reportable transaction” is the tax code’s term of art for prohibited tax shelter transactions. The tax code defines reportable transactions generally as “of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.” Id. § 6707A(c)(1). Meanwhile, Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2007) specifies particular prohibitive transactions, including: (i) “listed” transactions that have a “significant tax avoidance purpose,” see id. § 301.6111-2(b)(2), and are the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Treasury as a tax avoidance transaction; (ii) “confidential” transactions in which the advisor imposes a condition of confidentiality to protect the advisor’s planning strategy; (iii) transactions in which the advisor’s fee is contingent on the success of the planning strategy; (iv) “loss” transactions in which a gross loss exceeds certain thresholds; and (v) “transactions of interest” that have the potential for abuse, but for which the Treasury lacks sufficient information to determine whether they should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.
98 Several I.R.C. provisions still refer to “tax shelters” rather than “reportable transactions,” and continue to define the former as a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. E.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2) (2008).
99 See I.R.C. § 6700 (2000) (raising the shelter organizer penalty for a false statement from $1000 to 50% of gross income derived from the activity); id. § 6707 (increasing the penalty for failure to register a tax shelter transaction from $500 to $50,000 for reportable transactions other than listed transactions and up to 75% of gross income derived from the activity for listed transactions); id. § 6707A (creating a new taxpayer penalty for failure to disclose a reportable transaction); id. § 6708 (establishing a new penalty which replaced the $50 penalty for failure to maintain investor lists under § 6112 with a $10,000 per day penalty for failure to turn over information upon request from the IRS); id. § 6662A (creating a new taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions, increased to 30% if not disclosed).
100 See id. § 6664(d) (2000) (establishing exceptions for reportable transaction understatements).
102 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2008) (defining the substantial authority standard and method for determining whether it has been met).
103 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(C) (see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) (describing when a taxpayer is within reason to believe that the tax treatment of an item is more likely than not correct).
104 See infra notes 303–30 and accompanying text (discussing the penalties for practitioners and firms).
steep monetary sanctions (that can amount to double the expected fees charged for advising a reportable transaction) either in addition to or in lieu of other sanctions that may be levied, including censure, suspension, or disbarment. New rules governing tax practice reinforce the reporting requirements by mandating that practitioners affirmatively disclose transactions, via written opinions that fail to meet the elevated more likely than not standard. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued additional reporting requirements for an entirely new category of deals called “transactions of interest,” which Treasury feels have the potential for abuse but for which it lacks sufficient information to determine whether the deals should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.

Though these changes to the tax compliance regime reflect a typical command-and-control style of regulation, they appropriately address longstanding information asymmetries separating taxpayers and tax regulators. Like similar efforts to impose transparency in the corporate governance context—with, for instance, disclosure rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—heightened enforcement and disclosure in the tax context can also increase transparency. In turn, such transparency can facilitate certainty in reporting positions, and reduce costs of compliance as well as enforcement. Indeed, whether through “forced” transparency in the form of more threatening penalties, categories of prohibited transactions, and heightened disclosure rules or through “induced” transparency in the form of various pre-filing alternative dispute resolution initiatives, openness can lead to certainty for both taxpayers and the government. In addition, stiffer penalties and disclosure obligations send overt signals to taxpayers and their advisors that the government is serious about enforcing the law and prosecuting violators. When it is clear that the government means business, researchers have

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106 Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i).
108 See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1348–51 (2000) (discussing the several advantages taxpayers and tax lawyers have over the government); see also infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text (arguing that even if resources were allocated more evenly, there would still be an “information gap” between taxpayers and the government).
111 See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing pre-filing initiatives).
shown that taxpayers are more likely to comply with the law.\textsuperscript{112} This does not mean that tax regulators can rely exclusively on ramping up enforcement while ignoring service, information sharing, and cooperation. It does mean, however, that recent legislative changes to the penalty and disclosure regimes, by providing the IRS a fuller array of sticks and carrots, might induce taxpayers and their advisors to cooperate in a reciprocal tax regulatory environment.

In the event these incentives fail to alter the behavior of particularly intransigent taxpayers, the government should have at its disposal another policy option: a no-fault, strict-liability underpayment penalty. Under this approach, reasonableness and good faith do not provide a defense to challenged taxpayer positions,\textsuperscript{113} and legal opinions do not provide penalty protection for taxpayers. In the current world of tax compliance, where state of mind determines culpability, and where legal uncertainty lowers still further the chance a taxpayer will be found culpable (to say nothing of low audit rates that virtually assure asserted positions go unexamined by the government),\textsuperscript{114} the taxpayer has almost no reason to adopt a conservative approach when choosing between transactions. However, in a world where state of mind does not absolve the taxpayer, and where stricter disclosure rules (even for non-controversial positions) help counteract low audit rates, taxpayers might think twice before choosing overaggressive transactions.\textsuperscript{115} Of course, taxpayers may still assert overaggressive positions. But they will have to consider the heightened risk before doing so.

No-fault penalties are not unprecedented. In fact, the U.S. tax code currently uses several of them, though they are targeted to certain taxpayers and certain kinds of behavior.\textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, as law professor Daniel Shaviro has noted, once we acknowledge that taxpayers already respond strategically to the legal uncertainty surrounding tax law, “no-fault penalties should not even be controversial” because taxpayers will account

\textsuperscript{112} See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (indicating that taxpayer behavior is influenced by the perception of whether the government will enforce the law).

\textsuperscript{113} For current treatment respecting penalty abatement, see IRC § 6664(d) (2000) (reducing § 6662A penalty pertaining to accuracy-related understatements on reportable transactions “if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion”); id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (reducing the substantial understatement penalty for understatements pertaining to tax return positions that are adequately disclosed and that possess a reasonable basis of being upheld upon challenge).

\textsuperscript{114} For a fuller discussion, see infra notes 125–43 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{116} See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662(e), (h) (imposing no-fault penalties on certain transfer-pricing transactions).
for them like other compliance inputs.\textsuperscript{117} Imposing penalties on all taxpayers based purely on objective criteria and without regard to state of mind might be susceptible to charges of procedural unfairness depending on how the rules are written. To mitigate such concerns, Congress could require the government to pay for the taxpayer’s time and expense if it challenges a position and loses. Moreover, taxpayers could protect themselves against the risk of future penalties by turning to the thriving tax insurance industry.\textsuperscript{118}

Opponents of a no-fault penalty might still object to the approach given the inherently stochastic nature of tax law. More so than other areas of the law, tax rules often provide no clear law at all, whereby the law itself becomes a random variable, with a certain probability that it is X and a certain probability that it is Y. Add the difficulty of assigning particular probabilities to different outcomes—in addition to the fact that regulators and courts can express preferences for form, substance, or any point in between—and making risk assessments becomes a task of partially informed guesswork. In a world of such uncertainty, disclosure rather than substantive regulation may be the preferred course.

The next two sections of the Article address the difficulty of locating certainty in tax law. Part III discusses ways for taxpayers and tax officials to enjoy greater certainty through information sharing, collaboration, and pre-filing resolution rather than post-filing controversy. Moreover, it puts the government in a better position to act on the information it receives by increasing resources in the form of money, personnel, and expertise. Part III also explores various policy opportunities for bringing private enforcement to tax law as a way of adding risk of detection and prosecution to the compliance calculus, and aligning taxpayers on the side of tax collection rather than tax avoidance. Part IV takes the contingent nature of tax as given, but rejects the usual conclusion that legal uncertainty justifies nearly any transaction. Instead, it posits a stricter rather than more lax level of certainty that practitioners and taxpayers must reach before reporting tax positions. It also recommends broader disclosure rules, both to assist the government in cracking down on overaggressive behavior and to provide taxpayers a procedure to assert aggressive positions. A combination of heightened practice standards and disclosure rules can alter compliance norms by adding yet another element of risk to the taxpayer’s evaluation of whether and how to comply with the law.

\textsuperscript{117} Shaviro, supra note 115, at 45.

\textsuperscript{118} See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 387–95 (2005) (describing a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax indemnity insurance or transactional tax risk insurance, that provides coverage against the IRS disallowing a taxpayer-insured’s treatment of a particular transaction).
III. IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT, IMPROVING SERVICE

Improving enforcement alongside service requires balancing regulatory sticks and carrots. It entails enhancing the government’s ability to enforce the nation’s tax laws through increased resources and relevant taxpayer information. In some respects, improving enforcement requires making the government a better adversary. But creating a better adversary in the context of cooperative tax regulation appreciates that effective enforcement embraces transparency. In this way, enforcement spills over into service, with the government creating a regulatory culture that seeks to understand and inculcate the interests of taxpayers. Traditional regulatory models emphasizing post-filing controversy give way to pre-filing information sharing and issue resolution. The collaborative exchange, in turn, yields greater certainty of outcome for taxpayers and greater certainty of behavior for tax regulators. Moreover, it mitigates the mutual suspicion that currently separates taxpayers and tax regulators, and that contributes to flagging compliance. The IRS has begun to recognize the benefits of the cooperative approach, “establishing an environment where collaboration is priority one,”119 and “reducing noncompliance while ensuring fairness, observing taxpayer rights, and reducing the burden on taxpayers who comply.”120 Part III of the Article provides specific recommendations to further mobilize a cooperative regulatory environment, and to equip the government with the necessary tools to work collaboratively with taxpayers.

A. Closing the Resource and Information Gaps

In 1998, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act121 prompted a radical reshuffling of resources and a shift from enforcement to customer service that was arguably long overdue. Congress recognized that taxpayer perceptions of the system’s procedural fairness played an integral role in tax compliance. But politicians overreacted. The IRS “may have made mistakes,” former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin has said of the 1998 reforms, “but they were not malicious or systemic.”122 The crackdown on the IRS forced the agency to cut employees, reduce the number and thoroughness of audits, and slash enforcement appropriations all in the name of customer service.

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120 Reducing the Federal Tax Gap, supra note 8, at 57.
In recent years, the IRS has begun to recalibrate the scales. IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb has said that while the pendulum swung “way too far” in the direction of service in the 1990s, it is swinging back toward enforcement as the IRS attempts “to get to equilibrium.” Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson echoed Korb’s remarks, noting that a “rebalance has been struck between service and enforcement” but not at the expense of service, which, according to Everson, has also improved.

A renewed focus on enforcement appears to have paid dividends. Between 2002 and 2007, enforcement revenues rose an astounding 73%, from $34.1 billion to $59.2 billion. Moreover, between 2000 and 2007, the audit rate for individual taxpayers jumped from an all-time low of 0.49% to a more respectable 1.03%, while for high-income individuals (defined as persons earning more than $100,000), the audit rate steadily increased between 2001 and 2005, with tax year 2005 boasting the highest number of reviews since 1995. Furthermore, in 2007, the government audited a full 7% more total individual taxpayers (1.3 million versus 1.2 million), including an amazing 84% increase for taxpayers earning more than $1 million.

These numbers are misleading, however. While absolute dollar amounts from enforcement have increased, the IRS has left a significant amount of money on the table. The Service audited 45% fewer total companies between 1998 and 2007. For every category of business taxpayer—small business, large corporation, and tax-exempt—the IRS performed fewer audits in 2006 than in 1997. Moreover, although collections in 2007 increased 22% over the previous year, both the number of delinquent taxpayers (866,777) and the amount owed on unassigned collection cases ($34.9 billion) hit 10-year highs. In addition, the IRS has begun allocating fewer hours to each audit, relying increasingly on

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125 IRS, IRS Statement on Fiscal Year 2007 Enforcement, with Statistics, Enforcement Revenue Chart, TAXCORE (BNA) No. 12 (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement].
127 IRS News Release, supra note 1.
128 IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement, supra note 125.
129 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 9.
130 Stephen Joyce, IRS to Continue Tax Compliance Push; Effect on Audits, Planning Uncertain, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at S-11 (Jan. 16, 2007).
131 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 5.
132 See Alison Bennett, TRAC Asserts ‘Historic Collapse in Audits’; Shott Says Interpretation of Data Is Wrong, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-10 (Apr. 15, 2008); Stephen Joyce, TRAC Says IRS Spends Less Time on Audits: IRS Says Worker Gains Mean More Revenue, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at
“correspondence” audits (i.e., mail audits), which are less effective than in-person audits at detecting underreporting by high-income taxpayers. Revenue agents also spent 40% more time in 2006 than in 2001 conducting “no-change audits” that resulted in no additional tax assessment recommendations. There have even been reports that the Service has pressured agents to prematurely close audits of large corporations as part of negotiated compromises.

The audit rate itself belies improved enforcement. In 2007, the IRS audited only slightly more than 1% of all individual returns, a marked improvement in the short term, but far below historical averages. Even then, the IRS could not verify all positions embedded in examined returns. The other 99% of the time, the opposing party’s assertions went unexamined and unchallenged. The IRS may have even less luck enforcing the tax laws on businesses, despite higher absolute audit rates. In 2007, exams of companies with assets exceeding $10 million decreased to 16.8%, while audits of companies with assets of more than $250 million dropped to roughly 30%. Even for corporations subject to annual audit, there is no guarantee the Service will identify questionable transactions, either because of gaps in the corporate taxpayer’s records, concealment of impermissible transactions, or the practice of allowing corporations to set the audit agenda and include for examination conservative transactions while obscuring or omitting aggressive transactions.

Viewed historically, the modern Internal Revenue Service is a shadow...
of its former self. During the “golden age” of the IRS in the 1960s, audit levels approached an astonishing 6%.\textsuperscript{144} The Service recruited young lawyers from top law schools, entry-level salaries for government lawyers competed with private-sector wages, and IRS employees garnered respect from taxpayers, practitioners, and politicians. In every category, the golden years are a distant memory. Audit levels have fallen to 1%; newly-minted Harvard law graduates choose Wall Street firms with $160,000 starting salaries and $30,000 bonuses over positions at the IRS for one-fourth to one-third the remuneration; and the status attributed to working for the IRS has yet to recover from the “disasters” of the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{145} It is fair to say that the modern IRS strikes fear only in the hearts of the meek.

Compared to its main competitor, the private tax bar, the Service is short money, personnel, and expertise.\textsuperscript{146} The first two deficiencies go hand in hand. Between 1998 and 2007, funding for IRS personnel fell dramatically, resulting in a 23% decline in combined collection and examination function enforcement staff.\textsuperscript{147} Moreover, between 1996 and 2003, the number of revenue officers and revenue agents—two groups critical to detecting noncompliance—declined by 40% and 50%, respectively.\textsuperscript{148} Overall, the IRS workforce shrunk by nearly 15,000 employees from 2002 to 2008.\textsuperscript{149} Meanwhile, IRS workload jumped sharply. The number of taxpayers filing returns grew from 123 million in 1998 to 138 million in 2007, with more complicated returns—such as Schedule C returns—doubling the growth rate of aggregate individual returns.\textsuperscript{150}

Shortfalls in expertise are harder to quantify. But discussions with leading tax practitioners suggest that this component of the “resource gap” is an even larger problem than personnel and funding issues.\textsuperscript{151} One

\textsuperscript{144} A sizeable though unquantifiable portion of the declining audit rate is attributable to the computerization of tax administration, with computer matching performing much of what audits accomplished in the 1960s. This Article does not endorse raising audit rates to reflect historically high levels, and it recognizes that we cannot “audit our way out of the tax gap” to achieve optimal compliance. Alison Bennett, Solomon Previews Major Guidance, Outlines Concerns on Tax Gap, Economic Substance, 47 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-11 (Mar. 12, 2007) (quoting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon). However, it strongly recommends forging a new audit strategy that includes higher rates of audit as a form of deterrence.

\textsuperscript{145} Joyce, supra note 130, at 2 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander’s reference to the backlash against the IRS after the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings, in which witnesses testified—largely falsely—to abusive enforcement actions by the IRS).

\textsuperscript{146} David Schizer has drawn a similar conclusion: “In important respects, the private tax bar outmatches their counterparts in government. This imbalance is one of sheer numbers, of access to information, and, at least in some cases, of sophistication and expertise.” Schizer, supra note 56, at 331.

\textsuperscript{147} TIGTA, supra note 126, at 2.

\textsuperscript{148} Diane Freda, NTEU President Kelley Tells Congress More Workers Key to Reducing Tax Gap, 53 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 20, 2007).


\textsuperscript{150} Id.

\textsuperscript{151} These discussions involved practitioners in the Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC
seasoned tax lawyer reported that in one of the biggest partnership tax cases of the last twenty years, the investigating revenue agent suspended the audit for several weeks toward the end of the inquiry to attend an entry-level partnership class. In another partnership investigation, a private-sector lawyer spent several hours trying to explain to the investigating agents that, as the agents did understand, reduction of debt inside a partnership is treated as a cash distribution\(^{152}\) (which had not been reported as income by the partners), but there was the offsetting fact that the debt also increased outside basis when it was first assumed by the partnership, so the distribution was not in excess of basis after all.\(^{153}\) The agents relented on this key fact and closed the case, but only after months of resource-intensive investigation. In addition, some practitioners report that 40 to 50% of issues on tax returns get picked up by revenue agents today, whereas of old that figure was 70 to 90%. Professor John Braithwaite has reported a similarly dismal assessment of revenue agent competence among elite tax lawyers. It is “not hard to get things by them,” one of Braithwaite’s interviewee’s shared, while another opined, “[t]he real issue is that the IRS aren’t [sic] smart enough to find these [sophisticated tax shelter] deals on a tax return.”\(^{154}\)

The IRS has implemented aggressive measures to reduce the resource gap. Chief Counsel Donald Korb’s initiatives have been particularly laudable. Korb has launched an aggressive campaign, for instance, to return “a healthy respect for the IRS” by recruiting top legal talent to the Service.\(^{155}\) To this end, Korb and his deputies have begun aggressively recruiting at the country’s top law schools. The campaign, dubbed “Great Place to Start” and depicted in a glossy brochure containing biographies of tax luminaries whose legal careers began at the IRS, has been wildly successful, with thousands of aspiring tax lawyers vying for entry-level jobs.\(^{156}\)

While recruiting, training, and retaining a top-notch workforce are necessary components for closing the resource gap, they are not sufficient. More drastic measures need to be considered by policymakers and tax officials, including those offered by Dean David Schizer of Columbia Law

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\(^{152}\) I.R.C. § 752(b) (2008).
\(^{153}\) Id. § 752(a).
\(^{155}\) Bennett, supra note 123.
\(^{156}\) As testament to the campaign’s success, the Chief Counsel’s Office received over 3000 applications from law students in both 2006 and 2007 and interviewed at more than 150 law schools in both years, compared to 60 schools in 2005. Telephone Interview with Hsinyu Yu, Attorney Recruitment Manager, IRS Chief Counsel Office (Jan. 30, 2008); see also Robert Guy Matthews, It’s Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, but a New Push Betters Returns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Sheryl Stratton, After One Year on the Job, IRS Chief Counsel Reviews, Previews, 107 TNT 292 (Apr. 13, 2005). For the brochure, see http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/publication_4063.pdf.
School. With respect to increasing government expertise as part of the effort to combat overaggressive tax planning, Schizer proposes recruiting retiring tax partners to mentor recent law school graduates entering government work, 157 adopting a generous loan forgiveness program for these graduates, 158 increasing the government pay scale to attract a small, elite team of private sector lawyers, 159 retaining the equivalent of a Delta Force of tax academics and highly skilled practitioners for discrete, specialized projects and litigation, 160 and encouraging bar associations to participate and assist in law reform. 161

Even with the smartest, best educated, highest paid personnel, the IRS would still be at a disadvantage. Staffing and retention are problems for the Service, but skill level is not the primary issue. Indeed, in many respects, the “information gap” separating tax regulators from private sector tax lawyers is significantly wider than the resource gap. IRS enforcement is so severely handicapped by informational asymmetries that taxpayers can engage in abusive tax planning, accurately report transactions associated with that planning, yet still provide the IRS no indication of abusive activity.

Take the intermediary transaction tax shelter as an example. 162 These transactions typically involve four parties: a seller (S) who wants to sell the stock of a target corporation (T); a promoter-controlled intermediary entity (E); and a buyer (B) who wants to purchase the assets but not the stock of the target. Under the terms of a pre-arranged plan, S purports to sell the stock of T to E. E has arranged financing for the sale through a bridge loan, which is secured by the assets of T. At the same time or shortly after the stock sale, E purports to sell T’s assets to B. The bridge loan is repaid from the proceeds, while any excess proceeds are retained by E as a fee for serving as the accommodation party. As a result of the transaction, S recognizes reduced gain due to its high basis in the stock of T; B receives larger depreciation and amortization deductions based on the fair market value of the assets (i.e., B’s purchase price rather than T’s basis in the assets); and E avoids paying tax on the gain from the asset sale by offsetting the gain with losses from the sale of inflated-basis assets.

157 Schizer, supra note 56, at 347.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 347–48.
160 Id. at 348–49, 351–52.
161 Id. at 350–51.
162 See IRS Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730; IRS Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406. I am grateful to William Alexander for this example. The IRS has identified this scheme as a “listed transaction,” defined as a “reportable transaction” which “is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction.” I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(2) (Supp. 2000). To date, the IRS has identified thirty-two such transactions. See Listed Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html (listing abusive tax shelters and transactions).
As far as the IRS is concerned, S’s tax return reflects a simple sale, while B’s reflects a straight asset purchase. The only way for the Service to expose the scheme is to examine together the returns of all four parties. In these transactions, paying more money to private sector attorneys and expert academics or recruiting law students with higher grades or more elite degrees will not uncover the tax shelter activity. In either case, the IRS misses the abusive behavior because there is no indication that anything is wrong. In these situations, information rather than resources separates the government from the private sector. Ultimately, heightened disclosure requirements and more stringent standards of tax practice, subjects discussed in Part IV of this Article, offer a better solution to the problem of information asymmetries.

B. Extending the Private Enforcement Model to Tax

Even if public enforcement were stepped up by enhancing government resources, private innovation would outstrip it due to information asymmetries. These asymmetries are difficult to overcome because taxpayers and their advisors perceive substantial benefits to obscuring tax shelter activity. Moreover, these benefits far exceed the discounted probability of detection, prosecution, and punishment. Thus, to the extent the government turns to the private sector for help in improving compliance, it needs to provide incentives to balance the significant economic upside of abusive tax planning. This section of the Article discusses various incentives that flow from extending private enforcement to tax regulation. While this recommendation may appear to be susceptible to charges that it abdicates the essential governmental function of revenue collection, scholars have shown that private enforcement of public law can be a powerful monitoring and prosecutorial mechanism. 163 Private enforcement is particularly appropriate when regulators—due to asymmetric information, active concealment by regulated parties, and weak enforcement—are unable or unwilling to enforce the law or prosecute offenders effectively. Current tax regulation suffers from all three symptoms, and could benefit significantly from private enforcement efforts.

In 2006, Congress explicitly recognized the benefits associated with private tax enforcement. It amended the little known tax whistleblower statute, Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section 7623, by significantly

expanding the size of rewards paid to informants. The promise of lucrative bounties increased incentives for private persons to expose abusive taxpayer behavior, and added risk of detection and prosecution to the compliance calculus. In addition, the 2006 amendments authorized a new IRS Whistleblower Office to process tips received from informants who “spot tax problems in their workplace, while conducting day-to-day personal business, or anywhere else they may be encountered.” While prior law capped informant awards at $2,000,000 (and at $50,000 as late as 1989), the revamped law contains no such cap and authorizes awards between 15 and 30% of collected proceeds, including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and any other amounts resulting from the action. The IRS launched the Whistleblower Office in February 2007, and named Stephen Whitlock, former head of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility, as its first Director. Early indications are that the revamped program is working as planned, with “knowledgeable insiders” submitting bounty claims and turning over “big, fat piles of paper” involving hundreds of millions of dollars. In October 2007, the Whistleblower Office received its first $1 billion submission, followed by a $2 billion submission two months later, and a $4.4 billion submission in June 2008. At 30% of collected proceeds, that equals potential informant awards of $300 million, $600 million, and $1.32 billion.

Congress could further embrace the private enforcement approach by (i) enacting a private attorney general statute for tax, and (ii) authorizing private citizens to bring *qui tam* lawsuits for purported tax violations. Under a private attorney general statute for tax, private individuals would be authorized to make claims against other private parties for failure to pay

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165 Id. § 406(b).
167 IRS Publication 733 (rev. 7-80). Congress raised the cap in 1990 to $100,000. IRS Publication 733 (rev. 11-90).
174 “*Qui tam*” is shorthand for “*qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipse*” or “he who sues for the king as for himself.”
taxes. As with other such statutes, the idea would be to provide incentives for private persons to bring lawsuits deemed to be in the public interest (in this case, collection of taxes owed but not paid) and for private sector lawyers to represent those plaintiffs. With respect to extending the qui tam approach to tax, other federal and state whistleblower statutes, including the wildly successful False Claims Act, already provide for qui tam actions, which allow private individuals with knowledge of fraud committed against the government to bring suit on the government’s behalf. The informant presents the government with her information, and the government decides whether to prosecute the case or allow the informant to proceed alone as a qui tam plaintiff. Bringing the qui tam model to tax would add additional risk associated with noncompliant behavior. The threat of qui tam lawsuits could alter governance and compliance norms within organizations, and deter noncompliant behavior at the source. Moreover, the qui tam approach provides a particularly efficient form of regulation by shifting the cost of compliance to the party or parties with the lower cost of monitoring, i.e., employee insiders, in-house lawyers, and outside tax counsel.

Private enforcement of tax laws could also shrink the resource and information gaps by aligning the interests of taxpayers, tax practitioners, and tax regulators. Economic incentives for exposing abusive taxpayer behavior would put taxpayers and tax advisors on the side of enforcement and collection. Private enforcement programs could create a market for practitioners skilled in shepherding whistleblower and qui tam plaintiffs through the regulatory and judicial processes. Lured by the prospect of economic gain, these practitioners and their clients would effectively act as government deputies in protecting the revenue and rooting out abusive tax avoidance. In fact, in the short time since Congress enacted sweeping changes to the tax informant statute, the tax whistleblower bar has grown perceptibly, as much as 15–20% according to the national organization of

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177 As of September 1, 2008, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had enacted false claims statutes containing qui tam provisions. Five additional states had qui tam laws that applied exclusively to health care fraud, while two municipalities, Chicago and New York City, had enacted false claims ordinances with qui tam enforcement mechanisms. See Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, The False Claims Act Legal Center, State False Claims Acts, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).

178 See Kovacic, Private Monitoring, supra note 163, at 774 (“The chief virtue of private monitoring is that it gives monitoring tasks to individuals closest to the relevant information.”). For a fuller treatment of the tax whistleblower statute and the implications of extending qui tam to tax, see Ventry, supra note 163.
The private enforcement approach reflects an agile compliance strategy that could help the government keep up with “the capacities of professionals advising the private sector for evasive innovation.” Recent legislative enactments, particularly the anti-shelter provisions of the Jobs Act, arm tax officials with improved anti-shelter weapons. But they attack known transactions, while unidentified deals remain hidden. “Narrowly-tailored legislative responses to particular types of shelters are . . . not adequate as a solution to the overall shelter problem,” professors Marvin Chirelstein and Larry Zelenak have written, because legislative fixes “are prospective only,” and taxpayers “merely move on to new types of shelters not yet legislated against.” Statutory solutions should aim to uproot abusive activity rather than attack it \textit{post hoc}. Tax authorities need a compliance regime that will detect, deter, and effectively punish noncompliant behavior while rewarding compliant behavior. Extending the private enforcement model to tax and, as discussed in the next section, increasing information sharing among taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax officials, are essential components of such a regime.

\textbf{C. Diffusing Suspicion and Creating Dialogue}

At the same time we improve enforcement and align taxpayer and government interests, we must alter IRS culture. The failure of the prevailing tax compliance regime is as much attributable to deficient compliance and enforcement norms among tax regulators as among taxpayers and their advisors. Over the years, tax regulators have cultivated an “Us vs. Them” mentality, whereby officials resist sharing information with taxpayers whom they view (sometimes correctly) as resistant to sharing information with them. The result is that each side is deeply suspicious of the other, with concerns over process exacerbating the suspicion. Taxpayers complain about unresponsive administrative procedures associated with published guidance, taxpayer-specific issue resolution, and deficiency examinations. To their clients’ concerns, tax advisors add complaints that disciplinary investigations of tax practitioners conducted by the Treasury Department resemble Star Chamber

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{179} Telephone Interview with Jeb White, Editor, Quarterly Review, Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF) (July 3, 2007).
  \item \texttt{180} Simon, \textit{After Confidentiality}, supra note 32, at 1460.
  \item \texttt{181} Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, \textit{Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet}, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1939 (2005).
  \item \texttt{182} Altering organizational culture is no easy task, particularly within organizations with entrenched institutional practices such as the IRS. For a case study on changing organizational culture within revenue agencies, see Jenny Job et al., \textit{Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to Responsive Regulation}, 29 L. & Pol’y 84 (2007) (describing efforts to change revenue-collecting cultures in Australia, New Zealand, and Timor Leste).
\end{itemize}
proceedings with no procedural safeguards. Meanwhile, tax regulators are convinced that taxpayers and their advisors thwart reporting procedures by engaging in and failing to disclose abusive transactions. Thus, many of the recommendations already discussed in this Article, such as rewarding taxpayer compliance, encouraging participatory rulemaking, and enhancing private enforcement, are designed to align the interests of tax regulators, taxpayers, and tax advisors. Improving perceptions of procedural justice among taxpayers and advisors can be especially effective in facilitating compliance with tax laws.183

Sharing information could go a long way toward mitigating suspicious minds, but only if the information flows in two directions, with taxpayers and tax officials both realizing benefits from the exchange. Mutually beneficial communication would provide regulators with additional information to assess levels of compliance and to focus resources. It would also provide taxpayers certainty and assistance in complying with the law. Given that tax risk has become an increasingly salient factor in board rooms,184 taxpayers are seeking more from tax regulators to assist with compliance. According to Dave Hartnett, Director General of the United Kingdom’s tax agency, “tax is creeping into corporate responsibility and into the sort of thing that business leaders as opposed to tax leaders are starting to say about tax, tax risk[,] and the support they want from tax administrat[ors].”185 Business taxpayers can no longer afford to treat tax as an unknown quantity. They desire more certainty in outcome, even if that means sharing more information with tax officials. Meanwhile, tax authorities are starting to appreciate that disclosure and information sharing offer mutual benefits: “We want compliance with the

183 See Valerie Braithwaite, Tax System Integrity and Compliance: The Democratic Management of the Tax System, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 271, 287 (explaining that a taxing agency “that de-legitimizes itself in the eyes of citizens limits its effectiveness and short-changes citizens in terms of what they can expect from democracy”); Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 50, at 259, 261 (examining the adequacy of Strümpel’s three-variable model of tax enforcement and compliance, focusing specifically on “the effects of enforcement contacts on sanction perceptions, the perceived fairness of tax laws, and future intentions of noncompliance”); Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in id., at 223, 227 (“Positive actions by authorities toward taxpayers may be reciprocated by compliant actions on a simple tit-for-tat basis, a direct effect on taxpayers’ actions that is not mediated by normative or legitimating processes.”); Leviner, supra note 72, at 262 (noting that “the perceptions taxpayers have” of procedural fairness “affect the legitimacy taxpayers attribute to the administration and the extent to which they accept its authority”); John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 408–13 (1998) (examining the results of an empirical study finding that trust in government and trust in other citizens significantly increases the likelihood of compliance with federal income tax laws); Ronald G. Worsham, Jr., The Effect of Tax Authority Behavior on Taxpayer Compliance: A Procedural Justice Approach, 18 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 19 (1996) (determining that perceived procedural injustice adversely affects taxpayer compliance).

184 See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text.

185 Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 35 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
tax laws,” an IRS official recently told a roomful of practitioners. “You need a level of certainty, so do we.”

Reciprocal information sharing can produce mutual benefits even when opposing parties disclose otherwise proprietary information. At the annual Tax Council Policy Institute (TCPI) symposium in 2007, British tax officials discussed their experience with comparing risk assessments of aggressive tax positions prepared by taxpayers with those prepared by the government. The comparison revealed that each side shared similar assessments of each other’s litigating positions, a realization that generated trust and respect. During a later panel at the same symposium, moderator and tax lawyer Armando Gomez engaged IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb on the issue of reciprocal information sharing and on viewing risk assessments as “a useful tool for getting both sides closer to an agreement on what the right outcome is.” Korb dismissed the idea as “just silly,” and suggested that information sharing should be a one-way street with taxpayers disclosing information and the government receiving it.

While Korb has done a great deal during his tenure to facilitate communication between taxpayers and the government, his position at the TCPI conference undermines the principles of cooperative tax regulation. If tax authorities expect taxpayers and tax advisors to adopt a more transparent approach to tax compliance, they have to play by the same set of rules and be willing to alter their own compliance norms. In the words of Director General Hartnett, tax administrators have to “pause occasionally and say to ourselves, am I too close to the immediate issues and is there a bigger goal here and something bigger I can achieve if I start approaching tax in a different way?” The “mantra” for tax officials, therefore, should be “transparency, disclosure, and cooperation” flowing in both directions. One-way information flows, from taxpayer to tax official, only exacerbate suspicion, distrust, and noncompliance.

Suspicion and distrust also currently surround the appeals process. Tax practitioners have long questioned whether they really get a “fresh look” when the IRS Office of Appeals examines a challenged position. For their part, tax officials insist that appeals remain independent of agency policy or published guidance. But recent actions by IRS officials belie the

187 Id.
188 Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 39 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
190 Id. (remarks of Donald Korb).
191 Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 42 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
192 Id. at 33.
purported independence, indicating that while Appeals is committed to an independent review of each and every tax question, it is also beginning to conform more closely to official IRS interpretations of the law.\footnote{See Dustin Stamper, \textit{Appeals Needs to Be “On Same Page” as Rest of IRS, Brown Says}, 2007 \textit{TAX NOTES TODAY} 54-2 (Mar. 19, 2007), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (“IRS Deputy Commissioner of Services and Enforcement Kevin Brown assured practitioners at a March 19 meeting of the Tax Executives Institute that the IRS is committed to the Office of Appeals’ independence, but he said he wants Appeals to conform more closely to IRS interpretations of the law.”).}

Practitioners rightly wonder, “How can Appeals remain independent and ‘get with the program’ at the same time?”\footnote{Allen Kenney, \textit{IRS Wades Into Murky Waters: Appeals’ Independence}, 114 \textit{TAX NOTES} 1201, 1201 (2007) (quoting former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams).} In fact, why even have an appeals process if it merely restates the official views of the Chief Counsel’s office or of published guidance? Of course, appeals officers cannot adopt positions on statutory interpretation contrary to official IRS policy, but that does not prevent them from acknowledging contrary authority or distinguishing the taxpayer’s case from previous interpretations. If the IRS is serious about the perception and application of procedural fairness, it needs to embrace the idea of an independent Appeals Office.\footnote{In a recent ABA Section of Taxation survey, tax practitioners gave the Appeals process mixed reviews. The survey found overall satisfaction of sixty percent, but an even higher percentage expressed the opinion that recent changes to the appeals process negatively affected the office’s independence. For example, nearly eighty percent of respondents believed the office’s involvement in recent IRS tax shelter settlement initiatives made the Appeals Office appear less independent. \textit{AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, SURVEY REPORT ON INDEPENDENCE OF IRS APPEALS} 1–2 (2007).}

To break down still further its adversarial image, the IRS could involve taxpayers and their advisors more directly in regulatory processes. This effort should involve tax officials sitting down with taxpayers and their advisors to discuss and resolve tax positions \textit{before} the taxpayer files a return. The IRS has rolled out several pre-filing initiatives, including the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) program, the Industry Issue Resolution (IIR) program, the Pre-Filing Agreement (PFA) program, and the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP).\footnote{The first two programs are specific to particular industries, with the APA designed to resolve actual or potential transfer pricing disputes for cross-border transactions “in a principled and cooperative manner,” Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, while the IIR identifies disputed issues common to taxpayers in a particular industry, and seeks to resolve them through published guidance rather than post-filing examination. Rev. Proc. 2003-36, 2003-18 I.R.C. 859. Meanwhile, the PFA and CAP programs, though not specific to any particular industry or issue, serve a growing population of business taxpayers. Under the PFA, business taxpayers are allowed to request consideration of a specific issue prior to filing a return, a process that provides certainty of outcome and expedites the resolution of potential future disputes. Rev. Proc. 2007-17, 2007-4 I.R.B. 368. CAP, meanwhile, requires “extensive cooperation” between the government and participating taxpayers, with taxpayers fully disclosing information concerning completed transactions and proposed reporting positions in exchange for full resolution of all material tax issues prior to filing a tax return, in addition to the guarantee that they will not be subject to post-filing examinations for returns filed consistent with the agreed upon resolutions. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1144. Taxpayers are taking advantage of these programs in increasing numbers. Participation in the CAP program, for instance,}
themselves subject to examination by the IRS, the Fast Track Settlement (FTS) program offers a streamlined dispute resolution process.\(^{197}\)

Together, the pre-filing and dispute resolution programs offer taxpayers and advisors the opportunity to participate directly in the resolution of tax issues. Moreover, they provide taxpayers and the government increased certainty of outcome as well as lower costs.\(^{198}\) Timely, reliable, and participatory guidance enlists taxpayers and their advisors in tax enforcement, and discourages impermissible planning activity by offering tangible incentives for choosing compliance over avoidance.

An open dialogue between taxpayers, practitioners, and tax authorities is crucial to forging a shared understanding of what it means to comply with the law. Absent such dialogue, the parties “may have different and genuinely held understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider theirs the correct and clear meaning.”\(^{199}\) Moreover, as Valerie Braithwaite has observed, whether or not a taxpayer “does what is asked of him or her is not always visible. Furthermore, whether or not a person interprets the request in accordance with its intent is sometimes far from certain.”\(^{200}\) Active communication between the parties can identify a shared compliance norm, and clarify what is expected of each participant.

One particularly effective way to facilitate communication between taxpayers, advisors, and regulators is to involve all parties in the rulemaking process. In fact, in early 2007, the IRS launched a program to solicit public comments earlier in the guidance process.\(^{201}\) Though politicians initially criticized the program as giving private industry too much influence over regulatory functions,\(^{202}\) Chief Counsel Korb reported

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\(^{197}\) Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1044; Announcement 2006-61, 2006-36 I.R.B. 390. The program provides a review of the dispute by the IRS Office of Appeals, which allows all parties (including taxpayers, advisors, revenue agents) to participate in the resolution process. Id.

\(^{198}\) See John Herzfeld, Korb Renews Warning Against Reliance on Protection of So-Called Wall Street Rule, 198 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-7 (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Chief Counsel Korb on the compliance benefits of pre-filing resolution and the associated certainty for taxpayers and the government).


\(^{200}\) Braithwaite, supra note 183, at 276.


\(^{202}\) Legislators recoiled upon learning of the program, calling it a classic case of the fox guarding
in late 2007 that the process had “worked beautifully,” thereby quieting concerns on Capitol Hill. The initiative allows the government to “meet the demands of the taxpaying public for more technical guidance” when constrained by “a finite amount of resources,” while also opening to the light of day a previously insulated process. Affected taxpayers, bar associations, and trade groups routinely comment on published notices of proposed rulemaking, and many of these groups meet privately with Treasury officials on matters important to their constituents.

Recognizing that interest group lobbying had become an entrenched aspect of public lawmaking, and that business knowledge and experience, particularly in the tax field, are critical for government officials, the IRS added transparency to a process otherwise hidden from public view. Soliciting comments earlier creates a collaborative, participatory, and informed system. In addition to facilitating communication, the program helps regulators overcome distrust and suspicion by working alongside taxpayers, incorporating their concerns into legal rules, and investing them professionally and personally in compliance.

At their heart, policies that facilitate participatory rulemaking, information sharing, and pre-filing resolution challenge the historically adversarial tax regulatory environment. As we will see in Part IV, the tax professional associations—particularly the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)—have contributed mightily to this adversarial atmosphere. The ABA’s official ethical guidelines pertaining to tax practice characterize the IRS as an “adversary party rather than a judicial tribunal” or even a “quasi-judicial institution.” They further assume that the act of filing a tax return (an act that the taxpayer controls and that merely reports the taxpayer’s financial transactions for the year) will result in a controversy. Even ABA guidelines pertaining to marketed tax shelters—guidelines that were designed explicitly to encourage lawyers to

\[\text{...}\]
cooperate in the crackdown on abusive tax shelters in the early 1980s—
restate an adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the IRS with
respect to tax shelter opinions issued to taxpayer-clients.208 Achieving an
open, transparent, and reciprocal tax regulatory environment requires
altering the rules under which tax practitioners plan transactions and advise
clients.

IV. ELEVATING PRACTICE STANDARDS AND HEIGHTENING
DISCLOSURE RULES

A. The Failure of Self-Regulation

In 1980, the IRS reported that abusive tax avoidance was threatening
to destroy the tax system. Tax shelters were shunting billions of dollars
from the government, overloading the court system,209 and creating a tax
administration problem “of major proportions.”210 Nearly 200,000
individual tax returns representing 18,000 shelter schemes clogged the IRS
examination and appeals process.211 These returns, IRS Commissioner
Jerome Kurtz said, involved almost $5 billion “in questionable
deductions.”212 “The great abuse we are finding in this area,” Kurtz
warned, “could result in a serious decline in taxpayers’ perception of the
fairness and evenhandedness of our administration of the tax system and
consequently in the level of voluntary compliance.”213 The Treasury
Department’s General Counsel expressed similar fears, stating that the
“widespread nature” of tax shelters “undermines the public’s confidence in
the fairness of the tax system,” and ultimately “may affect the level of

see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty Regime, 111 TAX
209 Tax shelter litigation accounted for more of the increase in caseload for the U.S. Tax Court
than any other kind of controversy. Between 1980 and late 1982, tax shelter cases tripled from 5000 to
over 15,000, comprising nearly one-third of the entire docket. New York State Bar Association Tax
Section, Managing the Tax Court Docket, 85 TNT 146-93 (July 24, 1985).
210 Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213; see also Editor, Little Consensus on IRS Advisory Group, 5 TAX
NOTES 2 (1977) (discussing the backlog of shelter cases at the examination stage).
211 Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213.
212 Id.
voluntary compliance."\textsuperscript{214} The Treasury Department felt that tax lawyers were complicit in the proliferation of tax shelters. In particular, the lawyer’s written legal opinion legitimized questionable schemes and provided penalty protection for taxpayer-clients.\textsuperscript{215} Attacking tax shelters meant attacking the legal opinions, which, in turn, meant attacking the opinion writers, who owed “a particular responsibility to Treasury.”\textsuperscript{216} Through opinion writing, tax attorneys “control[led] access to the market place.”\textsuperscript{217} By virtue of that power and “the privileged position given the attorney by our system of law and government,”\textsuperscript{218} the tax lawyer shouldered professional obligations that extended beyond blind client fidelity.\textsuperscript{218}

The government set about reminding tax practitioners of their multiple responsibilities. By offering amendments in 1980 to Circular 230,\textsuperscript{219} the federal regulations governing standards of tax practice, the Treasury Department raised the ethical bar on tax practitioners, deputizing them (largely involuntarily) in the fight against abusive tax shelters.\textsuperscript{220} The 1980 amendments, in combination with subsequent amendments issued in 1986,\textsuperscript{221} 1992,\textsuperscript{222} 2000,\textsuperscript{223} 2001,\textsuperscript{224} and 2003,\textsuperscript{225} raised due diligence requirements for practitioners writing legal opinions; prohibited opinions

\textsuperscript{214} Robert H. Mundheim, Mundheim on “Abusive Tax Shelters,” 10 TAX NOTES 213, 213 (1980); see also James B. Lewis, The Treasury’s Latest Attack on Tax Shelters, 11 TAX NOTES 723, 723 (1980) (noting that tax shelters produce “impairment to the fairness of the income tax, the perception of unfairness by the rest of the taxpaying public, and the feared adverse impact on the level and temper of voluntary compliance”).

\textsuperscript{215} Mundheim, supra note 214, at 213–14 (noting that “the tax opinion is viewed as fraud insurance” whereby the investor “is protected against loss” from penalties for underpayment of tax).

\textsuperscript{216} Jerome Kurtz, Professional Opinions as “Tickets to the Audit Lottery,” 12 TAX NOTES 262, 262 (1981).

\textsuperscript{217} Mundheim, supra note 214, at 214.

\textsuperscript{218} Id.

\textsuperscript{219} 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2007). Circular 230 regulations govern tax practice “in front of the IRS,” which is read broadly to include all written tax advice, from planning to litigation.


that failed to reach a “more likely than not” conclusion that the reporting position would prevail if it were challenged and litigated by the government; defined broadly what constituted a prohibited “tax shelter”; and imposed significant disciplinary penalties on practitioners and their firms—including monetary sanctions, public censure, suspension from practice, and even disbarment—for failing to meet the federal practice standards.

The Treasury Department called out the professional associations, particularly the ABA and AICPA, for ineffectually regulating the misconduct of their members. The abject failure of self-regulation was evident in the thriving tax shelter market, and the associations’ abysmally low ethical standards contributed directly to the creation, marketing, and advising of overaggressive transactions. When the Treasury Department first issued proposed regulations to Circular 230, the ABA’s prevailing ethical guidelines allowed a practitioner to advise a client to take advantage of a transaction so long as the practitioner believed in good faith there was a “reasonable basis” for the transaction, even though she may have also believed that the transaction would be challenged, litigated, and disallowed. A transaction that had a reasonable basis of being sustained on the merits was widely recognized to have a 10–20% likelihood of success. Critics characterized it as “noncompliance with scienter” and “anything you can articulate without laughing.” Furthermore, the standard was used to support “any colorable claim,” and it facilitated a race to the bottom among tax practitioners such that “[t]he one with the least conscience gets the best result.”

To this day, the ABA recognizes the debased reasonable basis standard as a satisfactory level of confidence when advising a client with respect to tax controversy representation, as well as negotiation and settlement proceedings. When advising tax reporting positions, the ABA requires a slightly higher level of confidence—“realistic possibility of success”—which allows the lawyer to advise a position so long as she believes in good faith the advice possesses a 33% likelihood of success. This is the

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226 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 206.
228 John André LeDuc, *The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance*, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 365 (1983).
232 Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 207. For interpretation of the reasonable possibility of success
same standard used by the AICPA.\textsuperscript{233} It effectively means that tax practitioners can advise taxpayer clients on transactions and reporting positions that they believe, if discovered, challenged, and litigated, possess a one in three possibility of being sustained on the merits.

These phenomenally low ethical guidelines encourage a “catch-me-if-you-can” mentality that subverts statutory purpose and Congressional intent. If we are serious about reducing abusive tax avoidance, we must elevate practice standards. As importantly, we must not leave to the professional associations the responsibility of articulating appropriate standards and ethical guidelines. Historically, these organizations have promulgated rules benefitting their members’ interests while undermining the integrity of the tax system. Self-regulation has failed. The history of tax shelters in the United States implicates the professional associations and their deprived practice standards as culprits in aggressive taxpayer behavior, tax avoidance, creative noncompliance, and even evasion.\textsuperscript{234} Though the ABA and AICPA have historically been resistant to the government imposing practice standards on its respective membership,\textsuperscript{235} Congress and the Treasury Department have forced elevated practice standards and ethical guidelines on a reluctant practitioner community.

Congress and Treasury continue to press for additional reforms. Having succeeded in applying the more likely than not standard to written

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\item \textsuperscript{233} AICPA Federal Taxation Executive Committee, Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice (SRTP), No. 1, Tax Return Positions (rev. 1988).
\item \textsuperscript{235} With each government incursion into regulating tax practice standards, the professional organizations have reacted as if the sky were falling. In 1980, after the Treasury Department issued amendments to Circular 230, the New York State Bar Association stated that the government’s attempt to regulate practice standards was inherently dangerous and a threat to “our heritage of freedom.” New York State Bar Association Tax Section, \textit{Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter Opinions}, 12 Tax Notes 251, 259 (1981). In addition, a future chair of the ABA Section of Taxation expressed an opinion shared by the ABA that heightened reporting requirements created “a chilling effect on advocacy.” Paul J. Sax, \textit{Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions}, 34 Tax Law. 5, 44 (1980). The Treasury’s more recent amendments to Circular 230 generated a similar reaction. \textit{See infra} notes 293–97 and accompanying text. \textit{But see} Rostain, \textit{supra} note 55, at 81 (finding a “nuanced conception of professionalism” among elite corporate lawyers and the tax bar supporting reforms in reporting standards).
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opinions under Circular 230. Congress passed legislation in 2007 imposing the same standard on tax return preparers under the Code’s penalty provisions. Under prior law, the Code merely required practitioners to reach a “realistic possibility of success” determination before advising a taxpayer on undisclosed (non-shelter) positions or transactions. Under new law, practitioners must demonstrate a “reasonable belief” that the tax treatment of an undisclosed position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits before advising the position. For disclosed positions, preparers must show a “reasonable basis” for the position (rather than prior law’s “non-frivolous” standard, corresponding to a lowly 5–10% chance of success). To address practitioner concerns pertaining to the implementation of the new standard, Treasury issued transitional relief applying prior law to returns filed for tax year 2007. Moreover, it has continued to evaluate ways to align the standard for preparers with that for taxpayers, the latter of which currently requires taxpayers to meet a lower threshold—“substantial authority”—for reporting a position on a tax return, a level of certainty ranging between 40 and 51%. The higher standard for tax practitioners compared to taxpayers “has caused much angst for accountants and attorneys.” In particular, practitioners have complained about a potential conflict of interest vis-à-vis taxpayer clients, as well as greater costs for taxpayers, practitioners, and the government.

236 See supra note 219.
239 Id.
240 Id. A practitioner possesses a “reasonable belief” that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits if she analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities in the manner described in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) and, in reliance upon that analysis, “reasonably concludes in good faith that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS.” IRS Notice 2008-13, supra note 238, at *13–14. “Reasonable basis” under the new law is interpreted in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3), the threshold for which reflects “a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper. The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.” Id.
242 Alison Bennett, Desmond Discusses Range of Issues Under New Preparer Penalty Standards, 234 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-11 (Dec. 6, 2007). For the taxpayer understatement penalty and substantial authority requirement, see I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, CHAPTER 8 (1989), at 43 (substantial authority “should approach” 51% but could extend as low as 45%); Philipps, et al., supra note 227, at 1193 (“around 40%”). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2008) (providing an even wider range in defining the substantial authority standard as “less stringent than the more likely than not standard [i.e., 51%] . . . but more stringent than the reasonable basis standard [i.e., 10–20%]”).
244 See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Recent and Proposed Statutory Changes to
Though practitioners had hoped that Treasury would equalize the standards by lowering the tax preparer standard to “substantial authority,” Treasury appears committed to the higher, more likely than not standard for practitioners. This commitment indicates that to the extent Treasury equalizes the standards, it will raise the threshold for taxpayers rather than lower the threshold for practitioners. A more likely than not requirement for both taxpayers and tax practitioners would encourage taxpayers and their advisors to work together to locate the most likely “correct” answer for return positions. In this way, the more likely than not standard would reinforce the familiar jurat on the Form 1040 requiring a taxpayer to attest “[u]nder penalties of perjury” that she has examined her return, and to the best of her “knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete.” If the affidavit is to have any meaning—indeed, if “true, correct, and complete” is to have any meaning—it must mean that the taxpayer believes that an asserted position will be adjudged “correct” at least half the time. In addition, a more likely than not standard forces practitioners to reject “literalist interpretations that break the connection between language and underlying purpose” of the tax law.

In addition to reinforcing a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, a more likely than not standard would augment principles of reciprocity, taxpayer-government interaction, and regulatory transparency. If a practitioner and her client wish to assert a position that fails to meet the more likely than not standard, perhaps one they believe in good faith reinforces the purpose of the statute, they should be able to do so as long as they disclose it on the return. Predicting whether a reporting position will prevail if litigated contains inherent uncertainties, particularly when courts can rely on language of the statute, purpose of the transaction, legislative intent, or any combination of the three. Disclosure provides a legitimate option for taxpayers wanting to test or clarify a law or assert a non-

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245 Id.


247 The same can be said of I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000), which makes it a felony for an individual to “willfully” make and subscribe to a tax return which she does not believe “to be true and correct as to every material matter.” See Calvin Johnson, “True and Correct: Standards for Tax Return Reporting,” 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (1989).

frivolous but weak position. Additionally, taxpayers could seek pre-filing resolution of uncertain positions from the IRS. To the extent taxpayers prefer review by the courts rather than the Service, Congress or Treasury could institute expedited refund claim procedures whereby taxpayers could report and pay tax liability based on the more likely than not standard, and simultaneously file a refund claim requesting immediate administrative denial of the claim to facilitate judicial review.\textsuperscript{249}

It is important to acknowledge that a more likely than not standard would not necessarily eliminate abusive behavior. First, nearly all of the legal opinions that propped up the most notorious tax shelters of the 1990s and 2000s concluded that the underlying transactions were at least more likely than not correct.\textsuperscript{250} Elevated standards would not have deterred the creation and marketing of these transactions. Second, raising the required level of certainty to more likely than not—or even “should” or “will”—would do nothing to alter the behavior of tax lawyers who conceive of their role as legal advisors to include only a duty to inform clients of potential penalties associated with positions falling below statutory requirements.\textsuperscript{251} Third, heightened reporting standards would not stop lawyers from orally advising overaggressive positions, a form of advice not currently covered by Treasury regulations pertaining to written opinions.\textsuperscript{252} In fact, oral advice can circumvent any standard, particularly given the difficulties of

\textsuperscript{249} Id. at 642.

\textsuperscript{250} See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a BLIPS [Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure] transaction was more likely than not valid); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (involving a legal opinion from a different law firm concluding that a BLIPS transaction was more likely than not valid); Hoehn Family LLC v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 07-0069, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23422 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 2007) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a FLIP [Foreign Leverage Investment Program] transaction was more likely than not valid); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a COBRA [Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives] transaction was more likely than not valid).

\textsuperscript{251} Imagine the following scenario: A client comes to her tax advisor with a transaction that relies on a literal reading of the statute and that reflects a confidence level of 25% chance of success. How should the tax lawyer advise that client? Many attorneys would respond that all that is required is to predict how the IRS or the courts will react to the transaction. Under this view, it is not the role of the lawyer to say “yes” or “no” to the transaction based on the lawyer’s personal views of the morality of the deal, the purpose of the statute, or what will happen to the tax system if the transaction works. It is the lawyer’s role to review with the client all statutory and non-statutory requirements of the law. But beyond that, the lawyer is merely required to inform the client of the likelihood that the transaction will be upheld if challenged, as well as the likelihood of penalties if it is challenged and not upheld. At that point, the lawyer has fully complied with all applicable ethical and professional duties, and the client can decide for herself if she wants to engage in the transaction and how she wants to report it. The tougher scenario involves the lawyer developing the 25% likelihood of success transaction herself and subsequently peddling it to her client. Even then, many lawyers would condone such behavior so long as the lawyer fully disclosed the risks associated with the transaction.

\textsuperscript{252} See infra note 253. Conversations with practitioners in New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, revealed that some tax lawyers have responded to the more likely than not standard for certain written opinions by issuing advice orally, supplemented by internal memoranda used as talking points with clients, the latter of which are considered privileged and therefore neither disclosable nor discoverable absent client waiver.
policing advice without a paper trail and with the protective shield of privilege.

Notwithstanding these limitations, a more likely than not standard would assist in transforming compliance norms. If we remain concerned about the above loopholes (that is, a limited duty for attorneys and the shift to oral advice not covered by current opinion standards), we might consider extending the heightened standard to oral as well as written advice, and eliminating privilege and work-product protection from pre-return tax planning. Even absent such reforms, a more likely than not reporting standard would discourage literal interpretations of the law in so far as such analyses would lack sufficient authority beyond statutory language.

If policymakers were reluctant to apply the more likely than not standard to areas outside tax law, they might consider extending a radical reform currently taking place within tax law. In August 2005, the Department of Justice entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with KPMG as part of its multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud investigation involving abusive tax shelters. The signed agreement is a remarkable document, and imposes permanent restrictions on KPMG’s tax practice, including requiring the firm to: cease (with limited exceptions) its private

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253 See Beale, supra note 248, at 644–68 (arguing for eliminating privilege and work-product protection from pre-return tax planning). The subject of attorney-client and work-product protection has received considerable attention of late in the tax world. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has reinterpreted how tax practitioners should account for uncertainty in income taxes on financial statements. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES 1 (2006). The FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires companies to conduct detailed issue-by-issue analyses of all tax positions, an inquiry that generates documents and disclosures tracking legal analysis of tax advisors on a company’s transactions. Id. at 32. These documents, in turn, may become integrated into the tax accrual workpapers of a company’s auditors who review them before signing off on financial statements. Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, if the documents become part of the auditor’s workpapers, they are no longer privileged and therefore subject to disclosure to the IRS. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815–17 (1984) (finding tax accrual workpapers not privileged if requested under IRS summons power provided in I.R.C. § 7602). Practitioners have expressed concern that disclosure of internal evaluations pertaining to uncertain tax positions waives protection of the evaluations to future discovery requests, and provides tax officials with a heretofore protected roadmap for locating and challenging soft spots in a taxpayer’s return. See Tom Jaworski & Allen Kenney, PCAOB Officials Discuss Tax Accrual Workpapers, FIN 48, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-6 (Mar. 12, 2007), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Fred F. Murray, FASB and IRS Working on FIN 48 Implementation, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at J-1 (Mar. 15, 2007). Recently, a federal court in Rhode Island and another in Alabama refused to enforce IRS summonses by finding tax accrual workpapers privileged under the work-product doctrine. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.R.I. 2007); Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008). The government has appealed both cases. For a critique of the cases and a discussion of their adverse implications on tax enforcement, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, 120 TAX NOTES 857 (2008).

client tax practice as well as its compensation and benefits practice; refrain from developing, marketing, selling, or implementing pre-packaged tax products; and restrict severely its tax preparation services.\textsuperscript{255}

More importantly, the deferred prosecution agreement requires KPMG to apply significantly elevated standards to its tax practice. Rather than the otherwise prevailing more likely than not standard, the agreement requires KPMG to meet a “should” standard for all “covered opinions,”\textsuperscript{256} as well as for tax return preparation involving “principal purpose”\textsuperscript{257} or “listed”\textsuperscript{258} transactions. These elevated standards apply to transactions involving all taxpayer-clients, including individuals, private enterprises, and public corporations. Moreover, the agreement mandates that KPMG adhere to elevated standards when providing covered opinions for individuals and private entities on non-controversial transactions (“should” rather than “more likely than not”) and when providing tax return preparation on all other transactions (“more likely than not” rather than “realistic possibility of success”).\textsuperscript{259} Only when advising large private entities and public corporations on non-controversial transactions and run-of-the-mill tax return preparation may KPMG follow the same standards as other practitioners.\textsuperscript{260} While firms have not rushed to adopt similarly high standards, there has been no observable, adverse impact on KPMG’s tax practice associated with the heightened requirements.

B. Disclosure Rules for Increased Transparency and Certainty

Practice standards by themselves will not alter practitioner behavior. To animate the standards and to change behavior, tax officials must have at their disposal some way to determine if practitioners are complying with the heightened requirements. Stricter disclosure rules provide the window through which the government can monitor tax practitioner and taxpayer behavior. As part of the deferred prosecution agreement discussed above, KPMG agreed to oversight for three years by an “independent monitor” that, among other things, will ensure that KPMG is acting in accordance with the agreement.\textsuperscript{261} At the end of the monitor’s term, the IRS will

\textsuperscript{255} DPA, supra note 254, at 4–5.
\textsuperscript{256} Covered opinions include: listed transactions, see supra note 162, or a substantially similar transaction, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2007); a transaction, the principal purpose of which is the avoidance of tax, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B); or a transaction, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance of tax, if the opinion is either a reliance opinion, a marketed opinion, an opinion subject to conditions of confidentiality, or an opinion subject to contractual protection, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).
\textsuperscript{257} See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii)(C) (2005) (defining principal purpose as any plan or arrangement designed to avoid or evade federal income tax such that the motive to avoid or evade exceeds any other motivation).
\textsuperscript{258} See supra note 162.
\textsuperscript{259} DPA, supra note 254, at 7.
\textsuperscript{260} Id.
\textsuperscript{261} See id. at 18.
oversee KPMG’s “compliance with the restrictions and elevated standards” for an additional two years. The monitoring can be thought of as an extreme form of mandatory disclosure.

Disclosure, in and of itself, can be a good thing. It helps the government identify prohibited or potentially prohibited behavior. Disclosure also alters norms by adding risk to a taxpayer’s evaluation of whether and how to comply with the law. Disclosure provides a particularly effective incentive in the presence of low audit rates, where taxpayers otherwise evaluate risks with little concern that their reporting position will be seen by the government. In fact, disclosure can alter compliance norms not only with respect to plainly prohibited or probably prohibited transactions, but also with respect to probably permissible transactions, particularly if the government might designate those transactions as prohibited in the future. Of course, there is such a thing as too much disclosure, where the government cannot process the information or the taxpayer is overburdened by the requirements. However, so long as the advantages of disclosure (e.g., altering wasteful planning and avoidance behavior) exceed the disadvantages (e.g., overburdening the government or the taxpayer), disclosure requirements should be included in any tax compliance strategy.

The combination of elevated practice standards and heightened disclosure rules can shift compliance norms. Prevailing standards based on adversarial norms encourage literalist interpretations of the law because such interpretations can provide sufficient authority if challenged and litigated. Meanwhile, practice standards based on a more likely than not norm reinforce a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. With elevated standards, practitioners have to do more than simply rely on statutory language to support a position, particularly in the presence of

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262 Id. at 25.
263 See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 69–70 (2001) (stating that to combat “what amounts to audit lottery and to nip schemes in the bud, airtight, focused, prompt and efficient disclosure rules are required”); Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1060 n.96 (2007) (disclosure can alter taxpayer norms, “[even with a low risk of audit”). But see David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 73–78 (2001) (arguing that disclosure will not curb abusive behavior, and may even worsen it by producing continual changes to substantive law around which lawyers could plan).
264 This is basically Dan Shaviro’s point respecting the new category of reportable deals, “transactions of interest.” See supra note 107. According to Shaviro, requiring disclosure of these transactions is “important and valuable” for several reasons, including “the prospect that a deal not currently required to be disclosed may subsequently become so,” which, in turn, “may serve as a socially valuable deterrent when taxpayers are contemplating in questionable newly designed transactions.” Shaviro, supra note 115, at 33.
heightened disclosure requirements. They have to examine additional sources of statutory interpretation (such as legislative intent and public purpose), and they have to evaluate how individual statutes interact with other statutes, as well as how that interaction might reinforce or destroy the underlying purpose of the statutes in combination with each other.

Heightened disclosure rules under a more likely than not standard in the tax context should be viewed as part of a larger trend toward greater corporate transparency. Within the last several years, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) has subjected corporations to significantly stricter disclosure rules and internal controls. Sarbanes-Oxley also established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate the auditors of public companies and to conduct independent investigations and disciplinary proceedings of public accounting violations. Other recent changes to federal securities law require registered companies to provide “material historical and prospective textual disclosure” relevant to an understanding of its financial condition. In addition, the IRS has rolled out new Schedule M-3 as part of the corporate tax return to help the IRS find relevant information (assuming all cash is accounted for properly on the return) by reconciling a corporation’s financial accounting income (i.e., “book income”) with its taxable income (i.e., “tax income”). Finally, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has instituted significant changes to how companies account for uncertainty in income taxes recognized on financial statements. FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) clarifies the treatment of unrealized income tax benefits and liabilities on financial statements by requiring domestic public companies to assess whether their tax positions are more likely than not correct and to reflect the results of that assessment in financial disclosures. If a taxpayer determines that a position meets or exceeds the more likely than not standard, it can report the tax benefit without setting aside corresponding reserves; if not, it must provide adequate reserves to cover


272 See supra note 253.
the contingency. According to the IRS, FIN 48 increases transparency, assists the government in distinguishing between compliant and noncompliant taxpayers, and provides corporate taxpayers greater certainty with respect to tax reporting positions.273

All these reporting regimes share the same goal of enhanced transparency. Regulated parties possess information that the government wants, but they are reluctant to turn over the information without good reason. Indeed, turning over the information typically puts a party at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other parties. Heightened disclosure rules provide “good reason” to report relevant information, while elevated practice standards provide the framework to evaluate one’s responsibilities under the rules. The last Part of this Article continues this discussion by examining the regulatory tradeoffs between rules versus standards in facilitating compliance, and by evaluating the government’s recent attempts to regulate the behavior of tax practitioners through a combination of the two approaches.

V. RULES VS. STANDARDS AND THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TAX PRACTITIONERS

A. Rules vs. Standards and Cooperative Regulation

As tax regulators continue to work with tax professionals and taxpayers to improve compliance, the government needs at its disposal a judicious mix of rules and standards. Rules provide certainty of outcome and lower compliance costs, and enhance due process and fair treatment. Standards, for their part, breathe life into rules, adding context, intent, and purpose to text and language. In other words, standards provide coherence to a bunch of otherwise independent rules by giving them an overarching purpose. Reliance on rules alone would require that legislators, regulators, and legislative drafters possess a crystal ball to predict all potential uses and abuses of each and every tax provision, both in isolation and in combination with each other.274 Even if policymakers were somehow

273 See, e.g., Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 60–61 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, viewing FIN 48 disclosures as part of an “environment of increased transparency,” and stating that FIN 48 “increases the corporate taxpayer’s need for certainty, where we might be able to provide a service. And from a practical standpoint, it could provide us with additional information and data for our risk assessment tools as well”).

274 Given the infinite transactional permutations for tax planning, relying on rules alone would be futile and even irresponsible. See David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 33 (2006) (“No government can foresee, let alone draft, rules that produce the ‘right’ tax results under every conceivable permutation of facts that can be constructed by taxpayers in an increasingly complex financial world.”); see also Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969) (writing that standards reduce complexity, and “save the tax system from the far greater proliferation of detail that would be necessary if the tax avoider could
equipped with the power to see into the future, reliance on rules alone would yield an unduly complex and distortive regime. Standards by themselves are not the solution either. The flexibility of standards can be a virtue in assisting regulators and courts in responding to unpredictable taxpayer behavior. But such flexibility can also produce increased uncertainty, higher compliance costs, and behavioral distortions. Moreover, standards run the risk of producing a one-way street in favor of the government, with tax authorities administering and enforcing the law with wide and arbitrary discretion. Also, depending on the regulatory culture and whether practitioners have the wrong attitude about what they are supposed to do for clients, standards can encourage literalist interpretations of the law as much as bright-line rules. In fact, bright-line rules may reflect an effort on behalf of regulators to stop abuses of more ambiguous standards.

Coordinated use of comprehensible rules and anti-abuse standards holds the promise of achieving optimal tax compliance with lower costs for taxpayers, tax regulators, and the tax system. A balanced compliment of rules and standards allows tax authorities to enunciate general principles and goals underlying the rules, and to rely on tax professionals and taxpayers to implement and fulfill those goals. Recently, courts have scrutinized tax practitioners’ alleged compliance with legal rules in light of underlying standards, both with respect to applicable ethical standards as well as common law doctrines such as economic substance, business purpose, and substance over form. Complying with the literal terms of a statute or other legal rule was not necessarily enough in these cases; courts required practitioners to show compliance with the purpose of statutory language and respect for the coherence of the system.

Without standards to overlay rules, tax planning would run amok. Bright-line rules encourage literalist interpretations of the law and a myopic focus on form over substance. Faced with a bright-line rule, some tax advisors view it as their job to obscure and expand the line. The “ultimate question” in tax practice, law professor James Eustice has noted, is “where ‘the line’ is between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable

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276 See supra note 250; see also infra note 289 for representative cases, and infra note 287 for the common law doctrines.

277 See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 238 (1999) (stating that some lawyers’ “reverence for our objective method of determining tax liabilities approaches something like religious fervor (or more cynically, they recognize that results based to the maximum extent on the unadulterated application of objective rules tend to aggrandize both the power and the pocketbook of the tax practitioner”).
overreaching, and, equally important, how clear that line should be.”

Tax shelters, practitioner-scholar Peter Canellos has said, though perhaps on the legal side of the line, “almost always ignor[e] the underlying purpose of the law.” Standards provide a check on unadulterated tax reduction, and they offer the government, courts, and aggrieved taxpayers powerful weapons to wield against overreaching practitioners.

In recent years, the government has balanced rules with standards in its effort to improve compliance. As we have seen, the new rules include an enhanced statutory penalty regime and heightened disclosure requirements. With respect to standards, the government has adopted various anti-abuse rules and ethical guidelines to highlight the coherence of an otherwise independent set of rules. The anti-abuse “rules” operate more like standards. Typically promulgated by regulation but occasionally embedded directly in a statute, they override otherwise applicable legal rules when taxpayers enter into aggressive tax avoidance transactions deemed to violate the purposes of the statute or regulation. A transaction can run afoul of an anti-abuse rule even if it otherwise complies with statutory language. The use of such rules covers an increasing number of transactions, including the tax treatment of partnerships, consolidated returns, debt instruments, interest-rate, equity and commodity swaps, and net operating loss limitations. Essentially, the various anti-abuse rules reflect the spirit of common law doctrines that look to the overarching effect and purpose of a transaction rather than whether a taxpayer complied formulaically with the letter of the law. The anti-abuse rules for partnerships, for example, provide that if a partnership “is formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners’ aggregate federal tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent” of the partnership provisions, the government “can recast the transaction for federal tax purposes.” The anti-abuse rules parse the difference between the letter of the law and its spirit.

Anti-abuse rules also reflect explicit application of longstanding judicial doctrines that adopt a purposive rather than a literalist interpretation of the tax law. The most commonly known doctrines include economic substance, business purpose, sham transaction, and substance

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279 Canellos, supra note 263, at 52.
280 See supra Part IV.
282 Id. § 1.1502-95.
283 Id. § 1.1275-2.
284 Id. § 1.446-3.
285 Id. § 1.172-3.
286 Id. § 1.701-2(b).
The economic substance doctrine has been a particularly effective tool in the fight against tax shelters and reflects an amalgam of the other common law doctrines. At its core, it represents a judicial effort “to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit.” In a stunning series of recent victories for the government, judges have wielded the economic substance doctrine to invalidate abusive transactions. Though courts acknowledge that taxpayers possess “an unquestioned right to decrease or avoid . . . taxes by means which the law permits,” they also perceive “a material difference between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to provide a tax benefit (which is legitimate), and creating a transaction, without a business purpose, in order to create a tax benefit (which is illegitimate).” The anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines are designed to help taxpayers and tax regulators discern the real from the unreal, and thereby deter abusive tax avoidance behavior.

B. An Enforceable Normative Standard

The Treasury Department regulations governing tax practice also attempt to assist taxpayers and tax officials in discerning real from unreal transactions. To this end, the regulations employ a combination of elevated practice standards and strict disclosure rules that produce an enforceable normative standard. This standard, backed by the threat of

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290 Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 45. This sentiment is captured most famously in the oft-quoted line from Gregory v. Helvering: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The next line from the opinion is just as famous, though primarily due to its omission by pro-taxpayer courts and commentators: “But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.” Id.

291 Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1357.

292 See Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1197, 1236–37 (2003) (concluding that an enforceable normative standard is needed to discourage abusive tax planning); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in
palpable sanctions, discourages abusive tax avoidance, while encouraging tax practitioners to adopt non-literal statutory interpretations and to make themselves aware of the public purposes underlying the tax laws.

The new Circular 230 rules impose significant responsibilities on tax practitioners. When the Treasury Department proposed its most recent amendments to tax practice standards, practitioners freaked out. Accountants Burgess and William Raby, the latter a former chair of the AICPA’s Federal Tax Division, warned that tax practitioners and their clients were helplessly “caught up in a paradigm shift” that could alter tax practice as we know it. Practitioner “hue and cry” further charged that the new rules covering legal opinions and other written advice were “irrational” and “impediments to practice.” They would “drive a wedge between taxpayer and professional advisor,” lead to “intimidation tactics,” dramatically increase the cost of tax advice, and push clients to disreputable practitioners. Taxpayers, tax advisors, tax officials, and the tax system would all be better off if Treasury simply “threw in the towel,” and abandoned its twenty-five year effort to regulate tax shelters by regulating tax professionals.

Practitioners may have overreacted to the new regulations, but they were right about one thing: the new rules had everything to do with regulating noncompliance by regulating practitioners. There are shortcomings to this strategy, to be sure, and tax officials need to recognize the “intrinsic limits of practitioner regulation in controlling the behavior of clients.” Tax practitioners cannot change the hearts of taxpayers nor, for that matter, their desire for lower taxes. But tax practitioners do have a responsibility to lead clients, particularly if a client’s normative standards threaten the coherence of the system and the underlying purpose of the tax laws. At some point, the practitioner must “stop being a tax advisor and become a professional,” obliged to follow a moral compass that asks more of her than morals articulated in positive legal rules.

If we are uncomfortable or unconvinced by such moral injunctions, the

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265 Schenk, supra note 294, at 1311.
less overtly moral trappings of economic theory can lead us to similar conclusions. Modern economic thought holds that it is appropriate for regulators to shift the cost of compliance to the party or parties with the lower cost of monitoring.\textsuperscript{300} If the social value of the noncompliant activity is low, moreover, the socially optimal penalty for engaging in noncompliance can be quite large. In the realm of tax compliance, practitioners are undoubtedly in better positions to detect and deter noncompliance at lower cost than taxpayers or tax officials. They are “the first line of defense” against overaggressive tax avoidance.\textsuperscript{301} It is therefore appropriate to shift the cost of compliance to practitioners and to regulate their behavior with an enforceable normative standard as a way to regulate the behavior of taxpayers.\textsuperscript{302} It is also appropriate to impose severe, socially optimal penalties on their noncompliant behavior, at least insofar as we believe advising aggressive tax avoidance schemes contains little or no social value.

The new federal rules regulating tax practice are far from perfect. In some respects, they are overbroad, sweeping in plainly uncontroversial tax advice.\textsuperscript{303} The prevailing regime, in an attempt to improve transparency, also imposes unnecessary costs and inefficiencies on practitioners and clients, by, among other things, requiring practitioners to “prominently disclose” in all written advice that such advice cannot be used for purposes of avoiding penalties.\textsuperscript{304} This requirement has resulted in the ubiquitous “no-penalty reliance” legend that practitioners now routinely append to every written communication, not just official client communications and

\textsuperscript{300} See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malleusance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1974) (concluding that private enforcement of public laws can be more efficient than public enforcement).

\textsuperscript{301} Tom Gilroy, IRS Chief Counsel Calls Practitioners “First Line of Defense” Against Fraud, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-3 (Oct. 25, 2006) (quoting IRS Chief Counsel Korb).

\textsuperscript{302} Recent changes to securities law also shift the cost of compliance to practitioners on the theory that insiders, particularly lawyer-insiders, are well-positioned to identify, address, and remedy legal violations. For instance, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires lawyers representing issuer clients in any capacity to “report up” evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation within the issuer corporation to the chief legal counsel or CEO. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). Moreover, it permits lawyers to “report out” such evidence in the event the corporate entity does not stop, prevent, or remedy the alleged wrongdoing. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276 (Jan. 29, 2003).

\textsuperscript{303} See, e.g., David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843 (2006); Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonsense Tax Practice, 109 TAX NOTES 915, 918–19 (2005) (arguing that Circular 230, created “for the purpose of attacking tax shelters,” heavily regulates “normal day-to-day tax practice”). It is worth noting that the government could easily focus the rules on abusive tax avoidance by requiring practitioners to “opt in” rather than “opt out” of the current system; that is, to affirm in writing when a legal opinion can be used by the taxpayer for penalty protection rather than affirming, as currently required, when an opinion cannot be used for penalty protection.

\textsuperscript{304} 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).
work product. If tax regulators wanted to enhance transparency in the current tax marketplace, they could ask taxpayers and their advisors to disclose what the government really wants: the opinion itself rather than information about certain transactions contained within the opinion. What better way to enlist practitioners’ help in reducing noncompliance than requiring them to come clean on the kind of transactions they believe to be authorized, or they believe should be authorized, under the tax laws?

Although overbroad in important but not insoluble respects, the disclosure rules contained in Circular 230 move us toward cooperative tax regulation. With respect to legal opinions, Circular 230 requires that all covered opinions failing to reach a confidence level of “more likely than not” regarding one or more tax issues must include “appropriate disclosures.” Circular 230 further specifies that such disclosures must state “prominently” that the opinion does not in fact reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least more likely than not, and that the opinion cannot be used by the taxpayer for purposes of avoiding tax underpayment penalties. In other words, if a practitioner cannot conclude at a confidence level of at least more likely than not, then she must disclose that lack of confidence, both to the taxpayer and to the government. This approach encourages an honest, interactive approach to tax regulation that turns taxpayers and tax practitioners into stakeholders, partners in the legislative and regulatory effort to buttress tax compliance.

C. Assessing Compliance Risks Under the New Rules

The federal enforceable normative standard governing tax practice alters the cost-benefit analysis associated with noncompliance. In 2004, Congress authorized monetary penalties against practitioners and firms for Circular 230 violations. The IRS may impose penalties either in addition to or in lieu of other sanctions that may be levied by the Service,

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An exemplary no-penalty reliance legend reads:

IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any matters addressed herein.

Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 E-Mails, T-Shirts Attain “Legendary” Status, 2005 Tax Notes Today 127-1. For a discussion of the costs associated with the no-penalty reliance legend, see id.

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See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 353–54 (2002) (arguing that not requiring counsel to disclose its opinion about a full transaction “may seriously hurt the Service in its ability to discover and attack tax shelter transactions”). Requiring disclosure of opinions would have to overcome the same kind of privilege and work-product concerns discussed supra note 253.

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For a definition of “covered opinion,” see supra note 256.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{308}}\]

31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{309}}\]

including censure, suspension, or disbarment. It will also post on the IRS website final agency disciplinary decisions pertaining to individual practitioners. The head of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) has said that the agency is not going after mere “foot faults,” but rather misconduct “out of the mainstream” by “really bad actors,” those “who put a blemish on the industry.” Indeed, according to Michael Chesman, OPR Director, the IRS wants not only to “get the bad apples,” but also “to protect the practitioners and the public who are behaving ethically.” The sanctions will be used “only in extraordinary instances when traditional penalties may not appropriately punish violators,” and will be focused on “fitness to practice, not punish.”

Despite these assurances, practitioner groups remain wary of the government’s “powerful new weapon to deter prohibited conduct.” They desire more certainty of what will and what will not be considered violations subject to monetary sanction, particularly because penalties could exceed fees collected on a transaction. Practitioners are also wary of the process surrounding disciplinary proceedings conducted by the OPR that precede the imposition of sanctions. Though these proceedings are largely consistent with disciplinary procedures under ABA Model Rules

310 31 C.F.R. § 10.50.
315 Burkholder, supra note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman).
317 Id.
320 New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Comments on New Monetary Penalty Under Circular 230, TAXCORE (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2007).
and state bar associations, they are unlike bar disciplinary proceedings in which the charging body and the body conducting the trial are distinct. The OPR performs both functions, a procedure that frightens practitioners who have come to expect lax enforcement of ethical guidelines by professional associations reluctant to discipline members.\footnote{For practitioner fears of OPR acting as prosecutor, judge, and jury, see Kathleen David, \textit{IRS Officials Discuss Pending Guidance on Practice Issues, Including Circular 230}, \textit{Daily Tax Rep.} (BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 26, 2006); Sheryl Stratton, \textit{ABA Tax Section Meeting: Monetary Penalty Guidance Due Out Soon, IRS Officials Say}, 114 \textit{TAX NOTES} 407 (2007). For historically lax enforcement by professional organizations of ethical violations, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, \textit{Under Cloak of Settlement}, 82 \textit{Va. L. Rev.} 1051, 1121 (1996) (finding that disciplinary boards “are notoriously underfunded and . . . unable or reluctant to mount the effort needed to do battle with wealthy class action lawyers and powerful members of the defense bar”). Practitioner-scholar Michael Schler has observed that tax lawyers are not “unduly concerned about [the] threat” of being referred to a state disciplinary board, which is “designed to protect the client, not the Service.” Schler, \textit{supra} note 306, at 366. With respect to tax shelter advice running afoul of Circular 230 standards, Schler notes that the client “has received exactly what it paid for, namely an opinion that provides penalty protection.” \textit{Id.}}

The OPR—prosecutor, judge, and jury in these proceedings—must be mindful of practitioner anxieties concerning the system’s procedural fairness. If the federal ethical guidelines governing tax practice are to achieve the normative force envisioned in this Article, tax regulators must not abuse their disciplinary powers. Rather, they must impose the same kind of cooperative model on disciplinary proceedings as on procedures associated with guidance, rulemaking, and investigations. The message has to be one of cooperation rather than intimidation, a message that the IRS is keen in sending. Director Chesman has emphasized: “We want to be open, transparent, and a real partner in making sure there are high standards of ethics in the profession.”\footnote{Burkholder, \textit{supra} note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman); see also Bennett, \textit{supra} note 316, at G-1 (quoting Chesman as saying, “[w]e will be working to make this office more transparent, and answer questions of how we operate and what we do”).}

In addition to providing the government a process for disciplining wayward practitioners while protecting the interests of ethical practitioners and taxpayers, the new federal rules governing tax practice unify diverse standards among different groups of tax professionals.\footnote{See James P. Holden, \textit{New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346 and Circular 230}, 4 \textit{Va. Tax Rev.} 209, 210 (1985) (calling Circular 230 “essential if the Secretary is to regulate practice effectively before the Internal Revenue Service because of the interdisciplinary nature of that practice”).}\footnote{31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2007).}\footnote{\textit{Id.} § 10.3.} Officially, the new regulations govern representation of taxpayers “before the Internal Revenue Service.”\footnote{Id. § 10.3.} This group is distinctly interdisciplinary, and includes lawyers, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries.\footnote{Id. § 10.3.} The different professional organizations representing each group of practitioners maintain their own ethical standards. Furthermore, among attorneys, individual state bar associations interpret the standards promulgated by the national association differently. By
offering a uniform set of practice and ethical guidelines that are
disciplinary rather than merely aspirational, Circular 230 imposes
cohesion on the otherwise incoherent world of tax practice. Moreover,
although a minority of commentators interprets the reach of the federal
regulations narrowly to capture only direct communications with the
IRS,\textsuperscript{327} the consensus is that the rules govern all written tax advice, from
planning to litigation.\textsuperscript{328} More importantly, tax officials are prepared to
apply the regulations broadly. Director Chesman has indicated that the
OPR will be “very aggressive” in using monetary penalties against
practitioners who engage in prohibited conduct under Circular 230,\textsuperscript{329} and
that it will be “an activist office, a standard bearer for ethical behavior.”\textsuperscript{330}

Practitioners have responded affirmatively to their new ethical
responsibilities. Preliminary evidence indicates that shifting some of the
costs of tax compliance to practitioners is working as planned. According
to KPMG’s Tax Governance Institute, 60% of surveyed companies
reported that tax risk was a greater priority for corporate leadership in 2007
than in 2006.\textsuperscript{331} In addition, Ernst & Young’s annual Tax Risk Services
survey revealed that corporate tax departments are spending less time on
tax planning and proprietary tax strategies, while devoting more time to
complying with recent changes to the tax law and financial reporting
requirements.\textsuperscript{332} Respondents to Ernst & Young’s worldwide survey
reported that 9% of tax departments’ time was allocated to tax financial
reporting matters in 2004 compared to 23% in 2006, a jump of more than
150%, and that tax departments spent 40% less time on strategic tax
planning in 2006 than in 2004.

These trends in resource allocation away from planning and toward
compliance will likely continue as investors demand more information
about taxes from corporate executives. “Fully 70 percent of companies
surveyed in the Americas, are reporting increasing demands for more and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{327}] See, e.g., Arthur L. Bailey & Alexis A. Mclvor, \textit{New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict
Standards for Tax Practitioners}, 57 TAX EXECUTIVE 28, 36 (2005) (noting some commentators suggest
Circular 230 does not apply to attorneys who fail to file a power of attorney to practice before the
Service).
\item[\textsuperscript{328}] See Beale, supra note 248, at 618 & n.122 (writing that notwithstanding technical arguments to
the contrary, practitioners recognize the broad reach of Circular 230 “because of the potential relevance
of any opinion to a tax controversy,” an event that gets you “before the Service”); James P. Holden,
\textit{Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem}, 82 TAX NOTES 707, 710–11 (1999)
criticizing the weak, “technical” argument that “some tax opinions would not be covered because
Circular 230 does not explicitly include tax advice to taxpayers”).
\item[\textsuperscript{329}] Martha Kessler, \textit{IRS Office of Professional Responsibility to Be Aggressive on Penalties, Director Says},
\item[\textsuperscript{330}] Kathleen David, “Zealous” Representation Not Reason for Disciplinary Action, \textit{Chesman Says},
\item[\textsuperscript{331}] See http://www.taxgovernanceinstitute.com.
\item[\textsuperscript{332}] Stephen Joyce, \textit{Accounting Firms Increase Resources to Meet Reporting Requirements, Survey Says},
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
better information on tax.”333 In addition, the government has made it clear to practitioners that notwithstanding strides in compliance, it expects them “to do more to protect the integrity of the system.”334 In January 2007, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson admonished the ABA’s Section of Taxation for its complicity in tax shelter activity during the 1990s and early 2000s, stating that he was “not satisfied” with the recent turnaround.335 “You can do better,” Everson urged, “[w]e need to keep working on this.”336

VI. CONCLUSION

In February 2008, the government won yet another court decision involving abusive tax avoidance.337 In a stinging rebuke to the taxpayer’s position, the Seventh Circuit found that the transaction in question—which generated a $3.6 million tax loss from an investment in which the taxpayer had $6,000 at risk—bestowed unwarranted tax benefits on both the taxpayer and the shelter organizer, “the sort of thing that the Internal Revenue Service frowns on.”338 The Court detailed how the shelter organizer, disgraced tax lawyer Paul Daugerdas, issued opinion letters while at Jenkens & Gilchrist that “led to the firm’s demise,” and which forced it to pay out more than $75 million in penalties.339 Though perhaps lacking the style of the Seventh Circuit, other federal courts have reacted just as negatively to abusive tax avoidance.340 Government victories in 2006 included four appellate court wins,341 which preceded three favorable district court decisions in 2007,342 two victories in the Court of Federal

334 Sheryl Stratton, Everson to Tax Bar: You Should Do More, 114 TAX NOTES 404, 404 (2007) (paraphrasing IRS Commissioner Everson’s comments to the tax bar at a plenary session of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting).
335 Id.
336 Id.; see also Gilroy, supra note 301 (quoting Chief Counsel Korb as urging tax practitioners to “self-police” and to help the IRS encourage “self assessment” to protect the integrity of the tax system).
337 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
338 Id. at 751.
339 Id. at 750.
340 In one case, however, the Court of Federal Claims invalidated a tax shelter purchased by H.J. Heinz Co. in a style similar to that of the Seventh Circuit. The court quipped:

A Heinz promotion from the late 1950s and early 1960s touted its tomato ketchup by stating—“It’s Red Magic Time!” But no amount of magic, red or otherwise, can hide the meat of the transactions in question, the connective tissues and gristle of which have been revealed by the multi-tined substance-over-form doctrine. Sans sa sauce, it becomes plain that plaintiffs’ transaction simply was not “the thing which the statute intended.

342 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, No. 04-C-3211, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22246 (N.D.}
Claims, and two U.S. Supreme Court denials of certiorari. In 2008, the government has continued to pile up wins with three circuit court victories and three favorable district court decisions.

Indeed, the government has been on a serious roll. The legislative and regulatory attack on tax shelters has ignited the anti-shelter mood of the judiciary, which now more than ever scrutinizes tax practice standards and statutory penalties when analyzing challenged transactions. It has even motivated the ABA to review and update its official position on written tax shelter opinions. Despite the indisputable anti-shelter momentum, it is premature to conclude, as some observers have, that “the tax shelter war is over. The government won.” The government’s fight against abusive tax avoidance has been episodic. In the not so distant past, courts dealt the government a series of tax shelter losses that followed on the heels of seemingly momentous victories. Moreover, though we now point to certain cases as seminal anti-shelter wins, we should not forget that the government lost those cases in the lower courts, losses that underscore the contingent nature of the fight against abusive noncompliance.


345 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Kornman & Assocs. Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).


348 Pamela F. Olson, Now that You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do with It?: Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 60 TAX LAW. 567, 567 (2007).

349 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing the Tax Court’s decision to uphold deficiencies and negligence penalty); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing the Tax Court’s determination that the restructuring of customer loss claims amounted to a sham); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court and finding as valid a listed transaction generating a foreign tax credit and capital loss).


351 Professor Weisbach explains the contingency:

Recent taxpayer wins show that the series of government wins was a mere
Rather than declare victory over tax avoidance, we would do well to continue strengthening the existing tax compliance regime. To this end, this Article has offered a combination of reforms to move the current regime further from a failed command-and-control approach to one that emphasizes cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence. Currently, U.S. tax regulation relies too heavily on sticks and not enough on carrots. While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their advisors in a participatory process, and employing cognitive devices that portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than nonpayment of taxes as a penalty.

Even with optimal penalties, tax officials cannot currently enforce the law effectively due to severe resource and information asymmetries. To overcome these crippling shortcomings, the government must improve funding, recruiting, training, and retention. It must also partner with taxpayers and tax practitioners to strengthen detection, enforcement, and prosecution of abusive tax avoidance. If successfully implemented, cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not only in taxpaying, but also in tax advising and tax administration. It can produce a regulatory environment of collaboration rather than adversity, ex ante resolution rather than ex post controversy, and certainty rather than secrecy. Ultimately, cooperative tax regulation can forge a shared understanding among taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the government of what it means to comply with the law.

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coincidence, much like baseball teams on a streak that is merely a property of statistics rather than a change in ball playing skills. Although not literally independent like a coin flip, the analogy is close enough: If we flip enough coins, we are likely eventually to get 10 heads in a row. It may seem like the heads are on a streak, but the odds on each flip have not changed. The apparent advantage for heads and for the government is a result of selective vision.