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The Origins of the West German Human Rights Movement, 1945-1961

Lora Wildenthal

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In 1961, amid intensifying criticism of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s domestic and Cold War policies, the first West German chapters of Amnesty International were founded as well as a civil liberties and human rights organization named the Humanist Union (Humanistische Union). A few years later, in 1968, the Society for Threatened Peoples (Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker) was founded. Since then, dozens if not hundreds of organizations focusing on human rights (Menschenrechte) have emerged in West and now unified Germany. However, these early ones remain the most prominent. Amnesty International in Germany reports over 50,000 “members and regular donors” today. In the late 1960s, it was larger than the United States section; in the 1970s it was the largest in the world. The Society for Threatened Peoples, the second biggest, reports almost 8,000 members and 30,000 donors.¹

But what about the years before 1961? Today I want to show that human rights organizing actually began before then; in fact, it began immediately after 1945. It was not very successful, and this talk will indicate why. My larger aim with this material is to inquire into how a human rights movement was launched in post-Nazi Germany; and to investigate how the domestic political scene was connected to this activism.
This story begins in 1945, during the four years of occupation by the Allies, with the German League for Human Rights (Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte), the only supralocal human rights organization I have been able to find for the years before 1961. But I need to back up to the years of the Weimar Republic, before the Nazi regime, to introduce this “protagonist.”

The German League for Human Rights before 1945

The German League for Human Rights was Germany’s oldest and most distinguished human rights organization. It origins lay in the pre-First World War peace movement, and it affiliated itself already then with the French Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme, which itself began in protest against the Dreyfus Affair. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the German League—democratic, secular, pacifist, internationalist, and antiracist—supported Germany’s first democracy, the Weimar Republic. It advocated fulfilling the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, joining the League of Nations, and reconciling with the newly reestablished state of Poland. Using the press and well-chosen court cases, the German League’s journalists and lawyers exposed the Right’s illegal rearmament, “political justice” dispensed by the judiciary, and the various illegal actions of the growing Nazi party. Some of the most famous radical intellectuals of the era were German League members, including Albert Einstein, the sexual rights leader Helene Stöcker, diarist Count Harry von Kessler, journalists Hellmut von Gerlach and Carl von Ossietzky, and satirist Kurt Tucholsky. Close to the Social Democratic Party, the German League nevertheless sometimes cooperated with the
German Communist Party, and some League members advocated a Popular Front (that is, an alliance between parliamentary democratic parties and revolutionary Communists to oppose Nazism). The prominence of Jewish intellectuals in the League, the League’s refusal to condemn Communists, its pacifism and internationalism, its effective exposés—all this meant that the nationalist Right and Nazi party hated it. Within weeks of the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, many League members fled or were arrested. Robert M. W. Kempner, head of the League’s legal aid office and later a U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, destroyed the League’s files before fleeing in order to prevent the Nazis from using them; soon after that, the office was raided and closed.³ Carl von Ossietzky, editor of the famous political and cultural journal *Die Weltbühne*, continued to publish criticism of the Nazi regime and was arrested in 1933. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936, but was never freed. He died in 1938 of injuries and illness sustained from his camp internment.⁴

Shattered by political persecution and forced emigration, by 1945 the German League for Human Rights had essentially ceased to exist. A co-founder, Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt,⁵ lived in London, and gathered a handful of colleagues and newcomers in a “German League in Exile” in 1944.⁶ Other former leading figures were in the United States, such as Kurt R. Grossmann⁷ and Emil Julius Gumbel.⁸ Some had remained in, or now returned to, Germany,⁹ and already in 1945, some attempted to revive the German League. Its name remained valuable—very few German individuals or organizations could look back on such a clear and principled anti-Nazi position. Yet moral authority did not translate easily into organizational strength.
The surviving former League members were divided among themselves. They differed regarding their own willingness to return to Germany at all (Lehmann-Russbueldt was willing to; Grossmann and Gumbel were not). Some\textsuperscript{10} were sympathetic to the Soviet Union’s role in postwar Germany; others\textsuperscript{11} were not anti-communist but suspicious of the USSR; yet others\textsuperscript{12} objected to communism in any version. A number of the original League members still in Germany were pessimistic about refounding the League, at least so soon after the war. Katharina Kupsch in Berlin wrote to Grossmann that she found it “premature” to re-found the League; how could Germans speak out on international affairs as long as others could say they should first finish the trials of the war criminals and denazification? “We don’t have enough to contribute at this point.”\textsuperscript{13} Kurt Grossmann, in New York, agreed.\textsuperscript{14} In Grossmann’s opinion, the League members were too old, sick, and scattered, and Germans were too resistant about confronting the Nazi past.

In early 1947, some original members did start to re-found League groups in a few cities in the Western zones of occupation.\textsuperscript{15} They soon discovered that two different groups had beaten them to the punch, having organized already in 1945 under the League’s name.

*The First Hijacking*

Immediately after the war’s end in May 1945, conditions for renewing the League were harsh. In addition to the need for Allied permission for any political self-organization, telephones, paper, office space, and even food were in short supply. The
earliest League group to master all these problems was located in Wuppertal, in the British zone. Its leader, Heinrich Dietz, applied for Allied permission and gathered members, including some local old League members, in 1945 and held a founding meeting in early 1946. Dietz invited Kurt Grossmann to return from the U.S. and serve as the re-founded League’s first chairman. Grossmann responded in a thoughtful letter, explaining that as a new U.S. citizen and Jew who had seen the “abyss” of the Nazi years, he had decided not to return to live in Germany. However, Grossmann did invest a great deal of time advising this and other new League chapters. By early 1947 the Wuppertal group had 150 or so members—a large number under those conditions—and probably a better financial status than any of the other new groups. The old League members were gratified that Dietz’s energy had so rapidly achieved so much.

For awhile, that gratefulness cushioned the increasingly disturbing realization among Grossmann and other original League members that Dietz had little if any interest in pursuing the Weimar-era League’s goals and values. Dietz violated these in two respects in particular: he took nationalist positions on various issues, and he devoted his League chapter’s efforts to charity work.

Any utterance of nationalist pride or resentment was anathema to the old League, whose ultimate goal was the eradication of nationalist rivalries and a world government. Yet Dietz and his closest colleagues in the Wuppertal group indicated such nationalist feeling in a number of ways. The Wuppertal statutes specified that members were to be German; Dietz criticized Allied occupation policy; his colleague, the Sudeten German expellee Karl Kny, emphasized German expellees’ right to return to Czechoslovakia and Poland; Dietz emphasized the Wuppertal group’s commitment to aiding expellees and
other ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe, and to agitating for the release of
German POWs from the Soviet Union. Dietz told Germans and foreigners alike that
these days foreigners were making unfair accusations against Germans, and that the
League’s primary duty right now was to come to the aid of Germans. Grossmann, who
nevertheless continued working with Dietz, responded to such statements with his own
clear notion of how the re-founded League should start its work:

Have you forgotten what your “German people” have wrought in the last fifteen
years? If a German League for Human Rights on your model is to protect only
Germans’ human rights, then that has nothing to do with the old League.
[Already in 1946 I wrote to you to say], that I can only imagine a new League for
Human Rights in Germany if it begins by pointing out the wrongs done by
Germany, and helps to make good the human rights trampled by Germany.

The old League also objected to undertaking any charity or humanitarian/social
services work, for several reasons. The League saw itself as a generator of ideas, not
handouts; providing charity was also expensive, which would lead to dependence on
financial backers or alternatively to the exploitation of well-meaning but impoverished
supporters. Moreover, it might attract people who would join, hoping to benefit
personally from the League’s work. Yet Dietz advertised that the Wuppertal League
was providing charity services for expellees and POWs (food and clothing packages), and
even worse, fee-based services (address location; a “company” to purchase goods to aid
in settling expellees, and even a land parcel in Bavaria). Through setting up pen-pal
partnerships among youth, he encouraged the donation of more “care” packages. He also
claimed to provide a wide range of services that implied privileged access to official
agencies: helping those who wished to emigrate from Germany and needed passports; those who were applying for restitution as antifascists; those seeking residency and business permits; and those needing legal aid of all kinds, including for their denazification proceedings!26 Older League members objected that the Red Cross and the Association of Those Persecuted by the Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, VVN) were authorized and better able to do most of these things.27 Moreover, the original League had never given aid in matters of personal need; they took on cases with larger constitutional or political significance.28

The issue of charity was linked to another disputed goal of Dietz’s, to build a mass membership. The Weimar-era League consciously based itself on an elite of a few articulate individuals of strong pacifist and internationalist convictions, preferring not to attempt to make its cause attractive to those who did not genuinely share its principles.29 Not just anyone could join. Now, after 1945, the original members sought to bar anyone who had been a member of the Nazi party or any Nazi mass organization; any exceptions had to have several sponsors and could not hold any office.30 Dietz, by contrast, sought as many dues-paying members as possible. He admitted entire local chapters of the Social Democratic and Catholic Center parties (the latter was absorbed into today’s Christian Democratic Party over the 1950s) and openly counted former Nazis among his friends. He insisted that they had joined the NSDAP only in order to undermine it, and as for industrialists he recruited who had once supported the Nazis, he claimed that their support was vital to any successful political venture.31 Dietz’s emphasis on nationalist issues was part of his mass membership strategy; those were the popular issues in early West Germany. Dietz was hardly alone in voicing these issues; the top politician of the
CDU, Konrad Adenauer, as well as the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, stressed the very same things.\textsuperscript{32} The Bielefeld group, which allied itself with Dietz, noted that events it had held demanding the return of German POWs drew a stronger public response than concurrent, traditional League events on pacifism, opposition to the death penalty, and the right to conscientious objection to military service.\textsuperscript{33} It soon invited a professor of international law to speak on the right of the German POWs to be returned; “the right to live in one’s homeland and not to be driven violently from it”; and the need for treaties signed in unconditional surrender nevertheless to conform to international law—all hot-button issues for the Right after 1945.\textsuperscript{34} From the original League members’ point of view, such “success” actually spelt the demise of the League, for they feared being overrun with members who merely sought a lobby for their personal situations and did not really share any of the genuine League principles.\textsuperscript{35}

In 1947, the Bielefeld group cited at length a personal letter on these issues: “It is not right when certain circles […] think that they can say very derogatory things about the English, Poles, and Russians, and when the very same circles believe that one can only touch us Germans with kid gloves. Suddenly there human rights are discovered. When it was time, under Hitler, to grant human rights to the tormented peoples of Europe and especially to the Jews, one heard not a word.”\textsuperscript{36} The letter-writer summed up by stating: “…it all depends on who feels called upon to be a protector of human rights.”\textsuperscript{37}

Dietz responded to these criticisms by going on the offensive. He claimed that it was only Communists who were seeking to silence him on the issue of expellees.\textsuperscript{38} He insisted on his own primacy as the founder of the first postwar League group, and even accused original League members who founded groups in other cities of wrongly using
the League name. He called them as “imitators” of his efforts and suggesting that their sufferings during the Nazi era had affected their mental stability. Dietz even told Grossmann that he, Dietz, had suffered much more by staying in Germany than Grossmann had suffered in forced emigration in a succession of countries—although, as usual, Dietz did not offer specific details of what he, Dietz, had endured.

By 1947, the old League members became suspicious that Dietz was a Nazi sympathizer before 1945, still had ties to former Nazi supporters, and that he used the League’s name for personal gain, living off of League funds. Josef Kudrnofsky, an original League member who built up a postwar group in Frankfurt, noted that this was a wider postwar phenomenon: persons who founded founding voluntary organizations “in many cases are pursuing private interests—either they register their apartment as the organization’s office, so as not to have to offer living quarters to the local housing office, or they allocate to themselves, as the “executive,” a monthly income from the organization’s funds, etc.” The old League members came to agree that Dietz was a crank. Certainly Dietz’s letters indicate as much to this historian, with his vague references to having invented a chemical that the Nazis wanted, his connections to well-placed Nazis, and his claims to have singlehandedly kept the League in operation underground throughout the Nazi period—odd, given that none of the Weimar-era members had heard of him during that time. Threats of lawsuits flew between Dietz and the leaders of other League groups in the Western zones of occupation.

Ironically, however, the groups in the Western zones of occupation actually ended up confronting another rival—one from the very ranks of original League members—even more sharply than they confronted Dietz. In Berlin, some original members had
already in 1945 formed what they called the International League for Human Rights (Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte), and claimed it was Weimar-era German League’s true successor.49 At first they were denied a license by Berlin’s four-power command, but they persisted.50 When they learned of the Western zones’ groups that formed in 1946 and 1947, and especially that the Frankfurt group was seeking a Bizone-wide umbrella organization,51 the Berliners protested. They insisted that there should be no supraregional organizing before permission was secured from all four Allies, in order to maintain true neutrality and to preserve the chance of speaking out in both East and West Germany. If the League could be founded only in the Western zones or Western sectors of Berlin, then how could it avoid accusations of serving as a mouthpiece for that zone’s or sector’s occupying power?52

Original League members in the Western zones believed that the Soviet occupation authorities would never permit the League in its genuine form, and also came to believe that this International League was in fact a tool of the SED.53 The confrontation was painful, and in a way more difficult than with Dietz, because it was truly internecine, and because it was deeply embarrassing to take a public stand on whether to abandon all hope of working with the Soviet occupation authorities and therefore write off the Soviet zone of occupation and, by implication, eventual German unification.54

The Western groups founded their own, pro-Western League group in West Berlin in 1948. In late 1949, they secured a license for the League as a (West German) statewide organization and held a constitutive meeting in West Berlin.55 In 1950, this West Germany-wide, West Berlin-based German League won a court case once and for
all against the International League of Berlin, and thereby was secure in its claim to be
the true successor of the Weimar-era League.\textsuperscript{56} In 1951, Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt left
London for Berlin, and served as its Honorary President (\textit{Ehrenpräsident}).\textsuperscript{57} Now the
German League thrived: by 1954, there were chapters in nine additional cities, bringing
the total to 21.\textsuperscript{58}

Strangely, however, as late as 1954, Dietz was still listed as the head of the
Wuppertal chapter. The old League members found cooperation with Dietz more
feasible than with the Berlin group, given, as they drily noted, the general political
circumstances.\textsuperscript{59}

This refounded, West Germany-wide German League called for defending human
rights in Germany and elsewhere in the world, independent of political parties or
churches; to work in the spirit and letter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the United Nations for international reconciliation. An earlier program point about
opposing “economic egotism” (i.e. uncontrolled capitalism) faded by the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{60}
Like the old League, the new League issued statements publicizing current human rights
violations and appealing to statesmen to resolve conflicts in a pro-democratic way. In the
1950s, those statements often mentioned the Korean War and various anticolonial wars.
All of these priorities did carry forward the pre-1933 League’s pacifist and
internationalist goals. Moreover, the refounded League connected itself to the old
League by its consistent efforts to educate the public about the legacy of those who
resisted Nazism or were its “racial” victims.\textsuperscript{61} League members such as Josef Wulf and
Gerhard Schoenberner wrote some of the earliest documentary volumes on Nazi crimes,
and they remain basic, authoritative sources today.\textsuperscript{62} The League never engaged in
apologies for Nazism, nationalism, militarism, or anti-Semitism, and that set it apart from many West German political organizations and parties.

Yet one post-1945 issue emerged within the League and showed no sign of going away: how to respond to conditions in the Soviet zone of occupation and later German Democratic Republic. There was “stormy debate” at the constitutive meeting of the West-Germany-wide League in November 1949 in Berlin over a resolution to condemn the “concentration camps, forced labor, and kidnappings of the Eastern Zone system.” Those League members associated with the International League effort left the organization now at the latest. Other League members considered the practices of the Soviet zone of occupation, now the German Democratic Republic, to be not only clear violations of human rights, but also comparable to those under Nazism. The League journal, Die Menschenrechte, began a regular feature entitled “You Are Not Forgotten,” in which the story of a political victim of Nazism was paired with that of a victim of East German Stalinism.

This new, very much Cold Warrior League did cause some unease among some of the older League members. It was not that they did not want any criticism of the Soviet bloc countries; on the contrary, several emphasized in private correspondence and in the League journal that the lack of real democracy in the Soviet Union and East Bloc meant that a genuine peace movement could only exist in the West, in spite of all the faults of the West. Writing in the League journal, they warned readers not to be taken in by deceptive Soviet acts in the name of peace. But, again, they insisted, “Only the person who decisively rejected brown totalitarianism is qualified to oppose the blood-red variation.” The unfortunate truth, of which old League members were all too aware,
was that very few Germans could fit that requirement. At the same time, East Germany was not going to go away. The problem of how to respond to its human rights violations provided ever more opportunities for doubtful new friends to join the League and for resulting schism.

*The Second Hijacking*

Two of these doubtful friends were the couple Alfred and Anneliese Götze. Alfred Götze’s name appears as early as 1947 in League records; he quickly took on several leading roles. Soon after 1949, he became vice president and general secretary, while also heading the supplies department and a department he himself created, for refugees fleeing East Germany.

The early 1950s were an extremely harsh and tense period in East Germany. Consumer goods and labor shortages meant harsh living conditions, and any hopes for political openness were soon crushed. In June 1953, construction workers’ protests over low wages and speed-ups flared into a statewide political uprising. Thousands of East Germans escaped to West Germany before, during and after that uprising. West Berlin was overwhelmed with thousands of refugees. The constant crisis of the 1950s was what the East German Wall (built in 1961) was intended to resolve, by finally quelling the stream of refugees.

Alfred Götze established at least four hostels in Berlin, through which the League offered humanitarian aid to the refugees. His wife Anneliese Götze administered them.
These refugee hostels institutionalized what Heinrich Dietz had begun to offer back in 1947, in the West: charity.

How did Götze find the funds to shelter, feed, and advise thousands of empty-handed men, women, and children? Götze arranged for the city of West Berlin to allocate welfare funds to the League, as it did to other organizations that ran shelters there. The Berlin Senate paid for every refugee taken in, in cash and supplies. (The League also raised donations from trade unions and industry organizations, both of which opposed East Germany.) In the League journal, coverage of the East German situation took up ever more space, pushing to one side the older commitments of anti-Nazi education and international monitoring. Anneliese Götze put in a word in the journal for increasing the number of women in the League, and recommended the less political charity work with refugees as the best way to attract them. She noted condescendingly that the pre-1933 League was too male-dominated, and seemed to be placing her work in the hostels on a par with their international campaigns and courageous stands in the First World War and under the Nazis.

In late 1953, some League members accused Alfred Götze of falsifying his past by concealing his former membership in the SS and of exploiting the hostels for both espionage and embezzling by way of the hostels’ account books. Götze was suspended and an investigation took place that concluded in mid-1954 by exonerating Götze, but several members of the board did not believe that conclusion and resigned rather than accept it. Indeed, the investigation did not state that he had never been in the SS, but merely summed up that he “need not reproach himself about his political past.” It was conducted almost entirely by Götze’s friends. Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt resigned.
The League’s president and Götze’s ally, Klaus Jochen Schaefer, held a press conference to assure the public that the League was restored, offered a tour of the refugee hostels, and stressed the importance of documenting human rights violations in the “Ostzone.” Doing that work had nothing to do with any espionage or secret police, Schaefer insisted, and any reproaches to that effect, if they arose, were false.75

It seems clear from existing records that Götze was involved in espionage work. Two men who worked in the hostels eventually wrote reports for the East German State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, or Stasi). They described Alfred and Anneliese Götze as skilled and ruthless at enriching themselves. According to these reports, the Götzes stole from the Berlin funds for the refugees and lived well themselves, with a car and a lavishly outfitted motorboat they used to impress potential friends and underlings.76 They made up the difference by serving inedible food at the hostels and forcing refugee residents to perform maintenance labor for free. They intimidated or bribed League members and hostel employees into keeping quiet; they exploited the fears of the refugees, who were beholden to them for the certification of their endangered position in the GDR needed for moving out of the limbo of the hostels into a normal West German life.77 The Stasi reports also claimed that Alfred Götze was himself a longtime spy for France’s Deuxième Bureau, and that his spy salary helped make possible his winings and dinings of hungry and impressionable Berliners; in that capacity, Götze forced recent escapees from East Germany to spy on family and friends back home and build up illegal League chapters inside the GDR, which were then used for French intelligence.78 These Stasi reports supported the SS accusation, stating that Götze had been found guilty of falsifying his denazification questionnaire (Fragebogen) after he lodged a claim for
compensation for wartime losses. Specifically, he had failed to mention his membership in the SS (Schutzstaffel) and SD (Sicherheitsdienst).\textsuperscript{79} Götze, the reports claimed, used his influence not only for financial gain, but also to pursue affairs with women, “especially with the female refugees.”\textsuperscript{80} One of the reports even claimed that Götze and his loyal underlings raped female refugees in the hostels.\textsuperscript{81}

The authors of these reports were not career spies, but rather two of the hundreds of East Germans caught in the tense confrontation in 1950s Berlin. Wolfgang S., himself a refugee, held a job as caseworker in the refugee department of the League in 1953-1954, helping refugees whose applications for asylum in West Germany had been rejected.\textsuperscript{82} In 1954, he was lured back into the GDR and convicted there of participation in the 1953 uprising. The League journal reported his conviction on fabricated charges, then seems to have lost track of him.\textsuperscript{83} It is possible that he infiltrated the Liga on the Stasi’s behalf in the first place, but it seems more likely that he wrote the report in the hope of alleviating his sentence, given that there is no indication of previous reports. Anyway, his report is both coherent and congruent with assorted details that were published in the League journal. Josef W., author of the second report, was likewise an East German refugee who became stuck in a West Berlin camp when he failed to be recognized as politically endangered. He then decided to return with his wife and small child to East Germany, and apparently the price of his acceptance was the production of espionage reports on the League since it had publicized the events of the 17 June 1953 uprising.\textsuperscript{84}

In the wake of the 1954 investigation, Anneliese Götze became ill and was laid off in the course of a financial reorganization of the hostels. Alfred Götze continued his
work for about a year, then resigned from his posts as vice president and general secretary in 1955. He remained on the League board. The damage had been done, however—a considerable number of disaffected League members did not return.

*The Third Hijacking*

The Stasi intensified its surveillance of the League. In 1956, the East German spymaster Markus Wolf sent one of his top spies, Wolfram von Hanstein, into West Germany. Hanstein pretended to be a refugee from East Germany and rapidly rose in the League, holding the posts of vice president and general secretary between 1956 and 1959. In those positions he met leading West German politicians (about whom he wrote reports for the Stasi), enjoyed the trust of unsuspecting East German refugees, and collected public monies for their support. In 1959 Hanstein came under suspicion of espionage and was put on trial in 1960. Just before his arrest, however, he managed to steal the League’s files, which contained much information on East German refugees, and deliver them to the Stasi. If the League had managed to cover over its internal schism over Götze, the Hanstein trial was a very public sensation across West Germany.

In the wake of the Hanstein debacle, members again split over how to handle the crisis. By 1961, two rival Leagues developed. A Munich-based group used the old name “German League for Human Rights” (*Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte*), and continued the anticommmunist line of the 1950s League, including Dietz’s style of nationalist agitation. A reorganized Berlin-based group adopted the name International League for Human Rights (*Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte*) to mark a fresh start. Soon the
groups were suing each other over the right to the name, the Götze case, and the overall political direction of the League.\textsuperscript{88}

The Berlin-based International League soon prevailed as “the” League, with the help of an illustrious board of intellectuals and political figures with impeccable anti-Nazi credentials—for that was what was necessary to clear out the rumors of corruption. The new board included Ossip K. Flechtheim, a refugee from Hitler and one of the importers of the discipline of “political science” from the United States; his colleague at the Free University’s school of political science Margherita von Brentano, who organized the first scholarly conference on anti-Semitism in the Federal Republic (in 1959[!]) and taught a seminar on it for years. She is currently being rediscovered as an important influence especially on the Berlin student movement. The board also included Curt Radlauer, who had belonged to the Confessing Church; Joachim Leithäuser, a journalist and author best known for his book on Voltaire; and the immensely popular Social Democratic mayor of the Kreuzberg section of Berlin between 1949 and 1962, Willy Kressmann. Kressmann had been imprisoned by the Gestapo and then emigrated during the rest of the Nazi years, and as mayor was famous for stunts such as charging Soviet soldiers tolls for passing through his West Berlin borough, and for flouting his own party’s position on the GDR (that cost him his mayoral post).\textsuperscript{89}

The League returned to its focus on education about the Nazi past, supporting the pioneering exhibit on Nazi crimes “The Past Warns Us” (“Die Vergangenheit mahnt”) and holding lectures on the Dreyfus Affair (which had led to the founding of the old League’s parent organization), the League in Weimar days, the Eichmann trial, neo-Nazism, the “unmastered past” (“unbewältigte Vergangenheit”), the need to extend the
The League of the 1960s was certainly concerned about international developments; between 1961 and 1965, it held events on, for example, the bombing of Hiroshima, torture in Morocco, and the situation in Iran and Vietnam. However, the League’s anchor was education about Nazism and the commemoration of its victims. Antifascism itself became a form of human rights practice in West Germany.

The International League for Human Rights in Germany has never became large or powerful. Yet it has enjoyed almost continuous moral authority among at least some of the postwar German public, and it has always had ties to influential politicians, public intellectuals, and academics. Today it is perhaps best known for granting the Carl-von-Ossietzky medal.

Around 1961, the League joined in a wider protest against what was commonly termed the Adenauer “restoration” (Restauration) in the Federal Republic—a protest that West German society showed enough continuities that fascism might conceivably arise from it again. This moment of wider protest produced the second and third human rights organizations of West Germany: the Humanist Union and the West German section of Amnesty International.

Gerhard Szczesny, the founder of the Humanist Union, wrote in his manifesto calling for members:

Sixteen years after the end of the Nazi rule, and in the middle of a confrontation with Bolshevik dictatorship, we are compelled to face the fact that even a state in which the rules of democracy are valid can sacrifice diversity to uniformity,
tolerance to partisanship and truthfulness to convenience. We have become collaborators in a conspiracy that demands our disenfranchisement and coordination [Gleichschaltung], this time in the name of a Christian doctrine of salvation.91

He was attacking the entrenched Cold War opposition between a godless Communist East and a Christian West (Abendland); his keywords were “pluralism,” the “open society,” and the separation of church and state guaranteed in the West German Basic Law.92 The Humanist Union did almost nothing to protest human rights violations in the GDR, even as it gradually expanded its initially domestic focus—first, to foreigners in West Germany, then to international human rights violations.

In the same summer and fall of 1961 in which Szczesny was gathering support for his new idea, Peter Benenson in London launched the first appeal on behalf of political prisoners that developed into Amnesty International. Within weeks, a colleague of Benenson’s visited West Germany and spread news of “Appeal for Amnesty,” as it was then called, among journalists at a gathering sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.93 Several responded on the spot, including the radio journalist and author Carola Stern. At first, she recalled later, she feared that a human rights organization in West Germany would simply be taken over by apologists for war criminals; then she learned that it was against Amnesty’s rules to work on cases in one’s own country. For her, the most important thing about the Amnesty organization and strategy was that it was not German at all.

Each in their own way, these three early human rights organizations immunized themselves against Nazi apologias on the one hand and entanglements with East German
communism on the other: the League, through its focus on antifascism; the Humanist
Union, by ignoring the GDR, and Amnesty groups in West Germany, by working only on
other countries.

1 Statistics cited from those organizations’ websites, www.amnesty.de and www.gfbv.de
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Claudius and Franz Stepan, Amnesty International. Portrait einer Organisation (Munich:
R. Oldenbourg, 1976), 68.
2 On the League before 1933, see Richard A. Cohen, “The German League for Human
Rights in the Weimar Republic” (Ph.D. diss., SUNY Buffalo, 1989) and the League’s
entry in Volume One of Dieter Fricke, Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte. Die bürgerlichen
und kleinbürgerlichen Parteien und Verbände in Deutschland (1789-1945), 4 vols.
(Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1983-1986). In 1932, it had about 2,000
members (ibid., 749).
3 Robert M. W. Kempner, with Jörg Friedrich, Ankläger einer Epoche.
4 Gerhard Kraiker and Elke Suhr, Carl von Ossietzky (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1994).
5 On Lehmann-Russbueldt, see Charmian Brinson, “Im politischen Niemandsland der
Heimatlosen, Staatenlosen, Konfessionslosen, Portemonnaielosen…” Otto Lehmann-
Russbueldt in British Exile,” in German-Speaking Exiles (vol. 1, 1999): 117-144.
6 Brinson, “‘Im politischen Niemandsland…’,” 135.
7 He had been General Secretary. On Grossmann, see Lothar Mertens, “Unermüdlicher
Kämpfer für Frieden und Menschenrechte: Leben und Wirken von Kurt R. Grossmann”
(Ph.D. Diss., Universität Potsdam, 1995).
8 Such as Walter Persicaner or Prof. Paul Östreich.
9 Such as the pacifist Fritz Küster, editor of Das andere Deutschland (The Other
Germany).
10 Such as Lehmann-Russbueldt, Josef Kudrnofsky, Erik Reger, and Ernst Reuter.
11 Stadtarchiv Frankfurt, Nachlass Veit Valentin (hereafter SAF-NVV), S 1/1 309,
Katharina Kupsch to Kurt R. Grossmann, 7 January 1947.
12 SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Kurt R. Grossmann to Kaethe Kupsch, 22 February 1947. See
also Mertens, “Unermüdlicher Kämpfer,” 75.
13 SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Kudrnofsky to various recipients, n.d. [early 1947], co-signed
14 E.g. Otto Maria Saenger and Jakob Stoecker. Also General von Schönaich joined—
then soon complained about Dietz. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt to
Heinrich Dietz, 13 May 1947.
Deutsches Exil Archiv, Nachlass Wilhelm Sternfeld, Eb 75/177, Wuppertal Liga Satzung, 27 February 1946.

“Abgrund” Reprinted in Hermann Kesten, ed., Ich lebe nicht in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: List, 1964), 63-68. It was published at the time in Tagesspiegel.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Friedrich Welter to Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt, 26 Feb 1947, and Rudolf Herrmann to Heinrich Dietz, 8 March 1948.

On Kny, see SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Heinrich Dietz to Josef Kudrnofsky, 4 August 1947 and Karl Kny to Kurt R. Grossmann, enclosure, probably with letter of 10 December 1947. See also SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Karl Kny to Bielefeld Liga, 29 December 1947, and A. Ernst to Kurt R. Grossmann, 13 February 1948.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948
E.g., SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinrich Dietz to Gerald Balley, 16 June 1947.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Kurt R. Grossmann to Heinrich Dietz, 16 July 1947. On importance of League not focusing on Germans’ human rights, see also Kurt R. Grossmann to Friedrich Welter, 4 May 1947, Kurt R. Grossmann to Heinrich Dietz, 16 July 1947, and Karl Vetter to Heinrich Dietz, 5 February 1948. Old League members feared that the League would damage its internationalist goals if it became identified with the expellees’ cause; see Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 16 December 1947.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, “Öffentlicher Rechenschaftsbericht der Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte e.V. zu Wuppertal,” Ende November 1947, and Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinrich Dietz to Kurt R. Grossmann, 30 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Kurt R. Grossmann newsletter, May 1948, and Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Satzung, 14 June 1947.
And the original League members were intensely irritated by these politicians’ “scharf zugespitzte Elendspropaganda,” which reminded them of the “Alldeutschen Verband oder eine Harzburger Front.” Erik Reger also expressed such criticism in his Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Friedrich Welter to Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt, 26 February 1947.
Swarthmore College, Swarthmore Peace Collection—Liga für Menschenrechte (hereafter SPC-LfM), Oelze memo to members, 30 December 1947.
SPC-LfM, newsletter from Arbeitsbereich Niedersachsen, “Betr.: Völkerrechtsfragen,” 1 May 1948. The speaker was Prof. Dr. Laun.

ibid.
SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, enclosure with Heinrich Dietz to Josef Kudrnofscky, 25 February 1948.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Josef Kudrnofscky to Kurt R. Grossmann, 24 March 1948; see also Rudolf Herrmann to Josef Kudrnofscky, n.d. [March 1948] and, on Dietz directing other groups’ dues to himself, Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 8 January 1948.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, “Öffentlicher Rechenschaftsbericht der Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte e.V. zu Wuppertal,” Ende November 1947; Rudolf Herrmann to Heinrich Dietz, 8 March 1948; and Heinrich Dietz to Rudolf Herrmann, 3 March 1948.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Heinrich Dietz to Kurt R. Grossmann, 29 November 1946.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Rudolf Herrmann to Heinrich Dietz, 8 March 1948, and Walter Pittroff to Josef Kudrnofscky, 10 December 1947.


SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinrich Dietz to Josef Kudrnofscky, 25 February 1948.

Dietz claimed to have had connections who had access to card files in the Braunes Haus in Munich and were therefore able to warn people. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinrich Dietz to Friedrich Welter, n.d. [June 1947].

E.g., SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinrich Dietz to Otto Sänger, 10 March 1948; Rudolf Herrmann to Heinrich Dietz, 8 January 1948; and Kurt R. Grossmann to Heinrich Dietz, 6 March 1948.

They wanted to get their League groups registered and get their own Allied permission before facing Dietz in court. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, A. Ernst to Kudrnofscky, 10 February 1948.

Original League members in Berlin who were close to Communism and now to the SED included Prof. Paul Östreich, Ernst Oehlschläger, and Walter Persicaner.

Theodor Kiendl founded it. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Ingeborg Lehmann to Josef Kudrnofscky, 23 December 1947.


The western zone groups convened in late 1947 in Gelsenkirchen to resolve this, and Kudrnofscky became the Bizone umbrella group’s Geschäftsführer. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Frankfurt Liga, “Resolution” n.d. [ca. 1947]. Those present were unaware of Oelze’s activity in Hannover and so didn’t invite him to the meeting; they did invite Dietz but he refused to come. Rudolf Herrmann to Oelze, 16 December 1947 and, on the June meeting before Gelsenkirchen, “Programm” and “Satzung” of the Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte,” 14 June 1947.

This was Prof. Paul Östreich’s position. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 304, Waldemar Griese to Kurt R. Grossmann, 29 October 1947, and SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Heinz Kraschutzi to Lehmann-Russbueldt, 4 January 1948. Kraschutzi criticized Fritz Küster and his Anderes Deutschland for spreading anti-SBZ propaganda.

This was Kudrnofscky’s view. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Josef Kudrnofscky to Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt, 25 December 1947.

SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, DLfM im Exil [London] to Josef Kudrnofscky, 10 February 1948.

56 SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Josef Kudrnofsky to Roger Baldwin, 1 July 1950.

57 Ernst Reuter, mayor of Berlin, arranged a pension for him. His wife, Jeannette, was Jewish and, Charmian Brinson speculates, less interested in returning to Germany. Brinson, “‘Im politischen Niemandsland...’,” 136.


59 SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, A. Ernst to Josef Kudrnofsky, 10 February 1948.


62 E.g., Gerhard Schoenbener, ed., Das gelbe Stern. Die Judenverfolgung in Europa 1933 bis 1945 (Hamburg: Rütten & Loening, 1960); Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und seine Vollstrecker. Die Liquidation von 500 000 Juden im Ghetto Warschau (Berlin: Arani Verlag, 1961); and Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden. Dokumente und Aufsätze (Berlin: Arani Verlag, 1955). Schoenbener and Wulf each wrote several more titles, most of which have been reprinted in the 1970s and 1980s.


64 There were attempts to found League chapters in the Soviet zone of occupation, but the Soviet military government, like the later German Democratic Republic, quashed them. Editor to Fritz Kloppe, Die Menschenrechte, vol. 29 (N.F. 2), no. 9 (December 1954): 3. Kudrnofsky expressed interest in obtaining permission for the League in the Soviet sector of Berlin and eventually in the SBZ, although, he said, no League existed in the SBZ as of February 1948. SAF-NVV, S 1/1 307, Josef Kudrnofsky to Gustav Scherr, 3 February 1948.


66 SAF-NVV, S 1/1 309, Josef Kudrnofsky to Otto Lehmann-Russbuehl, 23 August 1947. Götzte helped obtain the League’s license from the Western Allies; served as delegate to the League’s international federation (the France-based Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme); and was elected to the League’s board at the constitutive meeting in November 1949.
25


The Hellmut-von-Gerlach-Heim in Kreuzberg (founded 1952, capacity of 1,000); Carl-von-Ossietzky-Heim (founded 1953, capacity of 600); Walther-Rathenau-Heim in Wannsee for victims of anti-Jewish persecutions in GDR in March 1953 (founded 1953, capacity of 200); and the Hildegard-Wegscheider-Heim for children (founded by 1954, capacity of 120).


Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter BStU), MfS HA IX Nr. 3897, Wolfgang S. report on Liga (30 July 1954), Bl. 145-147.

The core of Götze’s opposition who resigned were Ernst Carlbergh, Georg Kohn, and Robert von Radetzky (a member of the Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus).

Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter BStU), MfS HA IX Nr. 3897, Wolfgang S. report on Liga (30 July 1954), Bl. 147.

These included Klaus Jochen Schaefer and, on the committee, Gerhard Schwarz and Dr. Wolfgang Harnisch-Hoffmann. *Die Menschenrechte* (February-March 1954): n. p.

On the personal relationships, see BStU, MfS HA IX Nr. 3897, Wolfgang S. report on Liga (30 July 1954), Bl. 146.

BStU, MfS AIM 6463/57 Teil I, Josef W. report on Liga, n.d. [December 1953], Bl. 29.

BStU, MfS HA IX Nr. 3897, Wolfgang S. report on Liga (30 July 1954), Bl. 153.

BStU, MfS AIM 6463/57 Teil I, Josef W. report on Liga, n.d. [December 1953], Bl. 13, 22.


“Wolfram von Hanstein,” obtained from Münzinger Archiv database on 16 November 2001. It is interesting that the Münzinger Archiv (a sort of *Who’s Who*) refers to the
League matter-of-factly as “antikommunistisch”—quite the opposite of its Weimar-era reputation.

87 Only about two feet of files remain of those Hanstein stole; the rest was destroyed in late 1989, when the Stasi rushed to prevent its materials on the Federal Republic from falling into its opponents’ hands in the last days of the East German dictatorship. Wolfgang S.’s and Josef W.’s reports belong to this remainder.

88 The German League sued in early 1964 over a brochure by the International League (“Warum Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte?”) that set out the effort to make a fresh start; both accepted judicial arbitration. After exhausting themselves with lawsuits, the two groups did try to fuse, but at no time were successful. DEA-NOKF, League chronology, n.d. [ca. 1984]. “Vereinbarung” (September 1965), which describes an agreement to cooperate in publications and events, and “Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung” (1 February 1966) on proposed fusion. Today, the formal name of the Berlin League is Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte—Sektion Berlin, and it is affiliated with the International League for Human Rights, New York. The Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte still exists, and is affiliated with the Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme. Paris.


90 These items are drawn from DEA-NOKF, League chronology, n.d. [ca. 1984]. While the League did not officially participate in the ongoing Easter marches of the peace movement, its new student group, the Argument-Club, did, and the League protested the oppressive surveillance of the marchers. The League joined in the civil-liberties demand that riot police wear identification, and it joined in the outcry over the Spiegel Affair, when the Christian Social Union demagogue Franz-Josef Strauss, then Minister of Defense, used his power to search that news magazine’s office and arrest its editors for treason because of a critical article about NATO preparedness. It also participated in protests against the arrest of a medical doctor (Axel Dohrn) who had provided sterilizations to women seeking them, a famous case in the history of birth control law in the Federal Republic. These last several causes brought the League into close cooperation with the Humanistische Union; see below.

