Date of Completion

6-21-2013

Embargo Period

6-21-2013

Keywords

Firm, Integration

Major Advisor

Richard N. Langlois

Co-Major Advisor

Robert Gibbons

Associate Advisor

Christian Zimmermann

Associate Advisor

Vicki Knoblauch

Field of Study

Economics

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Open Access

Open Access

Abstract

My dissertation research focuses on the efficiency of various governance structures using the basic framework of the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) property rights model. The first two chapters expand the GHM framework to describe a richer spectrum of governance structures—including not only fully integrated firms and fully disintegrated market transactions but also asset-less firms and exclusive dealing between firms. The general framework combines the GHM model with a model of bargaining control rights, yielding an allocation of ownership rights that may differ from what the GHM model implies. The results are related to the general principles of employment law. The third chapter offers a formal economic theory that analyzes the differences between the subsidiary and the division as alternative governance structures of an internal business unit. Subsidiaries and divisions are widely observed as alternative governance structures, and one does not seem to completely dominate the other. Formal economic theory is almost silent on the topic of subsidiaries.

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